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“There are only two forces that unite men - fear and interest.”  
 
Napoleon Bonaparte 
French general, politician and emperor 
(1769-1821)
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1.1 Research scope 
 
This study seeks to explore the impact of Europeanisation on domestic interest groups 
in the Republic of Malta (hereafter referred to as Malta) and the Republic of Ireland 
(hereafter referred to as Ireland). In particular it investigates how the embedded 
geopolitical characteristics originating from small and remote member states affect the 
incorporation of, or resistance to, external incentives and norms of EU governance. 
Research primacy rests on the role and character of interest groups involved in national 
and sub-national policy-making and their interplay with governmental actors, as well as 
their participation in EU affairs. The study has two principal aims: 
 
1. to measure the extent of Europeanisation experienced by Maltese and Irish 
interest groups in the period between 2004 and 2011, and 
2. to identify whether the resulting Europeanisation is a consequence of 
rationalist or sociological triggers. 
 
This twofold aim is particularly stimulated by the way domestic interest groups react to 
changes taking place both within their traditional polity - the nation state with its 
embedded features of centuries-old traditions and patterns of authority (Warrington 
1994, Wettenhall and Thynne 1994) - and the supranational polity - the European 
Union (EU) with its emerging paradigm of political architecture based on multi-level 
governance (Bache and Flinders 2004, Gualini 2004), networking (Benkler 2006, 
Saliminen 2003, Leonard 1999) and  structured consultation processes (Grima G. 2009, 
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Pace 2009). The essential conceptual argument accentuating the need of understanding 
national adaptability to Europeanisation requires an approach that is sensitive to the 
particular domestic institutional configuration of member states (Bache and Marshall 
2004, Hanf and Soedtendorp 2002). 
 
In a world characterised by economic regionalism, the interdependencies of polities and 
the hybridisation of specialised policy communities, both governmental and non-
governmental actors (NGOs) that have come to terms with new constellations of power 
that do not necessarily emanate and fade within the traditional borders of the nation 
state. The EU presents us with an unprecedented striking case involving the blurring of 
the delineation line between the domestic and external affairs, which is eventually 
constructing a continental political platform, sprouting spill-over effects over national 
polities. Today interest groups, and governments alike, have to operate not only within 
the well-known parameters of their endogenous political environments crystallized with 
deeply embedded traditions of governance, but they also have to take into account the 
new stimuli resulting from the European institutional framework which is always in a 
state of flux (Kohler-Koch and Eising 2002).  
 
1.2 Key questions 
 
The first aim of the study seeks to establish the element of significance in relation to 
domestic change. In other words, it attempts to confirm or otherwise whether change 
among domestic interest groups has been significant or marginal as a result of EU 
influence. The second aim revolves around the why question. It is specifically concerned 
with the underlying reasons that make interest groups in Malta and Ireland respond 
positively to opportunities and norms emanating from the EU and the other member 
states. If rationalist triggers are the core cause of Europeanisation, then interest groups 
adapt their structures and actions to profit from the new multilevel European power 
structure. Thus political change occurs primarily when groups ‘rationally’ use European 
resources in order to supplement their predefined preferences (Graziano and Vink 2013: 
40). Contrastingly, if sociological triggers are at play, the elasticity of interest groups 
can be understood in terms of ‘cognitive’ Europeanisation, that is changes are the result 
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of the construction and diffusion of EU ideas and the socialisation provided by EU 
institutions and policy processes (Graziano and Vink 2013: 40). In this sense, Europe is 
not a mere extension of the domestic arena where partisan interests are preserved or 
promoted, but becomes an ‘aspiration’ and ‘master symbol’ for the development of 
interest groups (Moreno and Serrano-Pascual 2011: 53). Bache and Jordan call this 
usage of Europeanisation ‘the creation of a new, European lodestar for domestic 
politics’ (Bache and Jordan 2006: 60). 
 
A set of key research questions lies at the heart of this thesis. What factors determine 
domestic change (or lack of change) towards a more meaningful engagement of sectoral 
interest representation in public affairs? How does smallness and remoteness affect the 
transition of change among interest groups?  Has change been significant or not during 
the selected time frame? Is this change caused by EU’s vertical pressures and 
requirements for institutional reform, or by horizontal interactions with other member 
states? Or is it generated by the interplay between European and domestic variables for 
change? Can it be a case where domestic changes are triggered by other international 
factors, like the United Nations (UN) and globalisation that are not necessarily confined 
to the European integration model? Is there a relation between the magnitude of change 
and its true nature? How does the EU membership affect the responsiveness of interest 
groups to seize opportunities via domestic and/or Brussels routes of influence? How are 
groups’ structures and cultures affected by the EU and its member states?  Why and 
when will groups bypass the nation state to target their lobbying at the EU level?  
 
A conceptual framework, fuelled by explanatory theories, has been devised in order to 
provide answers for these questions and, hence, achieve the general scope of this 
research. This entails the application of a comparative research design based on the 
hypothetical-deductive model and the utilisation of both quantitative and qualitative 
data streams. The remaining sections of the introduction acquaint the reader with these 
fundamental building blocks that run through the thesis. 
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1.3 Research primacy 
 
All of the questions revolve around domestic interest groups that have become 
important actors in contemporary democracies and in the provision of public goods and 
services. Simply defined, interest groups comprise a wide and diversified range of 
rational entities, united by a common belief system, that have sufficient identity to act 
on behalf of their members and which, therefore, have some influence either on public 
opinion or on government to attain their prescribed goals (Scruton 2007: 338, Huggins 
and Turner 1997). They encircle a pluralist range of NGOs operating across different 
sectoral areas at the local, national and supranational orbits of power, including 
individual corporations, chambers of professions, producers’ confederations, 
employers’ associations, trade unions, think-tanks, environmental activists, consumer 
groups, charities and philanthropic foundations, heritage organisations, religious guilds, 
youth affiliations, social/community groups and an ever growing number of single issue 
groups (Greenwood 2003, Grant 2000, Smith 2006). Lately, the term interest groups 
has widened its meaning, as it is now also incorporating universities, local government 
committees, state-sponsored bodies, public/private partnerships (PPPs), the media, and 
foreign and pan-continent interest groups that are all exerting a direct or indirect impact 
on domestic institutions and processes that enact public policy (Cigler and Loomis 1995, 
Alexander 1998). The summation of all these forms of public activism was commonly 
referred to as ‘the third sector’ (Chapman 2006, Evers and Laville 2004, Anheier and 
Seibel 1990), but nowadays international organisations, like the United Nations (UN), 
the World Bank (WB) and the European Commission (EC), seem to prefer the all 
embracing term ‘civil society’ (Xuereb 2009, Axford et al. 1997).  
 
Although literature does sometimes differentiate between interest groups and civil 
society where the former are associated with self-centred inside lobbying and the latter 
as being more transparent in defending the common good (Beyers et al. 2008: 1110), 
empirical research on their action strategies and target institutions suggests how similar 
they can be (Saurugger 2013: 335). Ultimately they all aim at representing their 
interests in a specific section of society. The term ‘interest groups’ is the one preferred 
in this study not only because it is one of the widely used terms in scholarly literature 
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but, more importantly, because it entails a degree of structured organisation. Social 
network societies where no central coordinative function exists are, therefore, excluded. 
At the same time, when only trade unions and employers’ associations are implied, the 
term ‘social partners’ is used to mark their common economic interests that render them 
protagonists in corporatist models. 
 
Interest groups provide a link between state actors and the rest of society (Bache and 
George 2006). Their meaningful input into the decision-making process is seen as a sign 
of a functioning democracy (Karr 2006, Smismans 2006), particularly in contemporary 
times that are characterised by erosional symptoms of public trust in traditional politics 
made evident by popular uprisings, miserable electoral turnouts, low party memberships 
and dwindling interest in traditional political affairs (see Farrell et al. 2013: 100-101) 
Although elected governmental representatives may feel themselves ‘first among 
equals’ due to their democratic mandate and formal accountability through the ballot 
box, they increasingly need to work with and through representatives of other types 
(Lowndes and Chapman 2009). Concepts of good governance, including the ones 
advocated by the UN and the EU, call for the participation of actors which are 
independent of government institutions. These additional ‘actors’ must have a 
contributing voice in all stages of the policy process. 
 
The relevance and importance of interest groups to public policy have developed 
radically, as today governments are more disposed to enter into agreements with civil 
society in implementing social and economic projects for the benefit of society and the 
economy. These include the formation of PPPs, the engagement of non-elected 
representatives on state commissions and policy working groups, revamped 
empowerment to local councils on issues involving local/regional development, and the 
free/subsidised lease of government properties to voluntary organisations to transform 
neglected public sites into cultural, sports and recreational complexes. In this context, 
this research is particularly keen to explore whether the potential of interest groups in 
Malta and Ireland has increased substantially as a consequence of the transformation of 
the state or as a result of opportunity structures and learning incentives that they 
currently enjoy as part of EU membership. 
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Like other European politicians, Maltese and Irish political elites are aware of the 
escalating importance of interest groups in managing public affairs within an EU 
context. Warrington (2010) claims that civil society in Malta offers one of the most 
interesting and diverse forms of citizens’ engagement, deeply rooted in Catholicism and 
in representative democracy; yet Sant (2009: 128) laments that it ‘is still considered a 
vague field of analysis, lacking adequate national awareness and consistent momentum 
of leadership’. On their part, Adshead and Tonge (2009) maintain that civic activism in 
Ireland takes place via a wide range of organisations, covering every area of social, 
cultural and economic life; however there is limited information in literature with 
regards to the impact of EU membership on Irish interest groups (Study on Volunteering 
in the EU: Country Report Ireland 2011: 21). To this end, this study strives to address 
this literature gap from practitioners’ viewpoints. It also presents an opportunity to 
analyse the Europeanisation of interest groups from the perspective of small island 
member states. 
 
1.4 Theoretical background 
 
The best way to study the evolving character of interest groups is by anatomising the 
machinery of the polity - examining both its formal structure or skeleton, and decoding 
its working culture/practices or flesh and blood (Van Schendelen 2005: 56). According 
to Schmidt (2006), new institutionalism is equipped with the right theoretical features to 
understand the logic of political actions and how governing structures, governmental as 
well as non-governmental, adapt to internal and/or external forces of change. Bulmer 
(2008: 51) asserts that an awareness of new institutionalism is indispensable for 
understanding how Europeanisation is theorised.  
 
In particular, the concept of Europeanisation will be explored from the theoretical 
perspectives of rationalist and sociological institutionalisms which lie at the core of the 
scientific method of this study. The new institutionalist school rests on the premise that 
institutions, broadly defined as sets of rules, procedures, historical pathways and social 
norms that determine how ‘collective actions are made’, ‘give meaning to interactive 
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relationships’ and ‘provide the context’ within which interactive relationships take place 
(Caramani 2008: 10, Hix 2005: 13). Different political actors, including interest groups, 
are engaged in a cobweb of interactive policy networks wherein the contradictory forces 
of stability and change are mediated through the understanding of actors’ preferences 
and interpreted in the context of structures, rules, norms and interpersonal relationships 
within the institutional system (Richardson 2000: 1008). It involves bringing institutions 
back in into the explanation of politics and society, emphasising the extent to which 
political conduct is shaped by the institutional landscape in which it occurs, the 
importance of historical legacies and the range of diversity of actors’ strategies (Pollack 
2005a: 19/22). The logics of Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Sociological 
Institutionalism (SI) stress different mediating factors that facilitate or preclude 
domestic adaptation to Europeanisation (Börzel and Risse 2003).  
 
So far, the set of basic variables that are crucial for the successful achievement of the 
scope of this study have already been implied. The independent variable is made up of 
the EU as a political system that radiates change through its style of governance, norms, 
policies and networking opportunities, while changes within domestic interest groups 
are the dependent variables. The intermediary variables that determine the kind of 
relationship between the EU and interest groups are the logics of new institutionalisms. 
In line with Exadaktylos’ and Radaelli’s assertion (2009: 507), Europeanisation is 
considered as a process in this study, and not as an outcome variable. This conceptual 
framework, as applied in this research, has been widely applied by numerous scholars, 
including Graziano and Vink (2013), Eising (2008), Bulmer (2008), Featherstone 
(2003), Featherstone and Radaelli (2003), Börzel and Risse (2003). Now that the 
variables have been established, it is appropriate to formulate a set of hypotheses that 
shall determine the analytical design of this inquiry. 
 
1.5 Hypotheses setting 
 
The analytical model revolves around the testing of a null hypothesis and two contending 
causal hypotheses that focus on rationalist and sociological stimulus. In contrast to the 
synthetic approach developed by Börzel and Risse (2003: 69) that treats RCI and SI as 
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compatible, the hypothetical scenarios in this thesis imply a competing relationship 
between the two variants. The three hypotheses are built on a number of variables that 
stem from the ‘three-step’ framework developed by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 
6), where Step 1 involves identifying the relevant EU-level processes, Step 2 identifies 
the relevant mediating factors and Step 3 lays out the elasticity of domestic structural and 
attitudinal formations. The exposition and analysis of the mediating variables is a 
determining step in understanding why and to what extent change happens and embedded 
practices remain constant.  
 
1.5.1 The null hypothesis 
 
Due to the inelasticity of domestic polity and politics, EU membership has made no 
significant change to the character of interest groups’ participation in the politics  
of Malta and/or Ireland. 
  
This first scenario presents a null hypothesis which is contingent on the premise that 
domestic governance, together with its deeply embedded structures and norms, is highly 
inelastic to the conditionalities resulting from EU membership (see Figure 1.1). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The null hypothesis model 
 
 
Research Context 
 
 
 
  
 
EU polity, politics and 
processes 
Independent  
      variables 
 
Inelastic 
patterns of interest 
representation  
and  
routes of influence 
of interest groups 
 
 
  
Dependent  
variables 
 
Embedded structures 
+ 
Ingrained norms 
+ 
Coercive constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mediating  
variables 
Political landscapes of Malta and Ireland 
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This scenario follows the dialectic that the traditional governing style of small states is 
almost exclusively state centric (Ingebritsen et al. 2006, Hanf and Soetendorp 1998, 
Pirotta 1996,  Lockhart et al. 1993), where the role of interest groups is often weak due 
to sectoral fragmentation and their poorly organised structures (Saurugger 2013: 336). It 
presents the case of inelasticity that signifies the absence of any causal relationship 
between European-level and domestic change. However, the apparent immunity of 
domestic political architecture from external incentives promulgated by the EU does not 
necessarily entail strict embalmment of the member state’s polity formation and 
interactions. It may also be the case that domestic change, or changing relations 
between state and non-state actors, might be the result of other causalities which are not 
necessarily EU-related, namely globalisation, membership in other 
international/regional formations or home-grown restructuring programmes.  
 
The reluctance of Maltese and Irish actors to seize European opportunities and 
internalize new norms can be the result of a variety of causes. Organised groups may 
voluntary conform to the existing domestic polity structure because they are already 
well-connected with the establishment. Actors may have a vested interest in upholding 
the ingrained domestic ‘system-without-system’ associated with small states 
characterised by clientelistic relationships, informal interactions, relative easy access to 
power and the preservation of a self-interested klikka tal-qalba (elite clique) who know 
each other personally, and manage politics and bureaucracy to their own interest 
(Mitchell 2002, Cooper 2009, Mifsud 1995, Boissevain 1993). 
 
Contrastingly, interest groups may be constrained not to diversify their tactics and 
avenues of influence because of coercive limitations resulting from lack of 
administrative capacity. The prevalence of the status-quo can thus be attributed to the 
inherent institutional and operational limitations (Olaffson 1998). In this context, most 
of the cross-cutting issues are related to the state’s smallness and remoteness. 
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1.5.2 The rationalist hypothesis  
 
Through the emergence of new opportunities and constraints, EU membership has 
made a significant change to the character of interest groups’ participation in the 
politics of Malta and/or Ireland. 
 
This hypothesis contemplates that the change stimulus, initiated from ‘Brussels’, 
reshapes national polity, and contributes towards the loosening of the traditional 
‘fixation’ of national decision-making styles (Hanf and Soetendorp 1998: 10). It 
unravels the element of institutional elasticity wherein the endogenous characteristics of 
Malta and Ireland, including the interaction mechanisms between central authorities and 
interest groups, are transformed in order to absorb or adapt to the European mode of 
governance driven by hard law
2
 and formal institutional settings. It is the case where 
organisational structures and fieldwork lobby of domestic interest groups are remoulded 
to take account of the new set of regulations, opportunities and constraints as a result of 
EU membership. 
 
Adhering to the actor-centred, rationalist-based approaches, the second hypothesis 
focuses on the role of individuals within institutions and political systems. Because the 
main focus is on individuals and how they calculate their interests, institutions can 
change rapidly depending on the interest of key actors. Interest is assumed to be 
primarily rational, not necessarily selfish; and, although it can be pursued by the actor, it 
has nonetheless to be articulated within the institutional context (Oppenheimer 2012: 
114). Actors, in our case Maltese and Irish interest groups, shall deploy their resources 
in such a way as to maximise their gain and also to minimise their dependence on other 
actors in the area. As figure 1.2 shows, this process is subject to two key mediating 
factors, namely, multiple veto points (and the more there are the greater the difficulty in 
bringing about change) and facilitating formal institutions (opportunities for actors to 
organise themselves around mediating structures and, thus, increase their relative 
power).  
 
 
                                                 
2
 Hard law includes the Acquis Communautaire, formal institutional procedures, commitment devices and 
standards, regulations, directives and court decisions.  
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Figure 1.2: The rationalist hypothesis model 
 
 
Research Context 
 
 
This hypothesis predicts that there is a positive causal relationship between incentives 
and constraints stemming from the EU polity and resulting changes in repositioning 
interest groups on the national and supranational political platform. For Checkel (2001: 
559), actors compliance to European rules stems from ‘coercion’ (rarely in case of 
interest groups), ‘instrumental calculation’ (always), and ‘incentives’, like funding and 
policy measures. The choice mechanism is ‘cost/benefit calculations’ and the 
environment is one of strategic interaction in that it is premised on a ‘unilateral 
calculation’ of verbal and nonverbal cues. These are the classical cues pertaining to the 
rationalist narrative. 
 
1.5.3 The sociological hypothesis 
 
Through the provision of socialisation and collective learning processes, EU 
membership has made a significant change to the character of interest groups’ 
participation in the politics of Malta and/or Ireland. 
 
The third hypothesis is derived from SI which holds that the interests of actors and how 
they conceive their interests are determined by the institutions they form part of. 
Because EU membership creates new values, norms and processes of mutual learning 
across member states, actors change within this context. It presents another case of 
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elasticity where the identity and culture of interest groups are reshaped because of EU 
stimuli. In this respect, two key factors operate as intermediate variables in determining 
domestic response to European integration: norm entrepreneurs and cooperative 
informal institutions (see Figure 1.3). The former relates to expert knowledge and 
advocacy actors and communities that actively promote change within the continuously 
evolving European context, while the latter refers to informal understandings of correct 
institutional behaviour and the logic of change.  
 
Figure 1.3: The sociological hypothesis model 
 
 
Research Context 
 
 
This method of influence encapsulates the fundamental principles of SI which, as a 
variant of the new institutional school, is more interested in behavioural norms, and 
personal and collective ideologies rather than in formal structures (Hix 2005: 12). SI 
suggests research agendas exploring the behavioural transformation of Maltese and Irish 
actors within national and EU institutions, particularly the ways in which their 
participation leads them to alter behaviour through a process of learning and culture 
change (Bulmer 2008). In this vein, Checkel (2001: 553) maintains that the 
choice mechanism is ‘non-instrumental’, and the environment, contrary to the RCI 
hypothesis, is one of ‘social interaction’ between agents, where ‘mutual learning’ and 
the ‘discovery of new preferences’ replace unilateral calculation. 
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Whilst many scholars claim that ‘the shadow of the past’ still haunts small island states 
that draw lessons from past experiences than from outside threats - a direct reference to 
Historical Institutionalism (HI) which is another major variant within the new 
institutionalist school of thought - others like Katzenstein (1985) and Baldacchino 
(2007: 17) hold a contrary view and maintain that they can in fact be ‘sites of agency, 
depositories of new things’. In this vein, the SI hypothesis calls for the investigation of 
patterns of socialisation, embracing also soft Europeanisation,
3
 that act as strategic 
drivers in the absorption or adaptation of the EU mode of governance by domestic 
interest groups. It takes into account a transnational working culture based on dialogue, 
compromise and consensus-seeking, alliance formation, cross sectoral interactivity and 
sharing of best practices. 
 
1.6 The domestic impact of Europeanisation  
 
The set of hypotheses presented in the previous section capitalise on new 
institutionalism as the explanatory theory to identify, and eventually verify, alternative 
causal accounts of Europeanisation. Indeed, Europeanisation as such is not a theory but 
rather a phenomenon that needs to be explained (Bulmer and Lequesne 2013: 19, 
Bulmer 2007). Since the 1990s there has been a heightened interest in Europeanisation 
literature and, according to Olsen (2003), there have been five different meanings 
attributed to the term. The earlier studies interpreted Europeanisation as a historical 
phenomenon, while the second generation of studies defined Europeanisation as a 
carrier of transnationalism through a bottom-up approach. Europeanisation as a vehicle 
for domestic adaptation through a top-down approach formed the basis of the third 
generation of studies. The latest two generations explain Europeanisation in terms of 
governance style that is typical and distinct for Europe and beyond, and as a political 
project aiming at a unified and politically stronger continental platform. Other scholars 
came up with different mappings of usage (see Buller and Gamble 2002, Bache and 
Jordan 2006). This study is particularly concerned with uses of the term 
                                                 
3
 Soft Europeanisation comprises such instruments like codes of conduct, norms of ‘accepted discourse’, 
agenda priorities (e.g. Lisbon Agenda, Europe 2020), Charters and Open Method of Coordination (OMC). 
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Europeanisation that characterise the changing relationship between the EU and its 
member states. 
 
The focus of this study is in synch with recent trends of Europeanisation studies that 
started to concentrate on the impact of European unification on domestic political and 
cultural processes of member states and beyond (Börzel and Risse 2003: 57). 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ initiatives on policy processes, the 
conceptual scope of Europeanisation started to incorporate ‘top-down’ and ‘horizontal’ 
initiatives in favour of the European regional integration, together with an accentuation 
on national and sub-national structures and actors (Vink and Graziano 2008). 
Europeanisation in its contemporary meaning involves a 360
 
degree approach, implying 
the co-existence of vertical and lateral directionalities portraying, in Börzel’s terms 
(2005), the uploading, downloading and crossloading of policy matters and interest 
representation. Bulmer and Burch (2001: 78) adhere to this multi-directionality 
approach but propose alternative terminology, namely projection, reception and 
horizontal Europeanisation. 
 
In this context, this study’s supports Bache and Jordan (2006: 30) when they define 
Europeanisation as ‘the reorientation or reshaping of politics in the national arena in 
ways that reflect policies, practices or preferences advanced through the EU system of 
governance’.4 In line with its specific aims, this study opts for an original and more 
stringent definition, 
 
Europeanisation refers to the impact of European influence on the elasticity of 
domestic interest groups to adapt their character to new opportunities and 
norms as a corollary of EU membership. 
 
This definition, inspired by the works of Eising (2008), Bache and Jordan (2006), 
Börzel and Risse (2003) and Hanf and Soetendorp (2002) is formed around the research 
primacy of this study. It is particularly interested in the trade-off, or the synchronous 
existence, of change and continuity in domestic politics. Moreover, the conceptual 
                                                 
4
 In this definition, ‘politics’ is used broadly to capture concerns with polity, politics and policy 
dimensions. 
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framework of this study is encapsulated in this definition wherein the independent 
variable is the European stimulus triggered either by tactical opportunities or social 
interaction, and the dependent variable is the resulting change in the character of interest 
groups operating at the national and sub-national levels. In this vein, change in interest 
groups’ structures, activities and norms is a way of assessing their elasticity in relation 
to EU vertical and lateral triggers.   
1.7 Determining the extent and nature of Europeanisation  
 
Since the scope of the study is to determine the extent and nature of Europeanisation, it 
is crucial to establish which criteria are to be used to assess the impact of change over 
interest groups in Malta and Ireland. The early identification of these criteria is pertinent 
to the formulation of workable research methodology that shall ultimately put to test the 
original set of hypotheses. 
  
Scholars have used different yardsticks to measure Europeanisation but, in their 
absolute majority, they have relied on ‘the qualitative tradition’ to come up with 
matrices of categorised results (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009: 518). In measuring the 
impact of Europeanisation in UK’s economic policy making, Hall (1993) devises a 
three-tier change scheme: ‘first order change’ comprising incrementalist and routine 
changes, ‘second order change’ featuring strategic action, and ‘third order change’ in 
which goals, instruments, and instrument settings of policy changed in tandem. Bulmer 
and Burch (2005) also came up with their own version of measuring the impact of 
Europeanisation on UK polity. Contextualising their study within an HI perspective, 
they decode ‘receptive’ or ‘projected’ adaptation as either being a ‘quiet revolution’ or a 
‘step-change’. Bardi (2010) uses three impact assessments to identify the effects of 
Europeanisation over political parties, that is ‘cohesiveness’, ‘inclusiveness’ and 
‘systemness’. Studying the impact of policy change, Bache (2008) categorises the 
state’s responses to Europeanisation into four types, namely ‘transformation’, 
‘accommodation’, ‘absorption’ and ‘inertia’. In addition, and most important for this 
research, Balme and Chabanet (2008) argued that four types of transformations might 
be identified for interest groups, namely: 
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1. Internalisation when groups concentrate their actions at the domestic level 
2. Externalisation when groups circumvent the domestic level and directly ‘go to 
Brussels’ 
3. Supranationalisation when groups establish or join federations at the European 
level to influence the EU level directly 
4. Transnationalisation when domestic groups transform into global actors. 
 
 
This thesis presents an alternative method to the qualitative paradigm applied in the 
aforementioned studies as it relies on statistical measures to quantify the impact of 
Europeanisation. Thus the idea of significant change referred to in the three original 
hypotheses is intrinsically tied to statistical significance. The methodological design, 
not only tries to decode the nature of Europeanisation being experienced by Maltese and 
Irish interest groups, but also seeks to quantify the impact of Europeanisation. Such an 
impact is to be measured across four distinct, yet complementary, dimensions that make 
up the character of interest groups, as shown in table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1: The four dimensions of the character of interest groups 
 
Dimension Dynamics as a result of EU membership 
Internal structure Groups may have enriched their resource base and diversified 
their internal organisational structure to access additional 
incentives and internalise new norms made available by the EU. 
 
Domestic responsiveness Groups may have enhanced their participation in domestic 
policy-making by embarking on a set of strategies advocated by 
the style of EU governance, like solidifying their voice through 
umbrella formation, strengthening their role in public-private 
partnerships and striving to become consensus builders. 
 
European involvement Groups may have established points of contact with the EU 
architecture of governance, including European federations and 
other member states through the identification of partner 
organisations. 
 
Attitudinal 
transformation 
Groups’ members and leaders may have modified their 
personal outlook to start engaging more with the EU, 
embracing European norms and values that challenge their 
traditional individual and collective psyche. 
 
 
 
Through a rigorous process of deduction, change of statistical significance is to be 
determined across each of these four dimensions. EU influence over interest groups is 
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not only manifested in their engagement with the European institutional architecture and 
the formation of new attitudes towards the EU, but also in the ways they resort to in 
order to re-engineer their internal structures and enhance their participation in the 
national arena. Van Schendelen (2005: 218) maintains that ‘managing the EU arena’ 
and ‘handling the home front’ are not contrary forces but, in actual fact, they are part of 
the same continuum.  
 
Thus the first aim of the study that attempts to measure the degree of Europeanisation is 
to be achieved by a quantitative strategy making use of questionnaires distributed 
among four sectoral groupings in Malta and Ireland. The selected four sectors are dealt 
with in the next section. The second aim of the study that strives to decode the nature of 
Europeanisation is to be managed by a multi-qualitative strategy which is specifically 
designed to understand change in terms of rationalist or sociological underpinnings. 
Interviews and observations are employed as primary data collection tools to 
comprehend how the dynamics of intermediate variables work to absorb or resist 
changes as a consequence of EU membership. 
 
The reliance on mixed methodology to analyse the complexity of Europeanisation 
presents a great potential for an original contribution in terms of applied research design. 
While quantitative data gives an aggregate overview of the phenomena under scrutiny, 
the use of qualitative data is grounded by the persistent requirement to understand 
interdependent behaviours, needs, systems and cultures. 
 
1.8 Selected case scenarios 
 
As hinted in the previous section, this comparative study focuses on four specific types 
of interest groups – trade unions, employers’ associations, environmental groups and 
social and human rights organisations - that have been purposely selected for a case 
study investigation. They have been carefully pinpointed for their rather conflicting 
narratives and for the different policy domains in which they are functional. Thus the 
concept of Europeanisation shall be probed into by a versatile array of stakeholders. 
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As revealed by scholarly literature and empirical evidence, trade unions and employers’ 
associations are amongst the best organised and most influential in national and 
European public affairs. These associations feature prominently in the composition of 
the major elements constituting the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), 
a consultative body within the EU’s decision-making process acting as an intermediary 
between the Commission, and the European Parliament (EP) and the Council. Sustained 
by a long tradition of policy involvement through corporatist models, employers’ and 
workers’ representative bodies are invariably considered as core insider groups that are 
deemed to have political legitimacy with the government of the day. 
 
Contrastingly, environmental groups (comprising both single issue groups and 
permanent promotional groups) and social and human rights organisations (embracing a 
wide range of interests, including gay rights, ethnic minorities, migrant communities, 
victim support, disabled people and so on), are tagged as outsiders on the national scale, 
mainly because many of them are associated with  reformists and radical minority 
leaders who may be ideologically opposed to institutionalised political systems. Lacking 
resources and political clout, they try to gain political influence by mobilising popular 
support, even to the extent of adopting militant campaigns to voice their suppressed 
concerns. Others, who have transformed themselves into think-tanks, act more as policy 
experts and compile research dossiers that are often presented to government agencies, 
parliaments as well as the media. Furthermore, environmental policy is one of the most 
developed EU policy domain, while social policy presents a case where the EU has a 
rather weak grip since it is still largely formulated by national governments (Graziano 
and Vink 2013: 46). 
 
1.8.1 Different policy domains 
 
The selection of the four types of interest groups to form the case scenarios in this study 
has been made for more than one purpose. They were chosen not only because they 
differ in terms of internal structures and in their relationship with central authorities, but 
also because they are active in different policy domains. Notwithstanding the fact that 
this study is primarily about political actors, there is still the need to look at relevant 
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policy areas where the EU and its member states exert varying degrees of legal 
competencies. In fact, the Treaty of Lisbon clarifies the division of competences 
between the EU and member states.
5
 For example in the case of all regulatory affairs 
relating to competition and monetary union, as well as the functioning of the single 
market, the EU enjoys exclusive competence. This means that the EU alone is able to 
legislate and adopt binding acts in these fields, whereas the member states’ role is 
limited to applying these acts. Since such policy areas are at the core of all the functions 
pertaining to trade unions and employers’ associations, one would expect them to be 
more directly engaged with the EU.  
 
Although falling under the category of shared competency, environmental policy is one 
of the most developed EU policy domains. By its very nature, the environment 
transcends political, legal and man-made boundaries. As a result, cooperation among 
EU member states and between the EU and the rest of the world is essential if common 
solutions are to be formulated for common challenges. After more than four decades of 
policymaking at EU level, much of our environment is protected by a body of European 
legislation. On the other hand, in many aspects of social policy, like human health, 
education, youth, sport and culture, the EU has a limited competence to support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the member states. In other words, in these 
areas, the EU does not have the jurisdiction to adopt legally binding acts that require the 
member states to harmonise their laws and regulations. The asymmetries of powers of 
the EU in the environmental and social policies put environmental groups and social 
groups on different footings in the way they develop and manage their relationship with 
the EU. The former are more likely to be responsive to the multi-level governance 
structure of the EU than the latter. 
 
The explanation above shows the intimate link between political actors and the public 
policy domains in which they are functional; a link that may have the potential to 
determine the extent of Europeanisation. This caveat shall be revisited in the conclusion 
                                                 
5
 The Treaty of Lisbon introduces a precise classification for the first time in the founding Treaties, 
distinguishing among three main types of competence: exclusive competences, shared competences and 
supporting competences.  
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since it may partly explain the different primary findings relating to the four selected 
types of organised groups. 
 
Additionally, the selection of the four kinds of organised groups also strengthens the 
focus on interest group actors, particularly their personal outlook towards the EU, given 
the high level of personalisation in the lobbying processes of small states. Since the 
number of groups that are active in any sector is relatively limited and stakeholders are 
in close proximity to one another, small states have the advantage that policy-makers, 
whether in government or civil society, are much more likely to know each other very 
well and be able to activate personal contacts. This ‘exaggerated personalism’, a theme 
remarked upon in nearly every research dealing with the politics of small states (see 
Baldacchino 2003:156, Clarke and Payne 1987), stresses ‘the significance of 
personality’ in institutionalised contexts  where ‘there is less aloofness traditionally 
associated with bureuacracy’ (Sutton 1987: 15). The application of new institutionalist 
theory provides an excellent means of understanding the complexities and 
interdependencies between institutionalised and personalised negotations in Maltese and 
Irish traditions of governance and the way they are being remoulded in a Europeanised 
context. 
 
1.9 Spatial dimension 
 
This study is marshalled from the perspective and empirical experience of two small 
island member states, namely Malta and Ireland, at the fringes of an integrated continent. 
They share a common set of features in their geopolitical and geocultural profiling 
although, nonetheless, significant diverging attributes cannot be ignored. Their common 
British legacy after centuries of colonisation nurtured similar political thought and 
practice at home, based on the English Westminster model, though less so today than in 
the past (Pirotta 1996, Chubb 1992). From an economic perspective, the Maltese and 
Irish economies have undergone great transformations in the past three decades and, 
prior to the recent collapse of the Irish economy, they were favourably appraised by the 
international community for their knowledge-open-economies focusing on services and 
high-tech industries and dependent on international trade, niche markets and direct 
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foreign investment. Culturally, the two states have traditionally shared a Roman 
Catholic outlook, although their conservative societal fabric had already started to 
change in the 1960s due to strong processes of secularisation and consumerism (Borg 
2009a, Mac Donald 2009, Bezzina 2004). More importantly for this study, they both 
offer an intriguing narrative of widespread volunteerism that helps to restrain the 
syndromes of anonymity and public indifference that characterise contemporary 
societies. Nonetheless significant diverging attributes cannot be ignored. For example, 
Ireland had a rather different narrative about the language question; its size is 
considerably larger and the EU has connections with Ireland in ways that lend no 
comparison with Malta, particularly in the resolution of its territorial dispute (Meehan 
2011: 2). 
 
Acknowledging the fact that there is substantial disagreement over what type of criteria, 
quantifiable or qualitative, is most appropriate to define a state as small (Olaffson 1998, 
Nugent 2003), the perennial polemic concerning the definition of a small state is, 
however, beside the scope of this study.
6
 No lengthy methodological discussion of this 
nature is necessary here. On all counts, Malta is the smallest member state of the EU. Its 
micro size, resembling Plato’s idealistic idea of a city state, with a population size of 
less than half a million has infact been its greatest obstacle during the lengthy accession 
negotiations with the European Commission (Busuttil et al. 1999: 86). Ireland, on the 
other hand, despite its vast territory is still considered ‘small’ on relative grounds 
(Chubb 1992, Laffan and O’Mahoney 2008, Falkner and Laffan 2005, Laffan and 
Tannam 2002). Although Ireland may exhibit absolute dimensions of gigantic 
proportions compared to tiny Malta, if the notion of relative power
7
 is applied in 
                                                 
6
 In traditional political thought, as pioneered by Jacques Rousseau and Charles de Montesquieu, the 
qualification of a state as ‘small’ in the context of international relations meant that such a state was 
perceived as no threat to neighbouring countries (Goetschel 1998). Comparative politics has also 
contributed its stake in defining smallness in terms of ‘power’ by applying absolute and relative 
characterisations. According to Nugent (2003), the absolute, or quantitative, approach defines small states 
on the bases of measurable criteria, including population size, Gross National Product statistics and land 
area. However the definitional dilemma becomes more complex as there are different benchmarks when 
decoding smallness in numbers. For example, Vital (1971) conceived a 15 million person threshold, 
whilst Goetschel (1998) takes a population of less than ten million, but the Commonwealth definition of a 
small states settles on two and half million. Further, Kelstrup (1993: 140) defines smallness in terms of 
‘very limited resource base’. 
7
 The relative, or qualitative, approach considers power to be more fungible. Size still plays a role in 
defining a small state, but in this approach it is merely a variable, and furthermore is relative (Nugent 
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conjunction with historical pathways and geographical approximation to neighbouring 
countries, Ireland is definitely small compared to Great Britain. Hence the choice of 
Malta and Ireland as two small island member states of the EU avoids any controversy 
of a definitional nature. 
 
1.9.1 Islandness 
 
Besides the implications of smallness, Malta and Ireland have also to be 
comprehensively studied as peripheral island states on the borders of an integrated 
continent (see figure 1.4). ‘Islandness’ lends itself to metaphorical definition 
transcending the strictly geographical requirement of water boundaries, as Warrington 
and Milne (2007: 380) maintain that, 
 
‘Islandness’ is also a state of mind, or a human condition of relative isolation 
and distinctiveness, expressed across almost the entire range of human 
experience, from economic activity to speech patterns, from belief systems to 
genetics.  
 
Lying almost equidistant between Gibraltar and Lebanon, and 96 km south of Sicily and 
240 km north of Libya, the Maltese archipelago, consisting chiefly of the islands of 
Malta and Gozo, lies at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, where the cultures of this 
inland sea meet and where its trade routes cross. Malta, as the smallest member state, 
which is just over 300 km
2
 with an estimated population of 413,609
8
 people, is the most 
densely populated among the current 28 states forming the EU and ranks at the sixth 
place of the world’s most densely populated states.9 On May 1, 2004 when the ten new 
member states were formally admitted to the EU, an event which incidentally took place 
in Dublin, Jean Claude Junker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, made a toast with his 
                                                                                                                                               
2003). Jonathan Swift’s reflection, quoted from his epic novel Gulliver’s Travels (1726), that 
‘[u]ndoubtedly philosophers are in the right when they tell us that nothing is great or little otherwise than 
by comparison’ really hits the nail on the head. The relative approach evaluates the state’s relationship to 
its wider-environment with possible considerations, including the amount of influence a state exercises 
and the extent to which it perceives itself, and is perceived by others, as being small (Nugent 2003). Many 
authors such as Wallerstein (1991), Armstrong and Anderson (2007), Clarke and Payne (1987) and 
Olaffson (1998) refer to the spatial dimension when decoding the power of influence of small states in 
integrated regional blocks. 
8
 2008 estimate (source: National Statistics Office, Malta) 
9
 1,298 persons per km
2
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Maltese counterpart to celebrate the fact that from then onwards his country would no 
longer be the smallest member state (Gonzi 2011).  
 
Figure 1.4: Malta and Ireland at the outer borders of the EU 
 
One World – Nations Online   http://www.ezilon.com/european_maps.htm 
 
At the other end, lying on the fringe of the British Isles, the Republic of Ireland 
occupies five-sixths of the island of Ireland which ranks as the third largest island in 
Europe. With a population of four and half million inhabitants, it is one of the least 
densely populated in the EU. Apart from its EU membership, Ireland’s long history of 
mass emigration and more recent economic development have also led to strong links 
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with the United States, as well as important human and cultural ties with Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand (Adshead and Tonge 2009: 224). 
 
In this context, this thesis sets out to explore how the elements of size and geography 
shape the ecology of the polity’s landscape and the ethos of interdependencies among 
governmental and non-governmental actors. Any island, any islander, is a living 
contradiction between ‘openness and closure’, gripped by negotiating the anxious 
balance between ‘roots and routes’ and, thus, is not surprisingly nervous of ‘bridges and 
tunnels’ that presage attachment to mainlands (Baldacchino 2007: 5). In this vein of 
paradoxic features, a study on the effects of Europeanisation of interest groups 
originating from small island member states provides a fascinating and insightful 
narrative on the dichotomic tension between conservatism and modernity, stability and 
change, tradition and innovation, seclusion and exposure. 
 
1.9.2  ‘Special cases’ 
 
The specific nature of Malta and Ireland as small states, incorporating the features of 
remoteness and islandness, has been strategically used in pre- and post-EU accession 
bargaining. Being small and resource-poor islands gave Maltese and Irish politicians 
and technical attachés considerable leverage in their negotiations with EU technocrats 
and senior representatives of the other member states. Former president of the European 
Commission and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi reveals how he helped Malta’s 
accession behind the scenes when, 
[In 2003] I was telling my friends in Europe if you double the engagement with 
Malta we wouldn’t be changing the European budget. [By a few millions more] 
we could help Malta overcome the idea of insularity or being alone’ (Grech 
2014). 
During that same period, Malta closed negotiations in the sensitive area of free 
movement of persons, securing a special safeguard
10
 that may still be applied in the 
                                                 
10
 For a period of seven years after membership (2004-2011), Malta was able to apply safeguards on the 
right of EU nationals to work on the island even if EU law clearly states that this should not be allowed. 
After this period of seven years, in the event of a disproportionate influx of EU workers, Malta may still 
seek a remedy, this time acting through the EU institutions, rather than unilaterally. 
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event of a big influx of EU workers into Malta (Zahra 2001). Rooting its claims for 
‘special treatment’ because of innate vulnerability, Malta was the only candidate 
country that has sought and obtained an arrangement of this nature. Advocacy based on 
the special conditions of Malta pursued in the following years. For example, in 2012, 
Malta was ‘struggling in EU budget talks’ to retain its eligibility for Objective 1 status 
even though its GDP average surpassed the threshold of 75% of the EU average
11
 
(Camilleri 2012). In 2014 the Government of Malta once again played the tune of 
smallness vulnerability to go ahead with its financial and technical aid to Air Malta, 
Malta’s national and only air carrier that had been experiencing financial turmoil for a 
number of years (Timesofmalta.com 2014). 
The Irish narrative is very similar to that of Malta.  During its first decades as a member 
state within the EU, Ireland always tried to punch beyond its weight by exploiting its 
own vulnerability, particularly smallness and lack of development, to negotiate 
preferential deals. Brennan’s work (2008) on the EU negotiations that shaped modern 
Ireland is an authoritative account of the tough negotiations between determined Irish 
governments and the EU to bring about a series of generous financial packages that 
have contributed to Ireland’s economic and social progress. Brennan recalls Ireland’s 
early days of membership when it argued vociferously for the adoption of the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which was eventually established in 1975 during 
Ireland’s first Presidency of the Council. Being a resource poor island, Ireland generated 
the highest per capita return in the first ERDF budget. In fact ‘it got some €10.77 per 
capita which was more generous than the next less prosperous Member State (Italy) at 
€3.67 per capita (Brennan 2008: 83). The bargaining chip of smallness and belated 
development continued to ensure these above-average and high allocations for Ireland 
until the 1990s when the Irish economy started booming at unprecedented levels. But 
when the Celtic Tiger phenomenon suddenly faded away in 2008, Ireland was once 
again heard pleading for a ‘special case’. In his strenuous efforts to steer Ireland out of 
the bail-out experience, the Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny took comfort and relief 
                                                 
11
 This was due to the statistical effect that occurred with the entry of Romania and Bulgaria, the poorest 
EU member states, which lowered the EU’s average GDP. 
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when he reiterated that ‘The [German] chancellor confirmed that Ireland is a special 
case, which is also why Ireland should be treated differently’ (Deutsche Welle 2012). 
The Maltese and Irish geopolitical scenarios shaped their symbiotic relationship with 
the EU, one which has always been in search for the legitimisation of preferential 
treatments on the basis of ‘specific challenges’ (Pace 2001: 106). 
1.10 Temporal dimension 
 
Given that Ireland became a member of the EU 31 years before Malta, the temporal 
dimension of the research design covers the period between 2004 and 2011, that is, 
from the year of Malta’s accession to the year when the data collection phase was 
completed. However, the state of domestic affairs prior to membership is of interest 
here only to the extent that it provides a better understanding of the forces which are 
unfolding at present while in the process of designing the future.  
 
Although this study is clear about its ‘time period’ because it ‘increases the probability 
of finding Europeanisation effects’ (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009: 523), it does not 
include HI as part of the explanatory theoretical framework. The main focus of HI, 
according to Graziano and Vink (2013: 40) is ‘the analysis of the sequences of domestic 
adaptations in connection to the evolution of European political discourses, strategies, 
institutions and policies’. Its exclusion can be explained in terms of a very practical 
reason. At the time when primary data were collected, barely eight years have passed 
since Malta’s accession to the EU and this preliminary time window is too short to 
affirm any ‘critical junctures’ as a corollary of membership. Nonetheless since HI 
implications have direct relevance to the interpretation of empirical findings, there is a 
number of references to the factor of time disparity between the EU accession periods of 
the two states. Furthermore, the critical assessment of the concluding chapter embraces 
a series of reflections that are derived from the HI strand of new institutionalism.  
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1.11 The other small member states  
 
Other small member states could have been selected to form part of this transnational 
comparative research but they have been dropped for distinct reasons. Cyprus would 
have presented the most similar case scenario for Malta, being itself a Mediterranean 
small island state that like Malta joined the EU in the 2004 enlargement. Although 
geographically speaking Cyprus exhibits the best match, its political landscape 
distinguished by the Greek-Turkish divide and the deep political, trade and cultural 
alignment to the Greek state makes the Cypriot case  inadequate to serve as an ideal 
counterpart to the Maltese policy-making processes. In fact, its unique and problematic 
polity peculiarities proved to be the biggest stumbling block in the Cypriots’ long road 
to accession (Stefanou 2005: 5, Yiangou 2002). 
 
The Eastern European member states, namely, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia, were not considered a good match for Malta for two major reasons. Firstly, 
their political and historical background deeply rooted into what has been known as the 
Communist Block renders them inappropriate to be evaluated against the Maltese case 
which for more than 160 years has served as a ‘fortress colony’ of  the British Empire. 
Secondly, all of them are part of mainland Europe and, thus, their geographical 
positioning offers a stark contrast to islandness. Malta must not be probed into solely for 
its smallness, but also for its islandness and remoteness. 
  
Additionally, although Luxembourg’s population is the closest to that of Malta, it 
presents a very different case. Firstly, it is one of the six founding members of the EU. 
Secondly, it is geographically located at the centre of mainland Europe. Thirdly, it is 
considered as being an integral part of the hub of European institutions. The Maltese 
case presents an inverse copy of these three distinct characteristics. Other member states 
which are considered ‘small’ by many scholars include Austria (Luif 2002, Rendl 1998, 
Katzenstein 1984), Denmark (Nielsen and Kesting 2003, Balslev 1998), Finland 
(Tiilikainen 2006, Romsloe 2005, Arter 2000) and Sweden (Ekengren and Sundelius 
2002, Agrell 1998), which besides not being island states, have totally different national 
identity profiles due to their position in Central and Northern regions and, furthermore, 
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their geographical and trade proportions are immense when compared to those of 
Mediterranean Malta. 
 
1.12 Reader’s guide 
 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters including the introduction. The theoretical 
framework of new institutionalism and its application to the concept of Europeanisation 
are both addressed in depth in Chapter 2. The ultimate objective of the appraisal is to 
expose the development and the different models of state-society relations in policy-
making. It starts by elucidating corporatism, pluralism and elitism as behavioural 
paradigms of conceptualising the geometry of national governance. Their respective 
characteristics in shaping political outcomes through motives and actions of individual 
actors are discussed from the perspective of small states. As a reaction to such models 
where individual actors seek interest maximisation as if functioning in an institutional 
vacuum, political scientists rediscovered the crucial role of institutions that determine 
opportunities and constraints within which actors formulate their preferences. This is 
the point when the discussion heads towards the variants of the new institutionalist 
schools of thought where institutions are not necessarily formal and monolithic, as their 
contemporary understanding embraces norms, values, cultures and ideas embedded 
within political systems and landscapes. It is against this theoretical backdrop, stamped 
by RCI and SI, that the impact of European unification on domestic interest groups is 
assessed. Such an assessment is carried out by a closer look at the mediating factors that 
assert the nature of causality between EU influence and domestic change, and the 
identification of a set of dimensions through which the extent of Europeanisation can be 
measured. 
 
Chapter 3 turns its focus on non-state actors as the research primacy of this study. A 
historical insight on the aggregation of interests and the formation of lobby groups is 
instrumental to map out the changing perspectives of classical and contemporary 
political thinkers on the merits and risks of organised interests as social constructs. The 
ensuing discussion portrays a series of contradictory waves of scepticism and trust that 
have dominated the scene of interest representation in these last 300 years. Moreover, 
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the chapter comprises a typology of interest groups that is differentiated across four 
major factors, namely their raisons d'être, functional basis, relationship with central 
government and the scale of their operations. Each of these factors has a direct effect on 
how organised groups are managed and the type of influence strategies they opt for. In 
this vein, the theme progresses to the sophistication of interest representation as 
traditional pressure groups are being transformed into potential agents of change. Old 
strategies of lobbying are being supplemented by the techniques of Public Affairs 
Management (PAM) that require extensive internal preparatory work and fieldwork 
activity. This strategic and tactical transformation of interest groups is a step in the right 
direction towards good governance and policy success at national and supranational 
levels. Finally, the chapter takes an inquisitive look at the flipside of the coin when 
citizens’ engagement in public affairs leads to negative social capital that undermines 
democracy, legitimacy and accountability. 
 
Any study making use of institutionalist theory incorporates an analysis of the terrain 
where, in this case, social partners and interest groups thrive to influence the corridors 
of power, their peers and the public at large. It is in this environment that their practices 
and preferences in the domestic arena are reoriented as a corollary of the EU system of 
governance. To this effect, Chapter 4 reviews the political landscape of Malta and 
Ireland because, at the end, the confirmation or rejection of the initial hypotheses is 
subject to context specific realities. The chapter comprises a dual narrative of political 
institutions and systems, styles of governance and structural initiatives of social 
dialogue and public consultation that shape the Maltese and Irish political terrains. 
Apart from the configuration of the national sphere, the discussion also includes a brief 
commentary on intrastate regional differences, namely the case of Gozo’s double 
insularity in the case of Malta and the traditional western region in the case of Ireland. 
Furthermore, the different stages that characterise the development of Maltese and Irish 
attitudes and relations with the EU are an essential feature of this narrative. The 
objective of detecting similarities and contradictions in the two polities is to provide a 
contextual backdrop that paves the way for a better understanding of the complexity of 
issues that are raised by research subjects in the empirical chapters. 
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The primary objective of Chapter 5 is to provide an audit trail of the methodological 
and ethical implications of the study. It highlights the exploratory fieldwork that was 
undertaken in Malta, Dublin and Brussels in the initial stages of the investigation and 
explains why a mixed methods research design was employed to test the original set of 
hypotheses. The administration and application of self-completion questionnaires, elite 
interviewing and direct observation, together with the methods that have been used to 
analyse both quantitative and qualitative data streams, are meticulously illustrated. By 
ensuring completeness, the study shall fulfil the criteria of social research: validity and 
trustworthiness. Nonetheless, thematic methodological limitations are also brought to 
attention as some of them might have the potential to transform themselves into areas 
for further research. 
 
The data compiled through the utilisation of the three data collection tools is presented 
in two consecutive chapters: Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The former rolls out results 
pertaining to trade unions and employers’ associations, jointly called ‘social partners’, 
while the latter presents findings related to social and human rights groups, and 
environmental groups, amalgamated under the acronym ‘SHEGs’. As a consequence of 
a research design characterised by multiple case studies and multiple research methods, 
a massive corpus of data emerges. To ease the analytical process, results are largely 
organised in accordance with the four dimensions that constitute the character of 
domestic interest groups, namely internal structures, domestic responsiveness, European 
involvement and attitudinal transformation. Qualitative narratives and statistical 
information are dealt with from a dual perspective, Maltese and Irish, to detect patterns 
of similarity and disparity between the two countries. The exposition of results in these 
two empirical chapters leads to the subsequent section where the exercise of hypothesis 
testing is carried out. 
 
The hypothetical deductive model of inquiry reaches its apex in Chapter 8 where each 
of the original set of hypotheses is tried and tested. Essentially the process of hypothesis 
testing is segmented into two parts. Firstly, it calls for the quantification of the extent of 
Europeanisation over social partners and interest groups in order to confirm or reject the 
null hypothesis. Statistical computations based on the Z-score technique of hypothesis 
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testing presents unequivocal evidence whether the extent of Europeanisation of each 
cohort of participants has been significant or not. Secondly, it seeks to decode the nature 
of Europeanisation, that is, whether it has been triggered by purely rationalist triggers or 
by wider sociological motivations. The answer is provided by a rigorous thematic 
analysis that revolves around the mediating variables of RCI and SI hypotheses. An 
understanding of the context specific circumstances is indispensable to comprehend the 
results obtained. The investigative part of this research is concluded by pondering upon 
the issue of causality, in other words, whether domestic change has been the result of 
Europeanisation or of some other global, regional or homegrown causes. 
 
The final element, Chapter 9, attempts to blend the theoretical background provided in 
the literature review with the data analysis undertaken in the empirical chapters. Besides 
a synthesis demonstrating how empirical results fulfil the original scope of the study, it 
identifies a generous amount of knowledge claims that can be transferable to other 
polities that exhibit similar characteristics to those of Malta and Ireland. Furthermore 
the concluding chapter makes insightful reflections on the original contributions that 
this study has rendered in connection with the conceptual level of Europeanisation and 
the explanatory theoretical level of new institutionalism. It also embraces a critical 
assessment of the methodological level wherein the use of mixed data streams, 
particularly statistical results, are assessed on their capability of verifying or negating 
familiar grounds of Europeanisation that have been traditionally tried and tested by 
qualitative orthodoxy.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Theoretical and  
Conceptual Framework
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Chapter 2 
The theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
 
Institutions insist not only upon their illusions of predictability,  
but their systems of control by which they imagine 
 they can direct the world to their ends.  
 
Butler Shaffer (2002) 
The Wizard of Ozymandias 
 
 
2.1 Setting the agenda 
  
 
This chapter seeks to portray the different modes of interest representation in explaining 
patterns of interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors in domestic 
and European policy matters. It commences with a discussion of how the ‘traditional’ 
approaches of corporatism, pluralism and elitism have been used as theories of political 
participation with their emphasis on explaining actors’ behaviour across different policy 
domains. Their respective characteristics are discussed from the dual perspective of 
small states and the EU. The discussion will then lead to the re-launching of 
institutionalism in understanding policy dynamics and the ways how ‘inherited’ or 
‘acquired’ institutional frameworks can constrain and/or stimulate interest groups to 
take action or to resolve to inertia. The two variants of new institutionalism, RCI and SI, 
are being given a privileged status to decipher Europeanisation processes in the light of 
the ontological and epistemological commitments derived from the adopted 
hypothetical models. Although the HI perspective will not be probed upon, nonetheless 
some references to it would still be required. The chapter ends with a closer look at the 
intermediary variables that decode the nature of causality between EU influence and 
domestic change, and the explanation of the set of dimensions through which the extent 
of Europeanisation of domestic interest groups can be measured. 
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2.2 Conceptualising the geometry of governance 
 
For years the debate on corporatism and pluralism, together with their variant models, 
has been widely used by scholars as an attempt to systemise the correlation of state-
society relations in policy-making. These models map out state-group relations by 
inquiring into interest groups and their functioning in the political system, how they 
seek political influence and the forms in which they participate in policy formation and 
implementation (Saurugger 2013, Wiseman 2001). Besides their impetus towards the 
quality of democracy, these two approaches, together with the contemporary organising 
frameworks of new institutionalism and governing networks, lay at the heart of modern 
governance which, according to Peters and Pierre (2006) is shorthand for the pursuit of 
collective interests and the steering and coordination of society. Governance goes 
beyond the mere study of skeleton institutional governing frameworks, since it also 
comprises an evaluation of the differing natures of relations and dealings that delineate 
state and non-state stakeholders’ interactions (Rhodes 1999). After all, good governance 
is considered as one of the four fundamental pillars on which the resilience of small 
states, with inherent economic vulnerability, rests (Briguglio et al 2008).
12
  
 
Given the complexity of today’s public administration and decision-making processes, 
it is almost impossible to make effective policies without the specialised expertise 
which interest groups possess (Klijn 2003, Hollingsworth 1991, Miller 1987). Expertise 
is an important element of policy-making and, according to Chiles (1999: 1), the use of 
either scientific, technological or expert input is seen as a key ingredient in the success 
of policy formulations and outcomes; not least because of the prevailing dominance of 
technology, and complex and intertwined networks that define the nature of 
contemporary society. Understanding the geometrical parameters within which actors 
and institutions interact has long been on the agenda of political scholars who have 
created, discarded and reorientated various organisational models to take into account 
the ever evolving features of power constellations. ‘Modern politics is about 
organisation. Modern citizens have demonstrated that they know how to organise’ 
                                                 
12
 The other three pillars being macroeconomic stability, microeconomic market efficiency and social 
development. 
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(Richardson 2004: 186). In the next series of sections, the typical features and 
inadequacies of corporatism, pluralism and elitism as three major modes of interest 
representation will be discussed in the context of small states and European governance. 
 
2.3 Corporatism 
 
The corporatist model has been extensively applied in academic circles to analyse the 
interplay of state and socio-economic interests in small states due to their paternalistic, 
yet benign, state-centric style of governance (Katzenstein 1985). Corporatism, in its 
classical sense, is a form of political organisation that brings together hierarchical and 
highly concentrated representations, namely labour, management and the self-employed 
together with the government to guarantee economic development and social stability. 
In more recent versions of corporatism, ‘the existence of a broad, inclusive network of 
powerful persons with similar social origins, in different institutions, [has been termed] 
an important feature of this view of the power structure’ (Evans 2006: 45). 
 
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) of the EU has its origins in the 
corporatist institutions that were originally set up in Germany and France in the inter-
war period (Bache and George 2006: 336). Later adaptations to corporatist theory by 
Schmitter (1974) and Lehmbruch (1977) started to refer to a tripartite system based on a 
social pact among employers’ associations, worker unions’ representatives and the 
government, although tripartism is not necessarily corporatist in its nature (Reutter 
1996). This social pact finds its origins in the philosophical concept of social contract
13
  
as devised by classical political thinkers, namely, Hobbes (1651), Locke (1689) and 
Rousseau (1762). Such an elitist polity structure, distinguished by the so called ‘social 
partners’, comprises only peak associations that enjoy almost monopolistic 
representation in their respective sectoral domain. These are duly recognised by the 
state to take part in the national bargaining process of policy-making. This is typified 
                                                 
13
 Social contract describes a broad class of theories that try to explain the ways in which people form 
states to maintain social order. The notion of the social contract implies that the people give up 
sovereignty to a government or other authority in order to receive or maintain social order through the 
rule of law. It can also be thought of as an agreement by the governed on a set of rules by which they are 
governed. The Social Contract was used in the Declaration of Independence as a sign of enforcing 
Democracy. 
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notably by collective wage agreements negotiated within the ‘iron triangle pattern of 
governing’,14 the representation of capital and labour on key policy-making committees, 
the existence of one single dominant labour and employer association and that of closed 
shops
15
 (Peters and Pierre 2006: 184).    
 
The innate features of small states associated with a powerful unitary central 
government, a fragile open economy, high dependency on few external markets, a small 
number of large influential associations, and a proportionately large reliance of 
domestic economies on their public sector render them an ideal environment where 
corporatist approaches to governance can thrive. New corporatist arrangements, 
according to Katzenstein (1985), enable small open economies to effectively manage 
their relationship with the regional/global economy. The adjustment to trade shocks 
occurs through bargaining processes in which the costs of adjustment are supposed to be 
distributed evenly and ‘fairly’ among social partners.  
 
2.3.1 Inadequacies of corporatism 
 
‘Most writers now accept that the policy process in Western democracies is a very long 
way from (the alleged but never proven) corporatism of the 1960s’ (Richardson 2004: 
172). Under this model, exclusivity is a key feature that starkly contrasts with the 
proliferation of interest groups across all policy sectors in contemporary times. Analysts 
need concepts that will catch a more complex political terrain characterised by increased 
‘webbing’ among the various elements of multi-level governance (MLG) and the 
internationalisation of civil society. In many classically corporatist countries, like 
Sweden, Austria and Germany, traditional bargaining is on the retreat. This crisis is 
often attributed to the realisation of the Single Market in Europe and to globalization in 
general, with increasing labour mobility and competition from developing countries 
(Werner and Wilson 2008). The sheer mushrooming of multi-national corporations 
continued to weaken the power of unions and local employers’ associations alike. At the 
                                                 
14
 Formal bargaining process involving the state, employers’ associations and trade unions. 
15
 A closed shop is a form of union security agreement under which the employer agrees to only hire 
union members, and employees must remain members of the union at all times in order to remain 
employed (Pynes 2004). 
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same time small states have been extremely tactful in aligning economic and political 
dependencies to their own agendas and, at the same time, inflating the economic 
vulnerability to acquire special concessions from global and regional organisations. 
 
Consequently dominant trade unions have lost much of their bargaining power, 
primarily because of legislative measures that limit their negotiation strategies and also 
because of the constant decline in the number of paid-up members, particularly in new 
sectors, including information technology, call centres, insurance and banking and 
international franchising. The employers’ federations and individual firms alike, on the 
other hand, have spotted the signs of the times and have partially shifted their lobbying 
focus to the European level where they found a receptive Commission which, as a very 
open bureaucracy, has proved to be an attractive target not only for business interest 
groups, but also for non-producer groups such as women’s organisations, 
environmentalists, the disabled and a whole network of voluntary organisations (Bache 
and George 2006, Richardson 2004, Greenwood 1997). Undoubtedly, ‘[t]he 
institutionalised pattern of linkage between social interests and the state implied in 
corporatism has been eroding and is being replaced by more loosely defined 
relationships such as networks’ (Peters 2008: 51).  
 
2.4 Pluralism 
 
Scholarly discourse on small states started to show the complex, varying, asymmetrical 
arrangements applying to small sovereignties (Karatzogianni 2009, Baldacchino 2007). 
Such diversities are clearly evident in the European theatre where small states of 
varying sizes have pursued their own idiosyncratic paths within the complex evolving 
constitutional geometry of contemporary Europe (Warrington and Milne 2007: 388). 
The corporatist model did not remain the sole enticing framework on which political, 
economic and social interdependencies in small states are modelled. Priority policy 
domains started to encompass an ever increasing diverse array of sectoral themes, 
including environmental, social, health, educational, transport, energy and bio-ethical 
issues that all require specialised expertise. These developments in policy-settings were 
complemented by a proliferation of specialist and generic interest group formations, all 
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anxiously enthusiastic to stimulate and influence the corridors of power to their own 
advantage, though not necessarily having equal access to state institutions. Civil society 
became much more populated with a wide ranging multitude of interest organisations, 
associations, federations and umbrella groups that inject a competitive culture that 
contrasts with the hedged corporatist tri-partite system of governance. 
 
In this scenario, pluralism took the lead in interpreting the character of power 
relationships in any democratic political system. Within the pluralist tradition, Dahl and 
Tufte  (1974: 50-51) developed the theory of the state as a ‘neutral arena’ [or acting as a 
‘referee’ (Hix 2005)] for contending interests or its agencies as simply another set of 
interest groups, although Dahl himself admitted that the reality of small countries might 
be inflicted by clientelism and partisanship that do not guarantee the state’s neutrality in 
dealing with differing, most often conflicting interests (see Salib 2007: 42/43 on patron-
client relationships in small states). Although pluralism has been conceptualised in 
numerous ways, its stable core rests on the premise of continued emphasis upon (a) the 
centrality of groups, (b) a belief in limiting the power of the state and (c) the 
understanding of power as diffuse (Hay and Lister 2006: 15). Rhodes (1999) maintains 
that the ultimate pluralist dream is ‘governing without government’, and hence, the 
development of a differentiated polity where no single interests is able to dominate the 
policy process. Such an avant-garde view is not plausible, given the empirical evidence 
demonstrating the high level of resource and authority that remains within the 
jurisdiction of the central state (Smith 2006: 32), not least in small states where 
government still retains an axial position in governance (Briguglio et al 2008, Pirotta 
1996, Lockhart et al 1993).  
 
2.4.1 Inadequacies of pluralism 
The pluralist mode views the state as reacting to the competitive manoeuvres of interest 
groups within society. In this sense, it came under criticism for its 'society-centred' 
understanding of the state by scholars who emphasise the autonomy of the state with 
respect to social forces. Some political scientists have argued that pluralism takes a too 
optimistic approach in decoding state-group relations, and among interest groups 
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themselves. Pasquino (2004:191) argues that the assertion that ‘all interests have a fair 
chance of getting organised, obtaining access to decision-makers process, and 
influencing decisions’ is no more than an utopian view. Empirical research shows that 
in the public square there are both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Marsh et al. 2009, Eising 
2003, Grant 1978). Essentially, there are a number of influential and elite interest 
groups that enjoy a long history of solid connotations established around key influential 
politicians and, the rest, who although are active in sensitising society on particular 
issues, are not given an opportunity to contribute towards policy formulation and 
implementation. The EU institutions can be an important alternative channel of access 
for those organisations that, as outsiders, find it difficult to access national political 
institutions (Eising 2003: 196). 
The alleged failure of founding a real pluralist society is not solely targeted at nation 
states, but is also aimed towards the ‘EU interest group system [which] is not broadly 
pluralist as the first sight might suggest’ (Eising 2003: 200). Statistics constantly show 
that business lobby organisations by far outnumber non-business interests (Coen 2007, 
Charrad 2005, Burson-Marsteller 2005). According to Lee (2006), over 70% of known 
lobbyists based in Brussels work directly or indirectly for corporate interests, some 20% 
represent the interests of regions, cities and international institutions, while only 10% 
represent NGOs, including trade unions, equal opportunity movements and 
environmental groups. This inequality of influence is detrimental to the EU’s quest to 
address its democratic and connectivity deficits (see Naurin 2007). However lobbying 
practitioners, like Guéguen (2005), express opposing views and maintain that ‘NGOs 
are in fact mostly funded by the Commission and are extremely professional and well 
organised in Brussels, via the platform for civil society’. Contrastingly, Eising (2003: 
203) cites leaders of social policy interest groups who fear that the support given by EU 
institutions is little more than a convenient way for the EU ‘to give a human face to the 
Single Market’. 
Nonetheless, pluralism like corporatism has proved to be insufficient to explain the 
authentic dynamics that characterise state-groups relations and interdependencies, both 
at the domestic and supranational levels of policy-making. Besides issues concerning 
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inequality of resources and uneven access to political power, pluralism has also been 
criticised by advocates of the Rational Choice Theory, including Oppenheimer 2012, 
Carley 1981, Richardson and Jordan 1979, Jabes 1978 who came up with the concept of 
‘free-riders’. People, for example, can simply reap the benefits of higher consumer 
protection without giving their fair share to a consumer lobby group. As a result, private 
interests, such as individual firms and industrial lobbies, are more able to organise than 
public interests, like labour unions, environmentalists, peace activists or civil rights 
movements. Automatically, this creates an imbalance in the system of interest 
representation. 
2.5 From polarity to continuum to elitism 
For decades, the corporatist/pluralist debate was built upon the basis of polar extremes 
with the consequence that no state or society would fit comfortably in either of these 
two concepts. It is likely that they will co-exist in some way with one possibly being 
more predominant at certain times. Cawson (1986) does not position one against the 
other as alternative systems but visualises them at either end of a continuum linked by 
an intermediate variable, which he named ‘corporate pluralism’. This is the point where 
interest domains would be imperfectly defined and there would be no representational 
monopoly (Wiseman 2001: 25). A society will appear somewhere between corporatism 
and pluralism and changes which can vary in duration, will represent movements along 
the continuum. Figure 2.1 summarises Cawson’s landmark in the evolutionary discourse 
on corporatism and pluralism. 
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Figure 2.1: State-group relations continuum model 
Corporate PluralismLiberal (Neo-) Corporatism Pluralism
Limited number of groups
Fixed interest domains
Hierarchical order
No competition
Large number of groups
Overlapping interest domains
Fluid power structure
Pure competition
 
Cawson 1986: 42 
Cawson’s continuum model, however, is not applauded by all.  Elitists, who believe in 
the existence of a broad, inclusive network of powerful persons with similar social 
origins in different institutions argue that both corporatism and pluralism contain the 
seeds of elitism where ‘all pigs are equal, but some are more equal than others’ (Orwell 
1945). The power-elite literature identifies three key dimensions of political elite 
integration, namely, (a) social homogeneity which emphasis shared class and status 
origins, (b) value consensus that focuses on agreement among elites on ‘the rules of the 
game’ and (c) personal interaction among elites both informally and formally (Evans 
2006: 45). 
Dahrendorf (2004) labels MEPs as ‘mediocre elites elected by mediocre peoples’ whilst 
Andeweg (2004) examines the linkages between the elites and the common mass in 
Europe and probes on the issue whether the EU is seriously facing a crisis of political 
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legitimacy. When explaining the hyperglobalist thesis,
16
 Held et al (2005: 4) maintain 
that ‘among the elites and knowledge workers’ of the new global economy tacit trans-
national class allegiances have evolved, cemented by an ideological attachment to a 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy’.  
Scholarly literature suggest that small states are more prone to elitist power structures 
due to various reasons, including the relatively small number of organised groups who 
can act as veto players, the proximity of politicians among business lobbies and 
community leaders, and the reliance on inherited modes of governance. Leading 
journalists, scholars and former politicians like Joe Mifsud (1995), Glenn Bedingfield 
(1999) and Lino Spiteri (2007) in Malta, together with Matt Cooper (2009) in Ireland, 
are highly critical of the official portrayal of domestic politics founded on the 
republican model where everybody is supposed to enjoy equal rights. In their 
investigative works, like Mifsud’s Bizzilla u Barunijiet 17  (1995), Bedingfield’s Il-
Ġurament18 and Cooper’s Who Really Runs Ireland? (2009), they give evidence of how 
certain political decisions are taken to advance the interests of the privileged few. Such 
processes coordinated behind closed doors lead to serious accusations of institutional 
corruption, power abuse and invisible manoeuvres guaranteeing the award of public 
contracts worth millions of euro to the commercial interests of a handful of influential 
people. When interpreting social transitions in Maltese society, Cutajar and Cassar 
(2009) assert that in spite of the numbing rhetoric, social inequality renders some people 
‘more equal than others’. 
Elitism
19
 is not solely confined to small states, but is also a reality at every level of 
governance, including the studying of policy-making in European political science 
which is dominated by the paradigm of policy networks (Peters and Pierre 2006, Rhodes 
                                                 
16
 For the hyperglobalisers, globalisation defines a new epoch of human history in which traditional 
nation-states have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy (Held et al 
2005: 3) 
17
 Trans. Lace and Barons 
18
 Trans. The Oath 
19
 The term elitism or the title elitist are sometimes used resentfully by people who are (or claim to be) not 
a member of an elite. In politics, the terms are often used to describe people as out of touch with the rest 
of common society. The implication is that the alleged elitist person or group thinks they are superior to 
everyone else, and therefore put themselves before others. An elitist is not always seen as truly elite, but 
only privileged. 
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1999). The concept of policy network is employed as a generic term to categorise the 
relationship between groups, third sector organisations and government agencies (Evans 
2003). When such functional networks become more adhesive over time, they tend to 
block other outsider groups from penetrating their domain, and thus their networks will 
be transformed into exclusive policy communities that resemble the corporatist approach 
but with more versatile interests represented at the core of the decision-making 
mechanism. Policy communities which are tight-knit decision-making structures 
characterised by a limited number of privileged participants in a resource dependent 
relationship are numerous at domestic and European levels, thus constituting an elite 
system of governance.  
2.6 New institutionalism 
Scholars started to depart from the behavioural revolution in political science to really 
understand the polity and its actors (Hix 2005: 9) and re-launched a new version of 
institutionalism with a ‘focus on the central role of structures in shaping politics and 
also in shaping individual behaviour’ (Peters 2008: 48). Whilst corporatists, pluralists 
and elitists seek to explain political outcomes through the interests, motives and actions 
of actors, the latter brought back in the power of institutions and tried to integrate 
theories and assumptions about both actors and institutions in a single analytical 
framework. Using this logic, Hix (2005: 9) affirms that ‘actors and institutions 
[constitute] the basics of modern political science’. As a paradigm, institutionalism rests 
on the rejection of ‘rational’ and ‘efficiency’ explanations of social behaviour and, 
instead, rests on an assumption that social action (the behaviour of individuals, 
organisations and states) can be understood by reference to ‘institutions’.  
2.6.1 The ‘forgotten’ role of institutions 
 
The inadequacies of the corporatist, pluralist and elitist schools of thought, the removal 
of the state in explaining behavioural and relationship patterns in politics and society, 
together with the mounting commitments on European member states to coordinate EU 
wide policies across vertical and lateral layers of authority according to prescribed 
schemas, norms and standard procedures (Gualini 2004) led to a revival of interest in 
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institutionalism. It involves ‘bringing institutions back in’ to the explanation of politics 
and society, emphasising the extent to which political conduct is shaped by the 
institutional landscape in which it occurs, the importance of historical legacies and the 
range of diversity of actors’ strategies (Hay 2002: 14-15). ‘Institutions are seen as 
determining the opportunity structures and the limits within which individuals formulate 
preferences’ (Caramani 2008: 10, Schmidt 2006: 98). Hence, as Pollack (2005: 19) 
asserts, the rise of institutionalist analysis did not develop in isolation, but ‘reflected a 
gradual and widespread re-introduction of institutions into a large body of theories’. 
Institutional analysis once again was positioned under the limelight to interpret the logic 
of political action exerted within and outside the state in the midst of a whole range of 
domestic and supranational governing structures through which political actors, 
governmental as well as non-governmental, interact. 
 
Empiricism shows that ‘actors do not perform their preferences and choose their 
strategies in isolation’ (Hix 2005: 12): like chess players they have to predict their 
competitors’ tactics whilst manoeuvring their knights and bishops within the rules of the 
game. It brought back in the vitality of institutions to understand how they shape actors’ 
options and behaviours. Although still acting rationally, the resulting moves and ploys 
may not constitute an optimal outcome for all the stakeholders concerned. If one 
includes the institutional platform that embraces both formal institutions such as 
constitutions and rules of procedures, as well as informal institutions such as 
behavioural norms and personal and collective ideologies (North 1990), these 
institutions become ‘constraints’ on actors’ behaviour (Hix 2005: 12) and lead to 
outcomes that may be termed as ‘collectively suboptimal’, in the sense that another 
outcome could be found that would make at least one of the actors better off without 
making any of the others worse off (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
 
The institutional environment is not a mere neutral arena where political forces interact 
but, according to Svečias 2009, Caramani 2008, Schmidt 2006 and Risse 2001, it enjoys 
a considerable degree of autonomy. March and Olsen (1984), in their seminal work 
about the regeneration of interest in new institutionalism, stress the relative autonomy of 
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political institutions. Institutions are neither a mirror of society (the behavioural 
critique), nor merely the site for individual strategies (as in the rational actor paradigm). 
 
2.6.2 The ‘old’ and ‘new’ versions of institutionalism 
 
Having clarified the institutional part of the concept, the next question naturally 
follows: what is specifically new about the approach? The best way to answer this 
question is to compare the ‘old’ with the ‘new’. Samuel Huntington, the proposer of The 
Clash of Civilisations (1993), defines institutions as ‘stable, valued and recurring 
patterns of behaviour’ that have always been central to the discipline of political science 
since its inception (Huntington 1968).  
 
‘Old’ institutionalism studied government as a set of formal institutions, legally defined 
roles and positions, and according to Giuliani (2003) it lies at the very root of 
‘comparative politics’ as it developed in the Anglo-American tradition in the late 
nineteenth century. From the 1960s onwards it was the behavioural revolution which 
shifted attention away from institutions towards actors, behaviour and processes. New 
institutionalists seek to re-emphasise the ‘forgotten’ centrality of political institutions 
and the polity. However there are crucial differences between the old and new 
institutionalisms. New institutionalism decodes the behaviour of actors and the 
formulation of political outcomes through a much broader definition of institutions 
(Rosamond 2003: 114). Institutions are seen as persistent and connected sets of rules - 
both formal and informal - that prescribe behavioural roles, constraint and shape 
expectations, whilst old institutionalists were interested only in legal, constitutional and 
formal structures ignoring the role of informal structures. The other great novelty of 
new institutionalism is its concern with norms, values and cultures embedded within 
institutions. Lowndes (2009) spells out the criteria to be used when evaluating the 
institutional platform whilst, at the same time, invites political researchers to study the 
institutional paradox. 
 
One of the current characteristics of research on the theme is to study the double face of 
institutions – this central paradox that institutions constrain human behaviour, but, at 
the same time, they are also human creations. Biophysical factors and contexts constrain 
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agencies’ strategies. The material world constrains us, but as political scientists we are 
particularly interested in how humanly constructed institutions both constrain and also 
encourage certain courses of action (Lowndes 2009).
20
 
 
The core idea that governmental and non-governmental organisations are deeply 
embedded in social and political environments, according to Powell (2007), suggests 
that structures and practices are often either reflections or responses to rules, beliefs and 
conventions built into the wider environment. Early works identified institutional effects 
as concerned principally with social stability, drawing attention to reproductive 
processes that function as stable patterns for sequences that were routinely enacted 
(Cerny 1990, Thomas et al 1987). More contemporary institutionalist accounts devote 
more attention to institutional changes and reforms, addressing how changes in rules, 
normative systems and cognitive beliefs reshape organisational fields (Bulmer and 
Burch 2009, Powell 2007, Börzel and Risse 2003). This is the focal paradox that this 
work is concerned with: the inverted dualism between continuation and change, 
traditional pathways and new avenues. Notwithstanding this ongoing tension, 
“[i]nstitutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life… giving 
solidity to social systems across time and space’ (Scott 2001: 49).  
 
2.7 Stripes of institutionalisms 
 
As indicated earlier, new institutionalism is not a unitary theory but an umbrella term 
for many variants of new institutionalisms. Hall and Taylor (1996) identify the three 
major variants that they label as historical (HI), sociological (SI) and rational choice 
institutionalism (RCI). Peters (1999) goes further and identifies seven varieties of new 
institutionalism.
21
 More recently, a ‘discursive institutionalism’ has emerged which sees 
institutions as shaping behaviour through frames of meaning – the ideas and narratives 
that are used to explain, deliberate or legitimise political action (Schmidt 2006: 99). 
However, the labels change from author to author: what March and Olsen or Hall and 
Taylor label as SI, for example, is more accurately branded as normative 
                                                 
20
 Quotation from Vivien Lowndes’ lecture, entitled ‘Institutionalist Challenges: Diversity, Dynamics and 
Design’, delivered at the University of Sheffield on December 10, 2009 attended by the author. 
21
 (a) Normative Institutionalism, (b) Rational Choice Institutionalism, (c) Historical Institutionalism, (d) 
Empirical Institutionalism, (e) Sociological Institutionalism, (f) Institutions of Interest Representation and 
(g) International Institutionalism. 
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institutionalism by Peters. Furthermore Schmidt’s new addition concerning the 
discursive variant has been called constructivist institutionalism by others, like 
Sedelmeier (2006). This is itself a major shortcoming of the new-institutionalist 
approach since its various branches are united by little but common scepticism toward 
atomistic accounts of social processes and a common conviction that institutional 
arrangements and social processes matter (Svečias 2009).  
 
This thesis calls for the elucidation of two of the most known and widely used variants, 
RCI and SI. It ponders upon how these theoretical frameworks can be applied to 
confirm or negate the two alternative hypotheses set in the introduction. Since the key 
characteristics of each of the selected variants have already been exposed in the 
previous chapter, what follows is an analytical and concise account of each of them.  
 
2.7.1 Rational choice institutionalism 
 
RCI draws heavily from rational choice theory, but is not identical to it.
 22
 Proponents of 
this theory argue that political actors' rational choices are indeed constrained (bounded 
rationality); however individuals need institutions to realise their goals. In other words, 
institutions are systems of rules and inducements to behaviour in which individuals 
attempt to maximise their own utilities. RCI attempts to marry methodological 
individualism and institutional design (Ostrom 1997) and, thus, to understand 
institutions we need first and foremost to understand individual interactions. 
 
Politicians, senior bureaucrats and NGO leaders behave in a strategic manner to 
maximize the attainment of their fixed preferences, and do so in a highly strategic 
manner that presumes extensive calculation (Beichelt 2007). According to Bulmer 
(2008: 50), RCI is typically concerned with two particular issues. Firstly, it explores the 
ways in which actors’ preferences are oriented towards institutional settings and rules: 
                                                 
22
 Rational choice theory is a framework for understanding and often formally modelling social and 
economic behaviour. It is the dominant theoretical paradigm in microeconomics. It is also central to 
modern political science and is used by scholars in other disciplines such as sociology and philosophy. In 
Rational Choice Theory 'rationality' simply means that a person reasons before taking an action. A person 
balances costs against benefits before taking any action. In rational choice theory all decisions, crazy or 
sane, are arrived at by a 'rational' process of weighing costs against benefits (Scruton  2007). 
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institutions are regarded as opportunity structures or veto points; actors seize the 
available opportunities or are blocked by veto points. Secondly, RCI analysis is 
interested in the design of institutions in connection with desired policy objectives. 
Beichelt (2007) advocates that the existence of any institution is explained by reference 
to the value its functions have for the actors involved, that is, the benefits they gain 
from the existence of the institution. Actors create institutions in order to realise such 
value and/or benefits and, likewise institutions are chosen because of their functional 
consequences for those who create or choose them. In Gorges’ own words (1997: 2), 
‘RC institutionalists argue that institutions are established to help self-interested actors 
maximise utility, stabilise relations and facilitate cooperative behaviour’. Within this 
context, Hix (2005: 12) affirms that political outcomes are seen as the result of 
‘strategic’ interaction’ between competing actors. 
 
When the theoretical perspectives of RCI are applied to small states governance, a 
number of interesting insights crop up concerning the competitive nature of groups’ 
interactions. Dahl and Tufte (1974), Clarke and Payne (1987) and Sutton (1987) 
conclude that, in smaller political systems, it is likely that:  
 
 there is a higher chance that conflicts among groups will be translated into 
personal conflicts among individuals, 
 conflicts among organisations are less frequent since political cartels are as 
numerous as economic ones, 
 processes for dealing with organised group conflict are less institutionalised due 
to the familiarity and proximity of actors, 
 group conflicts are infrequent but explosive, 
 conflicts are more likely to polarise the whole community.  
 
These characteristics expose the imperfections of formal institutions in small polities 
where personal contacts can be stronger than conventional authority procedures. 
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2.7.2 Sociological institutionalism 
 
Reacting to the Weberian perspectives on bureaucratic structures, the new 
institutionalists in sociology began to argue that many of the institutional forms and 
procedures used by modern organisations are not adopted simply because they are most 
efficient for the tasks at hand (Schmidt 2006, Hall and Taylor 1996). Instead, they 
argued that many of these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally specific 
practices and assimilated into organisations, not necessarily to enhance their formal 
means-ends efficiency but as a result of the kind of processes associated with the 
transmission of cultural practices more generally. Thus even the most seemingly 
bureaucratic of practices can be explained in cultural terms. In essence, SI refers to the 
codes of appropriate behaviour that imbue actors in organisations. Public officials and 
NGO leaders act upon their perceptions of what is the correct code of behaviour; they 
are bound by common values, which explain not only their propensity to frustrate 
change, but also the capacity for organisations to reproduce themselves. In turn this 
indicates a ‘logic of appropriateness’, 
 
 
Rationality for sociological institutionalists is socially constructed and culturally and 
historically contingent. It is defined by cultural institutions which set the limits of the 
imagination, establishing basic preferences and identity and setting the context within 
which purposive, goal-oriented action is deemed acceptable according to the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’… (Schmidt 2006: 107). 
 
Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three features of SI that render it relatively distinctive 
in the context of the other ‘new institutionalisms.’ Fundamentally, sociological 
institutionalists tend to define institutions much more broadly than political scientists do 
to include not just formal rules, procedures or norms but the symbol systems, cognitive 
scripts, ideas and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human 
action. Such a definition breaks down the conceptual divide between ‘institutions’ and 
‘culture.’ The two can in fact intermingle. This assertion challenges the distinction that 
many political scientists like to draw between ‘institutional explanations’ based on 
organisational structures and ‘cultural explanations’ based on an understanding of 
culture as shared attitudes or values. 
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Moreover, the new institutionalists in sociology also have a distinctive understanding of 
the relationship between institutions and individual action: institutions influence 
behaviour not simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one 
can imagine oneself doing in a given context. In many cases, institutions are said to 
provide the very terms through which meaning is assigned in social life. It follows that 
institutions do not simply affect the strategic calculations of individuals, as RCI contend, 
but also their most basic preferences and very identity. Self-images and identities of 
social actors are said to be constituted from institutional forms, images and signs 
provided by social life. This is particularly true for the people of Malta and Ireland. The 
Catholic Church has not only been an influential institution in policy-making processes 
but for centuries it moulded the raison d'être of the majority of organised interest 
organisations and the public at large (Friggieri 2009b, Mifsud Bonnici 2009, Chubb 
1992, Boissevain 1993, Koster 1988). ‘Christian heritage in Malta is particularly 
equivalent to national heritage. Eliminate that and you have a desert” (Friggieri 2008b). 
Christian values served as a common transcendental yardstick of the degree of 
appropriateness. However contemporary narrative dictates a contrasting scenario. 
Secular society is becoming increasingly intolerant of religious beliefs which are stated 
in public, evidently leading to the ‘privatisation of religion’ (Vassallo, E. 2011: 58-64, 
Vassallo, M.T. 2009b).  
 
2.8 Bridging the variant stripes 
 
Although capped under the same umbrella, institutionalist discourse has been 
characterised not only by differing fundamental views, but most often by conflicting 
outlooks towards the constituents of its ontological and epistemological elements. In 
these circumstances, we ask whether it is possible to bring together common insights to 
what has been traditionally seen as separate scores of political science. For example, 
Lowndes (2009) observes that the two definitions below, concerning institutions, show 
convergence on RCI and SI:  
 
[RCI refers to] prescriptions that define what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited 
or permitted, and the sanctions authorised if the rules are not followed (Ostrom 1997). 
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[SI refers to] sets of regularised practices with a rule-like quality in the sense that the actors 
expect the practices to be observed; and which, in some but not all cases, are supported by 
formal sanction (Hall and Thelen 2008). 
 
According to Lowndes, ‘these two definitions are not really that far apart’. 
Institutionalism is an organising framework that prioritises institutions in developing 
explanatory accounts of political phenomena, whether that is political behaviour or 
political outcomes. Institutionalism, in its current forms, is concerned not only with 
formal rules and structures, but with informal conventions that shape political behaviour. 
The researcher does not take political institutions at face value but takes a critical look 
at the way they embody values and power. The real scholarly debate of this stance is not 
just about institutions, but the complex relations between institutional designers, 
institutionalised subjects (those who work within the constraints of institutions) and 
institutional environments which are made up of other institutions. This results in a 
mosaic compound policy terrain that continually regenerates concatenations of 
synergies, tensions and creative forces.  
 
Moreover, Olsen (2003: 342) sustains that the processes of institutional change 
discussed so far, namely argumentation and choice (RCI), and experiential learning 
through socialisation (SI) are seen as complimentary rather than mutually exclusive. 
Hix (2008, 2005) asserts that actors, contexts and rules are the basics of modern 
political science. They cannot be dichotomised and probed on their own as was the 
practice in the old days of state-centric institutions and society-centric theories, but they 
need to be investigated on the same continuum. If the investigation at hand is to 
reconfigure changes in institutions, the researcher needs to work with the actors – he 
needs to ask them about the rules (RCI). He also needs to observe who is in action (SI) 
and by what constraints they are restricted. 
 
The hypotheses at the core of this research are designed on the triangle marking the 
three protagonists behind the narrative, namely actors, rules/culture and context. They 
are primarily interested in the interaction between state and non-state actors. 
Furthermore, they also take into consideration the two loci of polity, domestic and 
European, that govern actors’ choices and behaviour through rules, procedures, norms 
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and values, whilst the underlying context is delineated by the ‘special circumstances’ of 
small island states.  
 
2.9 Theorising Europeanisation 
 
This chapter now proceeds with the application of the new institutionalist perspective to 
the theorising debate of Europeanisation. Vink and Graziano (2008: 12/13) affirm that 
‘Europeanisation scholars have reverted almost without exception to the broad spectrum 
of theories that fall under the umbrella of the so called “new institutionalism”’. At this 
point, it is logical to ask what is being meant by the term Europeanisation. How did it 
develop over the decades and what are its current trends in scholarly literature? In what 
ways have the variants of institutionalism contributed towards the understanding of 
domestic transformations, or the persistence of the status quo, as a consequence of 
European forces of change? Providing insightful answers to these pertinent questions is 
remarkably challenging, as the Europeanisation of domestic interest organisations and 
interest intermediation is a fairly recent research topic in EU studies and so there are 
several research gaps as well as areas of controversy and ambiguity (Eising 2008: 177). 
 
Since the late 1990s, Europeanisation has gained widespread currency amongst scholars 
as a ‘new fashionable term to denote a variety of changes within European politics, 
domestic affairs and international relations’ (Featherstone 2003: 3). Different scholars 
understand Europeanisation in different ways. Some think of it as a ‘historic 
phenomenon’ that describes the export of cultural norms and patterns through territorial 
expansion of the EU’s borders. Others explain it in terms of intensifying trans-
nationalism through the diffusion of cultural norms, ideas, identities and patterns of 
behaviour on a cross-national basis within Europe. Knill (2001: 10) observes that the 
‘traditional’ concepts of Europeanisation research were basically concerned with 
developments at the supranational level, basically the evolution of the EU’s institutional 
architecture in Brussels and Luxembourg. In this context, Goldsmith (2003: 117) states 
that Europeanisation was used to describe the process of regulation by which a wide 
variety of policy areas became subject to regulations and directives agreed in Brussels 
and accepted by member states.  
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Over the years, as the EU became more institutionalised in the sociological sense 
(Caporaso 2008: 25), it started to be referred to as a ‘polity in its own right’ (Cini 2003: 
2), a ‘political system’23 that could be analysed with the tools of most domestic systems 
without having to be a ‘state’ (Hix 2005: 2). The basic focus of these earlier strands of 
research on supranational institution-building and policy-making eventually proved to 
be inadequate to provide sufficient insights when it comes to the impact of European 
integration at the domestic level. Furthermore, this led to a gradual decline in the 
scholarly interest of refining the ‘grand theories’ of European integration based on the 
visions of eminent European politicians like Schuman, De Gasperi, Spaak, Monnet, 
Adenauer and Hallstein (see Bond et al 1996). These ‘grand theories’ were positioned 
across the two polar extremes of neo-functionalism,
24
 as advocated by the pioneering 
works of Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963); and intergovernmentalism,
25
 as 
promulgated by Hoffmann (1966) and Taylor (1982), among others.  
 
Subsequent generations of researchers have adapted these frameworks to take into 
consideration the signs of times. One of them was Moravcsik (1988) who developed a 
theory named liberal-intergovernmentalism that attempts to explain why sovereign 
governments in Europe have repeatedly chosen to coordinate their core economic 
policies
26
 and surrender sovereign prerogatives within an international institution 
(Nelsen and Stubb 2003: 240).  Other scholars like Pierson (1996) and Sandholtz and 
Stone Sweet (1998) have moved beyond vague supranationalism and explicitly 
                                                 
23
 If we think of the EU as a policy system, then it follows that scholarship needs to explore the ways in 
which policy agendas are set set, policies are formulated, decisions are made and legislation is 
implemented (Rosamond 2003: 118). 
24
 The neofunctionalist approach (introduced by Haas in the preface of his seminal work The Uniting of 
Europe), views the integration process as group driven. Federal institutions are established because 
important political groups see tangible benefits from joint governance in specific areas. The integration 
process pushes forward when federal institutions affect the interests of groups that respond by organising 
across national boundaries, rendering the concept of the nation state as almost obsolete (Nelson and Stubb 
2003: 145/6). 
25
 Intergovernmentalism, with its emphasis on the strength of the nation state, provides a theoretical 
counter to neofunctionalism. Hoffmann, as one of the first intergovernmentalists to challenge the core 
assumptions of the neofunctionalists, laid the foundation for the great theoretical debate of the early 
1990s (Nelsen and Stubb 2003: 163). 
26
 Moravcsik argues that state preferences are driven by economic rather than political interests, that state 
preferences are not fixed (because different groups can win the domestic political contest), and that inter-
state bargaining can produce positive sum outcomes (Hix 2005: 15). 
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developed a modern neofunctionalist account of the institutional development of the EU 
(Nelsen and Stubb 2003: 215), which is based on the principle of path-dependence 
theory that lies at the heart of the historical approach.
27
 This ‘lock-in’ theory of 
integration has much in common with the new institutionalism of Pollack (1997) and 
the governance approach of Marks and Hooghe (2001). But as Sweet and Sandholtz 
make clear, this theory stands in sharp contrast to the intergovernmentalism of 
Moravcsik (1988). Weiler (2004) expresses his sceptic sentiments when he insists that 
despite its notable success in attaining its historical objectives of consolidating post-war 
peace and contributing to new-found European prosperity, ‘today’s Union, bereft of its 
original transcendent ideals, risks becoming the perfect incarnation of bread-and-circus 
fin-de-siècle politics’.  
 
2.10 Applied new institutionalism to Europeanisation 
 
The decline of ‘grand theories’ has multiplied the number of schools of thought, 
prominently, the proliferation of ‘institutionalisms’ of various stripes and the rise of the 
‘governance approach’ (Nelsen and Stubb 2003: x) that sequentially led to the ever-
evolving discourse on the domestic impact of Europeanisation. A fast growing number 
of scholars (Quinn 2008, Bulmer 2008, Bulmer and Lequesne 2005, Graziano and Vink 
2008, Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, Knill 2001, Alexander 1998, Baillie 1998, 
Gorges 1997, DiMaggio and Powell 1991) started to adopt institutional analysis as a 
tool for studying the governance of the EU and also the domestic governance of its ever 
growing number of member states. The adoption of this approach reflects the general 
trend of employing the theories of comparative politics to the analysis of the EU. The 
attention was shifting away from the attempts to predict the final destiny of European 
integration process towards the analysis of day-to-day decision-making processes 
(Svečias 2009, Nelson and Stubb 2003, Cini 2003). 
                                                 
27
 “In response to path dependency, a body of theory developed around ‘punctuated equilibrium’ – in 
normal times there are small adaptations, but every so often there is a moment of primary selection that 
maybe genetic. These are called moments of critical junctures where no ideas come forward, championed 
by strategic actors and instigate the agenda for institutional change. Colin Hay states ‘this is basically a 
discontinuous conception of political time in which periods of modest institutional change are interrupted 
by more rapid moments of change and transformation’” (Lowndes 2009). 
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Recent trends in Europeanisation literature started to focus on the impact of European 
unification on domestic political and cultural processes of member states and beyond 
(Börzel and Risse 2003: 57). Notwithstanding the emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ initiatives 
on policy processes, the conceptual scope of Europeanisation started to incorporate ‘top-
down’ and ‘horizontal’ initiatives in favour of the European regional integration, 
together with an accentuation on national and sub-national structures and actors (Vink 
and Graziano 2008). Europeanisation, in its contemporary meaning, involves a 360
0
 
approach to interpret the implications of EU polity, politics and preferences across 
supranational, national and sub-national politics and policies. This implies the vertical
28
 
and horizontal
29
 dimensions of MLG that portrays the EU as a political system with 
interconnected institutions, operating at multiple levels and having unique policy 
features (Bache 2008, Bache and Flinders 2004, Gualini 2004). The EU is a political 
system with a European layer (Commission, Council and EP), a national layer (Cabinet, 
Parliament, Courts and national interest organisations) and a regional layer (sub-
national authorities, local NGOs, business communities). These layers interact with 
each other in two ways: first, across different levels of government (vertical dimension) 
and second, with other relevant actors within the same level (horizontal dimension). But 
the idea of MLG, according to Rosamond (2003: 120) ‘goes beyond this, as it also 
emphasises fluidity between tiers, so that policy actors may move between different 
levels of action’. Moreover, dispersion of authority is uneven across different policy 
domains.  
 
With this growing interest in Europeanisation as a process of domestic change in the 
face of European integration, greater attempts have been made to establish a far more 
rigorous definition, prominent amongst which has been that by Radaelli. He maintains 
that Europeanisation is taken to be the ‘processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and 
                                                 
28
 The ‘vertical’ dimension refers to the linkages between higher and lower levels of government, 
including their institutional, financial, and informational aspects. Here, local capacity building and 
incentives for effectiveness of sub-national levels of government are crucial issues for improving the 
quality and coherence of public policy. 
29
 The ‘horizontal’ dimension refers to co-operation arrangements between regions or between state and 
non-state organisations. These agreements are increasingly common as a means by which to improve the 
effectiveness of public service delivery and implementation of development strategies. 
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(c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies’ (Radaelli 2003: 
30). But while such a definition highlights the very broad domestic impact of European 
integration, some scholars have questioned whether such ‘catch-all’ annotations can 
have any real, practical and useful application (Harwood 2009: 6).  
 
2.10.1 The EU as an enabler of domestic change 
 
Börzel (2005: 61) leaves no doubt that the widening and deepening of the European 
model is not always the only source that stimulates domestic change, as there might be 
other driving forces and, thus, ‘we have to employ counterfactuals and test for 
alternative explanations’. The null hypothesis in this thesis serves this purpose. 
 
On the other hand, academic literature provides ample evidence that the EU is in fact a 
major incentive orbit that explains domestic changes in terms of processes, policies and 
institutions. In these studies, the EU polity is considered to be the independent variable 
that is motorised by three factors: polity (administrative adjustments, change in 
processes and institutions), politics (ideas, beliefs, interests, strategies), and policy 
(priorities, agendas, content, implementation). Figure 2.2 helps to simplify further the 
relation between the EU, as the independent variable, and the domestic political 
landscape, as the dependent variable.  
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Figure 2.2: The effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable 
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Domestic Politics
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• interest aggregation
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Domestic Policies
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• Problem-solving approaches
• Policy narratives and discourses
 
 
adapted from Börzel and Risse 2003: 60 
 
 
The issue is no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, in 
what direction, at what pace, and at what point in time (Börzel and Risse 2003). 
Answering these queries is not a straightforward exercise as it is highly dependent on 
the institutionalist perspective that has been adopted (Börzel 2005). Bulmer and Burch 
(2001: 73-76) develop a scheme of insights how Europeanisation can be examined from 
the different institutionalist variants. Those advocating RCI would most likely be 
concerned with examining a succession of insistent impacts: a sequence of snapshot-
analyses of the EU’s impact upon the institutional arrangements for policy-making in 
the member states. They would regard the wider context of national governance, 
including the interplay of state and interest groups, as exogenous to the explanation, 
which would be actor-centred.  
 
SI would share some of these concerns but would factor in a much greater cognitive and 
cultural component. SI, like HI, tends to adopt a rather long term approach to make 
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changes visible in the domestic public square, which would be decoded in reflexive 
terms in the state’s culture (Bulmer and Burch 2009, 2001: 74). Domestically, the 
important thing about institutions would not be ‘that they enhance efficiency but that 
they offer a normative context that constitutes actors and provides a set of norms in 
which the reputation of actors acquires meaning and value’ (Katzenstein 1997 as quoted 
in Bulmer and Burch 2001). It is through the internalisation of norms that actors acquire 
their identities and establish what their interests are (Rosamond 2003: 122). 
 
2.10.2 The role of mediating factors  
 
The Europeanisation process of domestic interest groups, however, is not so 
straightforward a phenomenon as one might expect. Empirical research suggests that 
organisations are not uniformly affected by external stimuli: a number of intervening 
factors mitigate their effects. Ultimately, these mediating variables determine the true 
nature of Europeanisation. In other words, these variables are crucial in deciphering the 
cause and effect relationship between, on the one hand, Europeanisation as a 
consequence of new opportunities and constraints implying an RCI understanding and, 
on the other hand, Europeanisation as a result of wider socialisation and collective 
learning implying an SI understanding. The process chart drafted by Börzel and Risse 
(figure 2.3) provides a synthesis of RCI and SI understandings of the cause and effect 
correlation that have a bearing on domestic change.  
 
Policy and institutional misfit or the incompatibility between European and member 
states’ scenarios is the starting point in the analysis of domestic change. The lower the 
compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions, the 
higher the need of adaptational pressure (Börzel and Risse 2003). However, misfit on its 
own is not a sufficient condition to instigate change. In this model RCI and SI set 
parallel mechanisms of institutional change and, consequently, stress different factors 
facilitating domestic adaptation in response to Europeanisation.  
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Figure 2.3: Conceptualising the domestic impact 
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Börzel and Risse 2003: 69 
 
 
Following the logic of RCI (left side), Europeanisation is largely conceived as an 
emerging opportunity structure which offers some actors additional resources to exert 
influence (funding and legislation, for instance), while severely constraining the ability 
of others (strict adherence to rules of procedures and new designed parameters that 
regulate action points, for example) to pursue their goals (Börzel and Risse 2003: 63). 
The action capacities of actors to exploit opportunities and restrain constraints are 
subject to two mediating factors: multiple veto points and formal institutions. The 
former implies that the more the dispersion of power across the polity and the more 
actors have rigid and polarised positions, the more difficult it is to introduce changes. 
The (in-) existence of supporting formal institutions which provide actors with material 
and ideational resources is also a determining factor in assessing whether 
Europeanisation does indeed lead to differential empowerment of actors or not. Member 
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states have built their own systems of interest intermediation based on inherited legacies 
(Saurugger 2013, Reiter 1994, Pirotta 1996, Lowenthal 1987). Privileged interest 
groups may choose to ignore or, at least, soften influence from Brussels to uphold the 
status-quo. Small states are traditionally synonymous with ‘partisan-friendly’ national 
governments which are more likely to exhibit ‘conservative’ features and protect their 
domestic political architecture from seismic external shocks.     
 
On the other hand, Europeanisation from the perspective of SI (right side) is understood 
as the emergence of new norms, practices and standards of behaviour to which member 
states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic practices and 
cultures. The internalisation of new norms and the development of new identities 
through socialisation and learning is subject to two mediating factors: norm 
entrepreneurs (or change agents) and informal institutions (or political culture). Change 
agents use moral arguments to persuade actors to redefine their interests and identities. 
A political culture oriented on consensus and cooperative decision-making helps change 
agents to bring about domestic change as a result of EU membership. 
 
Pondering on the mitigating factors that facilitate or hinder the effects of 
Europeanisation on interest groups, Eising concludes that these are the result of:  
  
the interest representation system (especially the differences in countries with pluralistic 
or corporatist systems); the type of group being studied (promotional groups, like 
environmentalists, find it easier to cooperate at a European level while protectionist 
groups, such as trade unions, often have to compete with unions in other member 
states); resources and geography (groups located far from Brussels find travel depletes 
limited financial and human resources) as well as the political compatibility of the 
national government and the group concerned (Eising 2008: 168).  
 
Through the use of empirical data encompassing Malta and Ireland, this study strives to 
map out the competing relationship between the RCI and SI conceptual frameworks of 
change. Thus, this study adopts a differentiated approach to Börzel and Risse’s model of 
Europeanisation. Whereas the latter treat RCI and SI as complementary forces of 
change leading to a transformation of domestic public affairs, this thesis investigates the 
two stripes of institutionalisms as competing or standing concepts in rivalry. So far, it 
has been established that the true nature of Europeanisation of Maltese and Irish groups 
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is to be decoded in terms of the mediating variables of the two competing theoretical 
variants.  
 
The next step is to identify a set of dimensions across which the extent of impact of EU 
influence on interest groups is to be measured. 
 
2.10.3 Assessing the impact on the dependent variables 
 
Ultimately, the whole discussion has to find its apex at this point. It is the ultimate stage 
wherein the null hypotheses is ratified, rejected or qualified. This is where one can 
determine if the Europeanisation impact on interest groups in Malta and Ireland has 
been marginal or significant between 2004 and 2011. The introductory chapter has 
identified the four dimensions through which the extent of Europeanisation is to be 
measured, namely: (i) internal structures, (ii) domestic responsiveness, (iii) European 
involvement and (iv) leaders’ attitude. Figure 2.4 defines each of these dimensions that 
are to be further expanded in the next couple of sections. 
 
2.10.3.1 Change in internal structures 
  
The first batch of changes due to Europeanisation can be visible within the internal 
organisational set-up of interest groups, wherein structures, resources and working 
practices are reshaped to take into account a wider spectrum. Structural transformations 
may include a change in the groups’ vision/mission to include a European perspective in 
addition to the domestic context, as well as designating key committee members to be 
exclusively in charge of EU affairs, or to do EU business in conjunction with other jobs. 
More resourceful groups may go even further and establish a fixed or fluid contact in 
Brussels. Enriching the resource base may also entail the acquisition of EU funding and 
participation in training programmes aimed to enhance EU knowledge. 
 
Change may also manifest itself in their working practices which may start to 
incorporate participation in EU related activities, engagement in transnational projects 
and a different typography of influence stratagems. It may also be the case that local 
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projects will start to embrace a European dimension through the use of statistical data, 
guest speakers and success stories.  
 
Figure 2.4: The effects of Europeanisation on domestic interest groups 
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2.10.3.2 Increased domestic responsiveness 
 
One of the key areas to look for change or elasticity, according to Ladrech (2005), is the 
degree of responsiveness and authoritativeness in relation to the domestic environment. 
Have the contributions of interest groups at the home front been enhanced as a result of 
membership? Are they any less or more significant and legitimate as interlocutors 
between society and government? Europeanisation may have also induced a new 
institutional challenge for the national coordination of EU policy by promoting the 
inclusion and engagement of the third sector in governance processes (Cassar 2008; 
Knill 2001; Kassim et al 2001). In this stance, it is pertinent to explore to what extent 
interest groups are responding to national mediating bodies. 
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Responsiveness to new institutional opportunities calls for the functioning of supportive 
formal institutions as well as norm entrepreneurs to instigate a mentality change in 
favour of cooperation and consensus building. EU membership might have brought 
about the need for networking or more permanent federations among interest groups to 
better address evolving trends. Such an evolution in the system of interest representation 
may have been experienced due to the growing competency of the EU in an increasing 
number of policy areas (Scharpf 1999). EU institutions acquiring or sharing 
competences over previously nationally determined policy areas may cause 
deterioration in special policy communities, as any change in the number of actors may 
alter the competitive edge for some groups (Ladrech 2005: 325). This would in turn 
create the need for interest groups to team with fellow domestic NGOs to solidify their 
voice. It is also valuable to investigate if organised groups have responded positively to 
the emerging concept of ‘PPPs which are considered crucial for both EU-funded and 
independent actions to be sustainable and effective’ (MEUSACnews 2011b: 4). 
 
2.10.3.3 Greater European involvement 
 
In terms of involvement in the wider European polity, Harwood (2009: 340) identifies 
three distinct levels. The first relates to those groups which actually make a direct 
contribution in EU institutions, including participation in Commission working groups, 
submission of feedback on Green and White Papers and engagement in EESC 
consultation processes. A second level applies to the impact of membership on the 
access of interest groups to EU institutions indirectly, through lobbying the Commission 
and the EP, including national MEPs. A third level of involvement is decoded in terms 
of links with other European groups, including membership in Euro umbrella groups, 
attainment of executive responsibilities within Euro federations and grasping 
networking opportunities with their European partners.  
 
Evidence suggests that whilst business lobbies have the human and financial capital to 
make a direct contribution at the EU arena, the more resource-humble NGOs prefer to 
exert pressure on their national governments which may, in turn, be in a position to 
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affect positions in the deliberations of the Council of Ministers (Pace 2006, 2008). 
Otherwise, domestic groups may choose to delegate European affairs to their parent 
organisations that are functional either on the national or European level. 
 
2.10.3.4 Attitudinal transformation 
 
If we extend the anatomical metaphor used by Van Schendelen (2005: 56), decoding 
change does not only involve the organisational set-up or skeleton and the working 
practices in home and European affairs or flesh and blood, but must also include values 
and identity or attitude as the fourth dimension of Europeanisation among organised 
groups. Working with attitudes or ‘habits of mind formed by past experience’ (Harper 
2010), means examining the motivation for specific behaviour that might change and/or 
improve over time. Given the personalisation of the lobbying processes in small states, 
it is crucial to assess leaders’ attachment to inherited praxis and their potential to change 
their outlook for a more active EU engagement. The interwoven matrix of norms and 
values have been formed over years of interaction among group members and leaders, 
and changing the accepted ethnographic identity can feel like rolling rocks uphill. 
Values are heartfelt beliefs about the appropriate way to behave and constitute the 
‘should’ and ‘shouldn't’ of both individuals and organisations (Allen 2006). Related to 
values is the concept of norms. These are implicit or explicit standards of behaviour 
agreed upon by group members which exert a powerful influence on social interaction 
(Morgan et al. 1986). The cultural dimension of any entity is one of the most stable and 
enduring features of organisational design. It calls for ‘the collective mental 
programming of the mind’ which is synchronised to the institutionalised context where 
individual actors interact (Steers and Black 1994). A significant change due to 
Europeanisation should manifest itself in the reconfiguration of the attitude of group 
leaders wherein the leaders themselves motivate the rest of their members to make a 
better use of the EU as a structure of opportunities and as a source of wider socialisation 
among European peers and beyond. 
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2.11 The next step 
This chapter provided a holistic review of the theoretical and conceptual framework that 
is being adopted in this study. It started by providing an insightful synopsis of the 
various models that try to explain the dynamics between state and non-state actors, 
namely, corporatism, pluralism, elitism and policy network/communities. After a brief 
discussion on their respective merits and inadequacies from the outlook of small states 
governance, the discussion proceeded to institutionalist theory that constitutes the 
theoretical backbone of this research. A great deal of the analysis concerned the 
diversity and vigour of its variants whilst, at the same time, every effort was exerted to 
single out their composite grassroots and common pivots. This thorough examination on 
the geometry of governance, eventually, shifted its focus on the effects of 
Europeanisation at member state level. At this point, the independent, dependent and 
mediating variables of the hypotheses were clearly illustrated and a detailed explanation 
was provided on how the extent and nature of Europeanisation are to be decoded in the 
empirical chapters. 
 
The next step is to turn attention on interest groups as the research primacy of this 
scientific investigation. Chapter 3 embraces the contradictory views of various political 
thinkers on the roles played by interest groups in society and governing institutions. 
Moreover, this part revolves around the typography of interest groups and the different 
types of strategies that they can resort to in accomplishing their objectives. Being key 
actors in contemporary democracies, these organisational issues and fieldwork activities 
are de facto important determinants of good governance and policy success. 
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Chapter 3 
The character and typology of interest groups 
 
 
We talk on principle, but we act on interest. 
 
Walter Savage Landor 
(1775-1864) 
English writer and poet 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Having laid out the theoretical and conceptual framework on solid ground in the 
previous sections, this chapter turns its focus on the research primacy of the study which 
rests on the character and role of interest groups involved in domestic policy-making 
and their interplay with governmental actors, as well as their participation in EU affairs. 
More specifically, it sets out to explore the structures and strategies of interest groups as 
intermediary actors between state and society. Such groups are deemed by the EU as 
generators of social capital and good governance, although one cannot discount their 
dark side which will also be discussed towards the end of this chapter. A comparative 
politics approach is being adopted to configure their different typologies which, 
ultimately, determine their stratagems to engage in public affairs. The major thrust of 
this chapter is to introduce in greater detail the nature of domestic interest groups, and 
the different methods and avenues of influence at their disposal. The inquiry 
commences with the complexity of multiple terminology associated with this field of 
analysis, together with a concise evaluation of how political thinkers assess the role of 
interest groups in the attainment of the common good. At the end of the chapter the 
correlation between interest groups and policy success is investigated, and consequently, 
groups’ input towards good and legitimate governance is also scrutinised. The chapter, 
moreover, features the variables that are eventually to be used when analysing change, 
if any, in internal structures, fieldwork interactivity and attitudinal formation of 
domestic organised groups as a consequence of EU impact. 
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3.2 Dealing with multiple terminology 
 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, the research field of interest representation is 
abundant not only with a long and versatile list of components including consumer 
groups, environmental movements, business lobbies, human rights groups, faith 
organisations, churches, professional associations, trade unions, think-tanks, universities, 
foundations and many more but, above all, with different terminologies to which a 
number of scholars attach specific semantics while others treat them as interchangeable. 
Figure 3.1 shows a compilation of such a versatile array of terms. 
 
Figure 3.1: Multiple terminology 
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The cost of this diversity is ambiguity in terms, ambiguity even about what the term 
‘interest group’ means and whether it is preferable or inferior to alternative terms. 
However, the complete picture is not as dull as it seems as ‘the benefit of this diversity 
is the existence of a large number of impressive studies that contribute much to our 
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understanding of politics, government and society’ (Werner and Wilson 2008: 349). 
Moreover all terms are united under the premise that they strive ‘to push public policy 
in a specific direction on behalf of the constituencies or a general political idea’ (Beyers 
at al. 2008: 1106). At the basis of them all, there is some sort of an organisational 
structure, represented in the black circle in figure 3.1, which is responsible for the set-up, 
operations and collective identity of each organised group. From its starting point, this 
study has adopted the term interest groups not only because it seems to be one of the 
most widely used term in academic literature but, more importantly, because its 
definitional connotations embrace almost all of the respective characteristics related to 
the rest. This work supports Saurugger’s definition stating that, 
 
Interest groups and social movements are entities whose aim is to represent the interests 
of a specific section of society. Their action strategies and degree of organisation must 
be placed on a continuum from loose to very organised, and from informal to formal 
consultation to protest movements (Saurugger 2013: 336). 
Relying on Rush’s assertion, the common thread that runs through the literature on 
interest groups, and other related terminology, is the process by which public policy 
[and public opinion] are formulated (Rush 1990: 7). The history of citizens’ engagement 
in the running of democracies and governance structures goes back, at least, to classical 
civilisations; however they were not always considered to be benign by everyone. In the 
next couple of sections, a historical insight of organised groups as interlocutors between 
state and society is to be provided, highlighting the contribution of interest formation 
towards participative democracies. 
 
3.3 An evolutionary insight 
 
The notion of civil society dates back at least to the ancient Roman notion of jus civile 
(Camilleri 1995: 216). In the more recent Western tradition, the formation of the first 
organised interests is unearthed during the Middle Ages. As towns grew larger and 
urban life became more competitive, the residents formed associations, called guilds, to 
protect their special interests. Guilds served as representative and philanthropic 
organisations of skilled labourers and craftsmen concerned with promoting the social, 
professional and religious aspirations of their members, to help those in need and to 
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stimulate their education and welfare (Matthews and Platt 2008: 250). Although the 
industrial revolution dealt a fatal blow to the guild movement, the gothic style, as the 
most dominant medieval architectural imprint, was propagandised in the nineteenth 
century as the symbol of a civil society which neither required nor tolerated the decrees 
of an absolute ruling power, but which arose organically out of common expectations, 
common beliefs and a shared experience of labour (Scruton 2007:35). These long-
established pluralist elements still constitute the very essence of modern interest groups 
in their quest to influence and contribute towards contemporary governance.  
 
3.3.1 Etymological connotations 
 
Interest groups flourish when governments have to listen to the people, and the slow 
spread of democracy from the eighteenth century has seen a sharp rise in their number, 
importance and variety. Campaigns have been fought over a bewildering range of issues, 
from the abolition of slavery to an ending of the trade in ivory and animal furs, from the 
outcry for women’s suffrage to resistance to the building of a by-pass around a rural 
town (Downing 2002: 8). Much of the organised interaction between state institutions 
and the numerous interests in society takes place through interest groups; the study of 
interest groups is thus of major importance in understanding the relationship between 
state and society (Smismans 2006, Magnette 2006, Smith 1993, Wilson 1990). In fact 
their attributed role as ‘democracy by proxy’ (Hudock 2005) is manifested through the 
etymological definition of the term interest which literally means ‘to be between’, 
derived from two Latin words: inter – ‘between’ and esse – ‘to be’ (Online Etymology 
Dictionary). In line with this etymological meaning, Berry (1977: 5) defines ‘an interest 
group as an intermediary between citizens and government, and it is the task of the 
organisation to convert what it perceives to be the desires of its constituents into 
specific policies and goals’.    
 
The idea of go-between entities is also promulgated by the Roman Catholic Church as 
the existence and operations of interest groups are considered safeguards against the 
hegemony, or ‘tyranny’ of the economic and political upper crust. Pope Benedict XVI, 
inspired by the social teachings of the Church, emphasises the importance of 
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subsidiarity which in a globalised world has to be considered as a key guaranteeing 
factor to delegate and stratify authority. In his encyclical letter Caritas in Veritate 
(2009: 57), Benedict XVI declares that ‘subsidiarity is first and foremost a form of 
assistance to the human person via the autonomy of intermediate bodies’. The 
betterment of representative democracy, the further inclusion of participative democracy 
and the achievement of the greater common good can all be attained by the vitality and 
autonomy of interest groups as intermediary bodies within the political system. 
 
Almost all organised interests contribute in different, and sometimes conflicting, ways 
to enlarging social participation. Groups have often been credited with the ability to 
counteract the anonymity and indifference of mass society, and, as a consequence, 
provide individual citizens with the necessary scope and tools to transform passive and 
representative democracies, or even ‘totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships’, to 
‘truly’ engaging and participatory democratic societies’ (Werner and Wilson 2008: 363).  
 
Given the versatile array of democratic credentials associated with interest groups, one 
cannot assume that political discourse has always been positive in their regard. Over the 
last three centuries, political thinkers have developed different paradigms of how to 
judge the ‘power’ of intermediary bodies in the art of governing. In the next section we 
shall explore how swings of apprehension and trust characterise the general outlook 
towards interest groups. 
 
3.4 The changing perspectives of political thinkers 
 
Classical and contemporary political scholars have been fascinated by the intermediary 
role of interest groups as they tried to evaluate their effectiveness in the public sphere; 
yet there is a shared concern that it is difficult to calculate their true impact due to the 
‘shrouded’ nature of campaigning and lobbying (Cigler and Loomis 1995: 25/27). 
Leaders of organised groups tend to ‘exaggerate’ their degree of leverage (Jordan and 
Maloney 1997, Zeller 1938). For example, both politicians and bureaucrats present 
‘vociferous claims of freedom from any outside influence’ in designing and 
implementing policies. On the other hand, interest groups, including trade unions and 
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employers’ associations of very high profile, are usually reluctant to communicate their 
latest figures in terms of paid-up members and tend to overestimate the unanimity and 
the size of their membership. In sum, the measurement of group influence is, as one 
American lobbyist put it, ‘like finding a black cat in a coal bin at midnight’ (Wilson 
1987: 221). Contemplating the extent that interest groups exert in politics, Lowi 
concludes that their importance differs from one policy domain to another (Lowi as 
quoted by Wilson 1990). Notwithstanding these default limitations, the idea of interest 
representation has underpinned the works of great European and American thinkers 
with ‘more passion’ than the study of other political institutions such as parliamentary 
or congressional committees (Wilson 1990: 2). 
 
3.4.1 Waves of scepticism and trust 
 
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) was sceptical of interest groups as he feared that they 
would hijack public policy by asserting minority rights against the interests of the 
majority. In his Social Contract (1762), Rousseau maintains that if groups cannot be 
hampered, then they should be as numerous as possible in order to limit their potential 
impact. This is in effect the crux of multiple veto points which are at the focal point of 
the rationalist approach on which the second hypothesis of this thesis is founded. James 
Madison (1751-1836), one of the principal architects of the US constitution, agrees with 
Rousseau when he argues that there should be many interest groups in the system of 
governance so as to hold each other in check. Although Madison is attributed as being 
an enthusiast of interest groups, in reality his insistence on the promulgation of 
abundant factions was based on the hope that selfish interest groups would 
counterbalance each other in the ultimate quest for the common good (Wilson 1990: 3) 
 
The French observer of the US in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) warned 
against the possibility of a ‘tyranny of the majority’ in democratic systems under which 
the views or interests of minorities will be sacrificed. He finds consolation in the 
American genius for association, which leads to a proliferation of clubs, churches and 
societies that will serve the cause of the marginalised, the outnumbered and the 
voiceless (Scruton 2007: 691). When Robert Dahl (b.1915), clarifies his view about 
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democracy, he calls politically advanced countries ‘polyarchies’ where there are elected 
officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, rights to run for office, freedom of 
expression, alternative information and associational autonomy (Dahl 1989). Like de 
Tocqueville, Dahl trusts interest groups as creators of multiple centres of political power 
and thus they are an effective remedy to the de facto defects of democratic politics.  
 
However, Mancur Olson (1932-1998) and Theodore Lowi (b.1931) illustrate the 
weakness of much interest group analysis that does not account properly for the reasons 
groups form for, persist and accumulate their resource base (Cigler and Loomis 1995: 2). 
In particular, Olson focuses on the logical basis of interest group membership and 
participation. He theorises that ‘only a separate and selective incentive will stimulate a 
rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way’ (Olson 2002: 51). 
This means that individuals will act collectively to provide private goods, but not to 
provide public goods. In his later works he continued to elaborate his logic to the point 
where interest groups are attributed with the fall of the state, 
 
Groups will have the incentives to form lobby groups and influence policies in their 
favour. These policies will tend to be protectionist and anti-technology, and will 
therefore hurt economic growth; but since the benefits of these policies are selective 
incentives
30
 concentrated amongst the few coalitions’ members, while the costs are 
diffused throughout the whole population, the ‘logic’ dictates that there will be little 
public resistance to them. Hence as time goes on, and these distributional coalitions 
accumulate in greater and greater numbers, the nation burdened by them will fall into 
economic decline (Olson 1982). 
 
Olson’s prediction appears to hold the theoretical explanation of the downfall of Social 
Partnership (SP) in Ireland, as is later highlighted in the empirical chapters. In parallel, 
Lowi’s antipathy against interest groups finds its roots in the reality of patronage where 
interest groups tighten on the machinery of governance leading to policy formulation to 
the advantage of the resourceful and clamorous few. This mechanism undermines the 
fundamental trajectory of democracy. 
 
                                                 
30
 Benefits which are available only to members such as cheaper insurances, gift vouchers, glossy 
calendars and diaries, and a psychological satisfaction from belonging. Only if compelled to join or if an 
interest group offers selective incentives to join is it rational for an individual to join an interest group. 
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The government expanded by responding to the demands of all major organized 
interests, by assuming responsibility for programs sought by those interests, and by 
assigning that responsibility to administrative agencies. Through the process of 
accommodation, the agencies became captives of the interest groups, a tendency [that 
can be] described as clientelism (Lowi 1979). 
 
Such an antagonist rationale against interest groups has brought stagnation in the field 
of research. Frequently, interest groups remained ‘unimpressive organisations deserving 
little and receiving little respect from politicians’ (Wilson 1990: 14). Simultaneously, 
society at large looked with suspicion at the ‘veiled’ activities of interest groups, but 
these sceptical attitudes were about to change. For example, Marsh et al (2006: 2) show 
that the combined membership of British political parties is little more than half that of 
the largest UK interest group, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Politicians, 
civil servants and journalists spend a significant proportion of their time communicating 
with interest groups. A new breed of researchers have changed their goalpost and, 
instead of pursuing their research to investigate the notoriously difficult question of the 
power of interest groups, they started to adopt a comparative perspective through which 
they can demonstrate the modes of integrating interests in society with the state.  
 
Such a comparative approach entails the classification of different types of interest 
groups under umbrella terminologies so as clusters of groups could be compared and 
contrasted across a number of factors, including their organisational mission, target 
audience, lobbying methods and scale of operations. A detailed analysis of the typology 
of interest groups follows. 
 
3.5 Typology of interest groups 
 
There have been many different attempts by numerous scholars to classify interest 
groups into a coherent typology, but the ambiguity of terminology referred to earlier 
often resulted in ambiguity of categorisation. Figure 3.2 constitutes an original attempt 
by the author to integrate the different widely accepted typologies of interest groups into 
one blueprint. This typology can be considered as a distillation of the distinct yet 
interrelated concepts which academics and practitioners have used to differentiate 
among various forms of interest formations and operations. 
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Before closely examining each of the typological concepts, it is crucial to note that 
interest groups do not operate in a vacuum, but their very nature and character depend 
on the system and culture of social and civil dialogue within the polity they operate in. 
The analysis of political terrain has been exposed in the preceding chapter, however, at 
this stage it would be appropriate to differentiate between social and civil dialogue.  
Whereas the former can be described in short as that communication activity involving 
social partners [on a tripartite basis] intended to influence the arrangement and 
development of social relations, the latter represents the ongoing and structured 
conversation that policy-makers maintain with the established organisations of civil 
society (Pierre and Peters 2000). In a nutshell, this notion refers to the three traditional 
models of the relationships between government and society, that is corporatism, 
pluralism and corporate pluralism that were discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Figure 3.2: Typology of interest groups 
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3.5.1 Functional basis 
 
Perhaps the most widely used criterion for categorising interest groups is the functional, 
or representational, basis. In this regard, groups are classified according to the policy 
domain in which they are active such as economic, socio-cultural, environmental, 
equality and justice, faith and public interests. Their functional basis could also be of a 
temporary nature. In this case, the collective representation of interests are promoted or 
defended by single issue groups. Once case is closed, such groups cease to exist. The 
problem with this type of classification is that not all groups fit comfortably into one of 
these functional domains, or it may also be the case that a group would belong to more 
than one category.  
 
5.2 Raison d'être 
 
Groups can also be differentiated in accordance with their core missions, or raison d’ 
être, which can be categorised into two broad sections: protectionist, sometimes 
referred to as sectional, and promotional. Jean Blondel, according to Rush (1990: 9), is 
accredited with being the person who first distinguished between those groups created 
for the defence of some particular section of the population and those for the promotion 
of a cause.  
 
The former includes trade unions, professional associations, agricultural lobbies and 
employers chambers which are specifically founded to protect their sectional interests, 
while the latter encompasses those groups that have been formed to promote a ‘cause’ 
of public interest such as the environmentalists, human rights movements and single 
issue groups. Compared to promotional ones, groups of a protectionist nature have more 
sufficient political access to formal institutions of power, including the executive, 
legislative and judiciary bodies, because they are likely to be recognised as legitimate 
representatives of certain sections of the population.  
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3.5.3 Relationship with central authorities 
 
An important variation on this theme, although by no means synonymous with it, has 
been developed by Wyn Grant (2000), who divides groups into insider and outsider 
groups, depending on the their relationship with central executive authorities.  
 
Insider groups are seen as having political legitimacy with the government of the day, 
and consequently they are valued for their policy credibility. They are able to take 
advantage of regular access to and consultation with the senior echelons of Government 
and the Civil Service machinery. Insider groups are normally content with operating 
within the existing ‘rules of the game’. They tend to be sectional but over the last couple 
of years some causal groups have achieved a degree of insider status, particularly some 
green organisations. On a supranational level, the European Commission tends to 
attribute interest groups with an insider character wherein they are invited to send their 
delegates to participate in the various policy committees. Consequently, civil society 
has become entrenched into the complex policy-making mechanisms of the EU. Insider 
groups can be further dissected into a more refined distinction, that is, core, specialist 
and peripheral insiders. Firstly, groups that are involved in collective bargaining 
processes, thanks to their close relationships with decision-makers over a broad range of 
issues, are called core insiders, such as general workers unions and chambers of 
commerce. Secondly, specialist insider groups are regarded as reliable and authoritative, 
but in a much narrower policy niches, for example, farmers associations and specialised 
unions like the ones that cater for midwives and nurses, teachers, engineers, etc. Thirdly, 
there are peripheral insiders who are often consulted but carry little real political 
influence and authority. 
 
In contrast, outsider groups are largely excluded from political consultation and contact. 
They may lack resources and political clout, implying that they have to work outside the 
governmental decision-making process. Some groups are ideologically opposed to 
political systems, notably anti-conformists and radical minorities and, thus, are termed 
antagonists. They choose to exert pressure by circumventing existing political 
institutions which they regard as lacking legitimacy and credibility. Such groups prefer 
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to retain their independence from any state interference and choose to lobby outside the 
perimeters of government, for example the Moviment Graffitti
31
 in Malta. In the Irish 
case, one can mention a number of antagonist or radical groups, like Revolutionary 
Anarchafeminist Group
32
, the Workers’ Solidarity Movement33 and Seomra Spraoi.34 
  
In forming his insider/outsider typology, Grant was also aware of some interest groups 
tending to switch their relationship from one mode to another in accordance to changing 
situational circumstances. He also agrees with Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin (1994: 
32-6) that ‘the choice of strategies by interest groups is constrained rather than being an 
entirely free one’ (Grant 2000: 28). Moreover, there are instances where groups tend to 
‘oscillate’ between insider and outsider strategies, thus creating a sense of ambiguity in 
the real nature of their relationship with the state and its agencies. These hybrid groups 
pursue a ‘good cop/bad cop’ strategy in which insider strategies of reasoned argument 
are combined with the mobilisation of public support (Page as quoted by Grant 2000: 
30). Many scholars cite the case of Greenpeace
35
 as a typical example of this kind. Over 
the years, Greenpeace has shifted towards more dialogue with government and business 
while maintaining the direct and militant action approach that still attracts the pure 
green hardliners. 
 
Contemporary experience may be portraying an inverse relationship between central 
authorities and interest groups to that envisaged by Grant. As governments are 
                                                 
31
 Moviment Graffitti is active against oppression and exploitation of people, environment and animals; 
with a vision of freedom and radical democracy. Its activism consists primarily of two strategies: (i) direct 
action in various areas such as social justice and protection of the environment and (ii) ideological action 
as it considers ideology as having a vital role in order that leftitst and progressive visions may be 
proposed within social formations (Moviment Graffitti website – accessed May 3, 2011). 
32
 Members of the Revolutionary Anarchafeminist Group call themselves anarchists, united in their belief 
for the need to create alternatives to the capitalistic, patriarchal society wherein all women are dominated 
and exploited. 
33
 The Workers Solidarity Movement was founded in Dublin, Ireland in 1984 following discussions by a 
number of local anarchist groups on the need for a national anarchist organisation. Its members share a 
fundamental belief that capitalism is the problem. 
34
 Seomra Spraoi is a collective that came together in 2004 to set up a radical social centre in Dublin. This 
idea is an attempt to rebuild some of the things that have been lost to the Irish in the modern world: the 
sense of community, an atmosphere of tolerance and respect, a safe and secure environment and a non-
commercial space for political, arts, cultural, community and other events. 
35
 Greenpeace is an independent, campaigning organisation which uses non-violent, creative 
confrontation to expose global environmental problems, and to force the solutions which are essential to a 
green and peaceful future. Greenpeace's goal is to ensure the ability of the earth to nurture life in all its 
diversity (Greenpeace International website – accessed May 3, 2011). 
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increasingly becoming resource-constrained actors, the dependencies between the state 
and powerful societal interests have changed direction. As Pierre and Peters (2000) 
clearly claim, nowadays it is as if governments want to be accepted by the other actors 
as insiders in policy communities, 
 
In the heyday of corporatism, organised interests were eager to secure access and 
participation in the state’s decision-making processes. Today, it is the state which seeks 
to engage the third sector in public service delivery (Pierre and Peters 2000: 83). 
 
Having laid out the different kinds of relationships between the state and non-state 
actors, the discussion shall now turn to the various scales of operations and alternative 
routes of influence that are available for organised groups to get their message through.  
 
3.5.4 Scale of operations and routes of influence 
 
The speeding up of regionalism and globalisation that are incrementally constituting a 
new world order, while reshaping domestic political space, has rendered the 
insider/outsider typology of interest groups less useful and dogmatic. The ‘new politics’ 
paradigm based on ‘a multi-level, multi-arena game’ offers a political scenario which is 
not necessarily confined to the traditional Westphalian system of nation-states. 
Contemporary times are characterised by powerful transformative forces responsible for 
a massive shake-out of societies, economies and the institutions of governance. States 
still retain the ultimate legal claim to effective supremacy over what occurs within their 
territories, but this is carried out in the light of expanding jurisdiction of institutions of 
international governance and the parameters of international law (Held et al 2005). The 
new world order is no longer conceived as ‘state-centric’, as regionalism and 
globalisation are associated with the emergence of powerful new non-territorial forms 
of economic and political organisations in the global domain, such as multinational 
corporations, international/regional regulatory agencies and transnational social 
movements. The creation of ‘a kind of global politics’ has implications for sovereignty 
and democracy (Anheier et al 2005) and, if given time and opportunity, global civil 
society can ‘strengthen and reinvigorate’ the credentials of democratic institutions 
(Wainwright 2005). These epoch-making developments led to a different configuration 
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of interest groups, one which takes into account the scale of operations and the 
preferred routes of influence.  
 
The scale of operations can range from local scenarios, wherein local authorities are 
targeted, to international arenas characterised by global and regional civil organised 
interests operating beyond and across national borders. The concept of MLG, as 
managed by the EU, gives expression to the idea that there are many interacting 
authority structures at work in the emergent global political economy. It illuminates the 
intimate entanglement between the domestic and European levels of state and non-state 
authorities. In the words of Wonka and Warntjen (2004: 10), ‘MLG shifts the focus from 
politics about the EU to politics in the EU’ and stresses the governance aspect by 
highlighting the relatively equal (horizontal) distribution of power in EU and member 
states’ politics among private interest groups and public actors (Kohler-Koch and Eising 
1999). In a similar vein, Bache and Flinders (2004: 197) observe that this mode of 
decision-making at various territorial levels is characterised by the increased 
participation of non-state actors, which are not necessarily Euro federations, but also 
interest groups operating at the national, regional and local levels. Bache and George’s 
hypothesis that the changing contexts and roles of the state are stimulating state actors 
to ‘develop new strategies of coordination, steering and networking with other non-state 
actors’ (Bache and George 2006: 36), has been probed into by later researchers 
(Saurugger 2013, Harwood 2010, Adshead and Tonge 2009, Bache 2008, Cassar 2008). 
Empirical evidence from these studies seems to indicate a positive relationship between 
public service reform and MLG as part of the Europeanisation process.  
 
A reconfiguration in the scale of operations leads to diversified routes of influence. 
Traditionally, interest groups were effectively geared to target national bodies, above all, 
ministers and central national bureaucracies. However, as the reality of the EU with its 
concepts of MLG and multi-access points became more immersed in public policy 
processes and in the actors’ mindset, a ‘European’, sometimes referred to as ‘Brussels’, 
route of influence emerged to complement, not substitute, the older national route, 
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At its most simple level, the ‘national route’ refers to the use of national contacts and 
national governments to influence the EU decision-making, whereas the ‘European 
route’ involves seeking to exert influence by representation direct to the European 
institutions themselves (Greenwood 2003: 32). 
 
If they choose the ‘European route’, interest groups have to take into account that the 
fundamental relationship between them and the European institutions is one of 
exchange: EU institutions seek information, interest groups seek influence. If the latter 
want to exert influence, they have to provide information (Charrad 2005: 14). Lobbying 
is a difficult task, and requires not only financial and personnel resources but also a 
profound knowledge of the EU institutions. Each institution has different ways of 
dealing with external input, and according to numerous commentators  (Said 2006, Van 
Schendelen 2005, Fazi and Petrescu 2003, Flynn 2000), national and supranational 
umbrella organisations, together with their commissioned lobbyists, need to adapt their 
strategies to the constantly changing settings they find themselves in. Rapid 
advancement in communication technologies has extended the geographical public 
square to cyber political space where the potential of domestic groups to go beyond 
their national borders has increased dramatically. Empiricism is confirming Hill and 
Hughes’ claim (1998: 181-184) that the more internet penetration spreads, the more it 
will change the nature of political action and discourse.  
  
As we have seen, the task of categorising interest groups into a typology which best 
suits particular polities is not a straightforward task since there are various variables at 
play. Nonetheless groups are all eager to find some space in the corridors of power 
where they can exert pressure among politicians and bureaucrats. Or else they can 
occupy the public square or utilise the cyber platform to sensitise the public about their 
concerns on policy issues. Whether engaged in physical or virtual activities, interest 
groups need to understand the art of lobbying and the management of public affairs in 
order to move and shake the status quo of institutional arrangements. In the next section, 
the discussion shall revolve round the different techniques used in exercising influence 
over policy processes and the public at large. 
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3.6 Lobbying and corrupt practices 
 
An essential part of the work performed by interest groups involves influence over 
policy decisions and public attitude through lobbying stratagems. Etymologically, the 
political meaning of the word ‘lobby’ refers to ‘those who seek to influence legislation’ 
in reference to the custom of influence-seekers gathering in large entrance-halls outside 
legislative chambers (Online Etymology Dictionary 2011). There are politicians and 
legislators who accept lobbyists and allow them space to manoeuvre around public 
policy domains, while many others tend to be extremely suspicious and raise ethical 
questions on their coercion tactics which sometimes, they argue, have a hint of political 
blackmailing and bribery. 
At the European level, there has been the new voluntary Transparency Register (a joint 
effort of the EC and the EP) which was launched in 2011. It replaces the Register of 
Interest Representatives 2008, which followed the European Transparency Initiative 
launched 2005 to ensure that the European Union is ‘open to public scrutiny’. When 
interviewed by the author in 2009, Charles McCreevy, Commissioner for Internal 
Market and Services (2004-2010), maintained that in future, the success of such 
transparency drives depends on whether there will be agreement on a working definition 
of who shall be incorporated in this register or not. ‘Everybody should know who the 
lobby groups are and in whose interests they are lobbying’. 36  Nonetheless, 
interconnections between lobbying and corruption are not alien to EU institutions. In 
March 2011, three MEPs were charged with corrupt practices and, eventually, two of 
them resigned. According to BBC online (2011), Sunday Times reporters posed as 
lobbyists looking to hire politicians to amend EU legislation. They said the three 
MEPs
37
 agreed to take up the role for up to 100,000 euros per year each. A far more 
serious case is the one involving John Dalli, Commissioner for Health and Consumer 
Policy (2010-2012), who was ordered to resign by the President of the European 
Commission following a report by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) in 2012 
                                                 
36
 Interview conducted by the author on July 8, 2009 in Brussels. 
37
 Zoran Thalen (Slovenian MEP), Ernst Stasser (Austrian MEP) and Adrian Severin (Romanian MEP). 
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which claimed that a Maltese lobbyist had approached a Swedish tobacco producer and 
proposed to make use of his contacts with Dalli to lift the EU export ban on snus
38
. 
Political legitimacy of interest representation can only be realised through the 
attainment of the principles of transparency and accountability (Wilson 1990, Smith 
1993). Lobbying tactics need to be ethically correct, although the demarcation line of 
what is ethically correct or what is not is not always clear and categorical. Attention 
shall now shift to discuss the various forms that lobbying strategies can take. An interest 
group wanting to influence the domestic and European arenas can choose from a variety 
of ‘old’ and ‘new’ lobbying techniques. According to Van Schendelen (2005: 44) the 
traditional methods are four, namely coercion, encapsulation, advocacy and 
argumentation, while the new (and better) stratagems involve the practice of Public 
Affairs Management (PAM). The latter entails a more holistic approach, starting from 
making internal choices and restructuring, and then proceeding to executing fieldwork. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the components of both the old and new influence techniques. 
 
3.6.1 ‘Old’ strategies of lobbying 
 
The first among the traditional influence techniques is coercive action. Business 
lobbyists and pressure groups may set up a blockade or an audacious campaign, such as 
the ‘tuna wars’ promoted by fishermen groups39 and green interests like Greenpeace.40 
In 2002, during a parliamentary debate that was discussing amendments to the 
Referendum Act in preparation for the referendum on EU accession, the Maltese Prime 
Minister claimed that ‘some of the existing investors had made it clear to him that 
                                                 
38
 Snus is a moist powder tobacco product originating from a variant of dry snuff in the early 18th century 
in Sweden. The sale of snus is illegal in the EU but due to special exemptions, it is still manufactured and 
consumed primarily in Sweden and Norway. 
39
 The hard-line protest campaigns by French fishermen in 2006 are a case in point. French tuna 
fishermen angry at a campaign by Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior II for a moratorium on tuna fishing 
blocked access to the port of Marseille on August 23, forcing ferries and cargo ships to suspend journeys 
(Reuters 2006). 
40
 On June 22, 2009 scuffles broke out in Malta as Greenpeace protesters tried to board a fishing boat in 
the Grand Harbour during a protest against unsustainable fishing. The incident happened when activists 
blocked access to the boats soon after they arrived from Libyan waters. The protest was held by activists 
from the UK, Australia, the US and Lebanon. One of the Americans said that when he tried to get on 
board one of the boats, he was punched, pulled by the hair and thrown overboard. Further scuffles broke 
out as another Greenpeace member tried to board a boat (timesofmalta.com 2009). 
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unless Malta became a member of the EU they would transfer their investment to other 
countries within the EU’ (Pirotta 2006: 283). It was a clear case of political 
blackmailing, or coercive pressure to use more ethically correct terminology.   
 
Figure 3.3:  Old and new influence techniques 
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Adapted from Van Schendelen 2005 
 
Encapsulation, a second technique, can be exploited by state and non-state actors alike. 
Interest groups can formalise their influence by accepting a leadership position in a joint 
scheme and/or by applying for state or EU funding. For sceptics, the price of becoming 
an integral part of the policy process is that NGOs will be wrapped within the state’s 
institutional framework with the probability of losing their independence. A subtler 
variant is the establishment of procedures of decision-making which make them 
subordinate to state authorities. Both the EU and individual member states are 
nowadays relying more heavily on partnership programmes and subsidy allocations to 
get NGOs on board in tandem with formal institutions. 
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The third traditional stratagem is advocacy which can never go out of usage since it is 
the bread and butter of any interest group, particularly when they detect an opportunity 
or fear a threat. Most often this technique manifests itself in public relations campaigns 
and other propaganda drives. Berry (1977: 213) identifies three categories of tactical 
advocacy: (a) techniques that are characterised by direct communication between 
lobbyists and governmental officials, (b) methods through which groups stimulate 
lobbying by citizens towards their government, and (c) tactics that groups may use to try 
to change governmental policy by influencing elections or altering public opinion. The 
referendum campaign on the introduction of divorce in Malta in May 2011 is a case in 
point. Pro and anti divorce pressure groups were formed which, together with political 
parties and the Church, engaged themselves in various public activities to get their 
message through to the electorate. The Church, together with the anti-divorce 
movements, defended the indissolubility of marriage and the stability of the family for 
the greater common good, while those in favour advocated that divorce is a civil right 
and that the interests of suffering citizens should not be sacrificed to the moral beliefs of 
the Catholic majority. Moreover the pro campaigners referred to the EU context where, 
they said, every citizen, except the Maltese, has the right of divorce. Their plea was to 
give the Maltese the same rights as those enjoyed by the rest of Europeans. 
 
Argumentation, according to Van Schendelen, is the fourth ‘old’ influence strategy.  
Here, self-interest is hidden behind seemingly intellectual reasoning based on logically 
sound inferences and empirically credible references. The idea is to present the cause in 
a way that the changes being lobbied for are to the benefit of society as a whole 
(Downing 2002: 6). A sizzling debate started in the last quarter of 2008 and was 
pursued in the following years when the Maltese government announced a reform in the 
utility tariffs pertaining to water, gas and electricity.
41
 Considering the higher tariff 
system as a drastic austerity measure, both the employers’ and workers’ representatives 
embarked on a long series of disputations that involved diverse arguments. They relied 
                                                 
41
 The announcement generated a chorus of disapproval from the social partners, who highlighted that the 
procedure adopted for the revision of the tariffs was not based on consultation; moreover, the trade unions 
and employer organisations were concerned about the adverse effects that the higher prices would have 
on the economy. On October 29, 2008, the MCESD issued a short statement noting that it had not been 
properly consulted by the government on the tariffs issue. Furthermore, MCESD insisted that the 
government should take the necessary measures to alleviate the burden of the new tariffs (Debono 2009). 
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on macro economic and social pleas to mobilise greater and wider public support in 
order to try and safeguard their members’ interests. 
 
Each of the four old lobbying strategies is still practised in the public square and within 
the corridors of power, yet these customary techniques have a limited, and frequently 
even decreasing effectiveness and efficiency. These stratagems seem to be unfit to 
match the challenging, ever changing national and EU playing fields where pragmatism, 
alliance formation and cross-cultural/sectorial interactivity are much more crucial than 
rigidity, protecting one’s own local ivory tower or simply isolating oneself through 
forcible action or encapsulation. In this context, Van Schendelen (2005) makes his case 
in favour of the ‘new’ strategies of lobbying based on PAM. 
 
3.6.2 ‘New’ strategies of lobbying 
 
PAM has become the new dictum. Interest groups need to improve their organisations 
continuously, identify alternative strategies and not stick to prescribed ones, determine 
their targets (which local, national, regional or international institutions to steer) and 
invest more time and energy to sustain their relations with partner organisations and 
establish new networks through the use of  social media. In addition, PAM entails the 
detection of those policy arenas where interest groups need to form coalitions and 
bargain collectively, build a workable agenda, set appropriate timing when to intervene 
and opt for the optimum tailored lobbying methods, techniques and routes. This is a 
complex process involving a simultaneous matrix constituted of ‘internal preparatory 
work’ and ‘fieldwork interactivity’. Groups need not only be rational in their choices to 
maximise their interests in the arena, but they must also be eager to learn through 
constant processes of evaluation and socialisation. It represents a practical way where 
RCI and SI become intertwined to offer a more holistic and pragmatic approach. When 
correlating the old and new influence strategies, Van Schendelen concludes that, 
 
The new techniques are, in contrast, based on the belief that the domain and the scope 
of influence are always limited and fragile. The domain has to be scanned by going 
window-out and the scope has to be enlarged by acting window-in. The popular 
catchword for both is lobbying. A lobby group, thus, is a pressure group acting window-
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out [external fieldwork] and window-in [home organisation and strategy formulation] 
(Van Schendelen 2005: 47). 
  
The set of questions, exhibited in Figure 3.3, absorbs the two logics of RCI and SI: 
calculation and appropriateness. Groups activists have to take into account the codes of 
appropriate behaviour and the contextual values of their calculated actions within the 
political arena. Concurrently, they seek to achieve their aspirations through 
methodological processes in the games people play. Thus, the PAM approach is 
conducive to the theoretical framework of new institutionalism as applied in this study. 
The transition from the old to the new patterns of lobbying can be considered an 
indication of Europeanisation. PAM is definitely more in line with the norms and values 
of power-sharing, negotiation, compromise, solidarity, coalition building and 
networking as promoted by the EU polity.  
 
The approach proposed by the PAM, together with its underlying institutional back-up 
and organisational norms, is considered by many as a core constituent of good 
governance not only within organised groups structures but, more importantly, in 
securing more legitimate processes of policy-making at the national and European 
levels. The theme of good governance shall be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.7 Towards good governance and policy success 
 
Good governance has already been referred to in Chapter 2 as one of the four 
fundamental pillars on which the economic resilience of small states rests. It was also 
implied throughout this chapter, particularly when reference was made to the social 
teachings of the Catholic Church and the principle of MLG as promoted by the EU. 
Although still a contested term with a high normative content, Hyden et al (2008) 
present one of the more important and recent elaborations of the concept of governance. 
Their approach is very broad defining governance as ‘the formation and stewardship of 
the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as 
well as economic and social actors interact to make decisions’. This definition, echoing 
the underlying principles of RCI and SI, epitomises the role and contribution of civil 
 89 
society towards public policy where citizens and interest groups raise and become aware 
of political issues and participate in ensuing political debate.  
 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1997a: iv), good 
governance ‘comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which 
citizens and groups can articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise 
their legal rights and obligations’. It presents a positive corollary between policy 
legitimacy and policy success: the greater the degree of policy legitimacy through 
public participation, fairness, accountability and transparency, the better the chance to 
achieve policy success. Figure 3.4 presents the eight fundamental values of good 
governance as identified by the UNDP. 
 
Figure 3.4: The core values of good governance 
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UNDP 1997 
 
Of all the nine characteristics of good governance, strategic vision deserves a special 
mention since the rest have more or less been treated in previous sections and chapters. 
Strategic vision refers to the broad and long-term perspective that the state and the 
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public ought to develop to realise the benefits of good governance. This entails an 
understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which public policy 
is grounded. In other words, good governance needs to be interwoven within the 
existing political culture. It builds on the social and economic fabric of the polity and 
strives to change those realities that are in conflict with any of its core characteristics. 
Interest groups do have important roles in policy processes and they stand to contribute 
best when there exists a political culture that is highly consultative. This aspect of 
governance, relating to voice and accountability, often articulated in terms of freedom 
of expression and association, is one of the six fundamental components of the 
Kaufmann Index of good governance (Kaufmann et al. 2009).
 42
 
 
The consultative style of governance is deemed important to simplify the decision-
making process (Smith 1993), ensuring the legitimacy of political decisions (Jordan and 
Richardson 1987) and lead to policy success (McConnell 2010). Green (quoted by 
Deakin 2001: 109) comments that ‘any conception of civil society and its role in 
democracy must incorporate a more sophisticated understanding of policy-making’. 
Actors operating outside the state must, therefore, have a contributing voice in any of 
the five stages of the policy cycle as figure 3.5 suggests.  
 
In this context, Gorges (1997: 4) asserts that it is impossible to make policy in an 
advanced industrial economy without active participation or, at least, acquiescence 
(passive or forced) of important interest groups. Rhodes (1996) speaks about game-like 
interactions between state and non-state actors, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of 
the game negotiated and agreed by network participants. Although policy networks 
have a significant degree of autonomy within the state, the latter can indirectly and 
imperfectly steer networks. In part, this urge to involve a greater spectrum of actors in 
making public policy explains why state bureaucracies seem to be constantly 
reinventing themselves.  
 
                                                 
42
 The Kaufmann Index, or The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports aggregate and 
individual governance indicators for 215 economies for six dimensions of governance: (a) voice and 
accountability, (b) political stability and absence of violence, (c) government effectiveness, (d) regulatory 
quality, (e) rule of law, and (f) control of corruption. 
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Figure 3.5: The policy cycle 
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New public management calls for two distinct yet interrelated values – openness43 and 
inclusion
44
 – in its quest to improve public policy. These two elements, highly 
recommended by OECD, led to the setting up of supporting formal and informal 
institutions that address the missing link that traditionally characterised the relationship 
between state and non-state actors. Figure 3.6 presents a continuum identifying the 
different steps of involvement of interest groups at all stages of the policy cycle. Except 
for exclusion and indifference, the other steps can be legitimate in the circumstances, 
for example partnerships are not always desirable, especially in times of economic 
decline or when NGOs persist in considering themselves as mere protest groups (Farrell 
2011: 10).  
 
                                                 
43
 Openness means providing citizens with information and making the policy process accessible and 
responsive (OECD 2009: 13). 
44
 Inclusion means including as wide a variety of citizens’ voices in the policy making process as much as 
possible (ibid.). 
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Figure 3.6: A scale of involvement of civil society organisations in policy processes 
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The impetus of civil society is, thus, at the very core of good governance. Rizzo (1989: 
96) maintains that governments may jeopardise their position by being oblivious to 
well-deserved causes and demands. Policy practitioners recognise the fact that ‘public 
engagement is not just desirable’ but ‘it is a condition of effective governance’ (Lenihan 
2009: 208); ‘a matter of survival for open, democratic government’ (OECD 2005d). 
While Minogue et al (1998) ponder on the challenge of converting changing ideas into 
practice, Andersson and Wilson (2009: 58) stress the need to ‘increase the focus on 
doing better rather than just more participation’. Think-tanks, policy practitioners and 
NGO leaders are not impressed by high levels of eloquent rhetoric but are more 
interested in translating the elements of good governance into ‘standard practice, 
especially at the national level’ (Lukensmeyer 2009: 232). This entails commitment to 
finding ways to institutionalise deliberative practices which is most prevalent in small 
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states where governance, according to Sutton (2006: 13), is characterised by 
‘exaggerated personalism’.45  
 
3.8 Negative social capital 
 
Although the inclusion of interest groups in the complex matrix of national and 
international policy-making is most often considered as a positive step towards greater 
legitimacy, better democracy, stronger accountability and an enhanced propensity for 
‘world peace and prosperity’ (Annan 2005), empirical evidence has also suggested a 
sinister side of citizens’ engagement. 
 
Depending on the intentions of their leaders, interest groups can either serve as a 
positive force to strengthen social capital [defined by Putman et al. (1993) as ‘features 
of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency 
of society by facilitating coordinated action’], or a damaging impetus that produces 
negative social capital. Monga (2009) dwells on the menacing nature of ‘uncivil 
societies’ and refers to mafia style organisations, secretive masonic lodges, extremist 
schools, terrorist groups, hate groups and dictators’ sponsored NGOs that seem to have 
a ‘monopoly over morals and ethics’ within their sphere of influence. Seligman (1992: 
60) also binds ‘morality’ with the ‘idea of civil society’.  
 
[B]ecause civil society leaders are often political entrepreneurs, some NGOs are 
hijacked by and serve as Trojan horses to people who are motivated by the quest for 
political power… [I]t is also undeniable that some organisations that pretend to work 
under the civil society umbrella do not adhere to national laws and regulations. Far from 
contributing to the emergence of a collective social compact, their actions can actually 
generate negative social capital (Monga 2009: 14/15). 
 
The Moviment Azzjoni Xellug
46
 (MAX) goes further than this as it considers NGOs as 
‘saħta’ (curse), in the sense that the majority of such organisations are apolitical and, 
                                                 
45
 Usually the public service of a small state is stongly influenced by ministers and senior public officials 
and may therefore be open to personal favour and patronage (Curmi 2011: 48). 
46
 Left Action Movement. MAX is a movement made up of individuals and associations who hold left-
wing principles and consider them relevant to today’s realities. It intends to be pro-active in promoting 
the concepts of equality, liberty, social justice and environmental vigilance through public debate and, 
where necessary, direct action. 
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thus, do not adopt holistic approaches wherein they propose alternative models in 
running society, economy and politics to solve existing problems (MAX 2011). 
Unfortunately their actions, according to MAX, can have a contrary effect. For example, 
when they organise fund raising activities for a good cause, they are implying that 
nobody is responsible for problems concerning poverty and social exclusion, and the 
solution can be found in charitable donations. Furthermore, their autonomy and 
independence from state institutions are seriously challenged whenever they obtain 
funding aids and/or participate as partners with national and/or European institutions. 
 
As a consequence, the field of interest groups does not only present an ambiguity of 
phraseological and semantic nature as argued earlier on but, above all, it constitutes an 
ethical dilemma: does it strengthen or debilitate the foundations of democracy? These 
troubling notions stress the need ‘to shift the debates about civil society away from 
formal structures and organisations and towards an investigation of beliefs, values and 
everyday practices’ (Hann 1996: 14). Albeit the overall perspective of this thesis is 
based on the belief that interest groups lead to better governance, nonetheless it would 
be a mistake to assume that all interest representations are benign in their true nature 
and character. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
Interest groups are a diverse bunch. The arena of interest representation is populated 
with multiple terminologies, definitions and typologies. In mainstream literature 
organised groups are considered as a nursery for social capital and a core characteristic 
of good governance. Yet they can also lead to negative consequences if the intentions of 
the actors are of a sinister nature. The result of this high variability is the lack of a 
common attitude among political scholars towards the role of interest groups in public 
affairs and a missing overarching classification which would be accepted by all. 
 
The wide array of influencing techniques at the disposal of interest groups gives them 
an impetus to deal with different situations using, what they think to be the most 
effective tactics. Some are subtle and remain unnoticed by the media, while others tend 
 95 
to be bold and loud. Some are collaborative, inducing a partnership culture with state 
actors, while others are extremely hostile and antagonistic to the establishment. 
Pragmatism is the underlying principle of success as groups need to constantly monitor 
their external environment and align their internal structures and strategy formulation to 
ever changing circumstances. 
 
The examination of the different variables relating to interest groups in this chapter is a 
crucial prerequisite to the presentation and analysis of primary findings in the empirical 
chapters. The nature and extent of Europeanisation are to be determined by these same 
variables.  In fact the homework and fieldwork manoeuvres associated with PAM give a 
solid theoretical background to the selected four dimensions against which the impact of 
Europeanisation is to be measured and decoded. The next step is to start analysing the 
political terrains of Malta and Ireland so as to detect points of similarities and disparities 
concerning context specific realities. The aim of detecting these tensions of synergies 
and conflicts is to provide a contextual setting that paves the way for a better 
appreciation of the complexity of issues when examining the impact of Europeanisation 
on domestic interest groups. Chapter 4, in essence, comprises a dual narrative of 
political institutions, modes of governance and strategic initiatives of social dialogue 
that shape the political terrains of the two selected member states.  
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Chapter 4 
Maltese and Irish soil: configuring small polity terrain 
 
 
Those who do not know the lay of the land cannot manoeuvre their forces. 
 
Sun Tzu 
Chinese military commander 
The Art of War 
 
 
4.1 Outlining the narratives 
 
This chapter outlines the changing scenarios of the two small island states under study. 
Malta and Ireland present interesting case studies on how Europeanisation can be 
accommodated within existent territorial politics signalled by the distinctive features of 
smallness, islandness and periphery. Primarily, the chapter has two major sections 
involving two parallel narratives elucidating the Maltese and Irish identities and the 
series of transformations they have gone through, particularly, over the last five decades. 
In particular, it tries to explore the narratives from the perspective of contemporary 
state-society relationship. This is in line with the school of institutionalist thought which, 
according to Schmidt (2006: 98), is characterised by its emphasis on the institutional 
terrain where political events occur and for the outcomes and effects they generate. The 
major aim is to lay out the political landscape where state and non-state actors are 
involved in the act of governance. Decoding the various elements that constitute the 
terrain through which political actions sprout and spread is the first step in 
understanding how and why interest groups in small island polities behave and act in 
specific ways. Furthermore, as Olsen (2002) maintains, the impact of the EU on 
territorial politics is classified as one of the many faces of Europeanisation. The 
discussion in this chapter stimulates the presentation and analysis of primary data in the 
next three chapters generated through fieldwork in Valletta, Dublin and Brussels. 
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4.2 Contrasts and contradictions 
 
The analysis of Maltese and Irish terrains reveals a hybridised model of governance 
based on idiosyncratic features and differing degrees of polarisation and pragmatism. 
Central governments still hold extensive powers in these small polities, as the concept 
of regional and local governance is much less defined and activated than in large states 
(Laffan and O’Mahony 2008: 137). In a similar vein, Warrington (1993: 167) concludes 
that small states seem to ‘remain complacent about big government’. Viewed from one 
perspective, Maltese and Irish interest groups are fragmented and competitive. Civil 
society is characterised by a cacophony of voices which have gained more momentum 
through the exploitation of old and new media sources. Nonetheless the ‘hegemonic 
power of the Church’ (Briguglio 2009) still raises eyebrows at the true nature of 
pluralism in an ‘almost monolithically Catholic’ environment (Garvin 1988: 96), even 
though interest in religion and the church in general has dwindled among the younger 
generations (Ellul 2009, Frendo 2009). In the beginning of the 1990s, Chubb did not 
hesitate to deduce that Ireland’s political and societal terrain was to be ‘configured in 
pluralist terminology, although [in order to be truly so] it would have to change a great 
deal more than it has so far done’ (Chubb 1992: 29). Time proved Chubb right. Malta 
seems to be following the same direction as its traditional value system has already 
made way for more differentiated lifestyle cultures and disparate interest activism in 
domestic and European politics (Briguglio 2009, Agius 2009, Abela 1991). 
 
However the two polities, if viewed from another perspective, display elements of 
neocorporatism, particularly in the engagement of tripartite mechanisms. Social 
partnerships (SP) do not come uncontested either, as the majority of Ireland’s 
intelligentsia advocate a form of SP which purports to give a voice to the excluded and 
the marginalised (Muscat Josie 2011, Allen 2000: 35). In Malta, the Social Pact could 
not be realised due to political polarisation. Moreover, parochialism – ‘a grid of strong 
and close personal connections resembling parish divisions’ (Friggieri 2009, Koster 
1988) – and personalism – ‘a pattern of relations in which people are valued for who 
they are and whom they know’ (Laffan and O’Mahoney 2008: 137, Chubb 1992: 13) – 
suggest an elitist presence in the two island states. The combined characteristic of 
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smallness, periphery and insularity make for a particularly intense social experience. 
Nonetheless, one of the paradoxes of small and intimate societies is that the social 
distance between the top and the grassroots seems to be the same – in relative terms – as 
one might find in larger, more complex and pluralistic societies (Ciorbaru et al 2005: 29, 
Friggieri 2008).  
 
4.3 Bio-diversity in polity terrain 
 
The sheer mushrooming of interest groups across all policy domains in Malta and 
Ireland does not automatically constitute a pluralistic state, as some groups are more 
privileged than others in inner power circles due to well preserved personal links. Elite 
governance is further sustained by the formation of policy networks, together with 
emergent and exclusive policy communities that bring about an aggregate of actors 
sharing homogeneous interests while vetoing any alternative voices. During observation 
sessions specifically conducted for this research, it was deduced that consultation 
meetings in Malta are almost always attended and dominated by a small circle of 
representatives who know each other well and know well how to marginalise dissenting 
voices.  
 
The process of decoding the performance of interest groups entails a configuration of 
the political terrain in which they are functioning. It is through an understanding of the 
composition of the nation’s soil and its political climate that we can really figure out the 
bio-diversity of actors and their webs of interconnectedness. On the one hand, the 
governance of small island polities tends to present a unique scenario. On the other hand, 
their experiences are composed of some elements that are distinctive and many others 
that are shared with numerous states, large and small, developed and developing 
(Warrington 1997). It is this blend of shared and distinctive factors that merits 
examination and perhaps holds some lessons that could be applied elsewhere, bearing in 
mind that ‘the roads to good governance are not paved in a linear or identical fashion’ 
(Koranteng 2010). In a nutshell, small polities are as complex as very large ones; small 
size does not automatically imply simplicity and uniformity.  
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The discussion will now devolve into two parallel narratives, starting with the case of 
Malta followed by the Irish one. Each narrative is activated by an official political 
profile, which is eventually qualified by a critical appraisal of key national features 
including the economic, social and cultural fabric that shape the contemporary political 
landscape.  
 
4.4 The Maltese narrative 
Malta became independent in 1964, having been under British rule since 1800. The 
Constitution established Malta as a liberal parliamentary democracy, guaranteeing 
separation between executive, judicial and legislative powers with regular elections 
based on universal suffrage. The country is divided into thirteen electoral districts, each 
electing five members to a unicameral House of Representatives
47
 on the basis of a 
Single Transferable Vote (STV) system of proportional representation, a system which 
is used by only one other state in the world - Ireland. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime 
Minister, exercises executive power and is accountable to Parliament. Since 
independence, it has been the norm for the government to run its full term of office 
spread over five years, thus guaranteeing political stability which is deemed as one of 
the most crucial prerequisites to attract foreign investment. In fact in only one of the 
eight post-independence legislatures (1996-1997) has the incumbent party failed to 
complete its full term. 
Eight days after independence, Malta submitted its application to join the United 
Nations (UN).
48
 Once its request was approved three months later by the UN General 
Assembly, the then Prime Minister, Ġorġ Borg Oliver, declared that the UN 
membership represented ‘the ultimate guarantor of our survival – the gesture of this 
Assembly has now set a permanent and indestructible seal on the sovereignty of Malta’ 
                                                 
47
 An indispensable characteristic of the Independence Constitution is the substitution of the bicameral 
system, which was no longer practicable, by a system of only one Government, the Government of Malta, 
with full legislative and executive powers 
48
 Malta’s constant contribution to the UN has been flagshipped by three major achievements, namely: the 
reformation of the Law of the Seas (1967), the issue of an ageing population in western societies (1969), 
the inclusion of climate change on the agenda of the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly (1988) 
and the election of Prof. Guido De Marco, one of Malta’s most renowned politicians, as President of the 
UN General Assembly in 1990. During his term of office, De Marco initiated an open-ended committee 
on the revitalisation of UN (for detailed insights on Malta’s contribution to the UN see Gauci 2005)  
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(Attard 2009). Furthermore, Malta remains a member of the Commonwealth and is a 
keen participant in the Euro-Med process. On defence matters, Malta usually allies itself 
with its fellow neutral EU member states, including Ireland, Sweden and Finland. 
In 1974 the Constitution was modified to make Malta a republic. The Head of State is 
the President whose duties are largely ceremonial. The change did not create a 
presidential style of government. The President is nominated for a five-year term by the 
House of Representatives. 
The principle of the separation of powers is safeguarded by the judiciary system which 
operates in an independent manner. The pluralistic elements that constitute Maltese Law 
are a reflection of the island’s millennial history characterised by foreign domination. It 
is initially based on Roman Law
49
 and eventually progressed to the Code de Rohan,
50
 
Code Napoleon
51
 with influences from Italian Civil Law.
52
 English common law,
53
 
however, is also a source of Maltese Law, most notably in Public Law.  
 
4.4.1 The power of the Church 
 
The role of the Catholic Church in the evolution of interest representation in Malta is of 
paramount importance. Christian credentials go back to the times of the apostles when 
Saint Paul, on his way to Rome in 64 A.D. onboard a Roman vessel, was shipwrecked 
on Maltese shores (Acts xxxviii). Prior to the foundation of local councils in the 1990s 
by an Act of Parliament, the Church was at the heart of village life. Its priests were 
influential men, and in the absence of elected mayors, they were the spokesmen of the 
village, the advisors and the organisers of civic affairs (ABC 1968). This was an 
                                                 
49
 Roman law is the legal system of ancient Rome, and the legal developments which occurred before the 
seventh century AD — when the Roman–Byzantine state adopted Greek as the language of government. 
50
 Emmanuel de Rohan-Polduc (1725-1797) was a member of the wealthy and influential Rohan family of 
France and Grand Master of the Knights of Malta from 1775 to 1797. He authored the Code de Rohan, a 
constitutional law book published in two volumes titled Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes of Malta in 
1782 and was also responsible for the publication of the Codice Municipale di Malta in 1784. 
51
 Code Napoleon is the French civil code, established under Napoléon I in 1804. The code forbade 
privileges based on birth, allowed freedom of religion, and specified that government jobs go to the most 
qualified. 
52
 Civil law is a legal system inspired by Roman law, the primary feature of which is that laws are written 
into a collection, codified, and not (as in common law) determined by judges. 
53
 The essence of English common law is that it is made by judges sitting in courts, applying their 
common sense and knowledge of legal precedent to the facts before them. 
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isolated island of simple Catholic faith – old-fashioned in its rituals, fervent in its 
expression. For centuries the Church has been the focus of national identity as it is 
symbolised by the national anthem; a prayer to God to defend and promote a collective 
spirit based on faith, work and peace written by a priest
54
 in the 1920s. Contemplating 
on religion and social change, Vassallo (1979) concludes that in many respects the 
Church had been almost a ‘surrogate form of political expression and nationalism’. 
 
For centuries, all the developments that occurred in crafts and guilds in Malta were 
steered by priests or by some other authoritative forms as delegated by the Church (Fino 
1983: 13). This semi-religious mode of representing artisans’ and workers’ interests was 
pursued during the British colonisation (1800-1964). Moreover, Frendo (2009: 95) 
states that the influence of the church as an institution was probably consolidated by 
British occupation in an age of secularisation. A case in point involves the Societá 
Operaia, founded in 1885 as a workers association, which had to change its name to 
Societá Operaia Cattolica to pursue its mission (A.A. and E.C. 1971). The practice of 
appointing priests as spiritual directors is still a remnant norm of the good old glorious 
days of religio e patria for Maltese organisations. The Malta Union of Teachers 
(MUT)
55
 and the Union Ħaddiema Magħqudin (UĦM) 56  still retain the post of a 
Spiritual Director within their organigrams while this practice was discontinued by the 
General Workers Union (GWU) in the late 1960s.
57
 
 
In recent times, as the Synod of the Archdiocese of Malta (1999-2003) admits, the 
Church has lost much of its power and cultural supremacy due to various external as 
                                                 
54
 Dun Karm Psaila (1871-1961) who is also attributed as the national poet of Malta. 
55
 ‘Rev. Thomas Moore is the present spiritual director of MUT who is responsible for the organisation of 
religious functions, including the celebration of mass in commemoration of the demised members and the 
celebration of union’s anniversaries’ (interview with MUT General Secretary on November 5, 2010).  
56
 According to Gejtu Vella, UĦM General Secretary, the Union is proud of having the services of a 
spiritual director and ‘hopes that this post is retained in the years to come’ (interview with UĦM 
Secretary on November 6, 2010) 
57
 The GWU, which has dominated the industrial relations field in Malta as the largest workers’ 
representative ever since its foundation in 1943, also maintained the tradition of engaging a spiritual 
director. The first spiritual director was Rev Paris who was succeeded by Rev Albert Busuttil. In 1951 
Archbishop Gonzi nominated Rev. Prof. Edoardo Coleiro. Rev Benny Tonna was the last priest to hold 
this post until the 1960s when this practice was discontinued (interview with Charles Vella, Public 
Relations Officer on November 5, 2010) 
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well as local factors (Synod 2003).
58
 Apart from the purely folkloristic aspect which the 
Catholic religion still evokes, it appears that, on an individual and private level, 
‘concrete decisions that affect the social and moral life of the majority of the Maltese 
are taken distinctly from, and sometimes in opposition to, Catholic teaching’ 
(Montebello 2009: 119). The yes majority vote
59
 in the divorce referendum in 2011 
confirms a definite pattern of secularisation at least in Malta, if not in Gozo
60
. Eddie 
Fenech Adami, President Emeritus, solemnises the introduction of the divorce bill as ‘it 
is the very first time since the inception of Maltese parliament that it went directly 
against one of the Ten Commandments’ (interview with the author, 2012). 
4.4.2 Post-colonial changes 
As an island characterised by lack of natural resources and limited administrative 
expertise, the Maltese economy, often claimed as a ‘miracle economy’, had to be one 
based on labour. Its small internal market makes economies of scale very difficult to 
attain, with the consequence that export-orientated growth appears to be the only viable 
development policy. Baldacchino (1988: 80) maintains that domestic ‘populist 
governments’ subsequently subscribed to ‘nationalistic appeals and corporatist tactics’ 
to control the labour force.
61
 Labour reacted by either consenting to the tactics or 
rejecting them, hence, consolidating the partisan political divide that has penetrated 
every sector of Maltese society.  
                                                 
58
 The Vatican Council II and the politico-religious struggle (between the PL and the Church), both 1960s 
events, can be considered as the main external and local sources of changes. The author participated in all 
of the Synod sessions between 2000 and 2003 as he was representing his parish. 
59
 The official tally showed that 52.67 per cent voted in favour of divorce but 46.4 per cent opposed the 
change. According to Dive.com ‘although the two political parties took a step back in the run up to the 
referendum, by and large voting patterns in the electoral districts respected the traditional voting patterns 
of a general election’. 
60
 Gozo saw almost all of its 70 per cent turnout vote No. Furthermore, four of the five Gozitan MPs 
declared that they were against the introduction of divorce and the fifth one did not commit himself until 
the draft legislation was discussed in Parliament. 
61
 The labour movement was consolidated in May 1978 when the GWU's National Council and the PL's 
Executive Committee signed a socio-political pact leading to the fusion of the two organisations. The pact 
was based on three principles: (a) a union-party liaison structure; (b) representation on each other's 
executive committees and (c) representation of the GWU in the Cabinet of Ministers during Labour 
Governments. One has to note that the offer of a seat in the Cabinet of Ministers was made to all trade 
unions, however it was the GWU only that accepted the offer (GWU online). The PL-GWU pact was 
dissolved in 1992. 
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Pondering on Malta’s recent development, Sultana (1997: 9) asserts that ‘the island… 
has its own specific character, one marked by scale, late industrial – and educational – 
development, and its own particular history of dependency’. Economic changes in 
Malta started shortly after independence with the expansion of the manufacturing 
industry and tourism. Consequently, Malta’s dependence on the British defence system 
started dwindling and from the last decade of the twentieth century it embarked on a 
holistic economic diversification programme based more on services. Although heavy 
state intervention as practised under Labour governments of the 1970s and the 1980s 
was dismantled by the Nationalist government since 1987, Malta’s welfare system still 
retained its central and dominant orbit of power. It is responsible for the redistribution 
of wealth,
62
 yet its relationship with interest groups tends to vary across different policy 
domains and in accordance with the party in government. A number of voluntary 
organisations have close partnership relationships with the State, often depending on 
statutory funding for survival. Others challenge the State through vigorous social 
movements (such as those involved in environmental, peace, gay and lesbian, civil 
rights and anti-racist causes) that some see as ‘a people’s opposition’ (Powell 2002). 
Undoubtedly, the mainstream of the voluntary sector in Malta is clearly shaped by its 
symbiotic relationship with the State (Baldacchino 2013). 
4.4.3 Gozo’s double insularity 
 
With one-twelfth of the country’s overall population on one-third of the country’s 
overall landmass,
63
 Għawdex (Gozo) is more rural and traditional. Despite the fact that 
the two islands are really compact geographically, yet differentiated territorial politics 
do play a part. Gozo’s mainly agricultural economy ensures a sense of pastoral calm and 
rustic quiet. Unscathed by the winds of moral relativism blowing across the European 
                                                 
62
 The welfare state emerged historically as a top-down solution to the problem of how to secure social 
protection and security in the context of an urbanised self-contained capitalist economy with a comodified 
labour market (Bertram 2008). Malta’s elaborate welfare state system developed over a fifty year period 
does not conform to Bertram’s presumptions that this system of wealth redistribution is most prominent 
in societies of 3-4 million, losing importance as population size falls from that level. 
63
 The population of Gozo is approximately 31,000. It has an area of 67 square kms, is 14 kms long and 7 
kms wide. Politically, Gozo and Comino form one of the thirteen electoral districts of Malta. Five 
representatives are elected to the Maltese Parliament, and each of the fourteen localities or village 
communities have their own local council and therefore their mayor. 
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continent, Gozo emerges as an island of churchgoers, where divorce and gay marriages 
are still considered anathema (Debono 2006).  
 
Conscious of its rural characteristics, the Government in its Vision 2015
64
 aims to make 
an ‘ecological island’ of Gozo to serve as a ‘model of sustainable development’. 
However the social and economic situation of Gozitans is far from idyllic. The specific 
problems faced by islands such as Gozo, which depend on another country which itself 
is an island, have been capped under the ‘double insularity’ syndrome. Mercieca (2011) 
shares the viewpoint of many other stakeholders when he attributes double insularity as 
‘the certificate for lack of progress or regress in comparison to other communities’. 
Gozo’s double insularity works against the island in many ways, and has often been 
touted as a huge disincentive for businesses to invest in the island. Moreover, Gozitans 
who have to commute to Malta on a daily basis to study or earn a living have to face 
additional hardships. 
Gozo has had its own ministry since 1987, an institutional element that helped speed up 
the identification of problems and the formulation of solutions. In addition, since Malta 
acceded to the EU, Gozo’s position of double insularity has allowed it to benefit from 
targeted funding as a region with special needs.
65
 ‘These funds are being used in key 
development areas, primarily transport infrastructure and education’ (World Report para. 
5). 
While lamenting that Gozo’s social and economic development was never truly high on 
the politicians’ agenda, a Gozitan citizen writes to the editor of The Sunday Times that, 
What we need … is a properly functioning [independent] pressure group with brave and 
innovative vision, who will articulate our case in a coherent and structured way; but 
also, one with some clout, able to put pressure on the powers that be, which is essential 
(Camilleri 2011). 
                                                 
64
 The document, entitled Viżjoni 2015, identifies seven sectors for development which will give the 
Maltese islands a comparative advantage by 2015. Besides establishing Gozo as an ecological island, the 
other six sectors are Financial Services, Information and Communications Technology, Tourism, 
Manufacturing, Health and Education. 
65
 With regards to the Structural Funds allocated to Malta and Gozo for the financial period 2007-2013, it 
was agreed with the Commission, that in recognition of the specific needs of Gozo arising from the 
double insularity aspect, 10% of the Structural Funds would be specifically earmarked for projects in 
Gozo. The rest of the Structural Funds can be allocated to projects in Malta as well as in Gozo. 
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Camilleri’s raging tone reflects the lack of trust in political parties by a growing 
segment of the local population. Many are becoming more and more ‘tired of rhetoric 
from whatever quarter’. Lobby groups who owe allegiance to no one are deemed to be 
more representative when taking initiatives in the interest of the common good.  The 
Gozitan University Group (GUG)
66
 is perhaps filling this gap for the younger islanders 
and in these last years has been bold and ambitious to bring about significant changes 
that had been long awaited. 
4.4.4 ‘The purest two-party system’ 
Despite the increase of widespread neo-liberal measures, particularly during Malta’s 
long road to EU accession and afterwards, political clout retained pivotal positions over 
business interests, as the two main parties – the Partit Nazzjonalista (PN) and the Partit 
Laburista (PL) have transformed into ‘catch-all’ parties with strong media apparatus, 
‘acting like total institutions’ (Baldacchino 2002). The former adheres to traditional 
European Christian Democratic ideals, while the latter followed the trend of other 
European socialist parties by shifting more towards the centre of the political spectrum 
and is lately labelling itself as a ‘new political movement for progressives and 
moderates’ (Zahra 2009). The failure on the part of a third party67 to score electoral 
success is remarkable both at national level and at European level, although it did 
manage to get a handful of seats in local elections; but even there, the already limited 
number of its councillors has decreased over the years.  
Domestic politics remain rife with divisive discourse. It is the only nation state in the 
world celebrating not less than five national days annually;
68
 a kind of compromise 
                                                 
66
 GUG was established in the 1980s and later, in 1987, it was formally recognized as a student 
organization. Since its inception GUG has evolved into a better organized, stronger organization and 
continuously strives to make its voice heard by undertaking a number of ambitious projects. Its main aim 
is to represent Gozitan students at University and to promote their interest in the transition to university 
life. 
67
 The major third party in Malta is the Alternattiva Demokratika (AD) which in the last election national 
election in 2008 managed to secure only 1.31 per cent of the first preference votes nationwide. Since the 
initiation process of Malta’s accession to the EU, it started rebranding itself as the Green Party. 
68
 The five national days in Malta are: September 21 (Independence Day, independence from the United 
Kingdom 1964), March 31 (Freedom Day, withdrawal of British troops from Malta 1979), December 13 
(Republic Day, republican constitution of 1974), June 7 (Sette Giugno, bread riot of 1919), September 8 
(Victory Day, victory over Turkish besiegers in the Great Siege of 1565 and  the allies over Nazis in 
1943). 
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protocol to accommodate conflicting political views that divide the nation over the 
single most predominant symbol of Maltese nationhood.   
Deemed to be ‘the purest two-party system in the developed world’ (Cini 2002), Malta 
is necessarily bound to go on being ‘politically divided, floating between two mutually 
exclusive concepts’ (Friggieri 2008: 57). With one of the highest voter turnout rates in 
the world, invariably over 90 per cent, Malta’s population is habitually highly 
politically aware, participating enthusiastically in debates, elections and political 
manifestations (Corporate Village 2010: 61). However there are scattered signs, though 
still very significant, suggesting that the status quo has encountered a critical juncture. 
The fact that both the PN and the PL now seem to share a common view on European 
unification can be considered as a significant step towards a new level of maturity 
reached in Malta’s international policy. However their outlook towards the EU is 
significantly different. Whereas the Nationalist government always treated the EU as the 
‘natural home’ and the ‘true vocation’ of Malta, the new Labour government since 
2013
69
 started to adopt a utilitarian approach wherein the EU is only one of the various 
avenues that Malta can take in a globalised world. Using the terminology of 
institutionalist theory, one can observe that the PN’s discourse on the EU follows a 
logic of appropriateness whereas the narrative of the PL is founded within a logic of 
calculation. 
4.4.5 Local governance 
Local governance is a relatively new concept in Malta. It was established in 1993 
following Parliament’s approval of the Local Councils Act. Today, Malta has 68 Local 
Councils - 54 in Malta and 14 in Gozo. A decisive step to consolidate local government 
in Malta was made when the system of local government was entrenched in the 
Constitution of Malta in 2001. From their inception, the Government adopted a policy 
of devolution of power and responsibilities to local authorities, although they have 
never been granted the power to raise taxes (Magro 2008). Over the years the objectives 
                                                 
69
 The PL won the general election in 2013 with a margin of 35,000 votes or 54.83% of the electorate 
which is considered by all political analysts as the largest landslide victory in Malta.  
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of Local Councils have been widened and investment in this sector has increased both 
through national budgets’ allocations and European funds. 
Local governance is deemed to be a successful experiment by all political actors. 
Furthermore, there are many instances where local councils have teamed up with 
interest groups to lead various schemes, programmes and initiatives. Although there are 
visible and encouraging elements of mutual collaboration, the ‘frequent use of sarcastic 
politically-loaded comments’ that feature frequently and prominently on news-bulletins 
of parties’ radio and TV stations indicate that ‘staunch political bi-polarism’ is still 
dominating the public square (Agius 2011: 20). 
4.4.6 Dogmatic and unswerving dualism 
Considering this heavily polarised political backdrop that cuts deep into the identity and 
cultural credentials of this Lilliputian nation, it comes as no surprise that the Maltese 
have an innate dilemma when it comes to accepting a unifying platform on which their 
contemporary nationalism could rest and regenerate its mould. In one of their pastoral 
letters of 2014, the bishops of Malta called for a ‘greater sense of the state’ among the 
Maltese in order to dismantle ‘the screw-vice of partisan politics’ (Cremona et al. 2014). 
Studies of this phenomenon memorably described the Maltese as ‘ambivalent 
Europeans’ (Mitchell 2002) and Malta as ‘a state without a nation’ (Baldacchino 2002). 
Prior to the EP election in 2004, Pat Cox, the Irish president of the EP (1989-2004) 
remarked that ‘the Maltese style of polarisation where everything is black or white’ is a 
doomed mentality as it would not reach up to people’s expectations through their 
participation in the EU processes (Fenech 2004). Friggieri (2002: 16) concludes that 
‘the problem of Malta is Malta’ where ‘all things in life are always only divisible into 
two’. Having been a servitude colony for centuries, the Maltese have logically nurtured 
a divide between ‘ġewwieni-barrani’ (local-foreigner) and, since the cultivation of the 
domestic political class in the mid-nineteenth century, this native divide has evolved 
into ‘aħna-huma’ (us-them), where every domestic political development has been 
managed by confrontation and ‘internecine rivalry’ (Warrington 2010, Frendo 1993: 
154). 
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The debate on EU membership was not spared from such a polarised straightjacket. The 
PN was the pioneer of Malta’s European vocation, while the PL advocated a partnership 
pact with the EU, a sort of a half-way house between staying out and getting in. The 
nation was once again divided into its endemic two tribes. Ever since the prospect of 
Malta’s membership of the EU was raised in the 1990s, complaints about aspects of 
local life and government have habitually made similar references to dichotomous 
discord. Warrington (2005) regards this discourse as odd, but significant: ‘it confirms 
Maltese insecurities – insecurities associated with Mediterranean geo-politics, a long 
history of subjugation, the small size and vulnerability of the island and its economy, 
and our contested identity’. These insecurities were at play in every choice of a strategic 
external relationship confronting the Maltese since the eighteenth century (De Marco 
2009, Spiteri 2007, Pirotta 2006). 
 
4.4.7 Quasi-tribal politics 
 
Operating in a political landscape divided into two ‘tribal cages that segregated people 
from each other’ (Serracino Inglott 2011, Mintoff 2010, Sansone 2008) Maltese interest 
groups are not free from political undertones and always run the risk of having their 
actions misinterpreted due to visible or alleged political connotations. Over the decades, 
trade unions, employers’ associations, social movements, environmentalists and even 
religious organisations have all gone through experiences where their missions and 
causes have metamorphosed and/or been hijacked by partisan politics. Reflecting on the 
implications of a divided nation, Sant Cassia claims that civil society in Malta is truly 
divested of all power unless it falls within the parameters of big party agendas’ (Vella 
2003). 
 
Alfred Sant, Prime Minister (1996-1998) who tried unsuccessfully to lessen the 
endemic divide, maintains that the people who should be making things shake and move 
are ‘too bound by ties of friendship, tactical allegiance and political orthodoxy’.  He 
maintains that, 
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The pool of talented people available to the government comes from only a half of the 
political spectrum. People believed to favour the other half are shunted, no matter how 
able they might be (Sant 2005). 
 
Evidence points to a great deal of hegemony of Maltese political parties and, ironically, 
their power has been compounded further through the launch of media pluralism when 
the two parties equipped themselves with radio and television stations, eventually even 
with mobile communications, adding further patronage and paternalism to the political 
elite,   
 
In 1991, Malta became the only European democracy allowing political parties to 
privately own radio and television stations. Radio licences to private companies were 
only granted after the main political parties and the Roman Catholic Church had 
established their media (Sammut 2009: 81). 
 
In Malta, the media has actually been politicised rather than pluralised. Strong 
politicisation in highly dense communities often brings with it elements of clientelism 
and nepotism. Retired and respected politician, Lino Spiteri, confirms that clientelism 
and patronage are more acute and tangible in small states, but there is more to it. ‘Our 
southern Mediterranean mentality, and (a false) dependence on the ‘above’ – expecting 
government to play god – make for and also fuel further patronage’ (Salib 2007: 43). 
Party loyalty that transcends generations (Lane 1994) also contributes towards the 
persistence of a national culture based on political guardianship ‘which, is often blind to 
the conflicts of interest that are inevitable in a small, densely-networked society’ 
(Warrington 2010). Notwithstanding this entrenched feature of a ‘politically polarised 
society where politics penetrate almost every sphere of social, communal and 
interpersonal life’ (Zammit and Baldacchino 1989: 80), over the years, the Maltese have 
adopted a love-hate attitude towards their politicians and glimpses of ‘extreme 
scepticism’ towards their political elites have been on the rise (Mitchell 2002).   
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4.4.8 Creation of national coordinating institutions 
 
Although Malta is still in the early stages of its European learning curve, according to a 
senior officer at Dar Malta,
70
 there is ample evidence that the domestic institutions are 
being re-engineered to become Europeanised in both their structures and in the ways 
they devise policy (interview with the author, 2010). The institutional structures of the 
Government, including Parliament
71
 and the Judiciary,
72
 during both pre- and post-
accession periods, have been ‘greatly and radically reshaped to better adapt to the reality 
of the EU’. For example, the setting up of Malta-EU Steering and Action Committee 
(MEUSAC) and Malta Council for Economic and Social Development (MCESD) is at 
the core of the whole Europeanisation process in Malta. Through MEUSAC, the 
Government is now obliged to coordinate with civil society and social partners in 
drafting the official position of Malta concerning proposed legislation by the European 
Commission. Such consultation is carried out both at MEUSAC core group and also in 
its nine sectoral committees.
73
  
 
Of significant mention is the fact that MEUSAC's sectoral umbrella committees have 
been designed to correspond exactly to the different formations of the EU Council of 
Ministers, with the exception of consumer affairs rather than reflecting the portfolios of 
domestic ministries. Vanni Xuereb, chairman, in an interview with the author, said that 
MEUSAC is responsible for information related to the EU while providing assistance to 
interest groups and local councils in all possible ways in order to exploit EU 
opportunities and its funding programmes. ‘My mandate, in particular, is to harness all 
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 The nine-storey building that houses Malta’s Permanent Representation in Brussels. 
71
 Within the Maltese Parliament, it is the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs that started 
assuming responsibility for European Affairs as well. Notwithstanding these developments, Malta has 
still not established a parliamentary permanent representation in Brussels. 
72
 The Europeanisation process has also left its mark on the domestic Judicial System wherein Maltese 
Courts are bound to observe the primacy of EU legislation and the principles of mutual recognition and 
judicial cooperation.  
73
 MEUSAC’s core group brings together representatives of Government, the political parties, constituted 
bodies, civil society and experts. Complementarily, MEUSAC’s structure also incorporates various 
committees formed by representatives of different organisations, grouped under nine sectoral umbrellas, 
namely: (a) General Affairs, (b) Economic and Financial Affairs, (c) Justice and Home Affairs, (d) 
Employment, Social Policy and Health, (e) Competitiveness and Consumer Affairs, (f) Transport, 
Telecommunication and Energy, (g) Agriculture and Fisheries, (h) Environment and (i) Education, Youth 
and Culture. 
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the different energies, primarily for civil society to own the process of accession in the 
sense that it is not only the government to be doing the business...’ (Micallef 2008). 
Likewise, MEUSAC’s role is nonetheless crucial in the transposition process wherein 
interest groups are once again informed and consulted in policy cycles involving 
implementation and enforcement. 
 
On its part, the MCESD, established in 2001, is rather geared towards domestic policy-
making solidified through social dialogue and acts as an advisory council that issues 
opinions and recommendations to the Maltese government on matters of economic and 
social relevance. The formation of MCESD is the second best option that could be 
pursued after the failure of several attempts to set up a Social Pact. EU membership 
gave an impetus to obtaining a better perspective of what is going on in other member 
states within similar areas of interest. Through socialisation and learning, the Maltese 
representatives on the EESC have contributed further towards the development of socio-
economic affairs, both at the domestic and European levels. Through information 
sharing and the establishment of best standards on a European scale, MCESD has been 
central in the deliberations pertaining to high profile dossiers, including Malta's 
National Reform Programme, Annual National Budgets, and the Sustainable 
Development Strategy. However MCESD does not come out uncontested. A number of 
social partners, both from the unions’ and employers’ sides, often express their 
disappointment that the true nature of such coordinating bodies is not consultative, but 
rather vehicles of state imposition of ready-made decisions.
74
 
 
The creation of supporting formal coordinating institutions in domestic polity is a sign 
of breaking away from the past, branded by fragmentation, personalism and patronage, 
and an embarquement on a new pathway characterised by reconciliation and a greater 
sense of institutionalism. These developments may involve new power configurations 
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 Many a time, the MCESD was marked by serious accusations of pseudo-dialogue regarding the 
‘imposition’ by Government of the proposed utility retail tariffs. Eventually, trade unions have joined 
forces and in an unprecedented effort have called the people to the streets on November 14, 2008 to 
protest against the imposed regime of higher tariffs on water and electricity (Vassallo 2009). Allegations 
of state bullying erupt from time to time, particularly during the annual budget period, as social partners 
feel that they are not ‘really consulted’ and their suggestions are almost never taken on board. 
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resulting from a distortion in the number of veto points and the internalisation of new 
norms of conduct. Laurence Gonzi, Prime Minister (2004-2013), affirms that the first 
seven years of membership (2004-2011) have been marked by two essential features for 
political maturity and economic growth: ‘normality’ and ‘stability’ (Gonzi 2011). He 
argues that the general mode of the people is ‘as if we have been there for fifty years’.  
 
The Maltese have learnt the rules of the game at a rapid pace, and policymakers, social 
partners and civil society alike have explored and exploited the new opportunities as a 
result of membership. EU funding has been used to correct the domestic infrastructural 
deficit in terms of urban environment embellishment, natural environment protection, 
power generation, road infrastructure, water management, new educational facilities and 
the modernisation of public transport (Gonzi 2011).  
 
Notwithstanding a widespread reform programme across almost all policy domains, 
membership also meant the consolidation of domestic stability within an unstable 
Mediterranean region. The adoption of the euro was strategic to Malta’s efforts to 
weather the negative implications of the latest global recession. 
Contrastingly, behind the official archetype scenario, there is always a chorus of voices 
that tend to tell different, if not conflicting, narratives. 
The truth is that, especially in the last years, government politicians have strengthened 
their personal grip on those areas of decision making which they consider crucial to 
their political standing. The official rhetoric of course proclaims the opposite. Though 
well-camouflaged, recruitment and promotions in the public service and in government 
agencies have come under tighter political control than ever before (Sant 2005).   
 
4.4.9 A more omnipotent Auberge de Castille
75
 
 
Joe Borg, former Maltese Commissioner responsible for Fisheries Policy (2004-2011), 
confirmed with the author that the great majority of interest groups in Malta were in 
favour of accession because they have been directly involved, and constantly informed, 
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 Auberge de Castille, in Valletta, became the Office of the Prime Minister on March 4, 1972. In this 
building the Prime Minister leads the business of government and every Monday he convenes his cabinet 
of ministers there. Auberge de Castille was the official seat of the knights of the Langue of Castille, León 
and Portugal – one of the most powerful of the Order, its head being the Grand Chancellor. The Knights 
of this Langue were responsible for the defence of part of the fortifications of Valletta, known as the St 
Barbara Bastion. The Auberge is situated at the highest point of Valletta and originally looked out on the 
rolling countryside beyond, giving it a unique vantage-point unsurpassed by any other building in the city. 
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throughout the negotiation period and, thus, their yes to Europe was out of conviction 
not convenience.
76
 But this has not led to power decentralisation as many practitioners 
in the voluntary sector had hoped for. 
In fact NGOs’ representatives often complain about the lack of consultation at the 
national level and that the degree of responsiveness of the public sector to their main 
preoccupations and queries is regularly low and belated
77
 (Pace 2008, 2006). Although 
things have improved with regards to the volume and content of public consultation, 
many activists admit that political power has even ‘become more highly centralised’ and 
‘we have to move a long way’ to have a real devolution of power beyond that which is 
required by the EU in the administration of European funds (different interviews with 
the author, 2011). Over the last two decades, the Government of Malta has embarked on 
an ongoing change management project to re-engineer its public sector in order to 
enhance service quality, efficiency and productivity within its national administrative 
set-up. However, the EU itself has contributed to further enhance the centralisation 
feature of the Maltese system of governance, as the Office of the Prime Minister has 
been made responsible for all the structures that relate to European affairs (Harwood 
2009, Camilleri 2009, Cassar 2008). In 2010 Nick Clegg, the UK's Deputy Prime 
Minister, labelled Malta ‘the most centralised country in Europe’ (The Times, May 20, 
2010). The different structures and networks that work in tandem in the coordination of 
EU affairs in Malta are mapped out in figure 4.1. The new Labour administration which 
came into power in 2013 retained the same structures and networks, with the exception 
of the Cabinet Committee on EU Affairs which had still not been appointed at the time 
when this research was completed. Its role is being performed by the Cabinet as a whole. 
 
 
                                                 
76
 Interview with Dr Joe Borg was held on April 7, 2011 at the University of Malta. 
77
 This feedback was put forward by numerous NGOs leaders during a national conference called L-
Ewropa Tagħti Widen organised by the European Commission Representation in Malta with the 
participation of Maltese civil society representatives in April 2006. In general, the same kind of problems 
cropped up during the second edition of the Conference in 2008, during which the author took a 
participant observer role.  
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Figure 4.1: Coordination of EU affairs in Malta 
The Cabinet
The Cabinet Committee     
on EU Affairs
The Inter-Ministerial 
Committee on       
EU Affairs
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 C
o
m
m
is
s
io
n
Ministries prepare 
national positions
E
U
-S
e
c
re
ta
ri
a
t
P
e
rm
a
n
e
n
t 
R
e
p
re
s
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
M
a
lt
e
s
e
 P
a
rl
ia
m
e
n
t
In
te
re
s
t 
G
ro
u
p
s
 /
 M
E
U
S
A
C
C
o
u
n
c
il 
/ 
E
P
 /
 E
E
S
C
 /
 C
o
R
political guidance
coordination
Maltese 
input
Legislation 
proposal
legislative issues
legislative issues
non-legislative issues
preparatory consultations
 
Dar Malta 2011 
Discussing the impact of Europeanisation on national administrations is besides the 
scope of this work, yet it could be revealing to highlight that the EU Secretariat which 
coordinates the preparatory work for the Cabinet Committee on EU Affairs and the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee for EU Affairs, the EU Secretariat and the Planning 
Priorities Coordination Department (PPCD) which ‘aims to ensure the efficient 
absorption and management of European assistance, EU and bilateral’ have all been 
interwoven within the epitome of Auberge de Castille. Of particular interest to the 
theme of this study is the inclusion of Maltese interest groups, through MEUSAC 
platform, as part of the consultative process in drafting the Maltese input to legislative 
proposals issued by the European Commission. 
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4.4.10 Nexus platform organisations 
Maltese groups are conscious of the benefits of EU membership within their respective 
sectors. The larger organisations
78
 have been successful in obtaining EU funding and in 
identifying partner organisations from other EU member states. The smaller ones,
79
 
which rely almost exclusively on volunteers, even if they represent professionals or sub-
sectors of the business sector, tend to be less successful and they point to the lack of 
administrative competence as the main reason for this (Pace 2006: 8). To mitigate such 
negative conditions, a number of domestic NGOs have discontinued their fragmented 
style of operations and, instead, have come together to follow a synergy strategy based 
on network formations (Wain 2009). This is done through the setting up of nexus 
platform organisations providing a forum for sharing good and useful practices, 
provision of training and consultation, research, projects development, technical 
assistance for applying and managing EU funding, and the promotion and development 
of corporate social responsibility.
80
 
4.4.11 The EU’s mark on Malta’s terrain 
The long years towards  EU accession, the bitterly contested referendum and the first 
ten years of membership (2004-2014) as the smallest member state have all left their 
mark on Malta’s terrain but, borrowing Saviour Rizzo’s sense of restraint, Maltese 
actors and institutions are still ‘not quite there’ (Rizzo 2009: 19). Conversely, Grima 
(2009: 61) concludes that ‘the potential of civil society organisations in Malta has 
increased substantially as a result of the opportunities that they currently enjoy to form 
part of European networks’. The two empirical chapters that follow help to better 
understand the nature and extent of Europeanisation that is being experienced by 
domestic social partners and interest groups.  
                                                 
78
 Such as the Malta Bankers Association, the General Retailers and Traders Union, the Federation of 
Industry, the Chamber of Commerce, the General Workers’ Union, the major political parties, Flimkien 
għal Ambjent Aħjar and various QUANGOES organisations including the Malta Environmental and 
Planning Authority (MEPA), the Central Bank of Malta, the Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs 
Authority, the Communications Authority and so on. 
79
 Such as Down Syndrome Association, Centre for Independent Living, Association of Farmers, 
Koperattiva tat-Trobbija tal-Fniek, Dar il-Kaptan, the Malta Union of Tourist Guides,  the Malta Cycling 
Association and Local Councils.  
80
 http://www.mrc.org.mt (accessed on December 29, 2008). 
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Prior to the presentation of the primary data, it is important to first portray the political 
landscape of Ireland so as to have a complete picture of the two member states under 
scrutiny. 
4.5 The Irish narrative  
 
The sovereign state of the Republic of Ireland, comprising 26 counties, is a 
parliamentary democracy. Its law is based on Common Law as modified by subsequent 
legislation and by the Constitution of 1937. Legislation is enacted by the Oireachtas 
(Irish Parliament) under the Constitution. Its Constitution sets out the form of 
Government and defines the powers and functions of the President, both Houses of the 
Oireachtas and the Government. It also defines the structures and the power of the 
Courts and outlines the fundamental rights of the citizen.
81
 
 
Through the Republic of Ireland Act 1948, Ireland renounced the sovereignty of the 
Crown
 
and, thus left the Commonwealth. Consequently the President is the Head of 
State and is elected by direct vote for a seven-year term. Executive power is exercised 
by or on the authority of the Government which is responsible to the Dàil (House of 
Representatives). The Head of the Government is the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). There 
are two Houses of Parliament, known as Dàil Èireann (House of Representatives) and 
Seanad Èireann (Senate). The Dàil has 166 members known as Teachtaì Dàla (TD). 
TDs are elected on a system of proportional representation by universal suffrage. 
Elections take place at least once every five years. The Seanad has sixty members, 
eleven of whom are nominated by the Taoiseach while the rest are elected from a 
number of vocational panels and by graduates of universities (Ireland in Brief 2007). 
 
As a small country in a changing world, Ireland’s foreign policy, similarly to that of 
Malta, remains firmly committed to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation amongst 
nations founded on international justice and morality (Borg 2011). Thirty-three years 
after its painful and blood-soaked acquisition of independence, Ireland joined the UN in 
                                                 
81
 The definition of rights covers five broad headings: Personal Rights, The Family, Education, Private 
Property and Religion. 
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1955 ‘with a wish to safeguard [its] status as militarily neutral or non-aligned’ (Laffan 
and O’Mahoney 2008: 176). Within the UN, Ireland has sought to promote effective 
international action on global issues such as disarmament, peace-keeping, human rights 
and development. 
 
4.5.1 A highly centralised state 
 
The local government system is administered by 114 local authorities and regularly 
undergoes processes of renewal and reform.
82
 It is a weak form of local governance,
83
 
largely funded by central government and partly by local sources including motor tax 
proceeds and local charges such as environmental waste charges and rents. As a small 
state, Ireland represents a highly centralised administration and, consequently, the focus 
of its development was steered on the national scale rather than treated from a regional 
perspective. Ireland was initially designated as one whole region for the purposes of 
structural funding; the introduction of regional governance was launched much later in 
the 1990s.
84
 Furthermore, the reform introduced by the EU for cohesion purposes, 
particularly the elements of ‘partnership and programming, did not succeed to 
reorganise central-local relations in Irish politics but it did manifest itself in innovative 
policy style and practice through community activism and area-based partnerships’ 
(Laffan and O’Mahoney 2008: 149, Adshead and Tonge 2009). MLG did not challenge 
the Irish central government which remained the most powerful strategic actor in 
cohesion and development policy.  
 
                                                 
82
 The services provided by the local authorities include housing and building, road transportation and 
safety, water supply and sewerage, development incentives and controls, environmental protection, 
recreation and amenity, education, health and welfare, and miscellaneous services. 
83
 Interview with Hermann Schiavone, political observer specialising on electoral systems (Malta: March 
21, 2001) 
84
 In the early 1990s the Government opted to divide the country into seven regions in order to introduce a 
regional layer in accordance with the principle of MLG. Furthermore, in connection with the EU’s 
Structural Funds, the Government divided the country into two regions: the Border, Midlands and 
Western Region (BMW) and the Southern and Eastern Region (S&E). From a national perspective, the 
establishment of the two regions had the benefit of ensuring that the BMW region retained Objective One 
status whereas the Objective One status of the S&E region was phased out by 2005 (Laffan and 
O’Mahoney 2008: 142/145). 
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Employing a ‘distinctive strategic-relational network framework’, James (2010: 930) 
attempts to capture ‘the fluidity, dynamism and wider significance of domestic change’. 
Figure 4.2 maps the interconnections that exist within the Irish core executive, that 
between sectoral departments and the five ‘network managers’: the Department of the 
Taoiseach, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Finance, the Office of 
the Attorney General and the Irish Permanent Representation in Brussels. This network 
system has reinforced, and in some cases accelerated, existing developmental 
trajectories towards the further strengthening of the Department of the Taoiseach and 
the use of increasingly formal coordinating committees, both of which are mirrored 
across the core executive (James 2010: 947). The eventual catastrophic collapse of the 
Irish economy has proved that Scott might have been right when he concluded that ‘the 
risk of augmenting the dependency of departmental policy to an already overburdened 
Department of Taoiseach’ would ultimately lead to ‘expectations which are raised 
beyond those that can be met’ (James 2010: 949). 
 
Figure 4.2: The Irish-EU Network since 1997 
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The Social Welfare system covers all of the internationally recognised forms of social 
protection. Incorporating a mix of both social insurance and social assistance 
programmes, it provides financial support to people in certain situations such as 
unemployment, illness and old-age. Spending on social welfare accounts for 
approximately one quarter of gross current Government expenditure and provides 
benefits to more than 1.5 million persons (Ireland in Brief  2007: 25). Civil society has 
teamed up with the state and the Church in providing joint services. This trend led to a 
substantial increase in the number and diversity of PPPs. 
 
4.5.2 The traditional Western region 
 
Although ‘a centralised administration and a highly localised political culture ensured 
that Irish regions would not develop as meaningful political and administrative arenas’ 
(Falkner and Laffan 2005: 215), nonetheless one cannot ignore regional asymmetries by 
focusing uniquely on the capital city and its affluent surrounding localities. Like the 
island of Gozo in Malta’s case, the west of Ireland provides different shades in the 
identity kit of territorial politics. According to the 2006 report of the Economic and 
Social Research Institute (ESRI),
85
 Ireland was the second most unequal country in 
Europe as the generated, new wealth is not evenly distributed across the country 
(Krishnani 2011 para 15) 
 
Cúige Chonnacht (Connacht), encompasses the West of Ireland. In this part of the 
island, people tend to be more dependent on farming and animal husbandry, and many 
still use the Irish language in everyday life. Being largely a Dublin phenomenon, the 
ripple effects of economic and social diversification associated with the Celtic Tiger 
have hardly left their mark on the western region. Today Connacht relies mainly on 
tourism and agriculture, Galway City being a notable exception with several high-tech-
industries and a university. 
                                                 
85
The ESRI produces research that contributes to understanding economic and social change and that 
informs public policymaking and civil society in Ireland and throughout the EU. For further information 
visit ESRI website at http://www.esri.ie 
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The west part of Ireland is crucially important to understand the earlier period of Irish 
membership when the Irish farmers’ groups exploited every opportunity to reap 
considerable financial benefits through the CAP. Farmers’ organisations established 
their representation in Brussels well before Ireland’s formal accession (Chubb 1992: 
114) and it did not take them too long to become expert lobbyists at the supranational 
level. Eventually agriculture pressure groups became more Brussels orientated (Jackson 
2002:  385). 
 
4.5.3 The Church and the Irish state 
 
‘The chief characteristics of nationalism in Ireland’, which succeeded in persisting even 
throughout the two decades after EU accession, ‘have been race, religion and a strong 
sense of territorial unity and integrity; and in all its modes it had been profoundly 
influenced by the power and proximity of Britain’ (George Boyce 1991: 19). 
Traditionally the discourse of Irish politics was a conservative one, searching for 
precedents, seeking to find the justification for their political behaviour in Ireland’s past. 
The Republic, according to Galvin (1998: 96/7), developed a ‘political liturgy 
emphasising Anglophobia, pseudo-Gaelic, peasant and Catholic themes
86’ which had 
reached a climax of sorts in 1966 during the public celebrations of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Easter Rising.
87 ‘Events in Ireland are usually interpreted from an 
Irish nationalist perspective’ (Pringle 1985: 3) and it seems that such a trend is to persist 
in the future, particularly at the time of writing when the nation has lost its ‘tiger’ brand. 
 
                                                 
86
 Catholic doctrine and moral values have found their way into state legislation with little consideration 
given to the civil liberties of the non-Catholic minority (Pringle 1985: 11). 
87
 The Easter Rising was an insurrection staged in Ireland during Easter Week, 1916. The Rising was 
mounted by Irish republicans with the aims of ending British rule in Ireland and of establishing the Irish 
Republic. According to Townshend (2006), it was the most significant uprising in Ireland since the 
rebellion of 1798. Incidentally, the two Irish uprisings match almost exactly two of the most troubled 
periods in Maltese history: in 1798 the Maltese revolted against the tyranny of their French occupiers and 
eventually requested the British navy to help them in their sudden uprising, while three years after the 
Easter Rising in Ireland, the Maltese rioted against the British regime in 1919. During the 1919 riots to be 
granted home rule as part of their constitutional development, five Maltese men paid with their lives. 
Today, June 7 is one of the five national days in Malta. 
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While Malta was experiencing its second politico-religious struggle of the century,
88
 
when prior to the 1962 election the Malta Labour Party (MLP) promised the electorate 
to reduce the overwhelming power of the Church by a reasonable secularisation (Pirotta 
2010, Friggieri 2008, Vassallo 2009), the traditional and religious outlook of the Irish 
nation started to change as well. Garvin (1988: 97) maintains that ‘the [Irish] liturgical 
edifice’ began to be eroded of relative affluence by the influence of the mass media and 
the Vatican Council II. For centuries the Catholic Church was the only corporate 
institution in Irish society that might seem to rival the institutions of the political system. 
During the 1960s, however, the Catholic-romantic view of Irish history started 
diluting… Changes in the status of the Catholic Church in the Irish constitution and 
changes in the law on contraception were put through against tepid opposition (Garvin 
1988: 100). The closure of the Irish embassy to the Vatican in 2011 to slash spending in 
line with its international bail-out has been acclaimed as a ‘stunning decision’ that 
liquidates the old ‘ironclad’ relationship between the two states (Pullella 2011). As a 
result, Ireland has become the first and only major country of ancient Catholic tradition 
without an embassy to the Holy See. 
 
Although the Church in Ireland has been sidelined and almost confined to a defensive 
strategy, Lee (1989) observes that ‘Catholic thinking, or assumed Catholic thinking, or 
selected Catholic thinking’, still has an important influence on social policymaking. The 
Irish referenda on abortion and divorce in the 1980s represent a resurgence of the older 
tradition. Though they have been disarmed of many of their former temporal powers, 
elite circles of ecclesiastical authorities still hold a ‘unique position’ in civil society 
(Chubb 1992: 116). In spite of a straightforward case of secularisation – ‘a wholesale 
exchange of agrarian Catholic nationalism for high-tech European cosmopolitanism’ 
(Tobin 2007) - it is ‘a mistake to conclude that the Church in Ireland is just another 
interest group’ (Chubb 1992: 119). 
 
 
                                                 
88
 The first political-religious dispute in Malta erupted in 1930 between Lord Strickland (Prime Minister 
and Leader of the Constitutional Party) and the Church, during which the Self-Government Constitution 
was suspended by the Crown. 
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4.5.4 ‘Civil war politics’ 
 
Like Malta, Ireland is considered a polarised polity, however for totally different 
reasons. The state is unusual as a developed nation, in that politics is not primarily 
characterised by the left-right political divide. This is because the two traditional and 
largest political parties, Fianna Fáil (FF) and Fine Gael (FG), do not identify 
themselves first and foremost as either centre-right or centre-left parties. Rather, both 
parties arose from the great split that occurred in Irish politics at the time of the 1922–
1923 Civil War that followed the foundation of the state. Both descended from factions 
of the original Sinn Féin (SF) party. By keeping the national question to the fore in 
southern Irish politics (to produce what is sometimes referred to as ‘civil war politics’, 
the two major conservative parties have effectively prevented serious political 
opposition along class lines (Pringle 1985: 231). George Boyce (1999) insists that the 
rise of the Labour Party has been decoded in terms of pressure groups and vested 
interests particularly trade unions, rather than with a strong ideology.  
 
The Irish political spectrum embraces the Green Party, the Progressive Democrats and 
the SF who are not alien to the formation of coalition governments. The Irish political 
system characterised by the so called ‘two-and-a-half-party system’ (Bowman 2010, 
Siaroff 2003) is, to a certain extent, more colourful than its Maltese counterpart but, 
nonetheless, the split of SF polarised Irish politics ever since (Chubb 1992). The present 
political scenario in Ireland has long been dominated by two basically conservative 
parties which are now virtually indistinguishable (Pringle 1985: 277). However the 
2011 election, which was instigated by the downfall of the Brian Cowan administration 
(2008-2011) due to the collapse of the Irish economy, brought about a new geometry of 
party power as the FF suffered its worst result in its 85-year history. The party's first 
preference vote plunged to 17.4% at the expense of a sharp rise in Labour popularity 
which made a very strong showing, almost doubling its share of the vote to become the 
second-largest party in the Dáil. 
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4.5.5 Looking beyond Irish shores 
 
Wisely reading the signs of the times, in the early 1970s, the Irish political 
establishment was convinced that accession to the EU was essential for Irish prosperity, 
particularly because the UK opted to join the EU as well. Small countries, unless they 
are exceptionally rich in natural resources, must rely heavily on the quality of their 
thinking to adapt to changing international circumstances. The problem with Ireland, 
according to Lee (1990: 638) is that the Irish have proven themselves talented as 
individuals in many areas of endeavour but less so on a collective platform. Many 
observers hoped that accession to the European trading block at the time would change 
the distinctive fabric of the Irish nation based on ‘fragmentation, localism, clientelism 
and brokerage’ (Laffan and O’Mahoney 2008: 137) to a new one built on ‘consensus, 
power-sharing and resilience’ (Darby 1988, Trimble 1988, Townshend 1988). 
 
According to George Boyce (1991: 387), Irish nationalism offered an illusory vision of 
‘a core national unity’ which for many decades hid its true identity underpinned by 
pluralism.
89
 The value of ‘modern scholarship was that it explored the complexity and 
diversity of Irish society’ (George Boyce 1991: 400). Accession to the EU dismantled 
this inherited paradigm of Irish ‘unity’ and, consequently, another national archetype 
emerged shaped by a cacophony of voices, ideas and perspectives and a grid network 
embracing all Europe, America and beyond. 
 
4.5.6 Acquaintance with Brussels 
 
The decision of the Irish state to become a member of the European Community marked 
a new way of doing politics, although the shift in attitude and strategies did not occur 
overnight. Accession had the effect of superimposing on the state both a new body of 
law, including the acquis communautaire, and a set of decision-making institutions 
(Chubb 1992: 307). This strategic turn in the Irish political destiny had to be 
                                                 
89
 George Boyce maintains that Irish nationalism is paradoxical, self-contradictory and guided by its own 
internal logic. In fact it is not peculiarly ‘Irish’; on the contrary, its many paradoxes and self 
contradictions arise from the close and permanent relationship between Ireland and her former 
neighbouring coloniser. 
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complemented by a series of Constitutional amendments through public referenda, 
which at times brought tremendous agitation and frustration not only in Dublin but in 
Brussels and other European capital cities alike (Laffan and O’Mahoney 2008: 105). 
 
Henceforth, Irish politicians and administrators, together with other political activists 
including interest groups, had to become acquainted with governance structures at 
another level. The importance of joining the EU is best synthesised by O’Rourke (2001) 
when she asserts that ‘it is very generally accepted that Ireland’s membership of the EU 
which began in 1973, has been critical to Irish economic success, and indeed the 
complete regeneration of Irish society as well’. EU membership was important as it 
gave not only financial support through regional policy but the timing was right as it 
helped Ireland prepare for the Single Market, while it was able to invest its own funds 
into infrastructure, human resources and nation rebranding. Cooper (2009) concludes 
that ‘whereas once Ireland looked to Rome… it now looked to Brussels’. 
 
The initial three decades since EU accession have not brought automatic changes to the 
domestic political landscape for the stuff of politics in Ireland remained local concerns, 
local problems, or, as its politicians would have claimed, ‘national’ concerns, ‘national’ 
problems, such as jobs, unemployment, prices and the managing of the nation’s 
resources (George Boyce 1991: 369). Considered as a poor and dependent country 
across all standard criteria at the time of entry right up to the late 1980s, Ireland reaped 
abundant fruits of an economical, infrastructural and social nature as a result of being a 
net beneficiary of EU funds. Entry into the EU has provided a major boost for the 
Republic’s very large agricultural sector, especially for beef and dairy farmers. 
However since the early 1960s the Republic has pursued a very active and successful 
policy of industrialisation by offering concessions to foreign industrialists.
90
 Pringle 
(1985: 13) attributes the rapid expansion of the welfare system to the overall growth in 
the economy. 
                                                 
90
 From the first Economic Programme (1958-1963) industrial policies offered tax concessions and capital 
grants to encourage export-oriented foreign companies to locate in Ireland. The Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA), a government agency established in 1950, became a key player in this strategy. 
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4.5.6.1  Sponger syndrome 
 
The distant mammoth figure of the EU doubling itself as a milking cow, through which 
‘grants’ and ‘subsidies’ pour, intensified the old Irish instinctive response to demand 
‘more’. From then on, Ireland was said to be suffering from a ‘sponger syndrome’ 
(Laffan and O’Mahoney 2008: 31, Meehan 2011). The prospects of milking money 
from Europe fostered the spread of envy and jealousy among domestic organisations, 
 
Pressure groups became, if not more insidious, certainly more blatant, expressing their 
demands more stridently, more self-righteously, and more avariciously, as they 
launched demand after demand for ‘our’ money from a growing but ineffectual state… 
Entry to the EEC in 1973 reinforced this tendency… The begrudger mode of discourse 
the pressure groups chose to cultivate in connection with the EEC scarcely elevated the 
level of public discussion in Ireland! (Lee 1990: 648). 
 
4.5.6.2  Initial cold shower 
 
Laffan and O’Mahoney (2008) classify the Irish experience within the EU into three 
consecutive phases. The first phase (1973-86) was characterised by learning to live 
within the European system, or the ‘apprenticeship’ phase as defined by Meehan (2011). 
Irish companies were caught on the wrong foot as they felt the cold shower effects of 
competition stemming from the common market. Apart from the impact in social and 
agricultural spheres, the initial impact was for the most part disappointing. EU funding, 
be it through the CAP or the Structural and Cohesion Funds were contributing factors in 
helping successive Irish governments turn the economy around after the early years of 
economic mismanagement (Jackson 2002, O’Donnell 1991). 
 
The holistic regeneration of the agri-sector mitigated the economic crises of the 1970s 
and 1980s and helped to sustain Irish living standards (Jackson 2002: 386). By this time, 
a new era of unprecedented economic growth was building up in Dublin, however the 
strategic decision to divide the country into two regions in 2000 ensured that the 
Western region, together with the Border and Midlands (BMW) retained their Objective 
One status entitling them to more Structural, Regional and Cohesion funding. 
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4.5.6.3  The roar of the Celtic Tiger 
 
The emergence of the Celtic Tiger marked the second phase between 1987 and 1997 of 
Irish membership, or ‘catch-up’ phase in Meehan’s terms (2011), as a result of 
unprecedented economic growth in the 1990s and the success in achieving economic 
convergence. In a euphoric tone the then Finance minister, Charles McCeevey (1997-
2004) was reported to exclaim that ‘economic theory doesn’t apply to Ireland’ (Hayes 
2011). Using his typical sarcastic tone, Cooper (2009:  xxiv) ponders on that ‘[i]ndeed 
things went so well that we thought that we had it made, that we had become an 
example to the rest of Europe, even the world, in how to become prosperous in a short 
space of time’. It was at the same time when Malta, Cyprus and eight other Eastern 
European states started looking at Ireland for inspiration and to disseminate the much 
needed ‘feel good factor’ among their anxious populations on the road to EU accession. 
4.5.7 A unique model of Social Partnership 
The third phase, starting in 1998 and lasting till the collapse of the Tiger phenomenon, 
revealed a new Ireland living in a re-engineered EU. Ireland has turned around full 
circle and, from a net beneficiary status as a poor member state, it became a net 
contributor as an affluent state. Surely, this was the triumphant moment of the 
triumvirate process through the joint contribution of state, trade unions and employers’ 
associations, and eventually civil society groups. It was the process that led to good 
governance through economic and social cohesion.
91
 According to Minister of the State, 
Dick Roche (2003), ‘necessity forced Government to recognise the need for better 
economic policies. The same necessity forced the evolution of a rather unique SP 
                                                 
91
 The social partnership process, which began in 1987, institutionalised wage bargaining between the 
social partners and involved an explicit trade-off of tax cuts for wage moderation, thus contributing to a 
positive economic environment for foreign and indigenous investment (Healy and Reynolds 2001). It is to 
be noted that industrial stability and consensus-building through a neo-corporatist approach was not the 
only factor that contributed to the Irish ‘miracle’. From the various studies on the theme, one can identify, 
without ranking in any particular order, nine other major contributory factors, namely: (a) membership of 
the EU, (b) significant subventions from the EU, (c) favourable regulatory and investment climate, (d) the 
English language and a lack of cultural barriers, (e) openness to trade, (f) stability of political and legal 
institutions, (g) industry clustering, technology transfer and supply chains, (h) human resources 
development and flexibility and (i) heavy investment in education. 
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approach to resolving 'big issues' which very often impede the evolution and more 
importantly the implementation of sound economic and social policies’. This is 
essentially a space in which the state interacts in a structured way with ‘selected’ 
representatives of society
92
 through a four pillar structure, founded on economic, 
agricultural and social/community interests. Just before the semi-disintegration of the 
SP a new environmental pillar was added in 2009. Figure 4.3 represents the five pillar 
model of Irish SP in its heyday. 
Figure 4.3: The pillar model of Irish Social Partnership 
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Adapted from Garvey 2009: 252 
Irish social partners and other non-state actors still prioritise national, rather than 
European affairs. However, both the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and Irish 
Business Employers Confederation (IBEC) assert their perception that the EU has 
                                                 
92
 Many organisations in various spheres of life have sought to become members of a particular pillar 
(that is to become Social Partners), but it is only the Government which chooses the social partners from 
its own analysis as to which organisation(s) provides the best representation in the various areas (Garvey 
2009: 252). 
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strengthened their bargaining power during negotiation sessions with their government 
(Sciortino 2008, Barry 1999), particularly in drafting, implementing and monitoring a 
series of National Development Plans (NDPs). The created system of governance 
allowed for compromise and agreement, although there are those who argue that this is 
only applicable to insider groups. Nonetheless, the number of strategic and single-issue 
driven alliances in policy domains, where few links existed before, started growing fast, 
‘thus strengthening interest groups’ bargaining position vis-à-vis national government’ 
(Laffan and Tannam 1998: 81). 
Furthermore size was particularly instrumental in Ireland’s strategic adaptation to the 
EU because its small size of national administration certainly helped to get things done 
more quickly (McCreevy interviewed by the author, 2010). Many small states scholars 
seem to agree that the lack of dense bureaucratic foliage and an administrative culture 
characterised by informality and personalism are key advantageous determinants of 
adapting relatively easily to home-grown and imported pressures of change. Although 
Laffan and Tannam (1998) and Laffan and O’Mahoney (2008) share this view and do 
not hesitate to apply it to their homeland, a deeper analysis of the institutional evolution 
of the Irish state administration tends to narrate an alternative storyline. Hardiman and 
MacCarthaigh (2010: 7) maintain that ‘the relatively ad hoc manner in which 
government agencies have been created in Ireland, the wide variety of accountability 
and communication mechanisms and the absence of performance framework’ have 
rendered the system of Irish governance more complex and awkward. The true story 
that lies behind the official print is less straightforward in determining the correlation 
between state size and state success. 
4.5.8 The collapse of the Celtic Tiger 
With the collapse of the Celtic Tiger, sober talk on the unspotted deficiencies of the 
Irish administration has become more bold and widespread. Therefore, a fourth phase of 
Irish membership in the EU has to be added to the original tripod suggested by Laffan 
and O’Mahoney. This latest phase is characterised by a ‘dizzying plunge’ that led 
Ireland ‘back to bust’ and ‘a return to something approaching the relative poverty of the 
recent decades’ (Cooper 2009: xxiv). Ireland is ‘back to square one and worse’ (Meehan 
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2011). The lack of prudence by banks, property developers and the construction 
industry, coupled with the ineffectiveness of regulators and the inability of 
policymakers to incubate new domestic business opportunities led to the final downfall 
(Hayes 2011). On its part, the interest representation system through the formation of 
the SP was like ‘a good marriage turned bad: the end had become inevitable’ (Cooper 
2009). The crucial aspect, from the perspective of this study, is the way the government 
strived to steer the economy through the impetus of unions, employers and civil society 
groups and, yet still, ‘the miracle was turned into a curse’. Although in its early years 
the Irish SP had ‘undoubted merits’, it eventually transformed itself into a fortified 
elitist circle where no alternative voices were allowed to be heard, 
SP instilled the false confidence that we were planning our economy properly, whereas 
we were only dividing the proceeds of the illusory boom according to who, apparently, 
had the most influence. It was a cosy relationship between government, business and 
trade unions that meant hard decisions weren’t made because trade-offs and 
compromises prevailed instead, it was another variation of crony capitalism, but this 
time the unions were the willing participants (Cooper 2009: 372/3). 
Hayes (2011) is more categorical in her judgement. She denounces the Irish SP as a 
‘disaster’ because over the years it had created a ‘social divide’ between public and 
private sector employees that led to an ‘economic civil war’.  
The narrative of contemporary Ireland under the scrutiny of the IMF, ECB, fellow 
member states and the international community is still unfolding at the time of writing. 
The latest news bulletins indicate that once again Ireland started showing progressive 
signs of economic expansion in the last quarter of 2013 (independent.ie 2014, OECD 
2013). The Irish-EU timeline in the first years of the 21
st
 century presents an 
exceptional narrative of great transformations in a very short period. 
4.6 Factors built into confrontation and unity 
So far this chapter has set out to provide two parallel narratives. In each case the 
description and analysis were broadly – and hopefully not over-rigidly – structured 
around institutions and actors who have been protagonists in the two small polities The 
narratives’ main thrust rests on the in-built factor of duality expressed across a 
diversified array of ideologies, situations and projections, left and right, polarisation and 
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consensus, unity and tribalism, tradition and modernisation, religion and secularism, 
pluralism and corporatism, centralisation and devolution, isolation and connectivity, 
Europeanisation and nationalism, nationalism and localism, clientelism and detachment, 
insiders and outsiders, grudge and solidarity, economic peaks and lows, confrontation 
and unity, us and them.  
Research has revealed that despite strategic similarities in the geopolitical, socio-
cultural and economic fabric of Malta and Ireland, a number of asymmetries do stand 
out as indicated in Table 4.1. These asymmetries are justified due to pragmatic 
circumstances and may have the potential to explain the empirical findings that shall be 
treated in the next two chapters.  
Table 4.1: Malta’s and Ireland’s comparative template  
 
  
 
Malta Ireland 
Constitutional and political issues 
 Constitution Republican polities based on parliamentary democracy 
 
 The President nominated by the House of 
Representatives 
elected by the people 
 The Executive a highly centralised executive power vested to the Cabinet and 
headed by the Prime Minister  
 
 The Legislative unicameral House of 
Representatives 
two Houses of Parliament: 
House of Representatives  and 
Senate  
 
 Legal System pluralistic system                 
incorporating Civil Law       
and Common Law              
based on Common Law and  
modified through subsequent   
legislation and Constitution 
 
 Electoral System  single transferable vote 
system (STV) of 
proportional representation 
(PR) 
TDs elected by PR (STV 
version). Senators elected from 
sectoral panels and universities. 
Some nominated by the 
Taoiseach 
 
 Type of Government camouflagic framework encompassing a social democratic 
orientation (welfare society) as well as a neo-liberal dimension 
 
 Regional and local 
Governance 
relatively weak local governance and an unelected regional 
tier 
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 Political Parties two party system traditionally a ‘two and a half 
party system’ but the 2011 early 
elections brought about a new 
geometry of power where the 
Labour Party became the 
second largest party 
 
 International Policy military neutral and non-aligned with a strong call for 
international peace and cooperation 
 
Socio-cultural issues 
 Religion traditionally ‘almost monolithically Roman Catholic’ 
 
 Secularisation secular trends are evident, particularly among the younger 
generations - the Catholic hierarchy is now more on the 
defensive side  
 
 Language Maltese widely used by the     English used predominately in   
people and the media but         all spheres of private and public 
English is the predominant      life, with the exception of some 
language of the                        rural areas in the west where the 
administration and the             Irish language is still spoken. 
business community                 
 
 Political discourse highly polarised consensus seeking  among 
social partners 
 
 Socio-political fabric parochial, clientelistic and personalised politics 
 
 Civil society diverse in its forms and structures, deeply rooted in 
Catholicism and in representative democracy 
 
 Interest 
representation system  
pluralistic, yet hindered by 
tacit elitism 
neo-corporatist in a pluralistic 
environment 
 
 National Identity ambivalent due to deep 
political polarisation 
 
Strong 
 National Holidays  Freedom Day – March 31 
Sette Giugno – June 7  
Victory Day – September 8  
Independence Day – Sept 21 
Republic Day – December13 
 
five national days reflecting 
an ambivalent nationhood 
 
Saint Patrick’s Day – March 17 
 
 
 
 
 
one national day signifying a 
tenacious nationhood 
 
Economic issues 
 Economy type small, open, trade-dependent economy 
 
 Natural Resources none, except limestone. agriculture, forestry and mining 
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Flexible and knowledgeable 
human resources 
 
but, above all, flexible and 
knowledgeable human 
resources 
 
 Economic 
diversification 
Traditionally based on the 
British military services 
and manufacturing  
traditionally based on 
agriculture, animal husbandry 
and fisheries 
 
  eventually transformed into knowledgeable open economies 
focusing on services and high-tech industries  
 
 Geographical 
competitive 
advantage 
 
Being a MS on the southern 
frontier, it can exploit the 
markets of the north 
African region 
 
being a MS on the western 
frontier, it attracts investment 
from the USA and other global 
partners 
 Social partners’ 
relations 
fragmented and rife, 
echoing deep political 
polarisation 
 
consensus building and 
compromise seeking yet it 
started to change again after the 
international bailout 
 
 Regional differences an affluent northern region 
and a relatively less well-
off South and Gozo 
 
an affluent southern and 
Eastern region and a relatively 
less well-off Western region 
 Economic resilience 
during global  
economic crises 
high resilience due to 
strong banking system and 
financial regulation 
 
low resilience followed by the 
collapse of the Celtic Tiger. 
Recovering from 2013 onwards 
EU membership 
 Accession  2004 1973 
 
 Regional designation single region Phase 1 (1973-1999) single 
region 
 
Phase 2 (1999 – today) two 
regions, BMW and S&E 
 
 Phases of experience 
within 
Phase 1 (2004-2013)  
Learning period dictated by 
the logic of appropriateness 
as devised by the PN 
government 
 
Phase 2 (2013 -  ) 
Utilitarian approach 
dictated by the logic of 
consequences as devised by 
the PL government 
 
 
Phase 1 (1973-1986)  
apprenticeship period focused 
on maximising receipts from 
EC funds and seeking 
derogations on difficult issues 
 
Phase 2 (1987-1997) 
unprecedented economic 
growth 
 
Phase 3 (1998-2008) 
consolidation of the SP 
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Phase 4 (2008 -  2012) 
setbacks for Irish economy. 
Discussions held with the EU 
and IMF on rebuilding an 
export led recovery 
 
     
Mario Vassallo 2014 
These are the troubled, yet exciting terrains where Maltese and Irish interest groups 
strive to influence the corridors of power, their peers, the public at large and the 
European multi-layered institutional architecture. Interest groups’ preferences are 
primarily shaped by institutional settings and culture. They have to work consciously at 
lobbying institutions, designing stratagems and nurturing a collective forma mentis to 
foster strategic thinking. 
So far, the theoretical and conceptual framework, together with the different types of 
interest groups and the political landscapes of the two selected states have all been 
exposed and discussed at length. The next step is to introduce the methodology that has 
been employed to collect and analyse primary data so that original hypotheses can be 
tested and questions answered. In the next chapter, an audit trail of the methodological 
and ethical implications of the study is thoroughly explained prior to the presentation of 
data relating to the four selected types of interest groups. 
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Chapter 5 
Research design and methodology 
 
All research is a practical activity requiring the exercise of judgement in context;  
it is not a matter of simply following methodological rules. 
 
Hammersley and Atkinson, 1994: 23 
 
5.1 Introductory note 
 
This study adopts a comparative approach involving Malta and Ireland as two small 
island member states within the EU. This approach uses four case studies, namely 
employers’ associations and trade unions, environmental groups and, social and human 
rights groups, in order to assess the relevance of new institutionalism in understanding 
the Europeanisation of domestic interest groups. ‘Multiple-case studies follow a 
replication logic’ (Tellis 1997) so as to better assess the application of theory to 
different situational contexts. The evidence from carefully selected ‘multisite’ polities, 
politics and policies is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is 
therefore regarded as being more robust (Burnham et al 2008, Herriot and Firestone 
1983). The nature of policy processes is a complex area for political analysis and many 
scholars maintain that mixed methods research is most appropriate not only as a means 
to triangulate results but, more importantly for this study, it offers the best equipped 
strategy to investigate a multifaceted research enquiry. Whilst quantitative data gives an 
aggregate overview of the phenomenon under scrutiny, the use of qualitative research is 
‘underpinned by the persistent requirement… to understand complex behaviours, needs, 
systems and cultures’ (Ritchie and Spencer 1994: 173). 
 
This chapter deals with the motivation behind the particular methodological position 
that is being taken and with the variety of methods that have been employed to collect 
and analyse quantitative and qualitative data. Then it surveys how the study attempts to 
respond to the key criteria of quality craftsmanship by ascertaining validity, reliability 
and credibility. It concludes by elucidating the ethical standards that have guided all 
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stages of the research cycle and the methodological and thematic limitations that set 
constraints on the study. 
  
5.2 The comparative method 
 
This thesis adheres to a research design based on a comparative case study. According 
to Yin (1994: 1) case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions 
are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events and when the focus 
is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. For the purposes of 
this research, such an approach enjoys all the right credentials, not only to answer the 
set of key research questions proposed in the introduction, but it is also crucially 
important ‘to provide a better understanding of the circumstances in which the 
hypotheses will and will not hold’ (Bryman 2008: 55). In this thesis, the relationship 
between theory and research is a deductive one, since the research design and the 
collection of data are guided by specific research questions and hypotheses that derive 
from theoretical concerns. Although many a time case studies have been considered as a 
weak sibling among social science methods, yet they too can provide a sound basis for 
scientific generalisation. In fact they are generalisable to theoretical propositions and 
not to populations or universes. Flyvbjerg (2004: 419) maintains that case studies 
cannot be of value in and of themselves; they need to be linked to hypotheses, following 
the well-known hypothetico-deductive model
93
 of epistemological stance. The use of 
theory in doing case studies is not only an immense aid in defining the appropriate 
research design and data collection, but also becomes the main vehicle for 
transferability of results (Yin 1994; Flinders and Mills 1993). 
 
One of the strengths of the case study approach is that it allows the researcher to use a 
variety of sources, a variety of types of data and a variety of research methods as part of 
the investigation (Denscombe 2005: 31). Thus, the idea of a case study can be 
                                                 
93
 Within a deductive study, political researchers take theory as their starting point. The research 
progresses from the adoption of a theoretical position and the prediction of what ought to be found in the 
empirical world. The researcher will then proceed to investigate the empirical world in which they find 
both themselves and their problem in order to test the theory and to draw conclusions about its 
explanatory value (Silbergh 2001: 17).  
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considered as an ‘umbrella term’ since it utilises a mix of data gathering techniques 
(Bell 1999: 10). Its reliance on multiple sources of evidence secures a competitive 
advantage over other research designs to explore complex issues from different 
perspectives. It is particularly suitable to gauge the extent of causality in a cause and 
effect relationship, in this case between EU influence and domestic change/preservation, 
as well as to understand how this process is being comprehended by the stakeholders, in 
this case social partners and interest groups. 
 
The four case scenarios featuring in this study have been purposely selected due to their 
critical contribution towards different policy areas of significant importance and their 
ability to provide rich narratives. The rationale behind the choice of the four cases has 
been discussed in Chapter 1. This type of multiple-case scenarios automatically entails 
multiple narratives, including statistical results, for both selected polities which shall be 
presented in the next two chapters: Chapter 6 relating to trade unions and employers’ 
associations and Chapter 7 featuring social and human rights groups, and environmental 
groups. Most political science is comparative, even if not explicitly so. Comparison in 
its broadest sense, according to Warwick and Osherson (1973: 7), ‘is the process of 
discovering similarities and differences among phenomena’. Comparativists ‘examine a 
case to reveal what it tells us about a larger set of political phenomena’ (Lichbach and 
Zuckerman 1997: 4).  
Comparative design presents the researcher with considerable challenges, 
especially when different countries are being compared. The researcher must 
select a theoretical problem that is best illuminated by comparative research… 
Relevant and equivalent data should then be collected and hypotheses tested…, 
and appropriate conclusions drawn. Comparative analysis sharpens our 
understanding of the context… (Burnham et al 2008: 68). 
 
The process illustrated by Burnham and his colleagues explains in a nutshell the process 
of inquiry as employed in this study.  
 
5.3 Preliminary feedback 
 
Prior to embarking on a fully-fledged investigation, an exploratory study was conducted 
in the initial stages when unstructured interviews were held with key protagonists so as 
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to better understand the contextual and theoretical implications. This preliminary 
fieldwork proved to be crucial in formulating the conceptual framework and in devising 
a holistic research design that addresses theoretical inferences on the dynamics of 
domestic civil society. Dexter (2006) argues that interviewing persons who have 
specialised information or who have involvement with any social or political processes, 
is different from standard interviewing. In elite interviewing the investigator must be 
willing to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, the question, or the situation 
is. The research exploration stage was conducted in Malta, Brussels and Ireland. A 
conscious attempt was made to obtain a variety of personal accounts and expert 
opinions from purposively selected respondents for an early identification of key issues 
and interdependencies. Ten interviews were conducted in Malta, two in Ireland and 
three in Brussels between 2009 and 2011 (see Appendix A). Among those interviewed 
there were national and European politicians and technocrats, academics, senior 
bureaucrats and key leaders of non-state organisations. Their feedback was instrumental 
in devising the set of questions for both questionnaires and interviews, as well as to gain 
organisational access for fieldwork purposes. 
 
Besides the information accumulated through non-anonymous interviews, the initial 
exploration stage also incorporated participation in a substantial number of conferences, 
seminars, public lectures, master classes, business breakfasts and workshops held in 
Malta, Gozo, Dublin, Sheffield, Rome, Istanbul and London. Some of these events 
concerned theoretical matters regarding the interplay between institutionalism and 
Europeanisation, while others pondered upon the nature and contribution of interest 
groups in policy-making. During these events I had the opportunity to present my 
opinions and workings either in writing through academic papers or verbally through 
presentations. This early involvement in fieldwork research was extremely beneficial to 
become more sensitive to political contexts and dynamics of interplay between state and 
non-state actors against an EU backdrop. Attendance in these types of activities was 
pursued during the remaining years of the doctorate programme. 
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5.4 Data collection toolkit 
 
The methodology that characterises research designs based on a case study approach 
entails the application of multiple data sources. In contrast to the conventional usage of 
mixed data which is often manifested through vigorous triangulation exercise to 
corroborate findings, this study assigns distinct investigative roles to the quantitative 
and qualitative data streams. The former is applied to determine the extent of 
Europeanisation that is, whether it has been statistically significant or not among 
Maltese and Irish groups in the selected time period (2004-2011), whereas the latter is 
used to figure out which mediating factors are at play to understand the nature of 
Europeanisation. However, within the qualitative part of the study, there is still an 
element of triangulation as two instruments of data collection are utilised to validate 
results. The discussion will now focus on each of the instruments that forms part of the 
data collection toolkit, namely self-completion questionnaires, elite interviewing and 
direct observation. They will be thoroughly analysed wherein their individual 
characteristics, advantages and limitations are highlighted.  
 
5.4.1 Self-completion questionnaires 
The quantitative contribution of this study is provided through the administration of 
self-completion questionnaires. It is specifically applied to verify the null hypothesis by 
measuring the degree of change due to Europeanisation through statistical computations. 
The questionnaire is composed of four separate sections, namely internal structures, 
domestic responsiveness, European involvement and attitudinal transformation. These 
four distinct, yet interlinked, dimensions portray the character of interest groups and 
their performance in domestic and European policy arenas. Besides an overall score that 
confirms or otherwise the null hypothesis, results also show if any of these dimensions 
has been significantly reconfigured as a consequence of Europeanisation (see Figure 
5.1). Such dimensions have been introduced in Chapter 1 and were thoroughly 
explained in Chapter 2. Refer to Appendix D for the English and Maltese versions of 
the questionnaire. 
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Figure 5.1: The four dimensions constituting the questionnaire 
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In the Maltese case, all registered groups under the four selected categories have been 
included in the exercise, thus no sampling technique was applied. Trade unions and 
employers’ associations were identified through the Registrar of Trade Unions 
(Gazzetta tal-Gvern ta’ Malta, 30/09/2011), while the list of registered social and 
human rights groups and environmental organisations was provided by the 
Commissioner of Voluntary Organisations (CVO)
94
 during the same time period. In the 
                                                 
94
 The Office of the CVO was set up by the Voluntary Organisations Act 2007 with the task to strengthen 
the voluntary sector through various initiatives with the specific aim of promoting the work of interest 
groups as well as encouraging their role as partners with the government in various initiatives. The 
ultimate mission of the Commissioner’s office is to give more visibility to the voluntary sector as well as 
to guarantee transparency and accountability of the organisations that compose it in the carrying out of 
their important work. In view of this, the Office of the CVO is also the regulatory authority responsible 
for this sector with the aim of monitoring and supervising the activities of these organisations as well as 
supporting them (CVO Annual Report 2012). 
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latter case, whenever a particular organisation was registered under both categories, it 
has been categorised under the one in which it is most active.  
The Irish case presents a slightly different strategy. In the case of trade unions and 
employers’ organisations, research subjects were identified through the list of member 
organisations within the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and the Irish Business 
and Employers Confederation (IBEC), respectively. Unions that are solely active in 
Northern Ireland or are based in the UK have been eliminated, while other workers’ and 
employers’ representative bodies that do not form part of the two confederations were 
added. Irish environmental groups that function on a national level have all been 
included in the research exercise, thanks to the information provided by the Irish 
Environmental Policy Unit. Random sampling was applied in the case of social and 
human rights groups. Unlike the situation in Malta, in Ireland there is no single official 
register of NGOs and voluntary organisations. Many are enrolled as charities, others are 
registered with the Companies’ Registration Office, and the whole context is rife with 
myriad umbrella organisations. Upon the advice of Irish officers who form part of the 
Community and Voluntary Pillar of Social Partnership, the register of The Wheel
95
 was 
used as the sample frame. Considering the limited resources available in terms of time, 
finance and people, 18% of the 800 organisations that are registered within The Wheel 
have been randomly selected, thus, obtaining a sample of 144 entities which more or 
less resembles the number of social groups in Malta. Table 5.1 shows the classification 
of population sizes and response rates in both countries. 
Appendix B exhibits the complete list of organisations that have participated in the 
questionnaire exercise. 
 
 
 
                                                 
95
 The Wheel is a support and representative body connecting community and voluntary organisations and 
charities across Ireland. Established in 1999, The Wheel has evolved to become a resource centre and 
forum for the community and voluntary sector. 
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Table 5.1:  Population sizes and response rates 
Sector Country Population 
Size 
Questionnaires 
received 
Response rate 
Trade Unions Malta 
Ireland 
34 
30 
24 
14 
70.6% 
46.6 % 
Employers’ 
associations 
Malta 
Ireland 
20 
32 
14 
20 
70.6% 
62.5% 
Social and 
Human rights 
Groups 
Malta 
Ireland 
130 
144* 
96 
64 
73.8% 
44.4% 
Environmental 
Groups 
Malta 
Ireland 
26 
47 
20 
20 
76.9% 
42.5% 
* This is the only exception where the whole population was not targeted and a random sample was used instead. 
Questionnaires in Malta were distributed during the last quarter of 2011, while the Irish 
subjects participated in the exercise during the first quarter of 2012. Participation was 
strictly on voluntary basis, yet subjects were duly encouraged to take part by gentle 
email reminders half way through the data collection period and two weeks prior to the 
expiry of submission date. The submission deadline in both countries was extended by 
further fifteen days. Although the whole exercise was initially online based, a need was 
instantly felt to supplement efforts through telephone calls and on-site visits with the 
hope of obtaining decent response rates. A research assistant was eventually 
commissioned to start phoning both Maltese and Irish NGOs, while maintaining online 
communication with them. Guaranteeing a good response rate from Irish subjects was 
far more challenging. The real drive to enhance the number of returned questionnaires 
was the fieldtrip in Dublin between February and March 2012. Originally it was a seven 
week period intended to conduct interviews but, as things turned out to be, it became 
necessary to visit a considerable number of Irish groups and assisted them in filling-in 
the questionnaire. In addition ICTU, IBEC, The Wheel and the two Irish umbrella 
environmental groups, Sustainable Water Network Ireland (SWAN)
96
 and Irish 
                                                 
96
 Sustainable Water Network (SWAN) is an umbrella network of twenty-five of Ireland’s leading 
environmental groups working together to protect Ireland’s waters by participating in the implementation 
of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) in Ireland. 
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Environmental Network (IEN)
97
 took the lead to reinforce the appeal by advising their 
affiliated member organisations to take part in this ‘important research considered to be 
the first of its kind in Ireland’. 
An introductory note complemented the questionnaire, stating the scope of the research 
exercise and the ways through which the collected data would be used (see Appendix C). 
Respondents were assured that organisational and personal details were not to be 
disclosed to third parties. Research subjects were presented with the researcher’s contact 
details so as to have a point of reference in case further clarifications or assistance were 
required. The questionnaire format has been kept simple and as short as possible since 
simplicity and conciseness are considered to be two major characteristics that ensure a 
high response rate. A small scale pilot study was conducted in Malta and, as a result, 
appropriate amendments were made.  
5.4.2 Elite interviewing 
 
Measuring the extent of Europeanisation using quantitative data is not the only 
objective of the initial set of hypotheses. Equally important is the understanding of 
which type of Europeanisation is being experienced by domestic interest groups. In 
other words, the ‘how’ is just as crucial as ‘to what level’ groups are Europeanised. 
Qualitative instruments are well suited to decode the nature of Europeanisation, that is, 
if it is best understood in terms of rational interest promotion or in terms of wider social 
conscience. 
 
One of the dominant tools through which empirical data have been collected has been 
the semi-structured, in-depth, elite interviewing. Ware and Sánchez-Jankowski (2006: 
5) firmly assert that elites are often willing to provide information because they are able 
                                                 
97
 Irish Environmental Network (IEN) represents to government the capacity building and funding needs 
of its member organisations, all of whom are involved in one way or another in the well-being, protection 
and enhancement of the environment. All these individual organisations attempt to achieve these aims 
through practical conservation work, raising public awareness of environmental and conservation needs, 
campaigning and lobbying. 
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to expound on a topic of which they believe they are the only experts. They are often the 
only persons to know specific information on a particular issue or topic. According to 
Rapley (2004: 15), ‘[i]nterviewing is currently the central resource through which 
contemporary social science engages with issues that concern it’.  
 
Interviewing sessions were first carried out in Ireland, mainly during the third fieldwork 
trip to Dublin that took place between February and March 2012 whereas Maltese 
protagonists were interviewed immediately afterwards. Besides interviewing high 
representatives of the four selected sectors of organised groups, other protagonists were 
also included in the exercise, including formal mediating bodies that bring in state and 
non-state actors round the table of discussions, politicians, scholars and think-tanks, 
thus, attempting to give as complete a picture as possible of the multi-faceted 
relationship between Europeanisation and domestic change. As exhibited in Table 5.2, a 
total of forty-two interviews were carried out among six distinct sectors of stakeholders. 
 
All interviews were carried out at the premises indicated by research subjects. In 
particular, interview questions draw their inspiration from the set of intermediate 
variables that characterise the selected variants of new institutionalism, RCI and SI, and, 
moreover, they provided an invaluable means of probing further into the contextual 
environment in which participants are active. The interview guide, together with the 
letter of invitation in both English and Maltese, is in Appendix E. On average, each 
interview was spread over sixty minutes. The great majority were audio-recorded, after 
obtaining the necessary authorisations, so as to concentrate on the flow and direction of 
the interviewing session. In accordance with the guidance provided by the University of 
Sheffield’s Ethics Committee, interviewees were reassured of anonymity, although 
some of them confirmed that they find no objection in being mentioned by name. 
However, at the end, it was decided to rule out all personal names and use a coding 
system instead. Appendix F shows the full list of organisations that participated during 
interviews. 
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Table 5.2: Classification of interviews in Malta and Ireland 
Sector Country Codification
98
 Number of 
interviewees 
 
Trade Unions Malta MTU 3 
 Ireland 
 
ITU 3 
Employers’ Associations Malta MEA 3 
 Ireland 
 
IEA 2 
Social and Human rights Groups Malta MSHG 5 
 Ireland 
 
ISHG 6 
Environmental Groups Malta MEG 3 
 Ireland 
 
IEG 7 
Mediating Bodies Malta MMB 4 
 Ireland 
 
IMB 1 
Political Observers, scholars and 
think-tanks 
Malta MPO 3 
 Ireland 
 
IPO 2 
TOTAL number of interviews Malta  21 
 Ireland  21 
 
A major problem that almost automatically crops up in elite interviewing is the issue of 
access. In general, access to elites can be hindered due to their busy schedules. 
Moreover, interviews can demand a substantial amount of time on their already 
overflowing commitments. Gaining access to Maltese elites was possible thanks to 
effective contact points that I had established over the years as an NGO leader,
99
 human 
resources practitioner
100
 and, eventually, an academic.
101
 Interviews with Maltese 
                                                 
98
 Each organisation/person that has been interviewed was given a code in order to secure anonymity. The 
coding process works as follows. The first letter corresponds to the country of origin, the next set of 
letters defines the nature of the organisation whilst the number at the end represents the interview number, 
e.g. MTU1 refers to a Maltese Trade Union (interview 1) and ISHG3 refers to an Irish Social and Human 
rights Group (interview 3). This is the pattern of codification that is used in Chapters 6 and 7 where 
primary findings are presented.  
99
 Over a span of 20 years (1988-2007), I occupied leading roles in local and national voluntary 
organisations, particularly in the fields of youth work, religion and culture. 
100
 Between 1996 and 2008 I was responsible for Training and Development and other related human 
resource matters at Malta’s telecommunications incumbent which since 1997 had become partly 
privatised and eventually fully privatised ten years later. 
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protagonists were conducted in Maltese and, thus, findings had to be translated into 
English. As for the Irish counterparts, I used the services of the Irish Embassy in Malta 
and the exploratory fieldwork in Dublin to set the ball rolling for making the 
preliminary networking.  
 
5.4.3 Direct observation  
 
No research method is without bias. Interviews and questionnaires must be 
supplemented by methods testing the same social science variables but which have 
different methodological weaknesses (Webb et al. 1966:1). Direct observation can fill 
this void, as it refers to:  
 
a set of methods of generating data which involve the researcher immersing 
himself or herself in a research setting, and systematically observing dimensions 
of that setting, interactions, relationships, actions, events and so on, within it… 
(Mason 1997: 60/3). 
 
Mason’s notion explains precisely the major advantage of observation over the first two 
methods, as observation calls for an investigation of real life data as it develops during 
changing contextual situations. I took on board Becker’s and Geer’s (1970) advice that 
since people do not often write/tell an interviewer all the things he might want to 
know,
102
 he will address such gaps in his information by observing actual changes in 
behaviour over a period of time and note the events which precede and follow them. In 
this way, ‘we add to the accuracy of our data when we substitute observable fact for 
inference’103 (Becker and Geer 1970: 140). 
For the period between 2009 and 2012, I was granted an informal observer status on 
four sectoral committees within the Malta-EU Action and Steering Committee 
(MEUSAC), namely (a) the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, (b) the Employment, 
                                                                                                                                               
101
 In December 2008 I joined the University of Malta as a member of the academic staff at the 
Department of Public Policy within the Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy. 
102
 This may be because interviewees did not want to. They feel that to speak of some particular subject 
would be impolitic, impolite, or insensitive, the interviewer does not have enough information to inquire 
into the matter and they are not able to (Becker and Geer 1970: 136) 
103
 The act or process of deriving logical conclusions from premises assumed to be true 
(http://www.thefreedictionary.com/inference). 
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Social Policy and Health Committee, (c) the Competitiveness and Consumer Affairs 
Committee and (d) the Environment Committee.
104
 These Sectoral Committees, 
constituted by representatives of interest groups and senior civil servants from the 
respective fields, allow interest groups to participate in the formulation of Malta’s 
position on legislative developments in the EU. They generate constructive discussion 
on the impact that proposed EU measures could have on Malta, its institutions, its 
specific sectors and ordinary citizens.  
The adopted approach was of an unobtrusive nature. After securing the necessary 
permits to attend these meetings, MEUSAC’s secretariat started to inform me of the 
dates of the committees meetings and the agenda for discussion. All members of the 
committees were advised by MEUSAC of my role as a ‘research-observer’ (Webb et al. 
1966: 112) and although I never concealed my visibility, at no time did I ever join in the 
ensuing discussions or in any way interrupted the flow of any session.  
In addition, I spent additional hours of observation during other fora wherein state and 
non-state actors are involved, like those organised by the MCESD,
105
 public 
consultations managed by the Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA) and 
other public events organised by social partners and interest groups in Malta and, to a 
lesser extent, in Ireland. (see Appendix G for a full list of observation sessions).  
 
 
                                                 
104 MEUSAC's sectoral umbrellas have been designed to correspond exactly to the different formations 
of the EU Council of Ministers with the exception of consumer affairs. It is interesting that MEUSAC 
chose to organise itself in this manner, as most national governments stick to their pre-existing ministerial 
structures which do not always coincide with the Council formations (Vassallo 2009: 68). This 
development can be considered part of the Europeanisation process of interest representation in Malta. 
105
 Between 2011 and 2012, I participated as an observer in the MCESD project ‘Closer to Europe: Social 
and Civil Dialogue’ which was co-financed by funds from the European Social Fund.  The project’s 
major aim was to enhance the process of social and civil dialogue in Malta by (a) encouraging and 
sustaining the development of a more effective social and civil dialogue in Malta and Gozo, and (b) 
supporting social partners and civil society organisations to increase their knowledge on EU and local 
policy developments. See Appendix G for a complete list of MCESD events that I have observed. 
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5.5 Data analysis 
 
The strategy of data analysis adopted in this thesis moves along the hypothetical-
deductive model. The researcher, on the basis of what is known about in a particular 
domain and of theoretical considerations in relation to that domain, deduces a set of 
hypotheses that must then be subjected to empirical scrutiny (Bryman 2008: 9).  
 
Figure 5.2 exhibits the logical process of deduction as employed in this study. As 
clearly demonstrated, the hypotheses testing exercise is divided into two major parts. 
The first, characterised by a quantitative element, seeks to confirm or reject the null 
hypothesis by calculating the impact of Europeanisation in statistical terms derived from 
questionnaires’ results. The second part, composed of qualitative data, is specifically 
designed to decode the nature of Europeanisation in terms of rationalist or sociological 
underpinnings. Moreover, the two phases of this model of data analysis is encased 
within a cross examination of Malta and Ireland. The introductory section of Chapter 8 
gives a more detailed explanation of the hypotheses testing exercise, elucidating the 
various steps involved in the processing of a large corpus of data in order to reach 
definitive conclusions. 
 
5.5.1 Analysing quantitative data 
 
The great majority of questions in the questionnaire involve a categorical or nominal 
scale where participants had to select between a yes or no answer. For such questions, 
where only one option is possible, the Chi Square Test has been used. This is used to 
determine if there exists an association between two categorical variables, in this case 
Malta and Ireland. The null hypothesis specifies that there is no association between the 
two categorical variables and is accepted if the p value exceeds the 0.05 level of 
significance. The alternative hypothesis specifies that there is a significant association 
between the two categorical variables and is accepted if the p value is less than the 0.05 
criterion. In other words, the null hypothesis specifies no contrast between the two 
categorical variables and the alternative hypothesis indicates a significant contrast 
between categories that can be generalised over the population. 
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Figure 5.2: Process of deduction 
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For questions where respondents had the option of selecting more than one response 
(see questions 6, 8, 13, 31, 35, 36, 38 and 49), the Multiple Response Analysis was used. 
At the end of the process the Chi Square Test was also computed in order to determine 
the level of significance of the respective findings. 
 
For questions where participants were asked to rate their answer on a likert scale or rank 
their options on a priority ranking scheme, a nonparametric test was applied, namely the 
Mann Witney Test, since this time an ordinal scale is involved. This Test has been used 
to compare the mean rating scores for questions where participants were asked for their 
own perspective regarding a particular statement (see questions 23, 24, 25, 26, 43, 44, 
48 and 50). The null hypothesis specifies that the mean rating scores elicited by Maltese 
and Irish respondents, as the two independent variables, for a particular statement are 
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comparable and is accepted if the p value exceeds the 0.05 level of significance. The 
alternative hypothesis specifies that the mean rating scores elicited by the two groups 
differ significantly and is accepted if the p value is less than the 0.05 criterion. It should 
be noted that a 4 point likert scale has been used, thus eliminating the possibility of a 
neutral position, where the possibilities for respondents were as follows: 
1 corresponds  to  No, not at all 
2 corresponds  to  Yes to a minor extent 
3 corresponds  to  Yes to some extent 
4 corresponds to  Yes to a great extent 
 
The higher the mean rating score for a particular statement, the higher is the agreement 
for that particular statement. It will be assumed that these categories have equal scale 
spacing such that a rating score expresses the intensity of an effect and measure it on a 
numbered scale. 
 
It is to be noted that the absolute numbers of three of the selected sectors in both Malta 
and Ireland, namely trade unions, employers’ associations and environmental groups, 
are limited due to small populations. When computing findings, preferably all the 
expected counts should not be less than 5. However, in a number of instances, some of 
the expected counts were infact less than 5. Where this is the case, such findings in 
Chapters 6 and 7 have been marked by the letter u, signifying the unreliability factor. 
Although this is a limitation in itself, the cross tab and the p values are still displayed. 
Furthermore, the criterion of unreliability has been relaxed by a number of scientists 
like Yates, Moore and McCabe (1999: 734) who confirm that it is generally acceptable 
to have some expected counts less than 5, provided none are less than 1, and at least 
80% of the expected counts are equal to or greater than 5. 
 
In the end the Z-score technique is used to test the viability of the original null 
hypothesis. Chapter 8 includes a detailed explanation of the process involved in 
calculating the extent of Europeanisation, thus determining its degree of statistical 
significance. 
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5.5.2 Analysing qualitative data 
 
The assessment of 42 interviews and 260 hours of observations was performed using 
thematic analysis which is a technique that aims at ‘identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data’, thereby organising and facilitating its interpretation 
(Braun and Clarke 2006: 79). Thematic analysis provides researchers the opportunity to 
understand the correlations between concepts and to replicate the study using clear 
themes and guidelines for interpretation. This technique, according to Alhojailan (2012: 
10), grants researchers flexibility whilst simultaneously providing a degree of structure 
to qualitative research.  
 
The coding of certain prompts and themes in this study were pre-defined by literature 
review, theory and the intermediate variables of the hypotheses, whereas others were 
constructed inductively. For instance, in the case of social partners, a very interesting 
topic cropped up during interviewing about the contemporary European and domestic 
economic scenario. This theme had not been coded prior to conducting the interviews, 
but would emerge as one of the key discussions coded selectively as a core category of 
discussion in Chapter 6.  
 
The thematic analysis of interviews and observations follows the six-step model 
proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006: 87). The first step is to get immersed in the data 
collected by reading repeatedly and actively searching for meaning and patterns. Phase 
two involves the confirmation of pre-determined initial codes or the identification of 
new ones which is the first step towards an overall conceptualisation of the data patterns 
and relationships between them. I did the same with the scratch notes that were 
composed during direct observation. In the third stage, the different codes are sorted 
into potential themes so that by the end of this phase one would start to have a sense of 
the significance of individual themes and sub-themes. This process is further refined in 
stage four. Some themes might be dropped because there is not enough data to support 
them, while others might collapse into each other or, alternatively, might need to be 
broken down into separate themes. By the time stage 5 is reached, the overall blueprint 
of the story is already in good shape. Figure 5.3 shows the resulting thematic map for 
 153 
trade unions and employers’ associations, identifying the main themes represented by 
black circles and the sub-themes represented by white circles. Figure 5.4 uses the same 
rationale for social, human rights and environmental groups. Finally, the last task in 
phase 6 is reserved for the empirical chapters where ‘you want to tell the complicated 
story of your data in a way which convinces the reader of the merit and validity of your 
analysis’ (Braun and Clarke 2006: 93).  
 
Figure 5.3: Thematic map for trade unions and employers’ associations 
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Figure 5.4: Thematic map for social, human rights and environmental groups 
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5.6 Quality of craftsmanship  
 
Validity and reliability are fundamental concepts of an efficacious mixed methods 
research strategy. Hesse-Biber (2010: 86) maintains that a discussion on the validity or 
otherwise of a mixed methods research exercise must be ‘methods-centric’ in nature. In 
other words, it must focus on the ‘correctness’ of application of the selected tools of 
data collection and on whether these tools adequately address the research question or 
hypothesis. In fact, mixed methods research was selected as a strategy due to the need 
for completeness of research arising out of the original set of hypotheses. The guarantee 
of credible conclusions is the quality of craftsmanship which ultimately depends on the 
rigour of methods used (Kvale 1996 as quoted by Herrera 2013: 58). The discussion 
will now be segmented into two parts to illustrate how rigour was ensured, firstly, in the 
quantitative and, secondly, in the qualitative components of the study. 
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5.6.1 Validity, reliability and objectivity 
 
Rigour of quantitative research is based on three basic principles, namely validity, 
reliability and objectivity that safeguard the veracity of results. A valid measure is one 
that is actually measuring what you think you are measuring (McIntyre 2005 as quoted 
by Burnham et al. 2008: 39). Academia differentiates between internal and external 
validity. The former refers to the extent to which a causal conclusion based on a study is 
warranted. Such warrant is constituted by the extent to which a study minimizes 
systematic error or bias in measurement. The latter refers to the extent to which the 
results of a study can be generalized to other situations. Besides ensuring validity, a 
measure must also be reliable in the sense that it gives consistent results. The measure 
itself must be capable of being used in other studies, even though it may yield different 
readings because the conditions or timing are different (Burnham et al. 2008: 39). 
Finally, objectivity is often attributed to value free measurement, as the accuracy of a 
measurement can be tested independently from the individual scientist who first reports 
it. Table 5.3 outlines the methods to ensure rigour in the application of the quantitative 
component in this study. 
 
Table 5.3: Rigour criteria in quantitative data 
Rigour criteria Methods to ensure veracity 
Internal validity i. The questionnaire design was developed on the 
causal relationships expressed in the conceptual 
framework of this study. 
ii. A pilot study was held wherein a number of 
questions were amended to enhance clarity and 
motivate response. 
iii. The questionnaire was vetted by two independent 
statisticians and their suggestions in the workings 
and interpretations of results were taken onboard. 
 
 
External validity iv. The questionnaire was projected on probabilistic 
reasoning to render results generalisable using p 
values, Z-scores and other inferential statistics. 
v. The quantitative exercise was based on the inclusion 
of whole populations except for the case of Irish 
social and human rights groups where a random 
sampling had to be used. 
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Reliability vi. The research design is characterised by multiple-
case studies that follow a replication logic. 
vii. Such a design has great potential to be replicated 
along a much wider spectrum of discussion, in this 
case, other different sectors of interest groups as 
well as other states. 
 
Objectivity viii. The quantitative part of the study is purely 
deductive in the sense that it only seeks precise 
measurements and analysis of concepts to verify the 
null hypothesis. 
ix. The concept was compromised because I had to 
interact with participants either through telephone or 
face-to-face meetings to encourage subjects to fill-in 
questionnaires in order to increase response rates. 
x. This violation of objectivity was mitigated by being 
neutral in my verbal and non-verbal communication 
so as not to bias respondents in any way. 
 
 
5.6.2 Credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability 
 
Validity, reliability and objectivity are conceptualized as credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability in qualitative paradigm (Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
Credibility replaces the idea of internal validity, by which researchers seek to establish 
confidence in the ‘sense’ of their findings. Transferability replaces the concept of 
external validity.  Instead of aiming for probabilistic reasoning, qualitative researchers 
are encouraged to provide a detailed portrait of the setting in which the research is 
conducted. Dependability and confirmability replace the ideas of reliability and 
objectivity. They encourage researchers to provide an audit trail which can be laid open 
to external scrutiny. Table 5.4 is a self-explanatory check list of measures to ensure the 
highest scientific standards in the application of qualitative methods in this study. 
 
Table 5.4: Rigour criteria in qualitative data 
Rigour criteria Methods to ensure quality 
Credibility i. Interviewees were given their interview 
transcripts for their approval and asked to suggest 
any changes. 
ii. Eventually, all research subjects that participated 
in questionnaires and interviews were presented 
with the two empirical chapters where findings 
are rolled out. They were given the opportunity 
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to comment on the findings in January 2013. 
iii. The whole study is the result of a prolonged 
engagement in the field incorporating 260 hours 
of direct observation in Malta, two study visits in 
Ireland and another two in Brussels. 
 
Transferability iv. Thick description of the context was provided in 
terms of political landscaping, so as knowledge 
claims that are generated by this study can be 
transferable to other similar contexts. 
v. Primary findings are discussed and interpreted 
within the context specific environments, giving 
readers enough information for them to judge the 
applicability of the findings to other settings. 
 
Dependability vi. The research design and methodology are 
explained in great detail to serve as an audit trail. 
vii. A generous Appendix section identifying 
participant organisations, results and guidelines is 
made available to ease external scrutiny. 
 
Confirmability viii. Triangulation between interview and observation 
findings has been a useful tool of confirmability 
in the case of Malta. 
ix. The continuous comparative method used in 
presenting empirical findings originating from 
Malta and Ireland sustains confirmability. 
x. In the final chapter, a reflexive assessment of the 
design and methodology is provided. 
 
 
5.7 Ethical considerations 
 
How much does one need to think about ethics when conducting an extensive 
qualitative exercise that employs a multiple number of research tools for the collection 
of fieldwork data? Bronfenbrenner (quoted in Burgess 1997) provides a rather dogmatic 
answer when he asserts that ‘the only safe way to avoid violating principles of 
professional ethics is to refrain from doing social research altogether’. A more positive, 
yet idealistic, approach is suggested by Sieber. 
 
 [W]e study ethics to learn how to make social research “work” for all concerned. 
The ethical researcher creates a mutually respectful, win-win relationship with 
the research population; this is a relationship in which subjects are pleased to 
participate candidly, and the community at large regards the conclusions as 
constructive (Sieber 1992: 3).  
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Quite frankly, Sieber’s line of thought is easier said than done. Although codes of 
ethical standards work best as guidelines, fieldwork ethical dilemmas have to be 
resolved situationally, and often, spontaneously (Bryman 2008; Ryen 2004). 
Notwithstanding this, Bryman, Ryen and Sieber agree on the principle that ethics is not 
restricted to fieldwork, but refers to all stages in the research process, including access 
to organisations and people, and writing the report. Clearly, sound ethics and sound 
methodology go hand in hand (Sieber 1992: 4). In accordance with the regulations 
stipulated by the University of Sheffield and the University of Malta, I have rigorously 
complied by their research ethical standards throughout the whole investigative process. 
Table 5.5 outlines the ethical check-list pertaining to each instrument used as part of the 
data collection toolkit. 
 
Figure 5.5: Ethical standards 
 
Research Tool Ethical standards 
Context analysis  
(literature review and 
initial exploratory 
fieldwork) 
 
i. Accurate and recent publications are used. 
ii. As far as possible, reference was made to primary sources 
of data. 
iii.          Data providers’ consent was sought, when necessary. 
iv. Data were collected for explicit academic purpose. 
v.            Sources are duly acknowledged and referenced. 
 
Self-completion 
questionnaires 
 
vi. Participation was purely on a voluntarily basis upon an 
informed consent. 
vii. Cultural sensitivity was shown through the use of the 
Maltese language in questionnaires circulated in Malta. 
viii. Findings are presented in aggregate form. 
ix. A pilot study was carried out to test effectiveness. 
 
Elite interviewing  
 
x.            Informed consent was obtained in writing. 
xi. Respondents were briefed again on research scope before 
start of interviews. 
xii. Respondents’ identity remains anonymous. 
xiii. Maltese participants were interviewed in Maltese. 
xiv. Authorisation was solicited prior to audio-recording. 
 
Direct observation 
 
xv. Authorisation in writing was given by MEUSAC to 
perform the role of an academic observer on selected 
sectoral committees. 
xvi. Members of selected committees were informed by 
MEUSAC of the author’s role 
xvii. Covert observation was never used. Presence as an 
observer was always known and visible to all. 
xviii. Results derived from observations were shared with 
MEUSAC officers. 
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Adherence to ethical obligations, not only ensures the application of best practices in 
search for truth and objectivity, but it also guarantees a holistic investigation of high 
quality craftsmanship. Such obligations have a direct impact on the fundamental 
dimensions of reliability, validity, completeness and trustworthiness which in turn 
assure the transferability and credibility of conclusions.  
 
5.8 Methodological and thematic limitations 
 
Every research investigation, including this one, has its own limitations, no matter how 
complete the methodology might have been. Methodological and thematic limitations 
set constraints on the application or interpretation of results, restrict transferability and 
dilute the utility of findings (McKenzie et al. 1997, Miller 1991). 
 
For instance, although the research design is composed of four case scenarios, namely 
(a) trade unions, (b) employers’ associations, (c) social and human rights groups and (d) 
environmental groups, quantitative results are presented in two aggregates. The former 
two (a+b) have been grouped together under a common umbrella, social partners, and 
the latter two (c+d) have likewise been amalgamated under a common acronym, SHEGs. 
Consequently it is not possible to manifest the impact of Europeanisation on each of the 
four sectors for a better assessment of how this phenomenon affects different types of 
organised interests. This methodological compromise was inevitable because the 
absolute numbers in three of the four selected sectors, namely trade unions, employers’ 
associations and environmental groups in both Malta and Ireland are small, and thus 
they had to be combined together in order to achieve a critical mass for statistical 
computations.  
 
Moreover, the response rate of Irish organisations for the questionnaire remained 
relatively low at an aggregate of 49.0% compared to the staggering aggregate rate of 
73.0% in the Maltese case. Considering all the efforts that have been exerted, the Irish 
response can still be considered reasonable. Nonetheless it had negative ramifications 
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on a number of insignificant p values and the incidence of the unreliability criterion in 
some statistics. 
 
Another constraint in methodological terms is the element of time asymmetries. The 
accession periods of the two selected member states occur in very different timeframes: 
Ireland joined the EU thirty-one years before Malta. A temporal disparity of three 
decades in the accession timeline makes comparative analysis between the two polities 
even more challenging. This caveat will be revisited in the final chapter because its 
crucial implications merit a closer look in the critical assessment of the study. 
 
The last set of potential limitations embraces thematic ones. Certain lobbying and 
influencing tactics are never written or recorded by practitioners. Some stratagems are 
considered as tricks of the trade for the lobbying profession and, hence, they are never 
shared with others to retain competitive advantage in the public square. In fact, as the 
influence of civil society groups in EU policy-making increases, calls are growing for 
them to become more transparent about their objectives and sources of funding 
(EurActive.com 2008). This is the reason why lobbying is sometimes referred to as a 
veiled area of politics. Such a lack of transparency could have negatively affected the 
results obtained from data collection tools as participants might have exaggerated or 
minimised their grassroots input, according to their reserved intentions, thus increasing 
the risk of the incompleteness of data. This was mitigated by the inclusion of 
observation in the data toolset, at least in the case of Malta. 
 
Finally, the notion that hired lobbyists are not included in this research deserves a 
remark. Although primary data embraces direct references to their existence and roles in 
civil society, they do not form part of the analysis and conclusions. The important topic 
of hired lobbyists may in itself serve as the basis for further research in the future. 
 
5.9 Introducing the empirical chapters 
 
This chapter, in essence, discussed the different methods of inquiry that have been 
applied in this project. In the present climate of methodology renewal, and in line with 
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Polkinghorne’s line of thought (1983: ix), a thorough analysis of the selected research 
approach has been provided not only to understand the ‘why’ of the adopted design, but 
also the ‘how’ of carrying it out. A mixed methodology strategy involves a large 
volume of statistical and researcher-generated data, including sampling, hypothesis 
testing, methodological decisions, notes about the context and data analysis procedures. 
Such data are important to document, particularly in the ‘development of an audit trail 
to substantiate trustworthiness’ and replication (Rodgers and Cowles 2007: 219). 
 
Focus will now be directed to the presentation of empirical findings in the next two 
chapters. In Chapter 6 the results pertaining to trade unions and employers’ associations, 
jointly called social partners, are presented and discussed, while Chapter 7 incorporates 
the findings related to social and human rights groups, and environmental groups, 
jointly named SHEGs. The two narratives and statistical packages are dealt with from a 
dual perspective, Maltese and Irish, to detect patterns of similarity and disparity 
between the two countries. These two empirical chapters pave the way for the 
subsequent part where the exercise of hypothesis testing shall be carried out. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Maltese and Irish Social Partners: 
Presentation of Findings 
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Chapter 6 
Maltese and Irish social partners: presentation of findings 
 
 
A mutual arrangement, I repeat,  
is the only satisfactory medium whereby the present system  
can be carried on with any degree of satisfaction,  
and in such an arrangement the employers have more to gain than the workers. 
 
James Larkin 
(1876-1947) 
Irish trade union leader 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the major qualitative and statistical findings related to trade 
unions and employers’ associations in both Malta and Ireland. Together with 
representatives of social partners, there are also heads of mediating organisations, think-
tanks’ chiefs and political observers who took part in the interviewing part, whereas 
only registered unions and employers’ associations participated in the questionnaire. 
Relying on elite interviewing does not infer that some general accounts beyond the 
sample are not possible to retrieve, since their advantageous roles give research subjects 
a high degree of credibility, trustworthiness and transferability to the data they generate. 
Moreover, the application of quantitative data strengthens the validity of findings when 
it comes to frequency and variety of practices and ideological preferences that can go 
beyond the parameters of the samples. 
 
The first section presents the findings concerning aspects of internal organisational 
structures and fieldwork practices of social partners, including their human resource 
potential, preferred modes of negotiation, network capabilities and their potential to 
instigate change. The second section introduces the results concerning the implications 
of the political and cultural scenarios in which they function. It covers such themes as 
political polarisation and diversity, smallness and islandness, together with the role of 
domestic media to forge public opinion. This is followed by another round of results 
pertaining to the paramount role of mediating institutions. In this section, findings will 
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reveal whether Maltese and Irish social partners prefer to rely on informal channels of 
consultation rather than being active through formal ones. The fourth set of findings 
revolves around contemporary economic issues characterised by a deep economic and 
financial crisis in the Irish case and an economic slowdown in Malta. Workers’ and 
employers’ representatives share their thoughts on whether alternative political 
ideologies or more bold emphasis on SME policies can indeed regenerate domestic and 
regional economies. The last section incorporates the majority of the statistical findings 
dealing more specifically with EU affairs. Among others, results reveal social partners’ 
exposure to EU funding, lobbying in Brussels, European federations and partners 
together with European norms and values. 
 
Each section encompasses comparable, sometimes contrasting, rich and in-depth 
narratives of the interviewees. Relevant statistical data are entwined around specific 
points in the text so as to complement or supplement interviewees’ expressive 
portrayals, figures of speech and metaphors. Besides the numeric tables presented in 
this chapter, the reader is also referred to the whole list of cross-tabs in appendix H. 
 
6.2 Internal organisational affairs 
 
The starting point to trace any transformations in rational choices and normative 
formations in any organisation is analysing its internal organisational structures, 
resource base, working practices and change potential. The findings expose the internal 
characteristics of Maltese and Irish social partners with particular emphasis on their 
thinking and actions within the fragmented sectors they work in, their preferred 
negotiation practices and the inner capability to render themselves into change agents. 
 
6.2.1 Human resource platform 
 
From the fieldwork undertaken in Valletta and Dublin, it transpires that Irish trade 
unions and employers’ associations are much more resourceful, particularly in 
possessing adequate headquarters, suitable logistics and full-time staff. Their Maltese 
counterparts, in particular trade unions, are much more modest and, in most cases, visits 
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had to be arranged strictly by appointment since offices are manned by part-timers who 
work irregular hours. Such observations are further corroborated by statistical data.  
 
For example, there is a significant difference in the type of personnel engaged by 
Maltese and Irish social partners (Chi
2
=26.88, p<0.0005). Table 6.1 shows that none of 
the Irish workers’ or employers’ representative bodies base their operations solely on 
volunteers while more than half of their Maltese counterparts (54.1%) depend solely on 
volunteers. The praxis of exclusively hiring paid personnel is remarkably more 
widespread in Ireland than in Malta (47.5% and 13.5% respectively), as is the 
hybridisation of volunteers and paid staff (52.9% and 32.4% respectively). The 
substantial number of small and fragmented in-house unions in Malta that rely on 
company officers who opt to undertake union matters on a voluntary basis contributes to 
this manpower imbalance between the two countries. For more than twenty years, the 
Maltese government has been running a scheme to assist trade unions by releasing 
public officers to perform trade union activities.
106
 This is a direct contribution by the 
government to address problems related to lack of administrative capacity. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Social partners’ human resource platform 
 Type of personnel engaged by organisations 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 volunteers only Count 20 0 20 
Percentage 54.1% .0% 28.2% 
paid personnel only Count 5 16 21 
Percentage 13.5% 47.1% 29.6% 
mix of volunteers &         
paid personnel 
Count 12 18 30 
Percentage 32.4% 52.9% 42.3% 
Total Count 37 34 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 26.88, v = 2, p < 0.0005 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106
 The maximum number of officers assigned per union and whether on a full-time or else on a part-time 
basis, depends on the number of union members (Public Service Management Code, 2011). This scheme 
has also been extended to voluntary organisations as well. 
 
 166 
6.2.2 Negotiation styles 
 
An integral part of the internal set-up of any organisation is its preferred style of 
negotiations. Maltese participants exert a lot of emphasis on personality rather than 
institutional set-up to determine whether negotiations can be fruitful for all or lead to 
the advantage of the ‘selected few’. MTU3 affirms that ‘bullying’ and ‘negative 
discourse’ poison the relationships among and within social partners. This induces an 
ambience where polarisation takes the lead wherein stakeholders adopt more rigid 
positions and can only show signs of flexibility if they deem that this would eventually 
result in favour of their partisan interests. 
 
We are Maltese. We defend our territory. 
Everyone sticks to his position around the 
discussion table and no one concedes 
anything if he doesn’t get any 
compensation. If you wear a hat and then 
you concede it once, you will never get it 
back. This is a symptom of our smallness 
(MEA4). 
 
 
There is a lot of bad blood amongst us, not 
only among unions and employers’ 
associations but also within. There are some 
individuals whose personalities cause a lot 
of tension because they show strong 
political nuances. Although there have been 
many initiatives to move closer to each 
other, we are still a long way from inducing 
a consensus feeling (MTU1). 
In contrast, Irish actors are more used to a culture based on consensus-seeking, not only 
in negotiations involving interactions with government and other ‘rival partners’, but 
also when discussing within their internal structures. This climate helps to speed 
processes of decision-making and is more receptive to change. 
 
The way we work has always been by 
consensus. We rarely have votes, apart 
from conferences where people are voting 
on motions… Our executive council works 
by consensus. They very rarely vote. That’s 
just the way we work. It is our tradition. We 
always try to forge consensus (ITU1). 
 
The predominant culture is consensus-
seeking in the end. Veto is not 
institutionalised. If you have problems in 
conforming to the rest, you state that you 
are finding difficulties and you will have a 
separate response which is then 
documented in the final version of the 
document (IEA6). 
 
Table 6.2 strengthens the validity of the interviewees’ experiences since its Chi2 
analysis reveals a significant difference in the preferred mode of negotiation between 
the two islands (Chi
2
=16.258, p=0.001). While the majority of both Maltese and Irish 
partners formulate their negotiation strategy according to situational needs (44.7% and 
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66.7% respectively), the Irish are by far characterised by a consensus strategy (27.3%) 
when compared to a meagre 7.9% of the Maltese. On their part, Maltese social partners 
rely heavily on a compromise strategy (42.1%); a strategy that moves in tandem with 
the polarised scenario within which they function. 
 
Table 6.2: Preferred style of negotiation strategy (social partners) 
 Preferred style of negotiations 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Competitive Count 2 0 2 
Percentage 5.3% .0% 2.8% 
Consensus Count 3 9 12 
Percentage 7.9% 27.3% 16.9% 
Compromise Count 16 2 18 
Percentage 42.1% 6.1% 25.4% 
Depends on the 
situation 
Count 17 22 39 
Percentage 44.7% 66.7% 54.9% 
Total Count 38 33 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 16.258, v = 3, p = 0.001, u 
 
 
Some of the Maltese stakeholders are not satisfied with the prevailing mode of 
negotiation in their sector. A leading figure of one of the trade unions’ confederations 
believes that whilst unions have to protect their members’ interest, at the same time, 
they ‘cannot ignore the common good’. ‘A consensus style is the best strategy we can 
aim for in industrial relations’ (MTU2). This ideal is also supported by another 
confederation leader, this time from the employers’ side, ‘To move forward we have to 
find the consensus’ formula’ (MEA5). He is confident that the EU has the expertise to 
help the Maltese find and apply this formula.  
 
6.2.3 Networking and fragmentation 
 
The willingness and ability to act together, or their mere absence, is an indication of 
how social partners react to their domestic environment. Networking, on the one hand, 
would imply a louder and more solid voice, resource sharing, cross-fertilisation of 
knowledge and, perhaps, a more legitimate cause. On the other hand, a fragmented 
system connotes disconcerted efforts, duplication of resources, resistance to change and 
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the takeover of factional interests over the greater common good. There is no doubt that 
the Maltese narrative recounts countless stories of the latter style. 
 
When we came together to protest against 
the new gas and electricity tariffs [in 2008], 
some thought that this event was going to 
mark the start of a new era of inter-union 
relations. I was very cautious and told them 
‘that we must first learn how to walk 
together before we start to run’! Since then, 
whenever occasions arise, we failed 
miserably to combine our forces again. It is 
very difficult to bring about synergy among 
unions that compete for members in the 
same market (MTU3).  
Even within our specific sector, it is 
difficult to come together. I don’t remember 
that there was a time when every interested 
entity came to sit round the same table.  
Partisan politics has nothing to do with this. 
It is a question that involves personal 
interests. Although everybody is 
represented by some sort of entity, this is 
only done as long as everyone gains or is in 
need of something, be it funds, legal advice, 
logistical support and so on (MEA4). 
 
Such an individualistic scenario does not exclude any effort of joining forces under 
umbrella formations. Both workers’ and employers’ representative organisations in 
Malta have their own confederations; the model adopted resembling the Italian version 
rather than the Anglo-Saxon one. ‘The latter have one umbrella in trade unionism, 
whilst the former have three big umbrella confederations. Ideally I would prefer the 
British or Irish model but, given our circumstances, the Italian system works better for 
us’ (MTU1). Infact, nowadays, the Maltese scenario embraces three distinct trade union 
confederations
107
 and three major employers’ federations.108  
 
Statistical data shows that the highly compartmentalised Maltese scenario might start to 
change as Maltese actors have been more prone to EU influence to act more cohesively 
at national level when compared to their Irish counterparts (Table 6.3). Using a four-
point likert scale, the mean rating scores represent a significant difference between 
Malta (2.76) and Ireland (2.00) (p=0.003). 
 
 
 
                                                 
107
 These are the Confederation of Malta Trade Unions (CMTU), the Forum Unions Maltin (ForUM) and 
the General Workers Union (GWU). The latter does not strictly abide by the accepted definition of a 
confederation but is lately calling itself such. 
108
 These are the Malta Employers Association (MEA), the Association of General Retailers and Traders 
(GRTU) and the Malta Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise and Industry (MCCEI). 
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Table 6.3: The EU induces social partners to act more cohesively at the national level 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.76 0.971 2.44 3.08 397.500 0.003 
 Ireland 2.00 1.073 1.63 2.37   
 
 
As already hinted, the Irish narrative tends to portray an alternative style based on 
togetherness. The fact that there is only one congress of trade unions, the Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions (ICTU), with a long outstanding history that predates the establishment 
of the Irish state, contributes to a greater sense of unity. The fact that ICTU is organised 
in Northern Ireland as well ‘increases our legitimacy as well as the complexity of our 
organisation’. Many unions that left the Congress over the years ‘did eventually return’. 
With 800,000 registered members, ‘ICTU is the largest civil society organisation on the 
entire island of Ireland’. Yet their system of interest representation is not immune to 
fragmentation. ITU1 and ITU2 sustain that ‘having 53 unions for two million workers’ 
is not viable at all. ‘A huge process of reorganisation is being undertaken to consolidate 
ICTU in five years’ time’. 
 
On their part, the majority of Irish employers’ representatives are also confederated 
under one strong umbrella, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), 
where ‘each affiliated member has its own voice when it comes to sectoral interests and, 
at the same time, a better chance to bring about collective achievements by acting 
together’. However dissenting voices claim that their sectoral interests have been 
jeopardised by IBEC due to its alleged preference to ‘big employers’ who have more 
‘political clout’. Two defunct voices, farmers and small firms, eventually resigned from 
affiliated membership within IBEC and established their own independent 
representative bodies.  
 
From a statistical point of view, results show high comparability between the two 
islands on issues involving networking over joint campaigns and partnership initiatives 
over the last eight years (2004-2011). Chi
2
 analysis in Table 6.4 reveals no significant 
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difference between Maltese and Irish social partners teaming up with other domestic 
organisations to solidify their voice over common issues (Chi
2
=0.003, p=0.958). More 
than 55% of both Maltese and Irish partners have invested time and energy to take part 
in group formations to campaign on a mutual cause while the rest simply resist such an 
opportunity.  
 
 
Table 6.4: Teaming up of social partners with other domestic organisations in these last eight years 
 Teaming up with other domestic organisations to 
solidify voice 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 21 19 40 
Percentage 55.3% 55.9% 55.6% 
No Count 17 15 32 
Percentage 44.7% 44.1% 44.4% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.003, v = 1, p = 0.958 
 
 
Furthermore Table 6.5 shows a high degree of reluctance to take part in joint projects 
involving PPPs. More than 70% of social partners in Malta and Ireland have never 
involved themselves in such joint ventures. Due to high levels of comparability, there is 
no significant difference between the two cohorts of participants (Chi
2
=1.886, p=0.596). 
 
 
Table 6.5: Social partners’ involvement in public-private partnership in these last eight years 
 Involvement in Private-Public Partnerships   
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes, on 1 occasion Count 1 0 1 
Percentage 2.6% .0% 1.4% 
Yes, in more than 1 but less than 
5 occasions 
Count 7 8 15 
Percentage 18.4% 25.0% 21.4% 
Yes, in 5 occasions or more Count 3 1 4 
Percentage 7.9% 3.1% 5.7% 
No Count 27 23 50 
Percentage 71.1% 71.9% 71.4% 
Total Count 38 32 70 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.886, v = 3, p = 0.596, u 
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6.2.4 Change and challenges 
 
Being able to initiate, manage and consolidate change is fundamental in today’s 
dynamic world. It is considered by many as an inner energy that secures survival. 
Although traditionally defined as protectionist groups, trade unions and employers’ 
associations are becoming more aware of their need to transform themselves into 
change agents. Otherwise there is the possibility of losing their relevance. Maltese trade 
unions and mediating bodies are very sensitive of their ability to change in order to meet 
unprecedented challenges. Some are very confident, others are more cautious and, then, 
there are those who argue that persons, rather than organisations, are the real change 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Of course we are! I am a member of the 
Industrial Relations Board that proposes 
legislative amendments to the minister. If 
you look at these last ten years, just prior to 
our accession to the EU, our union has 
always been proactive in recommending 
changes. Change is an ongoing item in our 
everyday agenda. Since we became EU 
members, my mentality on social dialogue 
changed dramatically. At first I used to go 
to Brussels with a Maltese mentality based 
on the antagonistic dictum of ‘us and them’. 
When in Brussels, I had to change my 
mentality completely. Up there it is not 
sword fighting anymore, but it is all about 
negotiations to find common grounds. 
Brussels is a place where one can learn a lot 
and benefit from others’ expertise (MTU1). 
 
Our organisation has been instrumental in 
bringing about big changes in the evolution 
of social dialogue. Suggestions brought up 
by our social partners are being more and 
more reflected in national budgets. Besides 
effective institutional design, real change 
can only happen when key people – 
politicians and group leaders – champion 
the process and are enthusiastic to bring 
about meaningful transformations (MMB6). 
 
The public has become rather indifferent to 
unions and many do no longer see the need 
to become a union member. In a period 
when individual performance contracts are 
becoming more numerous than collective 
agreements, we need to seriously address 
our relevance in today’s society (MTU2). 
 
The Irish show a higher degree of scepticism than their Maltese counterparts. Trade 
unionists claim that twenty years of SP have rendered them out of touch with the people. 
It seems that they are now reinstating themselves but it would take years to crystallise a 
new vision. Employers’ associations are likewise sceptical because Irish political and 
bureaucratic elites are not steered by ‘whitebait’ but by ‘big fish’. 
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The downside of SP was that everything 
became centralised.  You did not have to 
involve yourself at grass-roots level 
because everything was done in Dublin and 
this meant that unions became lazy. The 
opposite of being lazy is being visible and 
relevant. Trade unions need to read and 
understand what members have to say. 
These are the signals that trigger change. 
Unfortunately we lost this core value in 
Ireland because everybody became caught 
in a centralised bargaining system (ITU3). 
 
 
In Ireland we don’t have any potential for 
change. We have no vision. Unions are 
becoming less relevant to today’s workers. 
Workers see unions like a kind of insurance 
policy and not as vehicles of change (ITU2). 
 
The big employers are the ones who bring 
about huge changes because they are 
heeded to by our government. Very often, 
they don’t need their representative 
organisations to lobby government. They 
have direct access to whoever is in power 
(IEA6). 
The stimulus for change does not depend solely on the composite culture of an entity or 
is it uniquely reliant on the skills-set and charisma of a leader, but it can also be a 
consequential effect of intermingling with other organisations, especially when this is 
done to share best practices. When asked whether benchmarking exercises have 
transformation effects within participant organisations (see Table 6.6), the Maltese and 
Irish mean scores stand slightly higher than the middling position on a four-point likert 
scale (2.67 and 2.71 respectively). Due to their comparability, there is no statistical 
difference since the p value (0.584) exceeds the 0.05 criterion. 
 
Table 6.6: Benchmarking exercises have transformation effects on the culture of social partners 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.67 0.784 2.36 2.98 259.500 0.584 
 Ireland 2.71 0.561 2.46 2.97   
 
Having explored some of the characteristics that shape the internal structures and 
processes of social partners in Malta and Ireland, we can now proceed to present the 
qualitative and quantitative findings related to the implications of the politico-cultural 
landscaping on their strategies and tactics. 
 
6.3 Geopolitical and cultural affairs 
 
An understanding of the process of Europeanisation and its implications on the 
ideologies and practices of social partners has to take into account the national political 
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and cultural context as well. This domestic context dictates the level of elasticity of 
institutions and individual actors who have to face a continuous struggle between 
homegrown dogmas and new ways of imported thinking and practices. The Maltese and 
Irish participants express different views of how their geopolitical scenario is affecting 
their development and the consequential internalisation of new norms and values 
originating from a wider European experience.  
 
6.3.1 Getting used to polarised Malta 
 
On their part, all Maltese interviewees share their preoccupation with the heavy 
polarised political environment which seems to infiltrate all walks of life, not least, the 
industrial relations field. 
 
The next step in our national agenda is to 
tone down the level of political polarisation 
that is still evident. Since we only have two 
parties, there is always going to be a blue 
tribe and a red tribe. Although agitation has 
diminished and everyone talks to each other, 
partisan seals are still there and probably 
they will remain with us for long (MMB6). 
 
 
Political parties, with their own radio and 
TV stations are not in the interest of the 
common good because society cannot 
develop through objective argumentation. 
All arguments are adjusted from a partisan 
perspective. Leakages in the media and 
political polarisation were the two main 
issues that led to failure in negotiating the 
Social Pact (MTU3). 
 
MEA5’s opinion is contrastingly more optimistic when he states that ‘political 
polarisation… is no longer unswerving and divisive, possibly due to the PL’s 
acceptance of EU membership after a hard fought referendum and election campaign in 
2004’. Others have a different interpretation of the current situation as they deem that 
although domestic parties seem to be no longer ideologically divided, fierce attacks 
concentrated on issue politics are still being plotted on the battleground. Today, it is a 
question of ‘strong personalities and not staunch ideologies that dictate field tactics’ 
(MTU3). Such battles characterised by the personification of politics could be, 
nonetheless, deadly ground, not devoid of ‘character assassinations and jubilations’ 
fuelled by dominant party media (MMB7).  
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6.3.2 Party media in Malta 
 
Once again the idea of party media pops up. It is a phenomenon of the last two decades 
that is continuing to shape the social and political fabric of the Maltese. It can either 
break or make a deal among social partners and it has the power to camouflage any 
action matters with political innuendoes. Some participants consider it a ‘bonus’ if they 
are let free by the media. 
 
The mentality of the people is not going to 
change easily because of the wrong role 
being played by party media… In Malta we 
don’t have pluralism but the politicisation 
of the media. Political parties give their 
interpretations on every mundane story 
through their media channels. Even cases 
involving murders and drug trafficking are 
tagged with subtle political connotations 
(MTU3)! 
Our institution does not handle 
controversial issues and, thus, it is not 
normally covered by the media as is the 
case of other mediating bodies. To a certain 
extent, this is an advantage because we are 
left alone to do our business well (MMB7). 
 
 
 
 
The robust nature of party media in Malta is so far unchallenged. However various 
dissenting voices are today being heard that ‘something needs to be done to change this 
unique situation of ours’. This would certainly imply changes of a legislative nature. 
 
6.3.3 The weakness of the left in Irish politics 
 
On their part, Irish trade unions are also weary of their political landscaping. They feel 
particularly frustrated with not having a strong Labour Party to champion their social 
agenda and, furthermore, they miserably failed in sustaining authentic leftist politics 
across the state.  
 
There is no real left politics here but we all 
got used to it. The political life of this 
seventy-year-old state has been dominated 
by two conservative parties (ITU1). 
 
Ultimately we have not delivered via the 
trade union movement a strong left political 
party that is regularly in government. And 
they [the governing institutions] don’t see 
the need for it (ITU3). 
 
There is no clear left or right in Irish 
politics due to our national struggle that 
goes back to the early decades of the 20
th
 
century. We really haven’t developed left or 
right axis in Irish politics. So a lot of 
workers vote for a Conservative type of 
parties, not because they conceive them as 
conservative, but they see them as historical 
national parties (ITU2). 
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The status quo in Irish politics that has dominated the scenes for generations seems to 
have met a critical juncture in the election result of 2011 when FF failed miserably at 
the expense of notable increases by the Labour Party, SF and independent candidates.  
Reflecting on the magnitude of the latest election result, IMB4 observes that ‘ironically 
the biggest seismic effect in the system of domestic politics was the result of domestic 
issues, not imported through some European political or economic vehicle’. One trade 
union leader (ITU1) is aware that ‘[the Irish] are living through hugely transformative 
times and many changes can happen in the future’. Others share the same dream… 
 
If you want me to be optimistic, the rush to 
satisfy the insatiable markets and the lust 
for profits will actually bring about that 
change over a generation or two. People 
will say ‘this is not a society I want to live 
in’. We need to respect each other more and 
need to have laws which give us [union] 
rights’ (ITU3). 
 
 
The 2011 election brought about drastic 
changes in the way the Irish normally 
vote… These changes led to a redefinition 
of the ‘two and half party system’. 
Notwithstanding a long standing tradition 
based on clientelism, many voters opted to 
reject their traditional party. Widespread 
public anger against the dramatic downfall 
of the economy was actually the major 
change breeder (IPO7). 
 
Irish employers’ associations, on their part, seem less preoccupied with party politics. 
Their only concern is the lack of attention given to SMEs which are greatly 
disadvantaged when compared to the gigantic foreign corporations that have a plethora 
of connections within the inner circles of government. A representative of small 
businesses (IEA6) laments that ‘SMEs have never been included in any political 
consideration, including SP’. The issue of SMEs will be dealt with in greater detail in 
the section concerning the economic scenario. 
 
6.3.4 Investigative media in Ireland 
 
Like their Maltese counterparts, Irish social partners do feel threatened by the influence 
of the media but for different reasons. The Irish media are deemed to be independent 
and investigative. However their latter function is seriously crippled by libel laws, 
which although softened, personal reputation is still protected by the Constitution. 
Consequently, 
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[T]here are many programmes on current affairs that it is all talk and opinion 
and not a lot of analysis and evidence. In this way we don’t necessarily make 
any progress in terms of our understanding of an issue, or facts and figures 
(ITT8). 
 
Trade unions are convinced that they have been victimised and stigmatised by the Irish 
media as there has been a ‘very sophisticated and nasty campaign’ against unions in the 
last four years’ (ITU2). Small businesses also have their own complaints about the 
media. 
 
The general perception, primarily the media, 
is that trade unions are dinosaurs and that 
they act against progress and flexible 
workforces (ITU3). 
It is the media that makes overemphasis on 
the multinational companies (IEA5). 
 
 
Thus, despite its independent and investigative character, Irish media does not come out 
uncontested. 
 
6.3.5 Smallness and islandness 
 
 
Geographical smallness and islandness have a direct imprint on indigenous culture that 
can either facilitate or inhibit Maltese and Irish social partners in their quest to protect 
the rights of their members and/or to promote new interests as part of their programme 
of change. An Irish trade unionist is totally blunt against the ‘curse of smallness’ as this 
in itself propagates corruption. 
 
The powerful institutions and the people in a small country have countless 
interconnections. That led to a lot of the corruption charges, a lot of bad planning... We 
have three or four tribunals investigating politicians, what happened to financial grants 
and who was really influencing decisions. It all became incestuous. A lot of the trade 
union movement was funded by this sort of behaviour such as meetings on the side at 
racehorses in Galway and in pubs. All this goes against transparency and inclusiveness 
(ITU2). 
 
Maltese participants have a much more positive view of their microsize and to many 
such a compact geographical area is considered as a ‘blessing’ since ‘it gives the 
possibility of repositioning our economy in a matter of hours, not days, because all of 
the senior officers within governments, unions and employers’ associations can be 
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contacted instantly and be able to meet on that same evening, if need be’ (MTU3). 
Others share similar thoughts, 
 
We have an advantage because we are extra 
small. The government can commit itself to 
having full employment by implementing a 
number of schemes and this can be done 
because our numbers are also small. But 
other states cannot do it because of their 
sheer size where the number of individuals 
is also large (MTU1). 
 
A small state [with a concentrated 
population] finds the task of informing its 
citizens much easier and cost-effective… 
Other leverages come into play as well, 
including a small and centralised national 
administrative structure… This will 
ultimately lead to the speedy transposition 
and implementation of European legislation 
(MMB8). 
 
A representative of an employers’ association presents the case from another 
perspective. Islandness, not smallness, is his actual preoccupation. 
 
Success is size inelastic. What matters is the validity and reasonableness of the 
argument. From a business perspective, islandness rather than smallness is a concern. 
The main problems are the additional costs associated with commercial freight handling 
and accessibility as a tourist destination (MEA9). 
 
6.3.6 Indigenous culture 
 
Findings show that another geopolitical factor, indigenous culture, is a crucial mediating 
force that accommodates or resists changes stemming from a wider European 
experience. In the questionnaire, respondents were specifically asked whether national 
culture inhibits the adoption of European norms. The mean rating scores in Table 6.7 
are 2.42 for Malta and 2.07 for Ireland, implying comparability as they lay around the 
middling position of a four-point likert scale (p=0.169). This implies that both states 
believe that their national culture tends to be fairly elastic at times and fairly inelastic in 
other times or across different sectoral interests. Thus, the elasticity factor of national 
culture is dependent on two fundamental asymmetries: time and sectoral areas. 
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Table 6.7: National culture and the wider European experience among social partners 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.42 1.004 2.09 2.75 448.500 0.169 
 Ireland 2.07 0.923 1.72 2.42   
 
 
When asked about which features distinguish the Maltese people, the idea of ‘dakkir’ 
(pollination), in other words the innate ability to adapt and absorb new ideas without 
necessarily loosening ties with the past, came out very strongly during interviewing 
sessions.  
 
Pollination is our key characteristic. In the past we were pollinated by the English. They 
gave us a great sense of discipline. In the manufacturing industry and management 
skills, we were influenced by the Germans. The Maltese have this priceless skill. The 
Maltese don’t form ghettos of their own neither in Brussels nor in any country to which 
they emigrated. You can always see them mingling and socialising with anyone 
(MEA6). 
 
MTU2 continues to ponder on this collective feature and observes a paradoxical 
composition of the Maltese culture. On the one hand it is ‘rooted in conservatism’ and 
on the other hand it is ‘flexible and open to new challenges’. Although the ‘Maltese still 
cling to their colonial mentality’, at the same time everyone becomes ‘quickly 
acquainted’ with the new reality of forming part of the EU. MEA9 reaffirms that 
‘restructuring policies were the result of domestic policy choices that were heavily 
calculated by the long-term goal posts of EU membership’. However some of the deep 
roots might not bear the constant pressures coming from overseas and will one day 
break loose. 
 
Some of our cultural characteristics will be lost in the future. Our language may be one. 
The other is surely our Catholic faith. Religion will no longer define our nation. This is 
what happened in the continent and it will happen here just the same. Our set of values 
that have been dear to us for millennia will be negatively affected (MMB6). 
 
Insularity, observance to age-old traditions and obsession with secrecy have been 
singled out by Irish interviewees as the three major characteristics that still describe 
contemporary Ireland. 
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We are very insular and because of our 
economic recession we are becoming even 
more so, even though we now need even 
more help from outside (ITU2). 
  
We have a problem in relation to openness 
and transparency. Ireland has a problem 
about secrecy and it is certainly identified 
in the Irish state… Secrecy is part of our 
culture and it tends to be excessive. We 
prefer not to put things on paper in some 
policy areas (ITT8). 
  
 
Notwithstanding EU influence in all sectors 
of Irish life, including public administration, 
policy networks and regulatory affairs, our 
traditional culture of making our own 
politics and preserving old-aged patronage 
intricacies still persists. This must be, 
perhaps, the only area where EU influence 
was consciously not allowed (IMB4). 
 
 
 
Findings have shown that political and cultural connotations do influence the strategies 
and tactics of representative organisations. Results reveal a number of similarities and 
differences in the two islands which, in turn, affect the in/elastic capability of domestic 
culture to adapt or resist new norms stemming from beyond their shores. In the next 
section, the discussion will revolve around the in/effectiveness of formal and informal 
channels that liaise interaction between state and non-state actors. 
 
6.4 Institutional participative affairs 
 
Academic literature reveals that formal institutions of coordination enjoy paramount 
importance in decoding the dynamics of trust and scepticism between state and non-
state actors. Furthermore, theory and practice embrace informal channels of 
communication as well which sometimes move in parallel with the former and, at other 
times, they shun or replace them. This section presents the findings on the effectiveness 
and productivity of such channels which are deemed as powerful interlocutors between 
European influences and domestic politics. The findings pertaining to formal 
consultative institutions will be presented first, followed by those on informal channels. 
 
6.4.1 Setting the scene for formal institutions 
 
Much of the debate among Maltese social partners revolves primarily around the 
MCESD which enjoys centre stage in tripartite style dialogue and, to a lesser extent, the 
MEUSAC that incorporates a more pluralistic list of stakeholders due to the direct 
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involvement of civil society. The latter will be exclusively analysed in the next chapter 
where the findings of environmental, as well as social and human rights groups, will be 
presented. Much of the discussion focuses on the merits and in-built deficiencies of 
these formal channels of consultation, together with recent initiatives concerning their 
institutional regeneration to better reflect the evolving third sector in Malta. Besides 
these coordinating institutions, whenever the government issues a legal notice on a new 
project, the public sector is duty bound to identify which are the stakeholders that are 
affected in order to formulate a mitigation plan. An influential employers’ 
representative laments that ‘sometimes we are overdoing these ongoing one-to-one 
consultations which, in turn, slow every new business or economic opportunity’ 
(MEA5). 
 
The Irish case is totally dominated by the unofficial termination of the SP that 
characterised the scene from 1987 to 2008. Some participants look back nostalgically 
towards the peak periods of SP when it was perceived that the ‘dramatic increase in the 
Irish economy would never have happened if it wasn’t for SP’ (IEA5). Others show no 
apologies in identifying the serious wrongdoings of SP and believe that ‘the role it 
played in the boom period was overstated’ (ITU3). An overabundance of other 
coordinating institutions chaired by the state was simply discarded by the new coalition 
government after the 2011 election. Many, today, are sceptical about the effectiveness 
of the only remaining fully functional body that brings together state and non-state 
actors, namely the NESC
109
 since this ‘is no more than a research production house’ 
(IEA6).  
 
6.4.2 Significant quantitative results 
 
As expected since the aftermath of SP in Ireland, Chi
2
 analysis in Table 6.8 reveals 
significant difference between the disposition of Maltese and Irish social partners to 
                                                 
109
 The National Economic and Social Council (NESC) was established in 1973 and advises the 
Taoiseach (Prime Minister) on strategic issues for Ireland’s economic and social development. The 
members of the Council are appointed by the Taoiseach, for a three year term.  These members are 
representatives of business and employers’ organisations, trade unions, agricultural and farming 
organisations, community and voluntary organisations, and environmental organisations; as well as heads 
of Government departments and independent experts (see http://www.nesc.ie/). 
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participate in consultative bodies (Chi
2
=0.659, p=0.010). Maltese unions and 
employers’ associations are more involved in formal channels of consultation than their 
Irish counterparts (68% and 38% respectively). The difference is further reinforced 
when the non-participative ones were then asked if they intended to join a coordinating 
entity in the future. 95% of Irish respondents affirm that this option is out of question, 
whilst almost 31% of the Maltese think that they will grab the opportunity if it arises.  
 
 
Table 6.8: Participation of social partners in consultation entities           
 Participation in any coordination entities that bring 
together governmental and non-governmental bodies 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 26 13 39 
Percentage 68.4% 38.2% 54.2% 
No Count 12 21 33 
Percentage 31.6% 61.8% 45.8% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
    
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.659, v = 1, p = 0.010  
 
 
When asked if the EU has been instrumental in accentuating the culture of social 
dialogue in domestic affairs (Table 6.9), the resulting mean rating scores lead to a 
significant difference between Malta and Ireland (p=0.031). Using a four-point likert 
scale, the mean rating scores are 3.05 for Malta and 2.55 for Ireland. This means that 
whereas the Irish perceive the EU’s impetus as minor, the Maltese think that its drive 
has been more forceful in emphasising social dialogue in national politics. 
 
Table 6.9: The EU’s instrumentality in accentuating social dialogue in domestic affairs      
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 3.05 0.868 2.77 3.34 448.000 0.031 
 Ireland 2.55 1.063 2.17 2.92   
 
Furthermore, another score of significant difference is revealed in Table 6.10. It shows 
the Maltese and Irish perspectives of whether or not the EU has been effective in 
compelling national governments to seek more consultation. Respondents rated their 
opinion on a four-point likert scale. The mean rating scores are 2.76 for Malta and 2.33 
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for Ireland (p=0.032). This implies that Maltese social partners, when compared to their 
Irish counterparts, consider the EU as having been more effective in inducing their 
government to be more consultative in policy-making. MTU3 affirms that ‘since Malta 
applied to join the EU, social dialogue has become more central to our economic and 
social activity. It has certainly become more institutionalised’. MMB6 adds that social 
dialogue has become even more ‘critical’ when ‘Malta joined the eurozone’. 
 
 
Table 6.10: Pressure by the EU on national government to seek more participation       
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.76 0.971 2.44 3.08 451.500 0.032 
 Ireland 2.33 0.736 2.07 2.59   
 
 
This section will now be segmented into two narratives, the Maltese case and the Irish 
one, wherein statistical data presented so far will be corroborated by individual 
experiences. 
 
6.4.3 The Maltese scenario 
 
6.4.3.1  Formal institutions of participation 
 
The formation of consultative bodies by the Maltese government started within the 
same period when the country submitted its application to join the EU in 1990. 
Traditionally, Maltese stakeholders have been very intransigent, defending their own 
territory and extremely rigid in their polarised positions. Smallness and claustrophobic 
density render islanders sentinels guarding ‘the little they have’. The laying of 
foundations of innovative mediating institutions and instilling a more positive attitude 
among the people involved, directed matters differently. 
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MCSED was set up prior to EU accession. 
Since the 1990s, the government introduced 
new rhetoric in Maltese politics, including 
such words as dialogue, subsidiarity and 
participation. It wanted to move away from 
a hostile environment where stakeholders 
fought each other. At the end, workers and 
employers have to be seen as partners, not 
antagonists anymore (MMB6).  
I always believed that structural social 
dialogue among government, unions and 
employers is the key to resolve problems. 
The most important thing in such a set-up is 
not what I have to say but the need to 
understand what the others have to say. 
Any industrial dispute can be solved by 
argumentation and persuasion round a 
common table (MTU3). 
 
Although recognised by all as a ‘quantum leap that everybody was waiting for’ (MTU1), 
MCESD and other formal processes of consultation do not come uncontested. Those 
expecting a seat round the discussion table but remaining without one complained, as 
did others saying MCESD is still a far cry from the EESC due to ‘our style of doing 
politics where everyone is devoted to his own niche’ (MTU2). Maltese social partners 
‘do not collaborate together, form common study groups on certain issues and produce 
joint proposals to government’ (MEA5). There is no doubt that the homegrown 
institutional framework of MCESD needs to undergo a thorough transformative process 
which will ultimately render it similar to the more pluralistic format of the EESC.  
 
Others still have reservations as MCESD is still considered a government vehicle for 
information download which then does too little to upload suggestions and researched 
opinions from the rest of the ‘partners’. MTU1 asserts that real progress cannot be 
achieved unless Government ceases its chairing seat over MCESD and its officers 
taking their seats only whenever invited to address specific issues. In 2012, less than a 
year before a general election, the government took heed of the frequent calls to 
regenerate MCESD by broadening its official list of stakeholders, incorporating a new 
platform of small trade unions,
110
 representatives of civil society
111
 and Gozo as a 
                                                 
110
 This is the third union grouping, known as Forum Unions Maltin (ForUM). Initially set up with eight 
unions in 2004, with the MUMN – nurses and midwives – playing a key role, the group was strengthened 
when the MUT joined it after leaving the CMTU in 2008. A major reason for the creation of ForUM was 
to obtain seats in the tripartite Malta Council for Economic and Social Development (MCESD), on which 
the GWU, the UHM and the CMTU are represented. 
111
 In effect, MCESD already has a functional Civil Society Committee but this has been kept completely 
separate from its core group where only social partners had the right to participate. Through legal 
amendments, representatives of civil society are being promoted to the first tier Council, although the 
major problem in such situation always remain on the selection of who is best to represent a cacophony of 
different, sometimes conflicting, interests (MTU3). 
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region. Many think that this is the only way forward; shaping MCESD on the lines of 
the EU’s governance structures, not least, the EESC. 
 
6.4.3.2  Informal channels of influence 
 
Parallel to the supporting formal institutions, Maltese corporatist interdependencies are 
also characterised by informal channels of influence, which processes are expected in a 
country where the involved stakeholders’ headquarters are only a few minutes’ walk 
from each other, mostly in Valletta. Workers and employers’ associations, including 
government, can opt to go directly to those entities considered appropriate in certain 
cases, implying bilateral, often informal, meetings. Despite the legalisms characterising 
formal institutions and processes of social dialogue, informal options of influence are 
most often deemed to be more practical and easily available. ‘We invest a lot in 
informal networks as this is actually our job’, maintains one trade unionist (MTU1). 
Another union leader confirms that ‘[m]uch of our negotiations are done informally. We 
know each other since we are not too numerous in the field’ (MTU3). The head of an 
official mediating body goes as far as to say that ‘sometimes big problems are solved 
during a funeral service or a wedding reception’ (MMB7). However, being more 
practical and accessible does not necessarily entail that informal consultations are more 
effective or desirable than formal ones. In fact there are those who beg to differ. 
 
Informal meetings are not enough. We need 
to conduct such meetings on issues that are 
important at a particular moment in time. 
However by relying solely on informality, 
you will not be able to change power 
structures and processes in the long term 
(MTU1).  
 
We don’t believe in the potential of 
informal networks. In fact we want to 
change the current clientelistic system 
wherein our members petition their 
politicians on an individual basis.  In our 
sector there is a lot of untapped tension 
because we don’t have a formal structure 
where we can upload our concerns (MEA4). 
 
Contrary to common perception, although informal contacts are widespread and 
exercised on a day-to-day basis across the Maltese islands, they are not envisaged as 
superior to well-organised formal mediating structures where all parts are represented 
and power games are subject to ground rules and transparency. 
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6.4.4 The Irish scenario 
 
6.4.4.1  Formal institutions of participation 
 
The Irish narrative promulgates a divergent case since its state and non-state actors’ 
relationship goes beyond the consultative mode; it created a unique style of bond which 
brought long-term consensus among government and its social and civil partners 
through SP that contained a multi-tier set-up of consultative units spreading across 
different spheres. Here, we will only focus on its ‘corporatist economic tier through 
which trade unions, employers’ associations and the government met in the form of 
tripartite model to establish national pay agreements’ (ITT8). It was presented to Europe, 
particularly to the candidate Eastern countries at the time, as a unique winning formula 
that brings economic prosperity. While admitting that during its first years, SP was a 
must in bringing about the much needed industrial peace to attract foreign investment, 
the system became degenerative from 2000 onwards and the stakeholders could not pull 
out of the system until the rapid plunge back to economic bust dismantled the whole 
institutional framework.  
 
Employers representatives’ interpretations of what really went wrong are not in tandem 
with each other. 
 
Originally it served its purpose well. Then 
it became part of our structural problems. It 
did affect negatively our wage competitive 
edge. Wages kept rising to an overdose 
level… [Then] many things went wrong in 
this country (IEA5). 
 
SMEs did not have a voice at the 
partnership table. This was its real flaw. 
The employers’ group was mainly a 
representative group of the multinationals. 
We were always doomed to be outsiders 
because nobody wanted us in (IEA6). 
 
On their part, trade unions’ leaders have a different version of a ‘unique’ story that went 
‘terribly fallacious’. 
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The system was sustainable as long as the 
economy was booming. When the hard 
decisions had to be made, the people 
reverted back to the politicians. So, for 
example, employers’ associations are now 
on an aggressive mode on a number of 
issues, not least the minimum wage… What 
we didn’t do is that we didn’t identify 
problem issues and we didn’t try to sort 
them out… We became lazy… in a model 
that became elitist (ITU2). 
 
The trade union movement contributed 
hugely to the genuine boom.     [However]  
[f]rom 1998 a clear policy choice was made. 
Government wanted to move one way and 
this was hugely supported by the business 
community. They went to Boston [the 
American economic model]. We want 
something a bit more like Berlin [Social 
Europe model]. It is from this point on that 
the trade union movement began to loose its 
ideological argument (ITU1). 
6.4.4.2  Informal channels of influence 
 
In the post-SP period ‘the system has become much more informal’ (IEA5), although 
some stakeholders maintain that within the foregoing model ‘the relationship between 
trade unions and government was a strong mix of both formal and informal contact’ 
(ITU3). The negotiations leading to the renewal of national agreements were certainly 
formal but otherwise ‘week in, week out it was more informal than formal’. Nonetheless, 
since the collapse of many official coordinating bodies, except for NESC and the 
advisory board called the National Competitive Council (NCC) that ‘is doing some very 
good work in identifying difficulties and barriers for businesses’ (IEA6), personal 
contacts and inconspicuous lobbying have mushroomed among electoral as well as non-
electoral forms of representation. Notwithstanding widespread support for informality 
in influence stratagems, certain representative bodies still think that formal coordinating 
bodies are nevertheless desirable, as long as they are more pluralistic in their 
composition, that is, they would be open to all interested stakeholders and not 
exclusively available to the ones that have always enjoyed an insider status. 
 
We are now requesting the set-up of a 
national representative forum which would 
bring together not just big businesses but 
also small businesses. Not just big trade 
unions but also smaller ones and people 
who are not organised into trade unions. It 
would bring farmers, community groups, 
the Opposition spokespersons and the 
Central Bank. It would be an advisory 
forum for government, unlike the SP model 
which was the government itself (IEA6). 
Lots of business in Ireland is done because 
people know people… People go to the 
same sporting places. Irish politicians are 
very accessible. I can meet them within a 
week by going to local clinics where they 
make themselves available. It is quite an 
open political system in some ways… [But] 
there is still plenty of scope for corporatist 
type of tripartite partnership agreements to 
continue in the future in some form or other 
(ITT8). 
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It can be concluded that although the two polities provide a different historical narrative 
concerning the formation and functions of central mediating bodies, at the same time, 
they both present an earnest plea to make their channels of mediation more open and 
transparent in terms of representation and, perhaps, resembling more the EU model of 
negotiation both in terms of structures and processes. Economic affairs will form the 
basis of the third section which is exclusively composed of qualitative data.  
 
6.5 Economic affairs 
 
A thorough examination of economic interests groups is not complete without the 
inclusion of the regional and domestic economic dimension. Furthermore, economic 
discourse has a direct impact on the stakeholders’ outlook towards the Europeanisation 
process.  
 
Despite the negative effects of the global economic downturn, including slower 
economic growth, deterioration of public finances and a downgrading of its sovereign 
credit rating by Moody’s, Malta is still considered by the European Commission as one 
of its best eurozone performers (EC Interim Economic Forecast 2012). Ireland’s story 
presents a case of a failed economy. In late 2010, the Irish Government agreed to a $112 
billion loan package from the EU and IMF to help Dublin further increase the 
capitalisation of its banking sector and avoid defaulting on its sovereign debt (CIA 
World Factbook 2012). This led to an intensification of austerity measures to meet the 
deficit targets stipulated in the bail-out agreement. Participants’ feedback has to be 
interpreted against this severe economic backdrop that goes beyond domestic borders.  
 
6.5.1 The scars of neo-liberalism 
 
Trade unionists in both states agree that the financial and economic crisis is ‘deeply 
rooted in neo-liberalism to which the EU now adheres’. This is eventually leading to 
their lack of trust in the European project, although they admit that a change in political 
leadership may lead to an alternative policy choice. Most Maltese interviewees tackled 
the issues of political economy from an ideological point of view.  
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The current economic and financial 
problems are alienating the EU from its 
original and clear direction, that is, to bring 
harmony across member states and to 
renew their style of governance through the 
principles of MLG and subsidiarity… 
Today, power is being centralised and 
transferred to its supranational institutions 
to such an extent that the founding fathers 
would not recognise it anymore (MTU2).  
We favour a fairer capitalist system but are 
against violent aggression when it comes to 
anti-globalisation. Unfortunately, our 
European federation representing small 
agri-businesses started using violent 
campaigning. We don’t consent to this. We 
stand against multinationals that dictate 
decisions for the rest. Participation in 
economic decision-making should be more 
accessible and inclusive (MEA4). 
 
Feedback by the Irish shares a similar line of thought and Irish trade unions, in 
particular, are ferocious against the ‘dictatorship of the neo-liberal agenda’ driven by 
the powerful member states. 
 
What I would fear is that Europe becomes 
the lowest denominator. It becomes the big 
free market. It has always been the core of 
the integration project. So this would mean 
that the green and social European agenda 
becomes weak… Europe needs to be more 
idealistic and move beyond narrow 
economic interests. Then they can push us 
with targets through norms, penalties and 
so on (ITT8).  
What has changed the values of Europe is 
not the enlargement; it is the fact that at its 
inner core (the Germans and the French) 
feels absolutely compelled to comply with 
what markets want. As long as you are 
chasing the markets and try to satisfy their 
level profits – which you can never satisfy 
– you would neglect the needs of the 
people… It’s a seismic shift from social 
Europe to a market-driven Europe (ITU3). 
 
6.5.2 Regenerating an alternative vision 
Irish trade unionists feel strong about the ‘battle of ideas’ that will one day re-emerge in 
Europe. This can happen if the people wake-up from their apathetic indifference and a 
new ‘socialist’ leadership takes on the driving-seat. At the time of conducting the 
interviews in Ireland, there was much anticipation about the Presidential elections in 
France that were due a few weeks later.
 112
  A new French socialist president was seen, 
at the time, by many as the one who will show Europe that neo-liberalism is not the 
                                                 
112
 The presidential election was held in France on 22 April 2012, with a second round run-off held on 6 
May to elect the President of France. The incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy was running for a second 
successive. The first round ended with the selection of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande as second 
round participants, as neither of them received a majority of votes cast in the first round. Hollande won 
the run-off with 51.63% of the vote to Sarkozy's 48.37%. 
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only viable alternative to steer stagnant economies. For the Irish workers’ 
representatives this will be the time when a more solid and positive future will be 
redeemed for the benefit of ‘all Europeans’. 
 
It’s all about ideology. It has to do with 
ideas. A battle of ideas will someday take 
place. The real left has been absent from the 
European scene for at least a decade. 
People who are offering a countervailing 
view might find their way a bit more on the 
airwaves to put their case (ITU1). 
 
There is a growing, yet latent, disharmony 
between the people of Ireland and Europe, 
not because the EU is bad but its austerity 
measures are insistently being imposed as a 
result of what was primarily a banking 
meltdown. This can only be reversed by an 
alternative political clout at both national 
and European levels (ITU3). 
6.5.3 The centrality of a strong SMEs policy 
 
Contrastingly, Maltese and Irish employers’ associations do not invest their confidence 
in an ideological shift of political leadership but, instead, are vociferous about the need 
to place SMEs at the heart of the economic agenda. Their plea is to make their 
governments and the European institutions more proactive in nurturing home-grown 
industries based on micro, small and medium businesses. The comments below by 
Maltese partners are very clear. 
 
The Maltese government has enacted the 
Small Business Act (SBA). It is a 
legislative answer that created new forms of 
participation and consultation whenever 
SMEs are affected by new projects and 
laws. We have lobbied for this as we 
wanted to ensure that the European version 
of SBA is transposed to our own laws. 
SMEs are the solution of the current crises 
and they need to be promoted by those in 
power (MEA5). 
 
Small states are the ones that suffer the 
most from one size fits all approaches, 
particularly in an economic environment 
dominated by SMEs and micro-business… 
The EU’s SME definition is inadequate as it 
doesn’t properly take into account the 
concerns and mind-set of micro-businesses. 
Malta needs a boost to its micro home 
grown business sector to guarantee 
sustainable economic growth (MEA9). 
 
 
Representatives of small businesses in Ireland seem divided in the way they assess how 
SMEs were treated by domestic authorities. Some say the ‘SMEs sector has never been 
ignored’ even though Ireland had been largely dependent on Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI). Their sheer numbers are always a reminder of their presence and pressures. Other 
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associations insist that this is totally false. They ponder that ‘SMEs were never given 
their due importance by politicians, were excluded from being part of formal institutions 
like SP and did not benefit from any grants specifically designed for them’. When the 
Irish economy hit its lowest ebb, the new government nominated a junior minister 
responsible for SMEs. It is a step in the right direction which every employer 
organisation cherishes but it needs to be backed up by some robust policy structures. 
 
More than half of the private sector workers 
are employed by SMEs and if you look at 
business demography, 95% of firms in 
Ireland are SMEs. Naturally, these have 
different needs from those of large 
operators. If you look to our policy 
initiatives to government, most of them are 
SME related. SMEs have the potential to 
help Ireland go back on the right economic 
tracks (IEA5). 
 
From an SME perspective, the EU impact 
had been weak. Regulatory impact 
assessments, wherein we conduct analysis 
how new things are to affect SMEs, are not 
common practice here. In the past, it was 
the Taoiseach office responsible for this, 
but now it has all gone. So new regulations 
coming in from the EU are rarely assessed 
from an SME point of view (IEA6). 
 
 
One can conclude that the discourse of trade union leaders is, principally, of an 
ideological nature to reverse the casualties of neo-liberalism. Alternatively, employers’ 
associations seem to be more resolute on immediate corrective actions by lobbying for 
the introduction or strengthening of a better policy architecture that specifically seeks 
the development of SMEs. The last round of findings in this chapter is primarily of a 
statistical nature and deals more thoroughly with EU related concerns. 
6.6 European affairs  
 
The fifth set of results is primarily of a statistical nature. In this last section, findings are 
more directly related to EU affairs to gauge how social partners in Malta and Ireland are 
reacting to incentives and values emanating from an integrated continent, as well as 
their propensity to socialise and engage in collective learning. 
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6.6.1 European vision and dimension 
 
The first set of statistical findings reveal whether the European dimension has filtered 
within the organisation’s vision/mission statements and to what extent has it been 
incorporated in its endeavours. 
 
Chi
2 
analysis in Table 6.11 reveals no significant difference between Maltese and Irish 
social partners in incorporating a European dimension within their vision/mission 
statements. Workers’ and employers’ representatives in Malta and Ireland secure a 
comfortable majority in favour of having their raison d'être encapsulated within a wider 
European context (60.5% and 70.6% respectively).  
 
 
Table 6.11: Inclusion of European dimension in the vision/mission statements of social partners 
The vision/mission statement incorporates a 
European dimension 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 23 24 47 
Percentage 60.5% 70.6% 65.3% 
No Count 15 10 25 
Percentage 39.5% 29.4% 34.7% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.802, v = 1, p = 0.371 
 
 
On the other hand, significant difference is then registered in the follow-up question 
(Table 6.12) when respondents were asked whether the incorporation of the European 
dimension occurred as a consequence of EU accession (Chi
2
=5.248, p=0.022). The vast 
majority of Irish social partners (83.3%) confirm that the change was institutionalised 
due to EU accession. At the other end of the spectrum, almost half of the Maltese 
respondents (47.8%) express an opposite view which might imply a more proactive and 
persuasive drive towards the EU. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 192 
Table 6.12: Inclusion of European dimension occurred because of EU accession 
The inclusion of the EU dimension in the 
vision/mission statement occurred as a 
consequence of EU accession 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 12 20 32 
Percentage 52.2% 83.3% 68.1% 
No Count 11 4 15 
Percentage 47.8% 16.7% 31.9% 
Total Count 23 24 47 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.248, v = 1, p = 0.022 
 
Participation in EU related activities both domestically and abroad, as Table 6.13 
reveals, is significantly different for social partners in the two islands (Chi
2
=3.925, 
p=0.048). More than nine tenths of Irish trade unions and employers’ groups take part in 
such activities, while Maltese counterparts lag behind by 20%. Consequently 27% of 
Maltese social partners are still not active in initiatives which are EU-related.  
 
Table 6.13: Participation of social partners in EU activities domestically and abroad 
Participation in EU related activities both 
domestically and abroad 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 27 31 58 
Percentage 73.0% 91.2% 81.7% 
No Count 10 3 13 
Percentage 27.0% 8.8% 18.3% 
Total Count 37 34 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.925, v = 1, p = 0.048, u 
 
 
The Irish are more vociferous in European fora, particularly since the take over by the 
Troika, that is the ECB, the IMF and the EU. 
 
Member states need to be more active and vigorous to upload their agenda. There has 
been so much top-down Europeanisation. There is presumption and arrogance in the 
way EU deals with its nation states. From a trade union perspective we are trying to 
upload our concerns but our government adopted a strategy of ‘let’s do whatever they 
tell us and get a reward for it’ (ITU1). 
 
This heightened participation in EU affairs from the part of the Irish does not mean that 
they are now feeling closer to an integrated continent. On the contrary, ‘the general 
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feeling, in a strange way, is that the IMF is treating the Irish better than the ECB. There 
is now a sense of greater alienation towards the European project’ (ITU2). 
 
Table 6.14 rounds up these findings by defining the trend of participation in EU-related 
activities over these last eight years (2004-2011). The trend of Maltese activation in EU 
affairs is experiencing an apparently lower rate of expansion compared to the Irish 
(28.9% and 41.2% respectively), in addition to almost a third of Maltese social partners 
who are still indifferent to the European reality (28.9%). On their part, 44.1% of Irish 
organisations are going through a stabilisation mode where their rate of engagement in 
EU related activities is neither increasing nor decreasing. Given these trends, the Chi
2
 
test provides an almost significant difference between the two states (Chi
2
=6.631, 
p=0.085). 
 
 
Table 6.14: Social partners’ rate of participation in EU related activities 
The rate of participation in EU related activities 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Increased Count 11 14 25 
 Percentage 28.9% 41.2% 34.7% 
Remained Stable Count 11 15 26 
Percentage 28.9% 44.1% 36.1% 
Decreased Count 5 2 7 
Percentage 13.2% 5.9% 9.7% 
Not Applicable Count 11 3 14 
Percentage 28.9% 8.8% 19.4% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 6.631, v = 3, p = 0.085 
 
 
6.6.2 Training and coordination of EU matters 
 
Almost half of the trade unions and employers’ associations in Malta and Ireland have 
taken the initiative to participate in training programmes to enhance their skills in 
dealing with EU matters (44.7% and 47.1% respectively). Statistically, there is no 
significant difference between the two cohorts in this regard (see Table 6.15). 
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Table 6.15: Training of social partners’ officers in EU affairs 
 Participation in  training programmes to acquire 
necessary skills in EU affairs 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 17 16 33 
Percentage 44.7% 47.1% 45.8% 
No Count 21 18 39 
Percentage 55.3% 52.9% 54.2% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.039, v = 1, p = 0.844 
 
 
Table 6.16 reveals that almost 40% of Maltese unions and employers’ associations do 
not appoint any officer/s to deal with EU matters. This represents a significant contrast 
to the Irish situation where only 6% of the organisations do likewise (Chi
2
=21.801, 
p<0.0005). In contrast, Maltese social partners make a predominant use of the practice 
where EU matters fall under the responsibility of one officer who simultaneously 
executes other duties (28.9%), whilst the second most used praxis involves the 
appointment of one exclusive officer to coordinate EU affairs (18.4%). The majority of 
their Irish counterparts prefer a system of having a team of persons who share the 
responsibility of EU affairs (52.9%) instead of appointing one exclusive or joint officer 
(2.9% + 38.2% = 41.1%). Results have to be treated with caution due to the unreliability 
factor. 
 
Table 6.16: Responsibility of EU affairs within social partners 
 Responsibility of EU affairs within organisations 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes, one person who is 
solely responsible 
Count 7 1 8 
Percentage 18.4% 2.9% 11.1% 
Yes, one who performs 
other tasks as well 
Count 11 13 24 
Percentage 28.9% 38.2% 33.3% 
More than one person 
responsible 
Count 5 18 23 
Percentage 13.2% 52.9% 31.9% 
No Count 15 2 17 
Percentage 39.5% 5.9% 23.6% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
% within Social 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 21.801, v = 3, p < 0.0005, u 
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6.6.3 EU funding 
 
As can be seen in Table 6.17, there is a significant difference between social partners in 
Malta and Ireland in their attempts to access EU funding under different schemes and 
projects. In fact the vast majority of Maltese unions and employers’ associations 
(60.5%) have presented their case for EU funding, whilst the overwhelming majority of 
their Irish counterparts (79.4%) have not.  
 
Table 6.17: Attempts by social partners to access EU funds 
Attempts to access EU funds 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 23 7 30 
Percentage 60.5% 20.6% 41.7% 
No Count 15 27 42 
Percentage 39.5% 79.4% 58.3% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 11.776, v = 1, p = 0.001 
 
 
Upon further investigation, it is to be noted that almost all of IBEC’s federations have 
halted their attempts to attain EU funding during this last decade. An IBEC 
spokesperson confirmed that they do not currently apply for any EU funds, but ‘we have 
done so in the past when we were involved in quite a number of projects, in particular 
European Social Fund (ESF) funded projects’.  
 
Table 6.18 indicates that the majority of Maltese unions and employers’ associations 
(64%) state that they do use external advice to help them have a better chance of 
accessing EU funding, while the situation in Ireland is somewhat different as only 
38.9% declare to have the same need. Nonetheless, the Chi
2
 test still reveals no 
significant difference between Malta and Ireland in the usage of external consultancy 
(Chi
2
=2.652, p=0.103). The most popular sources of external advice in both Malta and 
Ireland are government agencies and confederate organisations (see Appendix H).  
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Table 6.18: Use of external expertise to access EU funds 
 Use of external advice to access EU funds 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 16 7 23 
Percentage 64.0% 38.9% 53.5% 
No Count 9 11 20 
Percentage 36.0% 61.1% 46.5% 
Total Count 25 18 43 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 2.652, v = 1, p = 0.103 
 
 
6.6.4 Contacts and lobbying in Brussels 
 
In this part, statistical findings are focused on the type of contacts that have been 
established by social partners in Brussels and their preferences as to whom they address 
their lobbying at the supranational level.  
 
Although the Chi
2
 test in Table 6.19 reveals a significant difference in the way Maltese 
and Irish organisations have dealt with their contacts in Brussels (Chi
2
=18.511,  
p=0.002), the result is to be treated with caution due to the unreliability factor. Many 
organisations have invested in more than one type of communication channel. A couple 
of divergences are easily detected. The Irish rely more on umbrella Euro-groups based 
in Brussels (48.2%) than do the Maltese (25.8%). On their part, 16.1% of Maltese rely 
on online networking when compared to the 10.7% of Irish social partners, maybe 
because it is the cheapest option. Contrastingly, since specific funds are allocated for 
members’ overseas travelling by their respective Euro federations,113 the two of them 
share approximately the same segment (22%) when it comes to sending officers to 
Brussels from time to time. However the most significant difference between the two 
states is apparent in the last item, that is where no contact has been established so far. A 
staggering 29% of Maltese social partners fall under this category when compared to the 
almost negligible figure of 3.6% on the Irish side. 
 
                                                 
113
 Such as the European Trade Unions Congress (ETUC) and Business Europe 
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Table 6.19: Types of contact with Brussels established by social partners  
 The type of contact that has already been established in 
Brussels, if any 
Trade Unions & Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Permanent Office in Brussels Count 3 6 9 
Percentage 4.8% 10.7% 7.6% 
Relying on umbrella Euro-
group based in Brussels 
Count 16 27 43 
Percentage 25.8% 48.2% 36.4% 
Sending members to Brussels 
periodically 
Count 14 12 26 
Percentage 22.6% 21.4% 22.0% 
Online networking Count 10 6 16 
Percentage 16.1% 10.7% 13.6% 
Other means Count 1 3 4 
Percentage 1.6% 5.4% 3.4% 
no contact Count 18 2 20 
Percentage 29.0% 3.6% 16.9% 
Total Count 62 56 118 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 18.511, v = 5, p = 0.002, u 
 
 
Lobbying in Brussels is another opportunity open for Maltese and Irish trade unions and 
employers’ association. The EU provides a plethora of different institutions with multi-
access points at different levels and at different locations and, thus, it attracts lobbyists 
from all member states. Almost all of the Irish social partners (88.2%) are engaged in 
some sort of lobbying at the EU level (see Table 6.20). This presents a significant 
difference when compared to the Maltese case where less than half of the organisations 
concerned are engaged (44.7%) (Chi
2
=14.98, p<0.0005). 
 
 
Table 6.20: Lobbying at EU level 
 Engagement in lobbying with any institution of the EU   
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 17 30 47 
Percentage 44.7% 88.2% 65.3% 
No Count 21 4 25 
Percentage 55.3% 11.8% 34.7% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 14.98, v = 1, p < 0.0005  
 
 
When probed as to why they feel reluctant to lobby EU institutions, 48.8% of Maltese 
social partners mentioned that their primary obstacle is lack of administrative capacity. 
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Then they referred to three other reasons that carry equal percentage weight (14.8%), 
namely too costly financial burden, little knowledge of EU institutional set-up and 
preference of the domestic route of influence (see appendix H). 
  
Table 6.21 shows there is no significant difference among the preferences of Maltese 
and Irish organisations as to whom they lobby at the European level (Chi
2
=7.287, 
p=0.200). Findings are to be treated with caution because of the unreliability factor due 
to small frequencies. National MEPs and the national members of EESC share the top 
lobbying rank for Maltese social partners with 30.3% each, followed by the European 
Commission at 15.2%. The Irish response shows a slightly different order of merit. The 
Commission and national MEPs are most lobbied by the Irish at 32.1%, followed by 
EESC at 14.3%. Both the Commissioner of the home country and the member state 
holding the Presidency of the Council show low levels of lobbying in both countries. In 
most cases, respondents who marked ‘other means’ are referring to their European 
federations that in turn voice their concerns at the supranational level. 
 
Table 6.21: Types of lobbying in Brussels 
 European institutions targeted for lobbying purposes 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 European Commission Count 5 27 32 
Percentage 15.2% 32.1% 27.4% 
National members of EESC Count 10 12 22 
Percentage 30.3% 14.3% 18.8% 
National MEPs Count 10 27 37 
Percentage 30.3% 32.1% 31.6% 
Commissioner of home  
country 
Count 3 11 14 
Percentage 9.1% 13.1% 12.0% 
Member State holding 
Presidency of Council 
Count 1 2 3 
Percentage 3.0% 2.4% 2.6% 
Other means Count 4 5 9 
Percentage 12.1% 6.0% 7.7% 
Total Count 33 84 117 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 7.287, v = 5, p = 0.200, u   
 
 
The EESC deserves a special mention in these findings as it is the official consultative 
body at European level composed of representatives of social partners and civil society 
from all member states. Figure 6.22 shows that only a sizeable minority of trade unions 
and employers’ associations in Malta and Ireland is engaged in consultation processes 
 199 
led by the EESC (32.4% and 45.5% respectively). Inferential statistics do not reveal any 
significant difference between the two (Chi
2
=1.248, p=0.264).  
 
 
Table 6.22: Engagement with the EESC 
 Engagement in consultation processes led by the 
European Economic and Social Committee 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 12 15 27 
Percentage 32.4% 45.5% 38.6% 
No Count 25 18 43 
Percentage 67.6% 54.5% 61.4% 
Total Count 37 33 70 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.248, v = 1, p = 0.264 
 
 
According to a Maltese member of the EESC, there should be no surprises that the 
EESC’s impact on domestic players is low. 
 
The government has never considered us seriously. We haven’t been granted a 
secretariat in Malta like the one set-up for the Committee of the Regions. We have 
never been collectively consulted by government. Each one of us pulls his rope 
according to his partisan interest. The situation could only be improved when the 
government decides to start talking to us about Malta’s position regarding the opinions 
issued by the Commission. It’s only then that I will be the first one to act in the national 
interest when it comes to voting in the EESC (MTU1). 
 
 
6.6.5 European federations 
 
Almost all social partners in Ireland (94.1%) are affiliated to European federations 
compared to the 71.1% of Maltese social partners (see Table 6.23). Chi
2
 analysis reveals 
that such a difference is considered significant (Chi
2
=6.452 and p=0.011) and may be 
explained by the simple fact that the majority of Irish actors are annexed to their 
respective domestic confederation, ICTU or IBEC, which in turn are affiliated to 
European federations. The Maltese case, which is more segmented with a remarkable 
presence of very small in-house unions, presents a situation wherein almost third of the 
trade unions and employers’ associations (28.9%) are affiliated neither to a domestic 
federation nor to a European federation. One union leader laments that ‘we are a very 
small union with 150 members with all our business conducted in Malta’. The EU 
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seems too distant and irrelevant to us’. When asked for what reasons are they not 
interested in affiliating themselves to European federations, the two most scored reasons 
were (a) they feel no need to be part of any European federation [40%] and (b) focusing 
on domestic issues being a priority [40%].  
 
Table 6.23: Affiliation of social partners to European federations 
 Affiliation to any European federation 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 27 32 59 
Percentage 71.1% 94.1% 81.9% 
No Count 11 2 13 
Percentage 28.9% 5.9% 18.1% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 6.452, v = 1, p = 0.011  
 
 
MEA4 is very critical of the current situation, ‘If you do not have insider knowledge of 
what other countries are doing, you have already started your negotiations at a 
disadvantage. Affiliations to European federations do cost a lot of money but, 
undoubtedly, it is money well spent’. An Irish counterpart, ITU3, shares a similar idea, 
‘We can learn from what other unions in other countries are doing. To do this we have 
to maintain a very strong connection with central Europe. Brussels, Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg will continue to loom very large in the lives of every European. We have 
to accept that and deal with it’. 
 
Table 6.24 presents another insightful determinant of the degree of European 
involvement, as it specifically asks whether any member of domestic organisations was 
nominated or elected to start assuming an executive position within a European 
federation. Chi
2
 analysis reveals no significant difference between the Maltese and Irish 
partners (Chi
2
=0.006, p=0.938) as the two of them exhibit highly comparable results 
(34.2% and 33.3%). Considering all of the adverse geographical factors, including 
smallness, islandness and periphery location, the finding is very encouraging. 
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Table 6.24: Executive responsibilities within European federations 
 Members of domestic organisations holding executive 
responsibilities within European federations 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 13 11 24 
Percentage 34.2% 33.3% 33.8% 
No Count 25 22 47 
 Percentage 65.8% 66.7% 66.2% 
Total Count 38 33 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.006, v = 1, p = 0.938 
 
 
6.6.6 European partner organisations 
 
One of the tangible effects relating to EU membership is the identification of partner 
organisations from any other European member states. Through working relationships 
with European partners, domestic organisations can grow, learn and collaborate over 
joint projects. Table 6.25 shows that social partners in Malta are significantly less likely 
to identify European partners than the Irish (34.2% and 87.9% respectively) 
(Chi2=21.054, p<0.0005).  
 
Table 6.25: Cooperation with European partners 
Identification of European partner organisations to 
cooperate over joint projects 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 13 29 42 
Percentage 34.2% 87.9% 59.2% 
No Count 25 4 29 
Percentage 65.8% 12.1% 40.8% 
Total Count 38 33 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 21.054, v = 1, p < 0.0005  
 
 
Another significant difference between Maltese and Irish social partners is evident with 
regards to the European regions from which their partner organisations originate 
(Chi
2
=18.663, p<0.0005). Table 6.26 shows that the Irish have partner organisations 
from the five regions
114
 of the EU but the preferred one seems to be the Eastern cluster 
                                                 
114
 For the purposes of this study, the five regional clusters of the EU have been devised on a geographical 
rationale and are composed of the following member states: 
Southern and Mediterranean cluster: Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain 
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with 35.3%. This may be explained by the fact that during the boom period, many 
Eastern member states, which at the time were applicant countries, were befriending 
Ireland to learn from its ‘outstanding’ experience in the EU (ITU1+ITU3). Otherwise 
the Irish look to the North (22.4%) for inspiration and learning. Contrastingly the 
Maltese concentrate on their own region, that is the Southern and Mediterranean 
countries, with 40.6%. While Eastern partners are totally absent from the Maltese scene, 
it is worth mentioning the northern region which at 35.5% comes only second to the 
Southern and Mediterranean cluster. Like the Irish, the Maltese see the Northern region 
as the one to aspire to because of its high standards, particularly in welfare state 
provisions, education, job creation and environmental policies.    
 
Table 6.26: Regional origins of European partners 
The European regions from which partner organisations 
originate 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Southern & Mediterranean cluster Count 13 94 107 
Percentage 40.6% 22.0% 23.3% 
Central cluster Count 7 87 94 
Percentage 21.9% 20.3% 20.4% 
Northern cluster Count 12 96 108 
Percentage 37.5% 22.4% 23.5% 
Eastern cluster Count 0 151 151 
Percentage .0% 35.3% 32.8% 
Total Count 32 428 460 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 18.663, v = 3, p < 0.0005  
 
 
These statistical findings are corroborated by experiential accounts resulting from 
interviews. For instance, excellent relations between the Maltese and the Italians are 
well known and go back to hundreds of years. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Central cluster: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands 
Northern cluster: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom 
Eastern cluster: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia 
At the time when data was being collected, Croatia was still an acceding country and, thus, it was not 
included in the exercise 
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We mingle with everyone. But the Italians 
are our best partners. We share almost the 
same culture. The Mediterranean Sea unites 
us (MTU1). 
 
 
 
 
When we started attending European fora 
prior to accession, the Italians took the lead 
to guide us. They taught us a lot. There was 
a time when we could use their premises in 
Brussels. But then this special relationship 
had to stop because we became aware that 
our concerns are of a different sort (MEA4).
On a different wavelength, the Maltese look towards the Northerners as if they represent 
the ideal state of EU membership. Others maintain that Malta and its organisations need 
to collaborate with anyone as long they share common causes. The nil hit on Eastern 
countries is also explained. 
 
The Maltese measure themselves with those 
who are superior to them. The Maltese want 
to be measured against the Germans, the 
Swedes and the Finns. Their high standards 
are actually our expectations. The Maltese 
are not happy with their pensions because 
the Greeks have dropped theirs. We say, 
‘we want to be like the Swedes who have 
the best safety nets within their welfare 
system’. All these cross comparisons are 
creating unprecedented pressures on our 
welfare system (MMB6). 
We are prepared to collaborate with anyone 
who thinks that his position and concerns 
match ours. Although there is the 
impression that small member states tend to 
form alliances with other small states, yet 
this is not always the norm because they 
might have different political, economic, 
social and cultural scenarios. This is the 
case of the Eastern countries which 
although relatively small, their innate 
characteristics are vividly distinct from ours 
(MMB8). 
 
 
Like the Maltese, the Irish aspire to achieve the higher standards of living that are 
evident in the European Northern region and this explains their preference to identify 
northern partners. ‘Their model’, according to ITU1, ‘is cohesive and egalitarian in 
terms of society and very efficient on an economic scale’. Furthermore, Northern 
countries are a bit easier to access because they produce a lot of work in English (ITT8). 
However the nature of their relationship is changing fast. ITU2 laments that ‘since our 
economic downfall, we noticed a certain amount of arrogance from Nordic countries. 
They are the ones who put the house in order and we are the bad children who have to 
take our medicine’.  
 
But the real Irish partners are the ones who speak English and may originate from 
beyond European borders. 
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We are not focused on Europe. We are 
more focused on the UK and us. Remember 
we have language difficulties. When we 
talk about the single market, Irish business 
doesn’t see this in Europe but they see it in 
the UK (IEA6). 
We are more attached to the Anglo-Saxon 
countries because our skills-set is more 
required in America, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand. The construction industry is 
one of these areas (IEA5). 
 
 
Although they might not publicly admit it, the Irish feel more comfortable as part of the 
Anglo-Saxon culture which incorporates the political, economic and social dimensions 
as well. ITT8 concludes that ‘we would see ourselves as normal in that context and 
Europe is the distant continent. Europe is this other place where things are organised 
differently’. 
 
6.6.7 European norms and values 
 
The infiltration of European norms and values is of paramount importance when 
looking at the degree of attitudinal transformation, implying changes to an old-rooted 
set of attitudes, culture and identity. In this part, attention is devoted to domestic change 
as a consequence of vertical and lateral agencies of Europeanisation. 
 
The first of three consecutive results that gauge the extent of change is the one in Table 
6.27 which measures the extent of EU influence on members’ mindset. The mean rating 
scores for Malta and Ireland are almost identical (2.97 and 2.94 respectively). This 
signifies a considerable amount of influence on a four-point likert scale. Consequently 
the p value (0.432) exceeds the 0.05 criterion and, thus, it implies no statistical 
difference between Malta and Ireland. 
 
Table 6.27: The extent of EU influence on the mindset of members within social partners  
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.97 0.944 2.66 3.28 586.500 0.432 
 Ireland 2.94 0.489 2.77 3.11   
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On a similar benchmark, Table 6.28 exhibits the findings concerning the extent of 
influence by European federations on the norms and practices of domestic social 
partners. The mean rating scores are 2.58 for Malta and 2.36 for Ireland. These two 
mean rating scores are comparable and lie almost in the middle of four-point likert scale. 
This implies that both groups have a middling opinion of whether European federations 
did influence their prescribed set of norms and practices or not. Like the previous result, 
the p value (0.196) exceeds the 0.05 criterion, thus, implying no significant difference. 
 
Table 6.28: The extent of influence on social partners by norms and practices of European federations 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.58 1.030 2.24 2.92 521.500 0.196 
 Ireland 2.36 0.603 2.15 2.58   
 
 
The third result in this series shows the respondents’ perspective of whether the internal 
changes that have been experienced can be attributed to new ideas brought in by 
European partners (see Table 6.29). The Maltese are much more categorical than their 
Irish counterparts. 40.5% believe that such internal changes can be attributed to 
European partners and 48.6% deny any cause and effect syndrome. The Irish, on the 
other hand, show a greater degree of ambivalence. Although 44.1% of them agree that 
changes were instigated by European partners, a compelling portion (38.2%) ‘do not 
know’ and, consequently, did not commit themselves on either side. Such an imbalance 
in the percentage distribution renders the result significant in the difference between the 
two islands (Chi
2
=10.657, p=0.005). 
 
Table 6.29: Internal changes attributed to new ideas brought about by European partners 
There have been changes within the organisation 
that are attributed to new ideas brought about by 
European partners 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 15 15 30 
Percentage 40.5% 44.1% 42.3% 
No Count 18 6 24 
Percentage 48.6% 17.6% 33.8% 
Don't Know Count 4 13 17 
Percentage 10.8% 38.2% 23.9% 
Total Count 37 34 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 10.657, v = 2, p = 0.005  
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After presenting a series of results showing the extent of influence through vertical and 
lateral agents, it is now pertinent to know the proper stimuli that trigger change. Table 
6.30 shows the ranking of five major stimuli emanating from the EU’s pattern and style 
of governance. In the case of Maltese social partners it is evident that they are primarily 
equally motivated by the opportunity to socialise with European partners and the value 
of consensus seeking (3.26 mean  and 3.21 mean respectively), followed equally again 
by training opportunities and European funding (3.05 mean and 3.00 mean respectively). 
In the case of social partners in Ireland, the major stimulus of change is the opportunity 
to socialise with European partners (3.9 mean), followed almost equally by the 
availability of training opportunities and the attainment of a positive attitude (3.40 mean 
and 3.10 mean respectively). The fact that the p value in all cases goes beyond the 0.05 
criterion of significance is an indication that the Maltese and Irish scores are 
comparable. 
 
Table 6.30: Sources of stimulus that instigate change in the organisation’s tactics and strategies 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
associations 
Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Mann-
Whitney 
U test  p value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
European  
Funds 
Malta 3.0000 1.44914 2.3404 3.6596 32.500 0.189 
 Ireland 2.1000 1.47479 .2688 3.9312   
Consensus  
Value 
 Malta 3.2143 1.44544 2.5563 3.8722 37.500 0.324 
Ireland 2.5000 .79057 1.5184 3.4816   
Socialisation  
with partners 
Malta 3.2619 1.18974 2.7203 3.8035 36.000 0.276 
 Ireland 3.9000 .96177 2.7058 5.0942   
Positive  
Attitude 
 Malta 2.4762 .87287 2.0789 2.8735 36.000 0.276 
Ireland 3.1000 1.24499 1.5541 4.6459   
Training  
Opportunities 
 Malta 3.0476 1.04767 2.5707 3.5245 44.000 0.574 
Ireland 3.4000 1.19373 1.9178 4.8822   
 
Statistical figures in Table 6.30 are very close to each other and this is indication that all 
stimuli are considered important by stakeholders. Although ranked fourth, Maltese 
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participants still consider EU funding as a crucial stimulus in making a success out of 
membership. 
 
Monies are attractive and important. But if 
we have accessed the EU solely to pump 
money, we will be committing a mistake. 
Europe is giving us new opportunities to 
socialise and learn from benchmarking 
exercises (MTU3). 
 
 
We believe in the potential of all stimuli but 
to realise our potential we still need money. 
It is only through the availability of funding 
that we can extend our chances of 
extending our contacts with European 
partners and to enhance our skills-set 
through training opportunities (MTU1). 
 
The Irish, in some sense resembling Maltese aspirations, want to shorten the 
psychological distance between them and the rest of the continent. This has never been 
their priority so far. The current economic crisis is a paradox since it embraces both 
elements of attraction and retraction from the EU. 
 
We need to invest more in socialisation and 
collective learning. We have done this but 
not as much as we should be… The level of 
socialisation is low because of lack of 
resources and the fact that we are different 
from the rest.  (IEA6) 
 
The Irish trade union movement doesn’t 
have an international officer.  We use our 
international links on a bilateral binary and 
not as part of the European project… We 
should have established more solid links at 
the European level (ITU2). 
 
6.7 Concluding remarks 
 
Social dialogue in Malta and Ireland takes place in fragmented sectors, even though 
many have the impression that the Irish are less fragmented because of being organised 
within large, unifying congresses. Social partners are aware of the need to continually 
change and be changed but, sometimes, inertia takes the lead over pro-activeness in 
change management. Social partners in Malta are subject to a lot of veto playing, while 
consensus seeking is the most widespread norm characterising negotiation strategies in 
Ireland.  
 
The degree of domestic responsiveness has been measured in terms of social partners’ 
participation in formal mediating institutions. The rise and downfall of SP dominates 
the discourse among Irish participants whereas the reorganisation of MCESD features 
prominently among Maltese protagonists. The EESC format and style of negotiation is 
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motivating Maltese stakeholders in their quest to render their formal system of interest 
representation more pluralistic and constructive. On their part, though still interested, 
the Irish are wary of reinventing new consultative structures. Informal channels of 
communication, though widely spread, are not seen as ideal to fix long-term solutions 
and as a contributor towards the common good.  
 
On economic affairs, much of the trade unions’ discourse is of an ideological nature that 
probes into a sustainable political vision which will provide an alternative to the 
‘tyranny’ and ‘austerity’ of neo-liberalism. Employers’ associations, on their part, are 
resolute to lobby for the strengthening of better policy measures that seek the 
development of SMEs. 
 
The general outlook towards the EU seems ambivalent for the Irish. More than thirty 
years of membership have not been enough for the Irish to feel a sense of belonging 
within the EU. They feel much more comfortable with the English speaking world than 
with the rest of the continent. At the same time, they are facing one of their deepest 
economic crises which they are trying to solve by making systematic connections to the 
EU and the rest of its member states. Contrastingly, social partners in Malta feel ‘at 
home’ within European borders, have integrated a European dimension within their 
vision and activities, and have immersed themselves into the identification of new 
European partners. Notwithstanding various setbacks in their home environment, 
Maltese social partners show a higher propensity towards attitudinal transformation 
through the diffusion of European standards and values than their Irish counterparts. 
 
The next step is to discuss and interpret these findings in the context of the conceptual 
framework selected for this thesis. In particular, the results will be evaluated in terms of 
the mediating variables pertaining to RCI and SI models, thus testing the suitability of 
the original hypotheses. This will be dealt with in Chapter 8, but prior to such an 
evaluation, it is pertinent to present the qualitative and quantitative findings pertaining 
to SHEGs in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
Maltese and Irish Social, Human Rights and Environmental Groups:  
presentation of findings 
 
 
 Civil society is essentially collective action,  
 providing an essential counterweight to individualism;  
and creative action,  
presenting a much-needed antidote to the cynicism that infects  
so much of contemporary politics. 
 
Michael Edwards (2004) 
Scholar and civil society activist 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Following the presentation of results concerning trade unions and employers’ 
associations in the previous chapter, the next logical step is to deal with the remaining 
case studies that form an integral part of this thesis’ research design. More specifically 
this chapter will uncover the findings pertaining to Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups (SHEGs). According to a conservative estimate, in Malta there 
are more than 2,500 voluntary groups operating at national and local levels (MMB15), 
whereas in Ireland there are 30,000 groups embracing a million and a half volunteers 
(ISHG14). Given these immense proportions, it is crucial to be scientifically selective 
so as to produce valid, reliable and credible results that, if possible, go beyond the 
samples used. In line with the rationale in the previous chapter, the two types of groups, 
that is, social and environmental, have been compounded for statistical analysis in order 
to decipher points of significant difference and comparability between the two selected 
states, while their distinctive characteristics and reactions are still made evident through 
qualitative findings. 
 
Findings in this chapter are grouped under similar cohorts that were used in the first set 
of results, with the exception of economic issues which were not considered of primary 
relevance by research subjects. As a result, findings are mapped out across four 
dimensions, namely (a) internal capabilities and limitations, (b) cultural and political 
dynamics, (c) domestic mediating institutions and (d) European influences. These four 
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dimensions reflect the criteria that were determined in Chapter 2 to decode the effects of 
Europeanisation on interest groups. In other words these four dimensions will show 
whether EU membership may have enriched the resources-base of interest groups and 
changed their internal organisational structures, enhanced their responsiveness to 
domestic interest intermediation and diversified the attitudinal formation of their leaders 
by embracing a wider European identity. 
 
Like its predecessor, this chapter is loaded with rich narratives that are corroborated by 
statistical results and inquisitive commentary resulting from observation. 
 
7.2 Internal potentials and limitations 
 
The first set of variables to be uncovered is related to internal organisational potentials 
and attitudes that have a direct impact on groups’ interactions within their sectoral 
landscapes in Malta and Ireland. Findings in this part will enlighten three main internal 
facets, namely the marginality of civil groups, the fragmentation of the sector and the 
potential for change. Quantitative and qualitative results disclose organisational trends, 
meanings behind choices made and ongoing transformations that may have the potential 
to change age-old paradigms of rationality and normativeness. 
 
7.2.1 Weak partners 
 
A common feature that crops up as soon as one starts talking to SHEGs’ leaders is the 
widely believed idea that their organisations are of a second-class status when compared 
to labour and business interests. The latter are equipped with more resources and better 
links to the corridors of power, while the former are weak and enjoy only a superficial 
treatment by politicians and top civil servants. Having experienced the ups and downs 
of SP and NESC, Irish social and human rights groups have no doubt that ‘some 
partners are more equal than others in their power to make proposals and the power that 
makes sure some things don’t get prioritised’ (IEG20).  
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The real power of SP rested within 
government as the largest employer, the 
unions and the business sector. The farmers, 
and the community pillar and 
environmental pillar were the weak partners 
(ISHG1). 
 
 
Our pillar in SP was not involved in such 
things as wage negotiations and conditions 
of employment. That stuff was very much 
reserved to unions and employers. 
Although we could have contributed 
significantly to the debate, we were simply 
excluded (ISHG11). 
 
Their Maltese counterparts share the same preoccupation and often complain about the 
institutional inadequacies to voice their concerns and recommendations. Although they 
acknowledge that social dialogue has been greatly improved thanks to the input of 
formal mediating bodies like the MCESD and the MEUSAC, civil society groups still 
suffer from what they call ‘inequity of opportunities’ as they seem to be ‘children of a 
lesser God’ when compared to social partners. 
 
We have fruitful dialogue with ministers 
but our status is still of a sub-committee 
within MCESD. For eleven years we have 
tried to make government understand that 
European models do not differentiate 
between the classical social partners and the 
rest of civil society groups. Now change 
seems to start moving on (MSHG11). 
 
As the third sector, we still feel that we are 
not being sufficiently involved at grassroots 
level in policy design and formulation. The 
greatest disadvantage for our sector is that 
we do not have a solid representation in 
mediating bodies. Very often, we are 
simply absent, or appointed members are 
not truly representative (MSHG13). 
 
This representational imbalance started being addressed by the Maltese parliament in 
2010 by enacting a new legislation to render the MCESD more inclusive. Civil society 
is now formally represented on the core group of the Council, yet SHEGs’ leaders are 
still lamenting that their Council representatives are not truly representative of all their 
interests. This issue will be dealt with in greater detail later on in this chapter. 
 
Environmental groups in both countries face an additional obstacle that continues to 
weaken their position in the domestic arena, that is, public apathy. In many cases, the 
numbers of subscribed members is minimal and, in turn, this affects their legitimacy, 
resourcefulness and lobbying strategies negatively. The economic recession has made 
matters even worse. A number of professional staff had to be laid off and, from an 
administrative capacity perspective, many ‘are still in need of the most basic 
requirements and, [thus], are not coping even with basic work’ (IEG21).  
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It is difficult to mobilise the Irish public on 
green issues. This is because we don’t have 
the level of professionalism in this sector. 
You can only do it if you have full-time 
officers who are trained in communications, 
advocacy and policy development (IEG16). 
In Malta we try to do the impossible. Our 
manpower is extremely scarce and funds 
are very limited. Yet we have the energy of 
our volunteers. Not swarms of them but a 
handful that are hard-working, committed 
and enthusiastic. They keep us going 
(MEG18). 
 
 
Statistical findings indicate that the challenge of human resource deficit is more 
precarious in the Maltese context. Table 7.1 shows that there is a significant difference 
between the type of personnel engaged by SHEGs in Malta and Ireland (Chi
2
=38.91, 
p<0.0005). While more than half of Maltese interest groups employ volunteers only 
(54.8%), the vast majority of their Irish counterparts employ a mix of volunteers and 
paid staff (82.1%). The practice of complementing volunteers with paid personnel in 
Malta has currently reached a level of 43.5% and indications show that this trend is 
becoming more widespread since EU accession.  
 
Table 7.1: SHEGs’ human resource platform 
X
2 
= 38.91, v = 2, p < 0.0005 
 
 
7.2.2 Fragmented sectors 
 
Besides being considered as weak partners, social and environmental groups in Malta 
and Ireland can also be regarded as fragmented, a feature that was practically confirmed 
by all interviewees. When conducting observations and interviews in Malta, much 
subtle, sometimes fierce, cross firing among group leaders could easily be detected. 
 
Type of personnel engaged by interest groups 
 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups Total 
Malta  Ireland  
 Volunteers only Count 63 10 73 
 Percentage 54.8% 11.9% 36.7% 
paid personnel only Count 2 5 7 
Percentage 1.7% 6.0% 3.5% 
mix of volunteers &         
paid personnel 
Count 50 69 119 
Percentage 43.5% 82.1% 59.8% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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There exists a high level of mistrust not only between government entities and civil 
society groups but, most importantly, among groups themselves. 
 
We are our own worst enemies (MSHG13).  
 
The climate characterising discussions 
around the table is highly polarised. 
Everyone is interested solely in gaining his 
part (MSHG12). 
Our groups are territorial. The island state 
mentality is a limitation factor. One of the 
greatest issues in Malta is that umbrella 
organisations are still at an inception stage 
(MMB15).  
 
However signs of change are evident. In these last years, particularly since the run-up 
years for EU accession, there have been a number of success stories where different 
Maltese groups that work for similar causes have come together to form federations in 
order to solidify their voices. This is the case of those involved in pyrotechnics, band 
clubs, health, humanitarian aid and fair trade. However institutional building is not the 
only requirement to promote synergy through umbrella organisations. At the base of it 
all, it requires a change in attitude. In the Maltese environmental sector there is a high 
level of parochial rivalry among groups, particularly among those that are engaged in 
similar causes. Dissenting voices, uncooperative behaviour and reluctance to form 
umbrella formations are the result of this kind of competitive environment. 
 
 
I remember nine attempts in my lifetime to 
set up an [environmental] federation. They 
all failed. We also had problems when we 
tried to appoint our representative on 
MCESD’s Civil Society Core Group. As a 
consequence, the environment is the only 
sector which is still not represented on the 
core group (MEG19). 
 
 
 
There was a time when there was genuine 
dialogue among the different environment 
groups. We have even reached an 
agreement not to criticize each other in 
public. But in these last years we have 
moved away from this collaborative spirit. 
Leaders changed over time and the 
agreement fell flat. It all depends on the 
willingness of the people involved 
(MEG17).
Although not immune to the threat of fragmentation, the Irish case presents a more 
coherent narrative favouring collaboration, compromise and consensus-seeking. Many 
leaders maintain that their ‘approach is to try and collaborate with others’ (ISHG10) 
while others ‘consider [themselves] as insiders’ as they ‘strive to build a political 
consensus’ over their cause (ISHG13).  Others were sceptical about the over-reliance on 
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consensus building through SP. ‘Such a mechanism was ill-suited when things started 
going wrong’ (ISHG11).  
 
All in all, the Irish case presents a solid institutionalised response to make the transition 
from fragmentation to cooperation. In mid-2009, the Environmental Pillar (EnvP) was 
created within the SP framework which by that time was already being phased out. It 
brought about a new sense of consensus-seeking strategy among 26 environmental 
groups which traditionally were characterised by deep divisions. However not all green 
interests accepted to be represented on the Pillar as the process of decision-making 
tends to be cumbersome and slow. 
 
[The environment] was a fragmented sector 
and is becoming less so… There was bad 
blood among groups… The role of the 
Pillar is to bring them together in such a 
way that they work collectively and 
effectively (IEG15). 
 
The Pillar is relatively slow in moving 
because they try to reach common position. 
We know how the Pillar works but we 
don’t want to get involved in all this. From 
my perspective, the sector is still 
fragmented (IEG17). 
 
These personal experiences are triangulated by statistical findings. For example, 
findings in Table 7.2 show that Irish groups have slightly more zeal than their Maltese 
counterparts to join forces with other entities over joint campaigns (57.3% and 48.7% 
respectively). However Chi
2
 analysis reveals no significant difference between the two 
countries as statistical figures are comparable (Chi
2
=1.426, p=0.232).  
 
 
Table 7.2: Teaming up of SHEGs with other domestic organisations in these last eight years 
Teaming up with other domestic organisations to 
solidify voice 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 56 47 103 
Percentage 48.7% 57.3% 52.3% 
No Count 59 35 94 
Percentage 51.3% 42.7% 47.7% 
Total Count 115 82 197 
  Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.426, v = 1, p = 0.232 
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Negotiation styles tell a lot about the character of interest groups, that is, whether they 
are collaborative, competitive, isolationists, rigid or flexible. Although the predominant 
mode of negotiation style in Table 7.3 differs in accordance with situational needs 
(56.0% in Malta and 60.8% in Ireland), the next widely used strategy by the Irish is 
consensus (33.8%). Consensus is still the second widely used strategy by Maltese 
groups (21.1%) although it falls behind the Irish score by more than 12%. It is then 
closely followed by compromise at 18.3%. Chi
2
 analysis fails to reveal a significant 
difference between Malta and Ireland (Chi
2
=16.258, p=0.021) and the result is to be 
treated with caution due to low frequencies. 
 
Table 7.3: SHEGs’ preferred style of negotiation strategy 
Preferred style of negotiations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Competitive Count 4 1 5 
Percentage 3.7% 1.4% 2.7% 
Consensus Count 23 25 48 
Percentage 21.1% 33.8% 26.2% 
Compromise Count 20 3 23 
Percentage 18.3% 4.1% 12.6% 
Laissez-Faire Count 1 0 1 
Percentage .9% .0% .5% 
Depends on the 
situation 
Count 61 45 106 
Percentage 56.0% 60.8% 57.9% 
Total Count 109 74 183 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 11.594, v = 4, p = 0.021, u 
 
Respondents were then asked to rate to what extent the EU enables domestic interest 
groups to act more cohesively in their home country (see Table 7.4). Rating their 
answers on a four point likert scale, SHEGs in Malta and Ireland have anchored their 
mean rating score in a middling position (2.62 and 2.47 respectively). This means that 
the degree of EU influence for greater cohesiveness among SHEGs ranges in between 
minor to moderate limits. Result show a high levels of statistical comparability 
(p=0.331). 
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Table 7.4: The EU induces SHEGs to act more cohesively at national level 
Social, Human 
rights and 
Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 Malta 2.62 0.933 2.45 2.79 4187.00 0.331 
 Ireland 2.47 0.985 2.25 2.69   
 
 
7.2.3 Change catalysts 
 
Notwithstanding such adverse characteristics, namely poor resource-base, internal 
rivalry, fragmentation and weak leverage position, there is optimism among Maltese 
and Irish SHEGs in that they are realising their potential to change the institutional 
status quo and public mentality. The following experiences express confidence that 
SHEGs are real change catalysts, although different methods are applied to activate 
transitions. 
 
I believe we are [change agents]. The 
visibility and impact of our movement are 
far greater than our size. We have managed 
to enhance public awareness across all 
sectors of society and our pressure proved 
decisive to bring legislative changes that 
were long due in Malta (MSHG10). 
 
We have brought change in Malta since we 
work at school levels. Through children we 
are also reaching out to their parents and 
entire communities. A radical change must 
first start with school children. We 
empower them. Indirectly, this would lead 
to a change in environmental policy-making 
(MEG19).
We have a tripartite strategy: (a) to change 
the rules, (b) the culture and (c) the 
experience of the people. We adopt a top 
down approach. We start by changing the 
rules and policies and out of that we will 
achieve a change in culture. People’s lives 
would eventually change. This strategy is 
working at its highest potential (ISHG13). 
Some Irish NGOs are realising their 
potential of being change agents. This is all 
about being continually aware of what your 
mission is. All too often, NGOs lose sight. 
The real change agents are those who 
achieve their mission. This is essentially the 
cultural ethos of civil society organisations 
(ISHG10).  
 
Many others, particularly Irish, do not share their colleagues’ enthusiasm. Some lament 
that ‘due to austerity, some of our wins are being lost’ (ISHG11) while others think that 
‘civil society in Ireland, perhaps in Europe and in the rest of the world, has failed to 
 218 
drive an alternative narrative of what society can be like (ISHG14)’. They condemn 
themselves for allowing the ‘craziness of the boom, individualism, the lack of 
community spirit and selfishness to be the winners’ (ISHG9). The greatest portion of 
Irish environmental groups denounces their track record to bring about change for the 
greater common good.  
 
There is probably a mismatch in what we 
are doing and in what we should be doing. 
At the moment, [Irish] NGOs score low on 
innovation and the pragmatic side of 
implementing theory (IEG21). 
Environmental NGOs are capable of being 
change catalysts and we have done so in the 
past but, today, we are not doing it as well 
as we should. Certainly we could do it 
better (IEG15). 
 
One Irish environmental group lost its trust completely in national authorities and 
domestic institutional processes and started to ‘upload green concerns to the EC’ 
(IEG17). Its leaders maintain that it is only ‘through the application of infringement 
procedures’ that they can ‘instigate change in the way Irish authorities and people think 
and act’. 
 
Our presentation of facts and figures concerning internal capabilities and limitations of 
SHEGs in Malta and Ireland ends here. Our next task is to bring forward the second 
cohort of results pertaining to the cultural and political dimension. These two are 
considered as another crucial element that can serve either as a motivator or as an 
impediment to European influences on domestic interest groups. 
 
7.3 Cultural and political scenario 
 
Interest groups do not function in a vacuum but they function within a context that is 
largely characterised by indigenous cultural and domestic political elements. 
Understanding how interest groups react to the environment that surrounds them is a 
key determinant to decode elements of adjustments in their modus operandi. Ultimately, 
it is the cultural and political landscape that renders the adaptation process to European 
influences more straightforward or more tiresome. In this section, Maltese and Irish 
leaders of interest groups express their views on whether their domestic political set-up 
is conducive to greater participation by civil society in policy processes and whether 
their deep-rooted cultures are protecting against, or open to, wider European 
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experiences. Findings about the central roles of the Catholic Church and the media are 
also included at a later stage in this part. The discussion starts by depicting the Maltese 
cultural narrative, followed by the Irish one, and then moves on to decode political 
implications in the two island states. 
 
7.3.1 The Maltese culture 
 
Pondering on the fate of Maltese culture, a local political observer maintains that the 
‘Maltese and their political and social structures have traditionally been pollinated by 
the European ethos at the expense of never seriously exploiting the opportunities 
presented by North Africa’. Furthermore, he maintains that the rate of European 
influence has been accelerated in these last thirty years. ‘I believe that change is the 
result of ideas that are brought about by opening new apertures of thought. These ideas 
are transforming Malta from its very roots’ (MPO21). 
 
Maltese interest groups, while expressing doubts on the potential of Maltese mentality 
to absorb change, are more concerned by the idea of territoriality. Smallness has been 
perpetually aligned to vulnerability and, as a consequence, once groups have defined 
their domain, they do their utmost to defend it. Such a ‘siege mentality’ transforms the 
whole system of interest representation into a battleground arena where fierce conflicts 
are fought among friends and foes alike. 
 
Domestic culture is miles apart from the 
European model. This is because of our 
insularity and the intransigent drive of our 
NGOs to create their own empires. We live 
in state of eternal conflict – conflicts among 
us and conflicts with foreigners as well. 
Many would tell us that the siege is coming 
from anywhere and from anyone. They can 
convince you without great effort 
(MSHG12). 
 
 
 
Our culture is essentially Mediterranean 
and such rival competition among people 
and groups can be found in Cyprus, Sicily 
and Southern Spain. More than a barrier, 
this is a cultural phenomenon that needs to 
be addressed (MMB15). 
 
The Maltese attitude is against any foreign 
influence. We love to insist that Malta 
presents a ‘special case’ and, thus, we have 
to be treated as an ‘exception’ (MEG18). 
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While emphasising that the Maltese frame of mind has traditionally been inward 
looking, Maltese SHEGs are likewise aware that things have started to change more 
rapidly in these last years. 
 
In our sector, Maltese culture can be a 
barrier to adopt European norms. Religious 
beliefs render social transformations much 
more difficult, although Church discourse 
has already started to change. It is getting 
milder (MSHG10). 
One of the greatest stumbling blocks to 
adopt European norms is our mentality. 
Living on an island makes us insular but we 
are now realising that we need to be more 
open and explore interdependencies with 
other countries (MSHG11). 
 
 
The Church in Malta, in one of the quotes above, is being referred to as a strong 
conservative force. This aspect will be further investigated in the next part. As a 
conclusion, reference is to be made to one of the most innate features of Maltese culture, 
that is, its extremely competitive bi-partite politics. It seems that every single entity or 
issue on the island, social and green NGOs not excluded, is understood in terms of 
partisan politics. 
 
Partisan politics is an essential component 
of our culture and, as a result, it is also 
present in our field. Our sector has been 
overwhelmingly entwined by political 
partisanship (MEG17). 
 
 
We have suffered from a culture loaded 
with political camouflages. Since we have 
obtained funding and embarked on a series 
of new projects, we were labelled by other 
green NGOs as being pro-government. This 
is not true. We are apolitical and work with 
any party (MEG19). 
 
  
7.3.2 The Irish culture 
 
Many exponents of civil society in Ireland make reference to their colonial past when 
answering questions related to culture. This inherited feature implanted a collective 
spirit characterised by low self-esteem, scepticism and conservatism.  
 
The dominant feature in our national 
identity is our inferiority complex. When 
we plunged again into the current recession, 
pessimism rolled in once again. Due to our 
colonial past we do not trust formal 
structures. We are too reliant on 
personalities to do things well (ISHG11). 
 
One cannot ignore the post-colonial factor. 
There is a tendency to react against 
authority wherever it comes from. So it is 
very easy here to paint Europe as the new 
oppressor in terms of imposing rules on 
us… Whether we like it or not, our culture 
belongs to the Anglophone world (IEG15). 
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Culture does not intentionally preclude new ideas from beyond the shorelines but ‘we 
can still be our own worst enemies’ (IEG19). As islanders, the Irish tend ‘to put blinkers 
on’ and stay away from public talk on hot issues. The period during which data were 
collected in Dublin was hugely characterised by the Irish dramatic economic crash and, 
consequently, this phenomenon featured prominently during interview sessions. This 
does not create problems for the overall scope of the study as the temporal dimension of 
the research design covers the period between 2004 and 2011. In the words of Irish 
activists, the deep economic slump ‘left no room for environmental issues to attain 
priority on national policy agenda’ (IEG20) and ‘now the people are to pay a hefty price 
for non-compliance with EU regulations’ (IEG18). Environmental groups often 
complain that the value of protecting the natural habitat is dormant, if not non-existent, 
in Irish culture. Such a laissez-faire attitude by authorities and people alike is demoting 
their efforts. 
 
At the same time of being proud, we are 
also in denial… a little too relaxed about 
not wanting to get involved in some areas 
of politics (IEG21). 
 
There is a lot of suspicion about people 
from different countries and cultures. 
Insularity makes us happy with our own 
mediocrity (IEG16). 
 
The Irish are aware that smallness breeds ‘clientelism’ (ISHG9), ‘political 
blackmailing’ (IEG17) and ‘actor-centred institutions’ (IEG11), even though it boosts a 
‘consensus-ethos’ (ISHG13). One interviewee goes as far to say that ‘we care more 
about our clan than we care about the Republic’ (ISHG9). Notwithstanding such a doom 
and gloom configuration, the Irish culture has its brighter side as well. 
 
Our culture is composed of a collective 
spirit. We have a great sense of 
volunteerism.  It is alive but needs to be 
nurtured by better policies to allow it to 
thrive (ISHG9). 
 
You know, sometimes you make one step 
forward, two steps back. So culture is not 
fixed. It contracts and expands… but we 
have continued to progress over the years 
(ISHG10). 
 
From the accounts provided, one concludes that a number of cultural issues cut across 
the two island states, primarily due to their similar geographical, historical and social 
fabric. Quantitative data confirm this high degree of comparability. When specifically 
asked whether national culture acts as a barrier towards the acquisition of new norms 
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and values originating from a wider European experience, the result is almost identical 
in the two countries (p=0.812). Table 7.5 shows that the mean rating scores lie a bit 
lower than the middling position of a four-point likert scale (2.25 in Malta and 2.27 in 
Ireland), meaning that SHEGs’ representatives feel that their indigenous culture is 
neither too open nor too insular to European influence. 
 
Table 7.5: National culture and the wider European experience among SHEGs 
Social, Human 
rights and 
Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.25 0.944 2.07 2.43 4228.000 0.812 
 Ireland 2.27 1.008 2.04 2.50   
 
 
 
7.3.3 The role of the Church 
 
It is practically impossible to investigate the impetus of Maltese and Irish interest 
groups in public life without referring to the contribution of the Church. MPO21 insists 
that ‘the Church is an essential component of Maltese civil society because it penetrates 
all strata within society’. Although times are tough for the Church in Malta, the Church 
‘still retains its relevance in setting moral standards and ethical measurements’ both for 
the political class and society in general.  
 
Nevertheless, Maltese interest groups that are active in social and human rights matters 
are seriously preoccupied by the fact that the Church is persistently positioning itself 
above the law. When one considers that a large plethora of Church organisations have 
been ordered by the Maltese and Gozitan dioceses not to get registered with the 
Commissioner for Voluntary Organisations, issues of good governance, transparency, 
accountability and submission to legitimate law become even more pertinent. According 
to MSHG13 this is a ‘great problem’ because there is no equal playing-field for 
everyone as some players are placing themselves outside the remit of law. 
 
 
 
 223 
What worries me is the detached attitude of 
the Church not to be part of the rest of civil 
society. This attitude is counterproductive 
to its own organisations because they 
cannot benefit from governmental and 
European funds. It seems that that the 
Church in Malta is still interested in 
preserving its medieval rights by not 
subjecting itself to the laws of the state 
(MSHG12). 
 
As an NGO founded by a religious order, 
we don’t have any restrictions to register 
ourselves with the competent civil 
authorities. Our NGO is recognised by the 
state and enrolled with the NGOs’ 
Regulatory Office. However the situation of 
the Diocese and its organisations is a 
completely different story. There are 
problems there, but discussions are still 
going on to find a solution (MSHG14). 
 
One Irish interviewee sustains that ‘civil society in Ireland is deeply rooted in 
Christianity’ (ISHG14). For ages Ireland did not develop, and it still has not developed 
a sophisticated system of welfare safety-nets funded by the state and, consequently, the 
contribution of the Church has been ‘truly brilliant and extremely positive’ to the most 
vulnerable in society (ISHG9). Today, public perception has changed radically and 
many feel that the Church is now ‘out of touch’ and more on the ‘defensive side’ 
because of the children’s abuse scandal that reached atrocious levels (ISHG10). Leaders 
of social and human rights groups think that the Church did not exert enough pressure to 
remedy its own wrongdoings and, at present, its potential to influence society has 
diminished extensively, particularly in the debate concerning civil rights. 
 
The Irish Church, other than Bishop Martin, 
has not fully understood the consequences 
of what they have done. If they did, they 
would have changed practices. Apologies 
are not enough. [Nevertheless] faith is still 
important to us. At the moment, you can 
either be pro-Church, defending everything 
that it does, or you are anti-Church, 
condemning it from top to bottom! 
(ISHG10). 
 
The Church is obviously a core factor that 
for many years gave voice to anti-gay 
feelings. The Church has now less and less 
control of authority in that area. What has 
superseded that is the increasing level of 
lesbian and gay people who decided to 
move out in public and they were 
[eventually] supported by families, friends 
and neighbours. That has superseded any 
moral authority (ISHG13). 
 
 
Historically, the input of the Church in the environmental domain has been almost non 
existent and, today, it is still in its inception stage. As a result, green advocates in Malta 
and Ireland did not make any reference to the Church in their responses. 
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7.3.4 The political scenario 
 
The composition of the domestic political scenario is another determining factor in this 
field of analysis. The receptivity potential of domestic politics to pressures brewing 
from within and overseas renders the whole polity together with its actors as being 
either elastic or inelastic to change. In this regard, four major factors are identified that 
can determine the in/elastic capability of the actors involved, namely the accessibility of 
politicians, parochialism and clientelism, politicisation and media coverage, and the 
compatibility of the state to work with civil society. 
 
7.3.4.1  Easy access to politicians 
 
The system of the STV using multi-seat constituencies, a British legacy that has 
remained in full force in Malta and Ireland, makes national politicians very accessible to 
people and group formations and, thus, politics tend to be heavily localised. Irish social 
and green groups show no hesitation when describing this reality. 
 
 
If you want to speak to a minister, it should 
not be a problem. If an interest group is 
really focused on trying to influence 
something, and does not form part of any 
formal channel of mediation, it could still 
make strong lobbying and impact with 
politicians (ISGH9). 
 
Politicians are very sensitive and aware of 
local concerns, and because we are a small 
country, we have very high level of access 
to our TDs. They are very responsive, and 
so if you ring them up, they will ring you 
back (IEG20).  
 
The Maltese confirm that their chances of infiltrating the corridors of power are high as 
well because personal connections are abundant. However they are not satisfied with the 
current situation that has been in existence for ages. Maltese protagonists believe that 
effective progress in any policy domain can only be secured through an institutionalised 
model where relationships are not subject to privy acquaintances but to formal channels 
governed by fairness and transparency. 
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There were times when I went directly to 
the minister with my feedback. The Maltese 
have much more access to politicians and 
central bureaucracy than other Europeans 
who live in large states. But this is only 
effective when you have personal cases. In 
matters involving change in national policy, 
it is appropriate to establish formal 
institutions (MSHG10). 
 
We access politicians through informal 
channels quite a lot. Institutional channels 
are infested with excessive bureaucracy.  
There were cases when we lost European 
funding due to bureaucratic procedures. To 
speed up matters, we have to request 
informal interventions. Sometimes the latter 
are the only option we have to get along 
with… It’s a pity! (MEG19). 
Maltese environment organisations also rely on informal networks of contact to promote 
or defend their interests. The following excerpts highlight issues of an ethical nature and 
the use of political blackmailing as a tool of last resort. 
 
I am not that type of person that invests in 
personal contacts. It is good to build a 
working relationship with your stakeholders 
but there are ethical standards that have to 
be respected at all times (MEG18).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are times when we start talking to 
bureaucrats who may give the impression 
that they understand your position but, 
ultimately, the issue has to be referred to 
the political level. And here we reach a 
dead end, unless a general election is close 
by! It is then that we are constrained to 
blackmail politicians with a powerful 
weapon – our votes! Sometimes it is the 
only way how we can get them to heed our 
concerns (MEG17). 
Empirical data clearly show that formal mediating institutions in small states are 
characterised by a number of imperfections that originate from the political landscape of 
which they form part. As a result, reliance on informal channels is much greater. The 
latter are considered as a necessary evil that can secure quick wins while at the same 
time raise questions of an ethical nature. 
 
7.3.4.2  Parochialism and clientelism 
 
  
Very often, parochial politics are downgraded to amateurish statecraft which can only 
lead to clientelistic impulses. Maltese and Irish alike hate this inherited characteristic in 
their political portfolio, yet there are some who prefer the unbundling of the two 
concepts. Parochialism is an idiosyncrasy that is intimately embedded in history and 
collective identity, while clientelism involves power manipulation for the gratification 
of private interest at the expense of the common good. The former does not necessarily 
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propagate the latter, but policy actors in Malta and Ireland need to renew their structures 
and strategies in a political environment characterised by the two. 
 
The parish structure has distinguished itself 
as a permanent feature in Maltese society, 
particularly Gozo. Parochial divisions have 
eventually been mirrored in our political 
set-up. This is not necessarily evil because 
it has constructed our identity as a nation. 
The real problem lies in the formation of 
elitist cliques that seize power and the 
personalisation of issues due to partisan 
interests (MSHG12). 
 
 
[In Ireland] [w]e have a paternalistic style 
of government characterised by parish 
politics, particularly in rural areas. It has 
been very much personalised as well. All 
these fuel a clientelistic culture (IEG15). 
 
It is terrible in Ireland. If a minister comes 
from a particular county, you are 
guaranteed to see that over five years a high 
portion of public money goes more to that 
county than to any other county (ISHG9). 
The Irish are most vociferous about the intricacies of political influences. They seem to 
hint at a void in Irish governance wherein their elected representatives are either 
manoeuvred by supranational or subnational pressures and not by national priorities. In 
turn, this is impacting negatively on people’s trust in their political class. 
 
Our politicians are influenced by the EU 
level and then by the local level, rather than 
by national policies. All politics is local and 
politicians are more responsive to local 
constituencies. All too often, people play 
the man, not the ball (ISHG10). 
We have no confidence in our politicians 
because they are prisoners of vested 
interests. Infact politicians are hostages of 
the [powerful] farmers’ lobby and all main 
parties, including Labour, support them 
(IEG19). 
 
 
Implicitly, Irish interviewees are saying that unless an issue gets the attention of 
politicians, it will never really make it to the agenda of national priorities. Additionally, 
clientelistic drives and underlying vested interests can corrode the whole system and 
deprive an issue of its due importance. 
 
7.3.4.3  Politicisation and media coverage 
 
Interviewees make ample references to politicisation which in simple terms is a process 
whereby a policy issue infiltrates the political agenda to become electorally salient and 
the subject of party competition. In the Maltese case, such matters stem from extreme 
competitive political polarisation. A policy dossier prepared by an interest group can 
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invariably end up as a hot and sensitive political issue. This is due to a deeply polarised 
political arena which, according to some, is no longer as staunch as it used to be. 
 
In our sector there is always the shadow of 
partisan politics. Everything under the sun 
is politicised in Malta. We always pay 
special attention not to let civil society 
become politicised. But the risk is always 
there (MSHG11). 
 
Political polarisation in our civil society is 
not alarming. However it is always going to 
be a bit higher than in other countries 
because our smallness renders the political 
scenario much more personalised (MPO16).
 
As already highlighted in previous chapters, the media in Malta are seldom a guardian 
of democracy, and despite protestations to the contrary, their operators wear their 
political allegiances on their sleeve (Pirotta 2012). News and current affairs 
programmes are hardly balanced or impartial, and Maltese SHEGs have to venture over 
a tight rope between two great adversaries whose appetite to spin stories is insatiable. 
The success rate of coming out unharmed (that is, apolitical) is very limited. The 
experience below says it all, 
 
Yesterday I addressed a press conference on behalf of my organisation wherein I 
indicated a number of policy deficiencies in the sector in which we are active. On that 
same evening, I ended up as first item on the news of the Partit Laburista’s TV station 
while no mention at all was made on the news bulletin belonging to the party in 
government. Then we got a short slot in mid-news on state television (MSHG14).  
 
Contrastingly, if a policy issue does not attract the interest of politicians it is destined to 
be shelved and, eventually, forgotten. Irish environmental groups have all suffered from 
this syndrome because ‘public apathy on green issues is due to the lack of politicisation 
of environmental matters’ (IEG18). On the other hand, civil rights activists in Ireland 
attribute their policy gains to political patronage.  
 
The problem we have in Ireland is that 
environmental issues are not politicised. 
Apart from the Greens, the environmental 
agenda doesn’t feature in the manifestos. 
There might be very little, maybe some 
references to European laws… (IEG21). 
Our success is partly due to a growing 
understanding by political class of the need 
to provide fairness to all citizens. Labour 
has always delivered a valuable input to our 
cause, even though it was always the junior 
coalition party (ISHG13). 
 
 
 228 
At the same time, Irish activists recognise the potential of the media in transforming 
their organisations into household names, rendering them visible to the public and 
assisting them in their campaigns. ISHG13 claims that ‘the media helped us very much 
because it was an early convert to our cause’. At the other end of the spectrum, IEG18 is 
concerned about the absence of environmental groups on social media where ‘our 
impact is zero.’ Another green activist expresses doubts on media efficacy to contribute 
towards lasting results. 
 
We have two bargains: (a) we can go to the media and make a fuss but this only works 
for a temporary period, or (b) we can exert pressure on our politicians by reminding 
them that they are not abiding by EU frameworks and fines will have to be paid if they 
do not make the changes. The second option has a better chance of setting the ball in 
motion (IEG16). 
 
Media remain a centre point for interest groups. It can either make or break their 
campaigns within a political context that can be receptive, hostile or indifferent to 
groups’ causes. 
 
7.3.4.4  Collaborative or competitive state  
 
Another essential political component that has been identified is the compatibility of the 
state to work collaboratively or in direct competition with interest groups. Maltese 
SHEGs expect ‘decent funding’ (MEG19), ‘adequate resources’ (MSHG14) and a 
‘partnering attitude’ based on ‘subsidiarity’ (MSHG13) from their government. Many 
feel that the executive branch of the state is not only failing on many of these counts, 
but it is reinventing the wheel whenever it creates state-sponsored bodies in the form of 
commissions, foundations, councils and so on that are made responsible for specific 
policy domains wherein NGOs are already in operation. Besides duplicating resources, 
these ‘anomalous entities’, like QUANGOs, are creating an accountability dilemma 
when they sit on central mediating bodies. ‘Are they to be considered part of civil 
society or do they represent the government?’, asked MSHG11. Other cases affirming 
the Maltese government’s competing approach are presented next. 
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There were cases where the Government 
competed with the NGOs and, in others, 
there was collaboration. There have been 
instances where a successful green scheme 
run by an NGO was hijacked by the 
government by setting up its own structures 
to run an identical scheme. Private 
enterprises opt to aid state schemes because 
the chances of getting something in return 
are higher than partnering an NGO. And 
finally we had to pull out (MEG19). 
If civil society starts working on a new idea, 
the government very often replicates it. As 
a consequence, our initiative dies or gets 
weaker. Instead of forming a partnership, 
the government goes for a competitive 
strategy. The government wants to show its 
people that it is doing something. Civil 
society is still being seen as a threat and not 
as a partner for change and development. 
However state rhetoric tells a different story 
(MSHG13). 
 
Although these negative experiences cannot be considered as one-offs, there are stories 
of mutual collaboration that lead to win-win results. The EU is most often cited as the 
stimulus that instigates synergy between governmental and non-governmental actors. 
Furthermore, many observers stress the importance of PPPs that should be the next 
quantum leap to good governance.  
 
When government has a strong will to act 
collaboratively, then we can succeed, even 
though our past relationships have always 
been antagonistic. Ironically it was the EU 
that rendered us united. Malta was sued in 
the ECJ regarding infringement of some EU 
directives. It turned out to be a very 
interesting case for us because state 
authorities involved us from end to finish. 
The government always sought our 
approval prior to the formulation of defence 
strategies. We collaborated very well. But 
this was the only time that government 
worked in tandem with us. It never 
happened either before or after this case 
(MEG17). 
Government policy on PPPs is still not 
quite well developed but we all agree to 
move in this direction. It is also a practice 
highly encouraged by the EU. In the future 
we are going to see PPPs in many other 
fields. In the social sphere, such as 
accommodation for the elderly, immigrants’ 
integration and drug rehabilitation, the 
Church and civil society were pioneers for 
many years. Now it is time to extend PPPs 
in new fields, including culture, education 
and the economy. When partnering the 
private sector and civil society, we can 
achieve much more than what the state 
could do on its own (MPO16). 
 
From a quantitative perspective, Table 7.6 shows a high degree of reluctance on the part 
of interest groups to take part in joint projects involving PPPs. Approximately, 70% of 
SHEGs in both countries have never involved themselves in joint initiatives with the 
public sector. Due to high levels of comparability, there is no significant difference 
between the two cohorts of participants (Chi
2
=1.768, p=0.622). This result amplify the 
need to adopt a more collaborative attitude among stakeholders and to find common 
ground where civil society can truly become a supporting partner of the state and vice-
versa. 
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Table 7.6: SHEG’s involvement in public-private partnership in these last eight years 
 Involvement in Private-Public Partnerships   
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes, on 1 occasion Count 9 5 14 
Percentage 7.8% 6.0% 7.1% 
Yes, on more than 1 but less than 
5 occasions 
Count 19 10 29 
Percentage 16.5% 12.0% 14.6% 
Yes, on 5 occasions or more Count 8 9 17 
Percentage 7.0% 10.8% 8.6% 
No Count 79 59 138 
Percentage 68.7% 71.1% 69.7% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.768, v = 3, p = 0.622 
 
In addition, Maltese SHEGs react more positively than the Irish when pondering upon 
the EU’s potential to exert pressure on national government to seek more participation 
from domestic interest groups in policy-making. Table 7.7 reveals significant difference 
between the two (p=0.017). Rating their opinion on a four-point likert scale, the mean 
rating scores are 2.77 for Malta and 2.42 for Ireland, meaning that the Maltese rate EU 
pressure as being considerable, compared to the minor rating given by the Irish.  
 
Table 7.7: Pressure by the EU on national government to seek more participation       
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.77 0.810 2.62 2.92 3597.500 0.017 
 Ireland 2.42 1.026 2.19 2.65   
 
The dimension of cultural and political affairs has provided a number of interesting 
revelations about how Maltese and Irish SHEGs are creatures of their own environment 
and, thus, their manoeuvrings and influences are subject to domestic affairs. Moreover, 
findings affirm a high degree of similarity between the two island states and an 
underlying understanding that many of the changes taking place in their cultural and 
political terrains are the result of European influence. This change stimulus, sometimes 
results out of conviction and at other times out of convenience.  In the next section, the 
third dimension of findings will be put under scrutiny, that is, the responsiveness of 
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domestic interest groups to participate in institutions of mediation responsible for 
consultation and interest intermediation. 
 
7.4 Institutions of mediation 
 
This section looks more closely at Maltese and Irish central entities that are specifically 
designed to institutionalise civil dialogue and seeks ways and means to widen and 
deepen working relationships between governmental and non-governmental actors. The 
Maltese experience will be treated first, followed by the Irish one. Each narrative will 
first outline the national institutions of interest intermediation and then conduct a 
stakeholders’ analysis to determine the institutions’ contributions and limitations to the 
system of interest representation.  
 
7.4.1 The Maltese experience 
 
Civil dialogue has become a household term in Malta as the government consistently 
seeks to portray a governing structure open to civil society which is given space and 
opportunity to contribute towards policy formulation and implementation. Many unused 
state properties that have been left to deteriorate over the years have been transferred to 
interest groups to renew their usage in the interest of the community at large. The 
government calls such policies a tangible means of decentralising power through the 
principle of subsidiarity. To further enhance inclusivity in the art of governance, central 
mediating bodies, including the MCESD and the MEUSAC have been set-up to 
institutionalise consultation processes regarding domestic and European affairs.  
 
7.4.1.1  The Malta-EU Steering and Action Committee 
 
MCESD, as the major institution responsible for social dialogue, was discussed at 
length in the previous chapter. In this part, our attention shall focus on MEUSAC where 
extensive hours of observations were carried out during meetings organised by four of 
its sectoral committees. As indicated in Chapter 4, the three main components of 
MEUSAC are consultation, information and support on EU programmes and funds. 
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Hence, the first findings that are to be rolled out are the ones resulting from overt 
observations that have been carried out at MEUSAC sectoral committees that allow 
civil society organisations to participate in the formulation of Malta’s position on 
legislative developments in the EU (see Table 7.8).  
 
Table 7.8: Observations during MEUSAC sectoral meetings       
Categories of 
observation 
List of observations at MEUSAC consultative meetings 
 
Level and type 
of participation 
i. Although every registered NGO is invited to be represented 
on one of the sectoral committees, only a few accept to 
participate. The environmental NGOs are the least 
represented because their large majority does not see the 
need to attend such meetings. 
 
ii. Due to the limited number of attendees, faces become 
familiar. The ones who attend regularly are either (a) 
pensioners, (b) officers who are allowed to attend by their 
employers or (c) people who work on their own, like 
consultants.  There develops a situation of close encounters 
where input by stakeholders becomes rather predictable 
because their ideological and political alliances are well 
known and highly consistent. 
 
iii. The practice of attending and voicing concerns from a 
federation perspective rather than from the stricter view of 
individual organisations is still not the norm. However there 
are indications that this trend is gradually increasing over 
time. 
 
iv. Over a period of two years there has been an incremental 
rise in the level of frustration among civil society attendees 
because the whole consultative exercise, notwithstanding all 
the good intentions of MEUSAC, is superfluous. 
 
Logistics and 
setup of 
meetings 
v. Meetings are normally conducted from Monday to Friday 
mornings or early afternoons. Many NGO leaders complain 
that such timings are not appropriate because they have to 
take time off from work in order to attend. The large 
majority of NGO leaders in Malta are volunteers. 
 
vi. The agenda of the meetings is always formulated by the 
secretariat which is composed solely of government 
officials. 
 
vii. Meetings usually span over two hours. Government officers 
take three quarters of the time allocated to introduce the 
theme and explain the draft position of Malta. The rest of 
the time is allocated for discussion. Proceedings are held in 
Maltese. 
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viii. The secretariat takes minutes of what is said while the 
whole session is audio-recorded. These are then forwarded 
to bureaucrats to take them into consideration when 
finalising Malta’s official position. 
 
ix. Seating arrangements do not help to motivate a more lively 
debate. Government officials are formally dressed, sit 
behind top tables and the rest are seated in a classroom 
style. As soon as one enters the room, he will instantly 
know who are the people vested with power. 
 
Availability and 
relevance of 
feedback 
x. Only few NGO leaders voice their concerns and 
recommendations during the meetings. In many cases these 
are the better well-educated people who have done their 
homework well by reading the extensive material sent by e-
mail prior to the meeting. Many of these are representatives 
of professional bodies. 
 
xi. Many others simply voice concerns and complaints that are 
only relevant to their organisations, thus making little or no 
contribution to the sector at large. These kinds of comments 
seem to irritate the officers of the secretariat. 
 
xii. It is very easy to detect partisan political connotations in the 
contributions made by NGOs’ representatives. 
 
xiii. Many participants complain that they rarely receive any 
feedback for their suggestions as if top civil servants are not 
accountable for taking into consideration civil society’s 
contributions. 
 
xiv. One of the greatest discontents among civil society groups 
is that they are never, or seldom, presented with the Maltese 
final version once all the inter-ministerial meetings and 
external consultations with civil society have been made. 
 
Overall 
judgmental 
perceptions 
xv. The large majority of NGO leaders think that these events 
are essentially information sessions rather than consultative 
ones. Beyond the official fora, they express their feeling 
that the final version of the national position is done 
irrespective of their input and suggestions. 
 
xvi. NGO leaders are not satisfied with the three representatives 
of civil society who sit on MEUSAC core group. They are 
all coming from professional bodies and know almost 
nothing on the realities of voluntary organisations. 
Professional bodies are not considered as true emissaries of 
civil society. 
 
xvii. NGOs express very positive feedback for MEUSAC’s 
commitment to help them identify suitable EU programmes, 
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provide them with technical and legal expertise to access 
funds and assist them in the selection of European partners 
with whom they can work on joint projects. 
 
Mario Vassallo 2014 
7.4.1.2  Real dialogue and smokescreens 
 
The above list of observations is corroborated by experiences conveyed during 
interviews. While acknowledging the good intentions of a number of politicians and 
bureaucrats who are involved in the process, many express their disappointment that 
their contribution is not being given its due weight in formulating policy decisions and 
priorities. Very often, Maltese environmental groups feel truly frustrated. 
 
Civil dialogue does exist. We are invited to 
many meetings and consultation sessions 
but, at the end of the day, the decision is 
always taken prior to all this. It was always 
like this, here in Malta. Consultation is only 
done by the Government to legitimise its 
preconceived decisions (MEG17). 
 
Very often we go for a dialogue and are 
presented with a strategy that is almost 
complete, ready to be published. There may 
be cosmetic touches as a result of 
consultation but the framework is already in 
place before we speak out… Sometimes the 
authorities adopt a take it or leave it 
attitude! (MEG19). 
 
Maltese social and human rights groups complain that feedback on their proposals, 
research documents and policy dossiers is only significant by its absence (MSHG12+ 
MSHG14+MSHG10). This is creating a lot of frustration and may be one of the causes 
why some interest groups start attending consultative sessions on an irregular basis, or 
even halt their participation. Accusations of kollox taparsi (feigning processes), political 
innuendos and paraventu (smokescreen) to appease European authorities are rampant 
and widespread. 
 
There are processes where we are genuinely 
being consulted and where our input is 
thoroughly analysed. Then there are 
consultations that are done out of 
convenience more than conviction. The 
government needs to show that it is 
including different stakeholders in its policy 
formulation, particularly to its European 
watchdogs (MSHG14). 
We work fabulously with bureaucrats. 
There are many who believe in our 
potential as civil society and give us 
support. But then it all boils down to the 
minister. Decentralisation has not really 
occurred in Malta. Politicisation is always 
at play and NGOs are not immune to it. Do 
we need to be aligned politically to be safe 
and captured within the political 
environment? (MSHG13). 
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The issue of participation in mediating bodies is also investigated quantitatively. Chi
2
 
analysis in Table 7.9 does not reveal any significant difference between the disposition 
of Maltese and Irish interest groups to participate in consultative bodies (Chi
2
=0.017, 
p=0.896). Only around 38% of SHEGs in both countries are involved in intermediary 
organisations that bring together governmental and non-governmental bodies. However 
significant difference emerges when non-participative SHEGs were asked if they 
intended to join a coordinating entity in the future. 86.3% of Irish respondents reiterate 
their negative response, while almost half of their Maltese counterparts (46.5%) think 
that they will grab the opportunity if it arises (see appendix I).  
 
 
Table 7.9: SHEGs’ participation in consultation entities           
Participation in any coordination entities that bring 
together governmental and non-governmental bodies 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 44 31 75 
Percentage 38.3% 37.3% 37.9% 
No Count 71 52 123 
Percentage 61.7% 62.7% 62.1% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.017, v = 1, p = 0.896 
 
 
7.4.1.3  Capacity-building and self-centredness 
 
However state bureaucracy and politicians are not the only ones to blame for this lack of 
true and transparent civil dialogue. Interest groups have a great stake and they cannot 
always play victim of the situation. Many of them do not invest in their capacity 
building, are never adventurous to think outside the box, act egoistically in terms of 
succession planning and fail to work collectively towards a better representation of their 
sector. The next set of Maltese perceptions shifts accountability back to interest groups. 
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We need to start working together so as to 
address our greatest weakness in terms of 
capacity-building. If our representatives on 
core groups and other governmental 
councils are not trustworthy, that is our own 
fault. The institutions are there and the 
democratic principles of representation are 
there as well. It is only us who cannot get 
organised, join forces and elect members in 
whom we trust (MSHG13). 
 
 
 
 
 
We do a lot of work but our efforts are 
deeply fragmented. There are many 
organisations that do the same work 
because everyone heads in different 
directions. This is also the case in 
MEUSAC committees as well. There is an 
urgency to change the style that 
characterises our leadership (MSHG11). 
 
Civil society groups are dependent on their 
leader. Good governance is still an 
unknown word to the majority. When a 
leader leaves the group, the trend here is to 
kisser u farrak kollox (crush and smash 
everything), so as the next leader will have 
to start from scratch! (MSHG12). 
 
The third quote above hints that there is also another important consideration that is part 
of the game: narcissistic behaviour or actor-centredness. This is the antithesis of 
teamwork which is at the heart of group formation and performance. It constitutes a 
culture where the actor is more important than the institution and thus progress depends 
on his/her self-interest and attitude. In most cases self-centredness proves to be 
catastrophic in building trust and long-term positive relationships but, in a few cases 
involving a benevolent actor, it can work miracles. However the latter cases tend to be 
short-lived as long as the person remains at the axis of the institution. The following 
experiences by social and human rights groups in Malta emphasise these risky dynamics. 
 
Last year [2010] we agreed with the 
Minister on a programme of events. Then 
there was a cabinet reshuffle and the 
minister changed and all else changed as 
well. We protested against how things 
happened. The only way to rectify this is by 
establishing solid institutions so as to 
reduce the power of the individual 
(MSH14). 
 
The only genuine dialogue that we have 
ever been involved in is the one led by 
Hon…. It is the person on the chair and not 
the institutional set-up that really 
champions change and find a way forward 
among conflictual interests. The actor is 
more important than the institution in a 
small island like ours (MSH10).
  
Two factors crop up instantly from such experiences. Firstly, interest groups need to 
invest in their own capacity building by being innovative, entrepreneurial and 
courageous to diversify their core missions. Secondly, individual power is to be 
restrained by more efficient organisational structures that have in-built mechanisms of 
checks and balances. 
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7.4.2 The Irish experience 
 
The Irish system of representation is characterised by platform organisations that are 
members of the two non-economic pillars of what was then the SP, that is the 
Community and Social Pillar (CSP) and the Environmental Pillar (EnvP). In CSP 
various sectors and issues of the Irish society are represented, namely the unemployed, 
children and youth, older people, the poor, housing, gender, rural, social justice and 
voluntary networks. The EnvP is naturally constituted of Irish environmental groups 
that operate on a national level. 
 
7.4.2.1  The Community and Social Pillar 
 
Since the ‘undeclared’ downfall of SP, the institutional position of the CFP has become 
extremely ambiguous. 
 
The current government did not officially 
say that SP is gone but it is truly finished. 
Our pillar made up of seventeen national 
organisations still has a little bit of status, 
not much, as it is disappearing every week, 
every month. It is only a matter of time 
before CSP will end (ISHG9). 
 
Although our pillar still exists and meets on 
a quarterly basis, we are now organising 
bilateral meetings with government 
departments. In some ways this works 
better than the original pillar structure that 
was chaired by the Taoiseach. Government 
departments were shy of talking then 
(ISHG11). 
 
It transpires that the formal mediating institutions are being transformed and, as a 
consequence, they are becoming less formal, less dependent on prescribed procedures 
and more actor-centred. Many agree that in its heydays, the CSP within SP was a great 
channel of communication to bring consensus among different interests but one radical 
organisation (ISHG13) claims that the pillar has never been supportive to its causes 
because ‘many of the [represented bodies] grew out of religious organisations’ and, thus 
were against progressive thinking and civil liberties. 
 
Even at a time when institutional design of interest intermediation was at its best, wise 
interest groups in Ireland ‘did not put their eggs into the SP bag’ (ISHG10). Informal 
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channels both with politicians and bureaucrats are not only widely available but most 
often are deemed to be more effective than the formal ones, even though the formal 
versions are considered more transparent and accountable to good conduct. 
 
Ireland is a sort of funny mix of formal and 
informal cultures. Our formal structures can 
be quite rigid and then lots of things happen 
informally by getting to know key officials 
or the minister. To achieve your cause, it all 
has to do with the person rather than the 
institutional structure (ISHG11). 
A lot of organisations have gone back to the 
political route, engaging informally with 
political parties. Informal channels are 
harder and more time consuming. Because 
Ireland is a small country, it’s all about 
chance and getting in contact with the 
people involved (ISH12). 
 
 
7.4.2.2  The Environmental Pillar  
 
In contrast to CSP, the EnvP seems to be still in full swing and its highly structured 
mechanisms of operations are continually being revised to render the whole system of 
interest mediation more effective, fairer and efficient. Notwithstanding the negative talk 
that nowadays characterises SP as having been an ‘elitist circle whose only interest was 
forming a cosy consensus at the top’ (ISHG12), the EnvP has not only emerged as a 
‘survival’ of a ‘disgraceful body’ but, moreover, it became as institutional catalyst to 
promote green concerns. It has sprouted out of the ashes of SP in 2010 and, today, 26 
environmental organisations are represented by the Pillar. It all started under the Green 
Party coalition government (2007-2011) and, from the very beginning, it was ‘intended 
to be permanent and well-funded’ (IEG17). 
 
Our efficiency has increased. We now have 
five working groups within the pillar 
operating on different themes. They can put 
forward a programme of work on a 
particular issue and after describing what 
and how they are going to do it, then the 
voting mechanism would come in. If there 
is approval, then they can go on with their 
project without referring back. It is a highly 
institutionalised model but it is working 
because it is a trust builder (IEG15). 
Although in a way it is a step back since we 
have relegated SP to social dialogue, the 
EnvP has developed internal processes to 
allow us to develop policy together as a 
unified entity and there are funding 
structures that support our groups through 
government funding. So environmental 
groups are actively encouraged to come 
together to develop policy… We can now 
be considered real civil partners (IEG21). 
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The EnvP, together with other initiatives like the Irish Environment Network (IEN),  the 
formation of an umbrella organisation appealing to almost all Irish green groups,  
proved hugely successful to ‘build trust among groups who were for years fighting each 
other like children’ (IEG19). Yet there are still unresolved issues in the matrix of green 
interest representation. IEG17 stresses that membership in the EnvP would 
automatically impinge on the autonomy of the groups because they will then become 
duty bound to support the ‘Government National Development Plan that speaks about 
the building of new motorways, airport expansions and lots of other things that 
environmental groups typically object to’. The NESC is also part of the deficit equation 
on behalf of environmental organisations because there are no environmentalists within 
its secretariat and, thus ‘whatever they do or research, is executed in an environmental 
vacuum’ (IEG15). Others claim it is true that there have been improvements by central 
bureaucracy ‘to take our concerns on board’ when drafting policy and, thus invitations 
to participate in forums, policy circles and participative councils are abundant. But 
experience has shown that ‘this is all done because the ‘EC is coming down very 
heavily on different departments to consult with different stakeholders’ (IEG21). It is a 
typical example of mere ‘tokenistic’ action just to ‘please the EC’.  
 
Not surprisingly, when asked whether the EU has been instrumental in accentuating the 
culture of civil dialogue in domestic affairs (see Table 7.10), the resulting mean rating 
scores show a significant difference between Malta and Ireland (p=0.005). Using a four-
point likert scale, the mean rating scores are 3.01 for Malta and 2.64 for Ireland, 
meaning that the EU’s impetus towards the domestic process of civil dialogue is 
deemed considerable by Maltese SHEGs and minor by Irish ones. The temporal factor 
might be a determining factor here. After a one shot event in 1973 when Ireland joined 
the EU, one would expect that the imported stimuli to get weaker when they are passed 
down to successive generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 240 
Table 7.10: The EU’s instrumentality in accentuating the culture  of civil dialogue in domestic affairs 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 3.01 0.907 2.84 3.18 2588.000 0.005 
 Ireland 2.64 0.885 2.45 2.84   
 
7.4.2.3  Informal channels of interest mediation 
 
Informal channels of mediating interests are not unknown to Irish activists in the green 
sector. Many interviewees agree that informal avenues tend to work better than formal 
ones. People just behave more favourably to one’s cause in an informal setting (IEG21). 
Apparently there is also a strategy called ‘adopt a politician’ where NGOs select a TD 
and go to his/her local offices to keep him/her abreast with developments about the 
organisation and the sector (IEG15).  
 
Our organisation is not part of the Pillar but 
I know most of the people who sit on the 
Pillar and I would speak to them in a 
personal capacity. Informal channels are 
more effective in the domestic scenario. 
The biggest disadvantage is funding 
because in order to get it you must first be 
within the formal sphere (IEG17). 
Absolutely! We use them [informal 
channels] all the way. Without them you 
wouldn’t get anywhere. Some of it is 
earned. We help state actors and they help 
us. You need both favourable institutional 
arrangements as well as personalities who 
are ready to team up with others (IEG19). 
 
Leaving the business of lobbying to informal channels alone can be very risky for 
environmental organisations because there are other stronger interest groups that can 
better exploit such avenues because they enjoy greater political clout due to bigger 
numbers of followers. One of the informants below makes reference to peat-cutting and 
sewage systems which at the time of the interviews were very hot issues. It was a period 
when public demonstrations were being organised by community groups in Dublin 
against the Irish government and the EC. It was a time when the Commission was 
bringing Ireland back to the ECJ on peat extraction and septic tanks. Peat is partly 
decomposed vegetable matter which, when burned as fuel, produces health hazard gases. 
Septic tanks are primitive, small-scale sewage treatment systems that are common in 
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rural areas. Discharges from septic tanks, of which there are more than 400,000 in 
Ireland, have contributed to pollution of groundwater. 
 
In Ireland, informal influence has always 
been more important than formal structures. 
And that works best for powerful interests. 
Insiders who have political clout socialise 
together, play golf and go for horse racing 
in Galway. Those who are at the outside, 
like us, are always looking for stronger, 
formal structures, stronger transparent 
democratic procedures that in some sense 
create a level-playing-field. We don’t 
favour informal structures (IEG20). 
 
 
Informal channels of lobbying are open to 
us as well, but there are very few of us 
compared to the other side. There are 
thousands of people involved in peat-
cutting and tens of thousands with 
substandard sewage systems. They are 
obviously louder in lobbying politicians. 
Our feeble voice is our difficulty and we 
don’t have big numbers behind us when 
defending the environment. So politicians 
give in to greater numbers. That is why our 
groups prefer more formal institutions of 
interest mediation (IEG18). 
 
From the extensive accounts and statistics provided, it seems that the two states’ 
narratives move in parallel. Formal mediating institutions enjoy central positions in the 
two polities, although informal channels are nonetheless widespread and deemed to be 
more effective in the short term. Nevertheless, both Maltese and Irish protagonists stress 
the need to have more efficient and transparent institutions which serve as a common 
platform to all and, thus, ensure fairness and limit the power of strong 
individuals/groups that may have the power to dictate the scene. Having presented the 
findings of the first three dimensions, it is now the time to move on to the last round of 
findings which deal more exclusively with the EU. 
 
7.5 European influences 
 
 
The last batch of results is directly related to perceptions on issues that are more directly 
related to EU affairs. In particular qualitative and quantitative findings shed light on 
four key areas, namely interest groups’ attitudes towards the EU, European funding and 
opportunities of socialisation, preference to the Brussels route over and above the 
domestic route of influence and, finally, transformation effects, if any, on organisational 
norms. 
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7.5.1 Attitude towards the EU 
 
Public attitude towards the EU is a highly complex concept consisting of many 
individual parts that are continuously interlinked with one another. Many claim that 
‘antipathy toward other cultures’ (McLaren 2002) is a crucial element when formulating 
public perception; others like Christin (2005) maintain that individual attitudes towards 
domestic economic and political reforms are good predictors of citizens’ attitudes 
towards the EU. Most studies also seem to agree on the importance of ‘cognitive 
mobilization’, meaning that a higher level of information about the EU leads to a higher 
level of public support (Pölzlbauer 2011). Findings from this research confirm that 
interest groups’ attitude towards the EU is affected by a combination of these factors.  
 
For example, the great majority of Maltese social and human rights groups have a 
positive attitude because they have been supportive since the early days of the EU 
referendum campaign in 2004 (MSHG10+MPO16+MPO20). Some others, particularly 
Gozitans, are rather indifferent to the EU because the continent closest to them is 
Australia, not Europe, where family and cultural connections are abundant (MSHG12). 
  
 
Ever since the EU referendum, we have 
always been active in the European sphere. 
We always thought that our EU 
membership would serve us as a push to 
realise our cause in favour of civil rights 
(MSHG10). 
 
The fact that government collaborated with 
civil society during the negotiations for EU 
accession secured a greater sense of 
ownership and legitimisation among all 
civil society’s stakeholders (MPO20). 
 
Many NGOs are still adapting to the EU’s 
reality. Although an early converter to 
Malta’s accession, NGOs still suffered from 
an initial shock. They are now going 
through a phase of strengthening their 
capacity, changing mentality and 
experimenting with a greater number of 
opportunities and institutions (MP016).  
For us, Melbourne is our first point of 
reference because it has the largest 
concentration of Gozitans living abroad. 
Europe does not influence our frame of 
mind, even though the yes vote for Europe 
was proportionately greater than the 
Maltese vote in the accession referendum 
(MSHG12). 
 
 
On the other hand, their Irish counterparts stress the lack of information and proper 
education on EU matters that led to apathy and negativity among various sectors of the 
population. Furthermore attitude towards the EU is also highly dependent on the 
cyclical nature of domestic political and economic performance. 
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The Irish government used to tell its people 
that Europe is good for money. It has never 
told us that being part of the EU is about a 
sense of citizenship. Thus it doesn’t 
motivate us, inspire us to get involved and 
to learn much, other than just getting the 
money grants. As a result, civil society 
organisations just don’t realise the EU’s 
relevance to them. This is the story behind 
our indifference to EU affairs (ISHG9). 
During our first phase of membership we 
were going to Brussels with an inferiority 
complex. Then, after so many years, there 
came the Celtic Tiger era and we adopted a 
superiority attitude towards the EU. Then 
when our economy rapidly fell apart, 
inferiority plagued the nation once again. 
So people’s attitudes towards the EU are 
determined by a series of contemporary and 
domestic circumstances (ISHG12). 
In the environmental arena, Maltese and Irish groups express a high degree of 
confidence in being part of the EU because it is ‘deemed as a leader of environmental 
legislation’ (IEG15+MEG18). The following excerpts reveal a pro-EU sentiment among 
islanders, but one of them does raise eyebrows over spill-over effects. 
 
Green NGOs in Malta cannot be indifferent 
to the EU. The fact that we are now 
members is very positive in terms of 
environmental issues. It is only through this 
way that the Maltese authorities are being 
forced to adopt more environment friendly 
measures (MEG18). 
 
 
 
The degree of Europeanisation on Irish civil 
society has been strong, mainly for two 
reasons, namely EU funding and EU 
environmental law. [Nevertheless,] they 
still have had a negative impact like over-
fishing because of the Common Fisheries 
Policy and uncontrolled infrastructural 
building through structural funding (IEG19). 
 
Although the majority of environmental groups are very receptive to the European 
integration project, there are still some Maltese and Irish groups that are either hostile or 
indifferent to the EU for different reasons. 
Our attitude used to be positive about the 
EU even during the referendum campaign. 
But today it turned upside down. The EU 
knew that the Maltese politicians were not 
honest [during the accession referendum]. 
There was a lot of double talk about our 
concerns, but the EU did nothing to clarify 
matters. Our members are amongst the most 
furious against the EU (MEG17). 
Our geographical remoteness has to do with 
our indifference to EU affairs (IEG16). 
 
We are an open culture and are able to 
adapt. With regards to the EU, there is a 
perception problem. What is it all about? 
What is it trying to do? This needs to be 
addressed. Ireland has not spent so much 
energy to get the European message across 
(IEG21).
 
 
Stakeholders’ accounts suggest that it is very difficult to establish common trends in this 
field of analysis. Overall, Maltese SHEGs seem to have a more positive attitude towards 
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the EU. Their accession period occurred relatively recently and, hence, they can still 
compare the pre- and post-accession experiences. The Irish, contrastingly, are more 
sceptical although both social and environmental groups acknowledge that the EU did 
champion the great legal changes which they are now benefiting from.  
 
A series of statistical findings that try to decode attitudes towards the EU from different 
standpoints follows. Such quantitative results are corroborating evidence that confirms 
the general orientation established qualitatively. 
 
7.5.1.1  Vision, training, ownership and European participation  
 
Interest groups were asked whether the European dimension has filtered within their 
organisational vision/mission statement. Table 7.11 indicates that almost 54% of 
Maltese SHEGs are significantly more proactive in incorporating a European dimension 
in their vision/mission statements when compared to 38% of their Irish counterparts 
(Chi
2
=4.87, p=0.027). The time factor has to be brought in once again. Forty years of 
Irish membership might have rendered the Irish to become less enthusiastic about the 
European integration project and, consequently more disinclined to own the European 
vision and less responsive to training opportunity on EU affairs. 
 
Table 7.11: The European dimension’s inclusion in the vision/mission statements of SHEGs 
The vision/mission statement incorporates a 
European dimension 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 62 32 94 
Percentage 53.9% 38.1% 47.2% 
No Count 53 52 105 
Percentage 46.1% 61.9% 52.8% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 4.87, v = 1, p = 0.027  
 
 
The lack of training and knowledge claimed by Irish interviewees is confirmed in Table 
7.12 which reveals a notable difference between Maltese and Irish SHEGs in terms of 
training opportunities (Chi
2
=11.208, p=0.001). 46.1% of Maltese groups, as against 
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22.9% of Irish groups, have participated in training programmes to deepen and widen 
their knowledge on EU matters, whilst acquiring the necessary skills. 
 
Table 7.12: Training of SHEGs’ officers in EU affairs 
 Participation in  training programmes to acquire 
necessary skills in EU affairs 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 53 19 72 
Percentage 46.1% 22.9% 36.4% 
No Count 62 64 126 
Percentage 53.9% 77.1% 63.6% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 11.208, v = 1, p = 0.001  
 
 
The way EU matters are owned and managed at interest groups’ level is another 
indicator of groups’ attitude towards the EU. To this effect, respondents were asked 
whether their organisation appoints a person/s to take care of EU related issues. Table 
7.13 shows that there is no significant difference between the two states (Chi
2
=5.571, 
p=0.134). Approximately half of the groups do not appoint any member/s to deal with 
EU affairs (46.1% in Malta and 54.2% in Ireland). The most widely used practice in 
Malta (27%) is that of appointing one person who, besides other matters, is also 
responsible for the coordination of EU affairs. In Ireland’s case, the most preferred 
method is to delegate European matters to more than one committee officer (26.5%).  
 
 
Table 7.13: Responsibility of EU affairs within SHEGs 
 Responsibility of EU affairs within organisations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes, one person who is 
solely responsible 
Count 7 5 12 
Percentage 6.1% 6.0% 6.1% 
Yes, one who performs 
other tasks as well 
Count 31 11 42 
Percentage 27.0% 13.3% 21.2% 
More than one person 
responsible 
Count 24 22 46 
Percentage 20.9% 26.5% 23.2% 
No Count 53 45 98 
Percentage 46.1% 54.2% 49.5% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.571, v = 3, p = 0.134  
 246 
Statistics resulting from Table 7.14 gauge the trend of domestic groups’ participation 
in EU related activities over a span of eight years (2004-2011) wherein yet again 
Maltese and Irish results are comparable (Chi
2
=3.648, p=0.302). The largest segment 
of SHEGs (36.8% in Malta and 37.4% in Ireland) register an accelerated trend of 
participation, while an approximate 28.6% have reached a plateau (27.2% and 30% 
respectively). Although those registering a decreasing rate account for less than 10% 
(3.5% in Malta and 8.8% in Ireland), concern arises for those who fall under the 
category of not applicable (32.5% in Malta and 23.8%) because they seem to be 
totally indifferent to the European reality since they are most probably exclusively 
engaged in local/parish issues. 
 
Table 7.14: SHEGs’ rate of participation in EU related activities 
The rate of participation in EU related activities 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Increased Count 42 30 72 
Percentage 36.8% 37.5% 37.1% 
Remained Stable Count 31 24 55 
Percentage 27.2% 30.0% 28.4% 
Decreased Count 4 7 11 
Percentage 3.5% 8.8% 5.7% 
Not Applicable Count 37 19 56 
Percentage 32.5% 23.8% 28.9% 
Total Count 114 80 194 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.648, v = 3, p = 0.302 
 
 
7.5.2 Links and lobbying in the EU 
 
 
Qualitative findings in this section reinforce the normal praxis that the Brussels route of 
influence ‘does not replace’ the domestic route (Bache and George 2006). European 
institutions rigorously demand that interest groups must first address their concerns to 
institutions at member state level. Once all domestic efforts prove fruitless, and a 
decision is taken to present the case to the EC, then interest groups must roll out an 
evidence-based cause. Ideological or emotional appeals simply do not work at European 
level. If ‘you have done your research well’ (MSHG10) and ‘with a bit of luck’ (IEG17), 
the EC can eventually opt to bring your case forward. 
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Maltese SHEGs are well aware of how things should proceed to lobby at EU level if the 
need arises. Their comments show that they have learned fast the rules of the game. 
 
Prior to venturing your concerns in Europe, 
an organisation must first exhaust all the 
[domestic] possibilities. Many of our 
discussions in Malta revolve around 
directives where the issues are related to 
implementation and time periods. However, 
there have been cases where we had to go 
to the EC. Then there are issues involving 
the EP where we were also active 
(MSHG11). 
 
When we become aware that local 
authorities are not interested in getting 
things done, we start making pressure in 
Brussels. In addition, we always participate 
in meetings whenever the Environment 
Commissioner visits Malta. This is of great 
help, particularly to smaller NGOs, because 
it makes European institutions more 
reachable (MEG18). 
 
The Maltese government does not seem to be bothered whenever any of the social or 
civil partners chooses to bypass its institutions and go directly to Brussels. There is 
almost certainty that the group will be referred back to make its submissions to the 
competent domestic authorities, as it should have done from the beginning, and then 
wait for the feedback. Nonetheless, even though the government has provided an 
institutional framework to facilitate national consultation, it would still be not annoyed 
if a Maltese NGO still opts to manoeuvre along the Brussels route of influence. 
However,  
 
It would be better for all if the government is informed in advance about the NGOs’ 
intention and position. In this way there will be a better chance for the government to 
support the cause being promoted by any NGO (MPO16). 
 
 
The Irish government seems to be adopting a similar attitude, at least in the social and 
human rights field. Although it has instituted domestic structures responsible for civil 
dialogue, coordination of national policy and discussion of EU legislative measures, 
NGOs are nonetheless unrestrained to cross the ocean on their way to lobby for their 
interest in Brussels. They know that once they leave the Irish shoreline, they have left 
behind an informal and flexible model structured around the politics of clout and 
clientelistic webs. The model that awaits them on the other side is much more 
rationalised, involving negotiation, persuasion and persistence. 
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Most members of the CSP would also be 
engaged with the EU in their own right or 
through other networks… Some of our 
representatives in the Pillar sit on EESC. In 
some ways the Pillar opens doors and then 
the people have other mechanisms and 
ways of engaging with Europe (ISHG11). 
 
 
 
Europe presents a completely different 
model to us. It is true that it is a slow and 
cumbersome process because there are 27 
member states involved; but it is better 
[than the Irish model] as a result of that. 
Another good thing at European level is 
that once something is decided, then it 
should be implemented… The European 
model is a sort of Germanic [one]; we have 
decided on evidence, this is the law, and it 
should be respected by all (ISHG12).
 
 
Irish environmental groups have been more active in Brussels, primarily because their 
domestic political, administrative and judiciary institutions are highly ineffective on 
green terms (IEG17+IEG18). Uploading their concerns proved to be a more effective 
route to get things done. This explains why Ireland has by far the highest per capita 
number of infringement cases concerning environmental issues (IEG18). When things 
went from bad to worse, the Irish government invested in domestic institutional 
mechanisms by setting up the EnvP to coordinate the work of national environmental 
groups and, at the same time, started to adopt a more open door policy. 
 
The EU does provide an alternative route to 
voice our concerns on green matters. It has 
become the most important countervailing 
power to Irish authorities. When NGOs 
made no progress with government 
agencies as had been the case for many 
years, then they had to bring the case to the 
EC. A lot of these cases ended up in front 
of the ECJ (IEG20). 
 
In the past we had to go straight to the EC 
because the government adopted a closed 
door policy for us. Now, the government is 
turning to green NGOs and telling us that 
‘we need to talk to you first before you go 
to the EC with a complaint procedure’.  The 
EC itself stressed the need that we have to 
try and resolve things before they go 
beyond the state (IEG21). 
 
The situation in the two island member states seems to be very similar although Irish 
environmental groups came out as the more adventurous to reach out for Brussels 
whenever they sense a deadlock in their country. The discussion will now incorporate 
statistical findings that shed more light on the potentials and limitations of Maltese and 
Irish interest groups to maintain links with Brussels and to establish a network and 
lobby platform within the multi-layered system of European institutions. 
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7.5.2.1  Types of contacts and potential of lobbying  
 
When asked about the nature of contact they have already established in Brussels (see 
Table 7.15), findings reveal a varied selection of contact types, yet statistically they are 
highly comparable (Chi
2
=7.154, p=0.209). A substantial portion of interest groups 
utilise multiple channels of communication. Relying on umbrella Euro-groups proves 
to be the most widely used form of attachment both in Malta (21.2%) and Ireland 
(31.2%), followed by online networking in Malta (19.2%) and in Ireland by members 
travelling overseas (17.6%). The ones who scored other means (11.5% in Malta and 
12.8% in Ireland) are referring to three major types of contacts: (a) delegating this task 
to their parent organisation that in turn has contacts in Brussels, (b) contacts with MEPs 
and (c) meetings with European commissioners when they visit the island. However 
there is still a substantial number of SHEGs (32.7% in Malta and 23.2% in Ireland) that 
have not yet established any contact of any sort in Brussels. 
 
 
Table 7.15: Types of contact with Brussels established by SHEGs  
 The type of contact that has already been established in      
Brussels, if any 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Permanent Office in Brussels Count 3 2 5 
Percentage 1.9% 1.6% 1.8% 
Relying on umbrella Euro-
groups based in Brussels 
Count 33 39 72 
Percentage 21.2% 31.2% 25.6% 
Sending members  to Brussels 
periodically 
Count 21 22 43 
Percentage 13.5% 17.6% 15.3% 
Online networking Count 30 17 47 
Percentage 19.2% 13.6% 16.7% 
Other means Count 18 16 34 
Percentage 11.5% 12.8% 12.1% 
No contact Count 51 29 80 
Percentage 32.7% 23.2% 28.5% 
Total Count 156 125 281 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 7.154, v = 5, p = 0.209  
 
 
When the latter were asked whether they intend to invest in any point of contact with 
Brussels in the future (see Table 7.16), the resulting figures are significant (Chi
2
=5.590, 
p=0.018). Whilst 47.2% of Maltese groups answered in the affirmative, only 20.7% of 
Irish groups positioned themselves in favour of the idea.   
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Table 7.16: SHEGs’ intention to establish contact in Brussels if this is not already the case 
 Intention to establish contact in Brussels if  
 this is not already the case 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 25 6 31 
Percentage 47.2% 20.7% 37.8% 
No Count 28 23 51 
Percentage 52.8% 79.3% 62.2% 
Total Count 53 29 82 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.590, v = 1, p = 0.018  
 
The next finding in Table 7.18 investigates whether interest groups are being 
engaged to promote and defend their interests at EU level. The majority of Maltese 
and Irish SHEGs are still not involved (64.3% and 57.8% respectively), indicating no 
significant difference between the two islands (Chi
2
=5.590, p=0.018). The reasons 
behind this lack of participation at EU level are inquired in Table 7.19. 
 
 
 
Table 7.18: SHEGs’ lobbying at EU level 
 Engagement in lobbying with any institution of the EU   
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 41 35 76 
Percentage 35.7% 42.2% 38.4% 
No Count 74 48 122 
Percentage 64.3% 57.8% 61.6% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.866, v = 1, p = 0.352 
 
 
Although Chi
2
 analysis in Table 7.19 confirms that there is no significant difference 
between Malta and Ireland (Chi
2
=3.702, p=0.717), the results are nonetheless 
interesting. While lack of administrative capacity is the most prominent reason that is 
debarring Maltese and Irish SHEGs from experimenting with the Brussels route of 
influence (36.3% and 27.0% respectively), the second most scored reason is that the 
domestic route of influence is still being preferred (19.5% and 24.0% respectively). The 
implied cost of lobbying at EU level has also been voted as a significant justification for 
staying out of the game (10.6% in Malta and 17.0% in Ireland). MSHG10 shows no 
hesitation in declaring that ‘the biggest hurdles in participating more extensively in the 
European experience are essentially a lack of people and money’. While affirming the 
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inbuilt organisational limitations, some experienced leaders maintain that the key to 
access the Brussels route is not money but contacts. 
 
To access the EU, you just need one clever person who has good relationships up there.  
It all depends on the contacts you have. If you go to a couple of conferences in Brussels, 
put a face to a name, exchange cards, shake hands, you build a relationship with them. 
Then you will pick up the phone, they will take your call (IEG16). 
 
MSHG10 agrees perfectly with IEG16. The two of them are specifically pointing to the 
centrality of establishing European partners, the need to socialise within the concentric 
circles of multilateral policy networks and, if possible, take ‘leading positions’ or secure 
a ‘visible presence’ in those places where decisions are taken.  
 
 
Table 7.19: Reasons for not lobbying at EU level 
Reasons why certain organisations do not engage  
with  EU institutions for lobbying purposes 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Domestic route of influence     
preferred 
Count 22 24 46 
Percentage 19.5% 24.0% 21.6% 
Targeting national ministers 
who in turn voice their 
opinion at the Council of 
Ministers 
Count 13 10 23 
Percentage 11.5% 10.0% 10.8% 
High cost of lobbying at        
EU level 
Count 12 17 29 
Percentage 10.6% 17.0% 13.6% 
No knowledge of EU 
institutional design 
Count 9 8 17 
Percentage 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
EU does not have      
relevance 
Count 11 9 20 
Percentage 9.7% 9.0% 9.4% 
Lack of administrative   
capacity 
Count 41 27 68 
Percentage 36.3% 27.0% 31.9% 
Other reasons Count 5 5 10 
Percentage 4.4% 5.0% 4.7% 
Total Count 113 100 213 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.702, v = 6, p = 0.717   
 
 
The last statistical finding in this section (Table 7.20) shows that there is a significant 
difference among the preferences of Maltese and Irish SHEGs as to whom they lobby 
at the supranational level (Chi
2
=17.717, p=0.003).  As expected the EC and EP enjoy 
the top ranks in both countries (approximately 30% each). This is understandable in the 
context of small states where people feel more attached to their politicians, including 
those functioning at the supranational level. Access to the EESC is imbalanced; almost 
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16% of Irish SHEGs do relate to this consultative institution compared to barely 5% of 
their Maltese counterparts. Feedback from one of the Maltese delegates of the EESC 
explains the situation, 
 
As a member of the EESC, I don’t have a secretariat to help me reach out [to domestic 
organisations]. Malta has the smallest delegation made up of five members. Only one 
of them represents the interests of the third sector, including social matters, 
environmental issues and consumer affairs; the other four represent unions and 
employers (MSHG11). 
 
 
The last point of significant difference concerns the reliance on other means which in 
the case of Malta is substantial (20.3%), contrasted to barely 5% on the Irish part. In the 
majority of cases, respondents were either referring to their national parent organisation 
or to the European federation that in turn voice their concerns at the EU level. 
 
 
Table 7.20: Lobbying institutions in Brussels 
 European institutions targeted for lobbying purposes 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 European Commission Count 19 24 43 
Percentage 32.2% 29.3% 30.5% 
National members of EESC Count 3 13 16 
Percentage 5.1% 15.9% 11.3% 
National MEPs Count 21 25 46 
Percentage 35.6% 30.5% 32.6% 
Commissioner of home  
country 
Count 4 7 11 
 Percentage 6.8% 8.5% 7.8% 
Member State holding  
Presidency of Council 
Count 0 9 9 
Percentage .0% 11.0% 6.4% 
Other means Count 12 4 16 
Percentage 20.3% 4.9% 11.3% 
Total Count 59 82 141 
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 17.717, v = 5, p = 0.003   
 
 
7.5.3 Funding and socialisation 
 
 
The acquisition of EU funding is always a crucial element of paramount importance not 
only to governments, but also to interest groups that have been found to suffer 
chronically from poor resources and administrative capacity. On the other hand, 
accession to the EU led to a proliferation of networking opportunities with other 
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European partners, thus taking advantage of greater socialisation, collective learning 
and sharing of best practices. Qualitative findings show which of the two is most prized 
by Maltese and Irish interest groups and how priorities shifted over time. Afterwards, 
the discussion will incorporate statistical data to determine the take up of funding and 
networking opportunities over a period of eight years (2004-2011). 
 
Maltese SHEGs seems not to differentiate between the two stimuli as they are both 
deemed ‘necessary prerequisites to live the European vocation’. According to MPO16, 
the two major problems that groups face in Malta are ‘smallness’, leading to a limited 
resource base; and ‘islandness’ that can lock in stakeholders in geographical and mental 
isolation. To address these innate coercive restraints, the Maltese government felt that it 
is its obligation to set up a specialised agency (MEUSAC) to help interest groups apply 
for funds and identify European partners. Thus, funding and socialisation are not 
mutually exclusive but two indispensable elements for the smallest member state to 
realise its ‘European dream’.  
 
Feedback by Maltese interviewees is very similar and no difference results between the 
two cohorts of interest groups, that is, social and human rights groups on one hand, and 
environmental groups on the other. 
 
 
If it weren’t for the EU funds, our group 
couldn’t have been able to flourish and 
increase its European and international 
connections. The sustainability of our 
organisation is based on government and 
EU funding. My dream is that we will not 
remain dependent on state funding, unless 
partnership projects are still on. Capacity 
building and financial management are the 
two most crucial elements in managing any 
organisation (MSHG13). 
 
 
I would rate the two as having the same 
weighting. The EU gave us new 
opportunities to embark on good practice 
sharing with other groups in the EU. We 
started creating partnerships and exchange 
ideas beyond our shores. At the same time, 
we cannot seize opportunities unless we 
have the funds. Financial constraints led us 
to withdraw our membership in one of our 
European federations and cancel our 
participation in meetings abroad (MEG19). 
 
In spite of this high level of equal understanding, one interviewee came up with a 
controversial allegation wherein he maintains that domestic and European authorities 
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use discriminatory criteria against certain interest groups, even though they abide by 
relevant legislation and are fully eligible for EU funding. 
 
 
We have tried to access EU funds many times, and spent a lot of money in consultancy 
fees, but to no avail. The Maltese government is behind this great barrier we have 
encountered. At the end of the day, funds are allocated on the guidelines provided by 
governments. This is our conviction because we do have documents to confirm it. If the 
Maltese government feels that an entity should not get any European funds, it has the 
power to do it. There is also an institutionalised bias even within the EU institutions 
against the sector we represent (MEG17). 
 
 
While MPO16 categorically denies these allegations, MPO20 confirms that the EU 
technocrats do differentiate between civil society groups and paid lobbyists. The former 
are always welcomed, the latter are given the cold shoulder and successive shields are 
put in place not to let them come too close to the top corridors of the EC. However the 
Maltese environmental NGO in question is nothing of this sort, it is just a legitimate 
organisation representing sectoral interests. 
 
The Irish narrative presents a completely different line-up, even though smallness and 
islandness still form part of its geopolitical profile. Having nurtured a framework that is 
heavily reliant on the Anglo-Saxon world, as was discussed in chapter 6, Irish social 
and human rights groups never really developed a need to Europeanise their circles of 
networks and contacts. The only need that they really strived hard for was money from 
Europe except, maybe, for the youth sector that has always been on the forefront in 
organising youth exchanges with mainland Europe. So the element of socialisation was 
non-existent for many Irish groups but, in these last years, things started moving in a 
different direction. Funding alone will not alter the mentality; collective learning 
through socialisation opportunities may start to take apart an insular culture dominantly 
attached to Britain and America. 
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[Irish] civil society organisations, if they 
think about Europe at all, would be more 
motivated by the socialisation effect. For 
example, we as an organisation have only 
introduced the international dimension in 
these last two years. We are guilty as 
everybody else. It has to do a bit with our 
national character. It has a little bit to do 
with how the government has always 
treated the EU: as a source of money 
(ISHG9). 
 
Compared to other NGOs, our youth sector 
has always had a very strong focus on 
European issues. A lot of our members 
have direct connections with European 
groups (ISHG12). 
The EU isn’t really that important in terms 
of change in our sector. But Europe and EU 
membership have been critical, primarily, 
because it has increased the opportunities 
for engagement at an ordinary level across 
Europe. So, for a country that was focused 
on Britain and America only, it shifted to 
become focused on Europe as well. One of 
the great things that the European 
engagement delivered was a whole set of 
projects that could be worked out through 
our partner counterparts across Europe. But 
this is a recent development. Thus, so far, 
we haven’t benefited hugely from 
opportunities of socialisation and cross 
fertilisation (ISHG13). 
 
Irish green groups share the same narrative. Since Ireland’s accession in 1973, funding 
always enjoyed a central and almost monolithic supremacy over all other considerations.   
 
Quite definitely, for a long time funding 
was first priority. No socialisation at all 
(IEG15). 
 
 
 
 
The process of Europeanisation has been 
motivated by the opportunity of obtaining 
funds for many years. In Ireland there is no 
government agency that helps NGOs 
exploit the opportunity that emanates from 
the EU. Now things have started to change 
(IEG21). 
 
This one-sided outlook has taken its toll on the environment groups’ ability to penetrate 
the ‘rest of the continent’ and intermingle with individuals, organisations and 
institutions that share common interest. The experience below by IEG16 is a prototype, 
whilst IEG18 provides an alternative account of a well-connected organisation, maybe, 
because it used to be substantially funded by the Irish government.  
 
We are not very good at identifying partner 
organisations in other member states. We 
have not built rapport with other 
organisations and haven’t been involved in 
sharing of best practices. Although we now 
network through online options, we are not 
really in touch (IEG16). 
 
Laterally, we have been very active. We are 
very much in contact with other 
environmental NGOs in other states, 
particularly Germany, the Netherlands and 
Scandinavian countries, Maybe more 
recently with Spain as well. The 
Mediterranean is a bit far and, thus we 
haven’t done any outreaches there (IEG18). 
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The next step is to present a number of quantitative findings that deal exclusively either 
with EU funding or with the cross fertilisation effect so as to formulate a more holistic 
depiction of the situation.  
 
 
7.5.3.1  European funding, federations and partners 
 
 
The selected series of statistical findings led to no significant differences between Malta 
and Ireland (that is p value is above the 0.05 criterion), thus confirming a high degree of 
comparability.   
 
Table 7.21 shows that Maltese interest groups are slightly more adventurous than the 
Irish to try their best in accessing EU funding (60% and 51.8% respectively). Likewise, 
the rate of success is also comparable. Table 7.22 reveals that Maltese and Irish SHEGs 
have almost the same success rate (approximately 77%), with the two cohorts of 
financing between 1 and 5 projects being the most subscribed to (60% [22.9% + 37.1%] 
in Malta and 66% [20.5% + 45.5%] in Ireland). The percentage of unsuccessful 
applicants is also highly comparable, that is, 22.9% in Malta and 20.5% in Ireland. 
When the latter were probed to see if they intended to reapply for EU funding in the 
future, 74.6% of Maltese SHEGs answered in the affirmative, compared to 65% of their 
Irish counterpart (see Appendix I).  
 
Table 7.21: Attempts by SHEGs to access EU funds 
 Attempts to access EU funds 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 69 43 112 
Percentage 60.0% 51.8% 56.6% 
No Count 46 40 86 
Percentage 40.0% 48.2% 43.4% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.317, v = 1, p = 0.251 
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Table 7.22: Success of SHEGs in obtaining EU funds 
 Success achieved in obtaining EU funds 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes in 1 project Count 16 9 25 
Percentage 22.9% 20.5% 21.9% 
Yes in more than 1 less than 5 
projects 
Count 26 20 46 
Percentage 37.1% 45.5% 40.4% 
Yes in 5 projects or more Count 12 6 18 
Percentage 17.1% 13.6% 15.8% 
No Count 16 9 25 
 Percentage 22.9% 20.5% 21.9% 
Total Count 70 44 114 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.815, v = 3, p = 0.846 
 
 
From further investigation, it results that 74% Maltese rely on external advice to apply 
for EU funding (see Appendix I) and, as Table 7.23 reveals, government agencies are 
the most widely used external expertise in this regard. It can be safely concluded that 
the majority of Maltese SHEGs had MEUSAC in mind when answering this question. 
On the other hand 53.3% of Irish groups (see Appendix I) rely on external advice when 
applying for funding. Their reliance is more fairly distributed among the four mentioned 
sources in Table 7.23. 
 
 
Table 7.23: Sources of external advice 
 The sources of external advice sought by organisations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Government agencies Count 45 14 59 
Percentage 43.3% 28.0% 38.3% 
Independent experts Count 17 12 29 
Percentage 16.3% 24.0% 18.8% 
Other domestic NGOs Count 16 11 27 
Percentage 15.4% 22.0% 17.5% 
Other European NGOs Count 21 11 32 
Percentage 20.2% 22.0% 20.8% 
Other means Count 5 2 7 
Percentage 4.8% 4.0% 4.5% 
Total Count 104 50 154 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 4.050, v = 4, p = 0.399 
 
 
The next set of data figures deal exclusively with the cross fertilisation effect, in 
particular the participation of domestic groups in European federations and their drive to 
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establish partners to work on joint projects and engage in mutual learning processes. 
Table 7.24 shows that almost half of SHEGs in Malta and Ireland are affiliated to 
European federations (43.0% and 47.0% respectively). However the number of non-
affiliated organisations, most of which are only functional at local or parish level, is still 
significant. When the latter were asked why they do not feel the need to appertain to 
European federations, the most scored reason in the two countries is that actually such a 
need does not exist because they are entirely committed to domestic issues. Secondly, a 
third of SHEGs in Malta and Ireland declare that the cost of affiliation is too expensive 
(see Table 7.25). 
 
Table 7.24: Affiliation of SHEGs to European federations 
 Affiliation to any European federation 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 49 39 88 
Percentage 43.0% 47.0% 44.7% 
No Count 65 44 109 
  Percentage 57.0% 53.0% 55.3% 
Total Count 114 83 197 
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.312, v = 1, p = 0.577 
 
Table 7.25: Reasons for not affiliating to European federations 
 Reasons why not to affiliate to a European 
federation 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 No need to be part of a   
Euro federation 
Count 15 4 19 
Percentage 34.1% 14.3% 26.4% 
high monetary cost of 
affiliation 
Count 13 8 21 
Percentage 29.5% 28.6% 29.2% 
focusing on domestic  
issues is a priority 
Count 12 14 26 
Percentage 27.3% 50.0% 36.1% 
affiliation is against     
statute 
Count 1 0 1 
Percentage 2.3% .0% 1.4% 
Other reasons Count 3 2 5 
Percentage 6.8% 7.1% 6.9% 
Total Count 44 28 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.635, v = 4, p = 0.228 
 
 
Table 7.26 reveals another element of high comparability between the two states in the 
identification of European partner organisations to cooperate over joint projects. Half of 
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SHEGs in Malta and Ireland have established partner organisations across the EU
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(49.6% and 54.8% respectively). When delving deeper, it transpires from Table 7.27 
that there is no significant difference with regards to the regional origins of partner 
organisations. Percentage points are more or less evenly distributed among the four 
geographical clusters both within and across the two states. One can comment that 
history seems to be repeating itself here as well. The fact that the largest segment of 
Maltese SHEGs’ partners originate from the Eastern cluster may indicate that the 
Easterners are now befriending Malta, just as they used to do with the Irish during their 
boom years, to learn ‘quickly’ from the Maltese experience in the EU. 
 
Table 7.26: SHEGs’ cooperation with European partners 
 Identification of European partner organisations to  
cooperate over joint projects 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 57 46 103 
Percentage 49.6% 54.8% 51.8% 
No Count 58 38 96 
Percentage 50.4% 45.2% 48.2% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.525, v = 1, p = 0.469  
 
Table 7.27: Regional origins of SHEGs’ European partners 
 The European regions from which partner organisations 
originate 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Southern & Mediterranean cluster Count 95 67 162 
Percentage 26.5% 24.2% 25.5% 
Central cluster Count 68 63 131 
 Percentage 18.9% 22.7% 20.6% 
Northern cluster Count 84 75 159 
Percentage 23.4% 27.1% 25.0% 
Eastern cluster Count 112 72 184 
Percentage 31.2% 26.0% 28.9% 
Total Count 359 277 636 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.725, v = 3, p = 0.293 
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 For the purposes of this study, the members states of the EU have been grouped into five geographical 
clusters and each cluster is composed as follows: 
Southern and Mediterranean cluster: Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain 
Central cluster: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands 
Northern cluster: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom 
Eastern cluster: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia 
At the time when data was being collected, Croatia was still an acceding country and, thus, it was not 
included in the exercise 
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7.5.4 EU norms and values 
 
Changes in attitudinal formations are a critical factor to determine whether European 
influences have infiltrated the mindset of interest groups. Compared to other factors that 
have already been examined, this is the most difficult one to analyse because of its 
intangibility nature. Nevertheless qualitative and quantitative data exhibit interesting 
and exploratory findings that will eventually be used in the testing phase of the original 
hypotheses.  
 
Maltese interviewees are very optimistic that more changes in attitude, culture and 
perception are on the way as a result of EU membership because they believe that the 
ball has already started rolling at a faster pace than expected. However, one has to 
distinguish between two types of social and human rights groups. Firstly, there are peer 
support organisations of a small scale whose interest is entirely domestic but which can 
‘have the potential to reverse certain imported values that are gradually heading in’ 
(MSH12). Secondly, there are the more robust representative groups that can be 
pioneers in initiating further substantial changes not only in Malta but also on a 
European scale by using smallness as an ideal prerequisite to undertake pilot projects. 
 
 
Many Maltese NGOs are very small, 
offering peer support rather than being 
actual representative organisations. These 
are active within the Church and disability 
circles where the European dimension is 
not so relevant. However, those that are 
involved in minority rights are very much 
involved in European affairs. For us, the 
EU is a source to speed up change in 
[domestic] legislation through a fast track 
change in public mentality (MSHG10). 
 
Through accession, we started looking 
beyond our shores more. We have already 
achieved a lot in terms of sharing of best 
practices but we can do a lot more. Our 
NGOs must be on the forefront to bring 
pilot studies to Malta and, when enough 
experience has been gained, they could be 
extended to other larger member states. I 
am thinking of capacity building, mentoring, 
partnerships, open mentality exercises and 
internal reengineering projects (MMB15). 
 
Other Maltese protagonists emphasise that the need for change is already being realised, 
not only at structural and tactical levels, but most importantly, in terms of leadership 
transformation. 
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In 2004 we became aware of the various 
EU opportunities that are open to 
organisations like ours. We embarked on 
internal strategic changes to develop and 
diversify as an entity. At the base of it all, it 
involved a change in vision through a 
different leadership mentality (MSHG13). 
We have brought a number of European 
group leaders to address our members who 
challenged our frame of mind and taught us 
how to look ’il barra minn żokortna 
(beyond ourselves). It is all about being 
open to new ideas (MSHG14). 
 
Optimism makes way for a more sarcastic tone when interviewing Irish leaders. Piaras 
Mac Éinrí, a respected Irish academic, diplomat and civil society activist, is unequivocal, 
‘I would be critical of the failure of the Irish NGO sector to fully understand the 
possibilities of a more proactive approach to EU, but then again most of these NGOs 
just don’t have the knowledge, experience or resources to do this (Éinrí 2012). Irish 
social and human rights groups sustain the scholar’s perception, although one of them 
expresses hope that mentality change is the only way forward. 
 
As civil society, we need to have an impact 
on where Europe is going, not just continue 
to behave as if each country is on its own. 
We are now more and more federalised and 
we need to act like that. Organised like 
that… but we’ve barely started! (ISHG9). 
Cohesive European norms and values exist 
only when you go for a conference in 
Brussels. There you meet people who are 
able to articulate such a vision, but if you 
talk to an Irish person in the streets, you 
wouldn’t get an answer for this one! 
(ISHG12). 
 
Although some of the Irish environmental groups acknowledge the valid contribution of 
the Green Party in government in Dublin (2007-2011), particularly in adopting a more 
positive attitude and active engagement with the EU, other organisations remain sceptic 
of domestic politics. IEG16 is the most pronounced among the latter, ‘every green 
initiative that the government has ever embarked upon was not homegrown but forced 
by the EU’ (IEG16). However they still do not feel ‘a sense of belonging’ to the rest of 
the continent (IEG15). The degree of Europeanisation on green NGOs has actually been 
strong, mainly because of two reasons: ‘EU funds and EU legislation’ (IEG19). The EU 
did not challenge innate norms and embedded values, and the bailout experience has 
made things much more difficult. But membership did provide green NGOs with an 
opportunity to seek remedy in Brussels when Irish institutions failed (IEG18). 
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7.5.3.1  Mentality change and transformation effects  
 
Table 7.28 measures the extent of EU influence on members’ mindset. The mean rating 
scores in both countries are almost congruent (2.65 in Malta and 2.69 in Ireland), 
signifying that respondents are closer to considerable limits of influence on a four point 
likert scale. Since the p value exceeds the 0.05 criterion, no statistical difference 
emerges between Malta and Ireland. 
 
 
Table 7.28: The extent of EU influence on the mindset of SHEGs’ members  
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.65 1.047 2.45 2.84 4485.500 0.840 
 Ireland 2.69 1.001 2.46 2.91   
 
 
Similarly, Table 7.29 reveals the extent of influence by European federations’ norms 
and practices on the character of domestic interest groups. The mean rating score is the 
same for both countries (2.165 mean), implying a minor extent of influence on a four 
point likert scale. Since findings are highly comparable, no significant difference is 
affirmed. 
 
 
Table 7.29: The extent of influence on SHEGs by norms and practices of European federations 
Social, Human 
rights and 
Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.16 1.172 1.94 2.38 4469.000 0.804 
 Ireland 2.17 0.991 1.95 2.40   
 
 
Table 7.30 conveys a significant difference in the receptivity of Maltese and Irish 
SHEGs towards new ideas stemming from their European partners (Chi
2
=13.122, 
p=0.001). While 42.5% of the Maltese believe that there have been changes within their 
organisations that are attributed to their European partners, 47.8% deny any causal 
relationship between internal changes and external influences. Contrastingly, the Irish 
show a greater sense of inconclusiveness. 39.8% confirm the causal relationship, 31.3% 
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deny it and a substantial segment 28.9% did not give a definite answer and preferred the 
‘don’t know’ category. 
 
 
Table 7.30: Internal changes attributed to new ideas brought about by European partners 
There have been changes within the organisation that 
are attributed to new ideas brought about by 
European partners 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 48 33 81 
Percentage 42.5% 39.8% 41.3% 
No Count 54 26 80 
Percentage 47.8% 31.3% 40.8% 
Don't Know Count 11 24 35 
Percentage 9.7% 28.9% 17.9% 
Total Count 113 83 196 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 13.122, v = 2, p = 0.001  
 
 
 
While the three previous results showed the extent of European influence through 
vertical and lateral axis, the next one maps out the proper stimuli that trigger changes 
within domestic interest groups. Table 7.31 shows the ranking of five major stimuli 
emanating from the EU’s pattern and style of governance. In the case of Maltese 
SHEGs it is clear that they are primarily motivated by European funds (3.84 mean), 
followed by socialisation with European partners (3.10 mean). In the case of Irish 
SHEGs, the major stimulus of change is almost spread equally among three sources, 
namely socialisation with European partners (3.32 mean), European funds (3.31 mean) 
and the value of consensus (3.12 mean). The fact that the p value in the case of 
European funding is just on the point of 0.05 criterion of significance indicates that that 
the Maltese and Irish scores are comparable.  
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Table 7.31: Sources of stimulus that instigate change in SHEGs’ tactics & strategies 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean  Mann-
Whitney U 
Test p value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
European  
Funds 
Malta 3.8396 1.26253 3.4916 4.1876 617.0000 0.050 
Ireland 3.3065 1.20884 2.8630 3.7499   
Consensus  
Value 
Malta 2.6132 1.17523 2.2893 2.9371 661.0000 0.131 
Ireland 3.1129 1.37058 2.6102 3.6156   
Socialisation  
with Partners 
Malta 3.1038 1.14924 2.7870 3.4205 739.0000 0.437 
Ireland 3.3226 1.30095 2.8454 3.7998   
Positive  
Attitude 
Malta 2.4528 1.02029 2.1716 2.7341 689.0000 0.210 
Ireland 2.7097 .99812 2.3436 3.0758   
Training 
opportunities 
Malta 2.9906 1.15813 2.6713 3.3098 632.5000 0.075 
 Ireland 2.5484 .89773 2.2191 2.8777   
 
 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter presented a tremendous amount of findings, digesting quantitative and 
qualitative data to provide contrasting and analogous impressions of Ireland and Malta. 
Maltese SHEGs are more resolute to live up to their ‘European vocation’ to the full, 
despite inbuilt coercive constraints that impose limits to European exposure. Many of 
their leaders, particularly those of peak organisations and mediating bodies, talk about 
‘the need for Europe’ to reaffirm themselves, their organisation and for all they believe 
in. Contrastingly, the Irish are ambivalent to the European reality. Although they admit 
that their attitude, knowledge and experience towards European affairs are somehow 
limited, they are still vociferous to get from Brussels all that was denied by their 
government. 
 
The four major categories under which results have been segmented, that is, internal 
capabilities and limitations, cultural and political dynamics, domestic mediating 
institutions, and European influences are the four pillars on which the codification and 
measurement of Europeanisation effects are to be manifested. The analysis and 
interpretation of results pertaining to the four types of interest groups that have been 
selected as case studies, that is, social partners as well as interest groups, will be dealt 
with in the next chapter. The inquiry will be marshalled within the parameters of the 
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original conceptual framework, particularly by investigating the intermediate variables 
of the original set of hypotheses against the primary findings. As a result, one can then 
put to test the feasibility of the null hypothesis, signifying no indication of 
Europeanisation, or the alternative one, signifying that European influence has been 
registered either through the rational choice or the sociological model of the 
institutionalist theory. 
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 Chapter 8 
Hypothesis testing 
 
 
You cannot open a window and expect the wind not to blow through.
116
 
 
Joe Friggieri 
Maltese philosopher, poet and playwright 
(b.1946) 
 
 
8.1 Revisiting the original hypotheses 
 
This part discusses the major findings of the study as it brings together all the results 
that emerged from both quantitative and qualitative data streams that were presented in 
the previous two chapters. In particular, the analysis of findings is specifically 
marshalled to test the three original hypotheses presented in the introduction. The 
viability of the null hypothesis stating that: 
 
due to the inelasticity of domestic polity and politics, EU membership has made no 
significant change to the character of interest groups’ participation in the politics 
of Malta and/or Ireland 
 
depends on whether the resulting change is indeed statistically significant or not. In this 
case the result is to be determined by the Z-score model of hypothesis testing. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, meaning that Europeanisation has indeed been statistically 
significant, then the two alternative hypotheses have to be put to test. Qualitative 
evidence is eventually brought in to decode whether Europeanisation has been caused 
by enablers of rational choice institutionalism (RCI): 
 
through the emergence of new opportunities and constraints, EU membership has 
made a significant change to the character of interest groups’ participation in the 
politics of Malta and/or Ireland 
 
 
or whether it is a case which is better portrayed by sociological institutionalism (SI): 
 
through the provision of socialisation and collective learning processes, EU 
membership has made a significant change to the character of interest groups’ 
participation in the politics of Malta and/or Ireland. 
                                                 
116
 Patron, 2013 (ed. 2) p.3. 
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Answers have to be provided for both categories of interest groups, that is, social 
partners and SHEGs in each of the two selected member states. Consequently, it may 
result that none of the hypotheses can be discarded completely because different 
segments of interest groups in any member state may subscribe to differing degrees and 
natures of Europeanisation. 
 
8.2 Overview of the hypothesis testing process 
 
At this introductory stage it is important to establish a clear blueprint of how the process 
of hypotheses testing is to unfold. As shown in Figure 8.1, the entire model is divided 
into two major parts. On the one hand, part A is crucial to determine the extent of 
Europeanisation, that is whether it has been statistically significant or not. Part B, on the 
other hand, is indispensable to decode the true nature of Europeanisation, in other words 
to decipher whether rational or sociological triggers are predominantly at play to initiate 
and maintain change at the domestic level. 
 
The scope of part A is to test the first hypothesis, in other words to confirm or reject the 
null hypothesis which sustains that there is no significant relationship between EU 
membership and changes in the character of domestic interest groups. An affirmative 
answer can best be provided by a deductive approach that quantifies the extent of EU 
impact and, consequently demonstrates whether the resulting changes have been 
statistically significant or not. This is done, firstly, by bringing back in the results 
obtained in the questionnaires in order to establish the dimensional and global ratios 
between the number of scores that are greater than 50% and those that are less than 50% 
and, secondly, by computing the Z-scores to determine whether proportions differ 
significantly. The null hypothesis is accepted if the ensuing proportions do not differ 
significantly and this occurs when the estimated Z-score lies within the threshold of 
1.96 . An opposite result, in other words, where proportions differ significantly and go 
beyond the 1.96  limit, the null hypothesis is rejected. A more detailed explanation 
about this first part of the hypotheses testing model is provided immediately after this 
section. 
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Part A of Hypothesis Testing:
using quantitative analysis to determine
extent of Europeanisation
To determine the extent of EU impact, i.e. whether 
impact has been statistically significant or not 
Null Hypothesis
No significant 
Europeanisation of 
interest groups due to 
embedded structures, 
norms & constraints
Summarise questionnaires’ results, thus computing 
the ratios of non-significant scores to significant ones
Compute Z-score to test null hypothesis, i.e. to verify 
whether Europeanisation has been statistically 
significant or otherwise
Besides the overall statistical result, Z-scores are also 
computed for each dimension of domestic change: 
internal structures, domestic responsiveness,    
European involvement & norm transformation
If overall Z-score lies within
kkk  limit
If overall Z-score lies beyond 
t limit
Null hypothesis 
confirmed
Null hypothesis   
rejected
1.96
1.96
1.96
Z-score
threshold
Figure 8.1: Hypotheses Testing Model
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To decode the nature of EU impact: i.e. whether impact 
has been driven by rational or sociological triggers
RCI Hypothesis
Significant 
Europeanisation of 
interest groups through 
new opportunties and 
constraints
SI Hypothesis
Significant    
Europeanisation of     
interest groups           
through socialisation & 
collective learning
Testing RCI 
explanation
Testing SI 
explanation
Low number 
of veto points
Supporting 
formal 
institutions
Norm 
entrepreneurs
Cooperative 
informal 
institutions
Intermediate 
variables
Thematic Mapping Charts 
to define logic of change
resulting 
evidence
resulting 
evidence
RCI hypothesis 
appropriate
RCI hypothesis 
not appropriate
supportive
unfavourable
SI hypothesis 
appropriate
SI hypothesis 
not appropriate
Part B of Hypothesis Testing:
using qualitative analysis to decipher
nature of Europeanisation
In cases where 
the Null 
hypothesis is 
confirmed, the 
test to determine 
the nature of 
Europeanisation 
is still applied.
supportive 
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By the end of part A, the statistical extent of Europeanisation has been determined, 
hence confirming or eliminating the first hypothesis for each of the two cohorts of 
interest groups in both Malta and Ireland. The next step is to verify the two remaining 
hypotheses that both relate to the differing enablers of Europeanisation. Within a 
political environment characterised by institutions, one predicts that rational choice is 
the true driver for changes within and among domestic interest groups, while the other 
surmises that domestic transformations are the result of a set of sociologically-related 
factors. To this effect, part B is characterised by a qualitative model of analysis which 
puts each of these two hypotheses to test. Findings revealed in the previous two chapters, 
particularly those which are directly or indirectly related to the intermediate variables of 
the conceptual framework explained in the introduction, are once again brought up and 
interpreted in terms of their potential to instigate or resist changes as a consequence of 
EU membership. Resulting conclusions are mapped out in a series of thematic maps 
specifically designed to define the predominant logic of change in accordance with the 
most applauded hypothesis. This process of decoding the nature of Europeanisation is 
also applied to those cases where the null hypothesis is confirmed. In other words even 
when the extent of Europeanisation is statistically marginal, its nature is still explored 
using the same approach. More information about Part B of the hypotheses testing 
mechanism is provided in the second part of this chapter. 
 
Immediately afterwards, the analysis moves on to explore if there is a relationship 
between the results of part A and those of part B of the hypothesis testing exercise, in 
other words, if there is an association between the magnitude of change and its true 
nature.  In the end, the focus of the discussion is then directed towards answering the 
only remaining crucial question that has been flagged out in the introduction. This 
concerns the dilemma whether Europeanisation is the real source of domestic change or 
whether there are other prompters like globalisation and/or homegrown initiatives that 
are significant contributors of change within polities. The answer rests on a set of 
qualitative experiences that are derived directly from research participants. 
 
8.3 Determining the extent of Europeanisation 
 
Determining the extensiveness of EU influence on domestic interest groups is indeed 
the first conclusion that needs to be worked out. The computation of this pivotal finding 
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will either confirm or discredit the null hypothesis. The methodology adopted in this 
study leads to the quantification of European influence and thus, statistical models are 
to be introduced so as to determine whether the extent of Europeanisation has infact 
been statistically significant or not. The step-by-step process kicks in by compiling a 
rundown of all the results that have been derived from the questionnaires administered 
in Malta and Ireland. Once the proportions between minority and majority scores are 
presented, the application of the Z-score technique determines whether the difference 
between proportions has been statistically significant or not. Hence the null hypothesis 
will be tried and tested. 
 
8.3.1 Questionnaires results: the ground rules   
 
As already stated, part A of the hypothesis testing process starts by mapping out the 
quantitative findings of the questionnaires. Every questionnaire statement referring to a 
specific aspect related to Europeanisation is brought into two tabulations, each 
pertaining to the two cohorts of organised groups under study, where the reactions of 
research subjects are shown either as exceeding the 50% threshold or not exceeding the 
50%. If we take Table 8.1 as an example, then with 68.4% of Maltese social partners 
answering in the affirmative, the result yields a majority score because it goes beyond 
the 50% threshold. The Irish case is a minority score because only 38.2% of social 
partners participate in central coordination bodies.  
 
Table 8.1: Example of crosstab result          
 Participation in any coordination entities that bring 
together governmental and non-governmental bodies 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 26 13 39 
Percentage 68.4% 38.2% 54.2% 
No Count 12 21 33 
Percentage 31.6% 61.8% 45.8% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
    
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  
Furthermore, in cases involving a four-point likert scale, a majority score signifies that 
the participants’ reaction to a specific aspect has exceeded the mid-point position or 
median, that is, 2.5. If this is not surpassed, then the result is deemed to be a minority 
score. Table 8.2 presents us with a typical example. Since the mean for Maltese trade 
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unions and employers’ associations is 2.76, thus surpassing the mid-point position, it is 
considered as exceeding the 50% threshold. Contrastingly the Irish result, at a mean 
value of 2.00, does not exceed 50% because it does not go beyond the median at a value 
of 2.5.  
 
Table 8.2: Example of likert scale tab result 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.76 0.971 2.44 3.08 397.500 0.003 
 Ireland 2.00 1.073 1.63 2.37   
 
When conducting the ‘Difference between Proportions test’ it is customary to assume, 
when specifying the null hypothesis, that there is no difference between the two 
population proportions (p1-p2 = 0). Since in this thesis the two population proportions 
sum up to 1 (p1+p2 = 1), then the null hypothesis formally specifies that p1 = p2 = 0.5. 
Although there are other forms of null hypotheses, the one described here is by far the 
most commonly used in statistics. In fact, most of the statistical packages and online 
software that conduct this test assume that the two population proportions are equal (see 
http://www.socscistatistics.com/tests/ztest/). 
 
8.3.1.1  Elimination of borderline results 
 
The simple concepts explained in this section constitute the ground rules for the 
compilation of the summaries of the questionnaires’ results. However there is still one 
rule that needs a special mention as it concerns the elimination of certain results. This 
involves borderline cases, in other words where there has been an exact 50/50 
percentage divide in crosstabs or 2.5/2.5 ratio split in likert scales. For the purposes of 
this exercise, such results have been eliminated from the calculation and thus, the 
aspects in question are not marked under any column in the summary of results. 
Consequently, score boxes are only labelled as ‘borderline results’.117 
 
                                                 
117
 In the questionnaire results summary concerning social partners, there are two borderline cases. One of 
them occurs under the Maltese section, corresponding to statement 23, and the other one occurs in 
statement 38 under the Irish section. In the questionnaire results summary pertaining to SHEGs, there is 
one case of a borderline score. This occurs under the Irish section and corresponds to statement 18. 
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8.3.2 Questionnaire results summary: social partners 
 
Having explained the ground rules of how to interpret the results of the questionnaire, it 
is now appropriate to introduce the first of the two summary tables, that is, the one 
encapsulating the questionnaire scores of trade unions and employers’ associations in 
Malta and Ireland (Table 8.3). The ratios between the two types of scores, that is 
between those exceeding 50% and the rest that do not exceed such limit, become 
evident not only at the end of the table (called the global score ratio) but are also 
expressed at each dimensional level.  
 
After a brief exposition of the ensuing ratios, the second results summary is rolled-out 
in Table 8.5, this time incorporating the results of SHEGs’ questionnaire in both states 
as well.  
 
Table 8.3 gives a clear indication that at the time when this research exercise was 
conducted, social partners in both Malta and Ireland were indeed undergoing through a 
transformation phase because almost all of the resulting ratios favour the category of 
scores that exceed the 50% threshold. In fact, the global score ratio of minority scores to 
majority ones is 15:28 in Malta and 19:24 in Ireland. However a complete analysis of 
the elasticity of social partners with respect to European opportunities and values does 
not only take into consideration the overall picture but seeks to examine score ratios at 
of each of the four selected dimensions that match Van Schendelen’s anatomical 
metaphor of interest groups (Van Schendelen 2005). To this effect, Table 8.4 presents a 
summary of results compiled in the previous table with the intention of rendering the 
comparative process among the four dimensions more straightforward. 
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Table 8.3: Questionnaire results summary – social partners 
    Malta Ireland 
    
Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores  
exceeding 
50% 
1 
European dimension incorporated in the 
vision/mission statement of organisations 
   
2 
Intention to include a European dimension in 
the vision/mission statement if this is not 
already the case 
   
3 
Inclusion of responsibility of EU affairs in the 
organisations' committees 
   
4 
Participation in training programmes to 
acquire skills in EU affairs 
   
5 
Points of contact already established in 
Brussels                 . 
   
6 
Intention to establish points of contact in 
Brussels if this is not already the case 
   
7 Attempts to access EU funds    
8 Success achieved in obtaining EU funds    
9 
Intention to try again to access EU funds if 
unsuccessful in the past 
   
10 
Participation in EU related activities both 
domestically and abroad 
   
11 
Rate of participation in EU related activities 
has stabilised or is experiencing further 
increases in the past 8 years 
   
12 
The European dimension has been 
integrated within the events organised by 
domestic organisations 
   
RATIO:  INTERNAL STRUCTURES 3 9 5 7 
13 
Participation in domestic fora that discuss EU 
legislation 
   
14 
Participation in any coordination entities that 
bring together governmental and non-
governmental entities on EU affairs 
   
15 
Intention to start forming part of a 
coordinating entity if this is not already the 
case 
   
16 
Teaming up with other domestic 
organisations to solidify voice 
   
17 Involvement in private-public partnerships    
18 
The EU enhanced the role of individual 
organisations in the process of domestic 
policy-making  
   
19 
The EU has been instrumental in 
accentuating the culture of civil dialogue in 
domestic affairs   ................. 
   
20 
The EU induces domestic organisations to 
act more cohesively at the national level 
   
21 
The EU exerts pressure on national 
government to seek more participation from 
domestic organisations in policy-making 
   
RATIO: DOMESTIC RESPONSIVENESS 3 6 6 3 
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    Malta Ireland 
    
Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores  
exceeding 
50% 
22 
Participation in any of the EC's working 
groups 
   
23 
Submission of feedback concerning draft 
legislation issued by the European 
Commission 
borderline result  
24 
Engagement in consultation processes led by 
the EESC 
   
25 Affiliation to any European Federation    
26 
Intention of affiliation to any European 
federation if this is not already the case 
   
27 
Members of domestic organisations holding 
executive responsibilities within European 
federations 
   
28 
Engagement in lobbying with any institution 
of the EU 
   
29 
Identification of European partner 
organisations to cooperate over joint projects 
   
30 
Intention to work with other European partner 
organisations if this is not already the case 
   
31 
Engagement with other European partners 
through members' exchanges 
   
32 
Engagement with European partners through 
online activity 
   
RATIO:  EUROPEAN  INVOLVEMENT 7 3 5 6 
33 
EU membership affects the mind-set of 
organisations' members 
   
34 
The organisations' character has been 
influenced by norms and practices of 
European federations 
   
35 
There have been changes within 
organisations that are attributed to new ideas 
brought about by European partners 
   
36 
Organisations are encouraged by the pattern 
of EU governance to change their tactics and 
strategy in domestic negotiations 
   
37 EU funds as change stimulus    
38 Consensus value as change stimulus   borderline result 
39 Socialisation as change stimulus    
40 Positive attitude as change stimulus    
41 Training as change stimulus    
42 
National culture promotes the acquisition of 
new norms and values from a wider 
European experience 
   
43 
Participation in exercises involving sharing of 
best practices  
   
44 
Benchmarking exercises have transformation 
effects on the norms that shape the culture of 
organisations 
   
RATIO: ATTITUDINAL TRANSFORMATION  2 10 3 8 
GLOBAL SCORE RATIO 15 28 19 24 
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Change is evident in the great majority of aspects as Table 8.4 reveals, yet there are still 
specific pockets where the extent of change is still not evident. In the case of Maltese 
trade unions and employers’ associations, this is most noticeable in the dimension of 
European involvement where the ratio of minority scores to majority ones is 7:3. 
Feedback by research subjects suggests that the slow pace of Maltese engagement with 
the European actors is a consequence of coercive constraints due to smallness and 
islandness, namely inadequate funding, lack of human resources and a self-centred 
psyche. However there are indications that such impediments will become less 
important in the future and, hence, more change is envisaged in this regard. In fact in 
the remaining dimensions, that is, internal structures, domestic responsiveness and 
attitudinal transformation, the ratios of the number of scores not exceeding 50% to the 
ones exceeding the threshold are 3:9, 3:6 and 2:10 respectively, implying that the fabric 
of domestic actors is becoming more receptive to changes emanating from the EU. 
 
Table 8.4: Ratios at dimension levels – social partners 
 Malta Ireland 
 Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores 
exceeding 
50% 
Internal structures 3 9 5 7 
Domestic responsiveness 3 6 6 3 
European involvement 7 3 5 6 
Attitudinal transformation  2 10 3 8 
Global Score Ratio 15 28 19 24 
 
In the case of Ireland, trade unions and employers’ associations registered a greater 
number of majority scores than minority ones in three dimensions, as well as in the 
overall result. Actually, the ratios of the number of scores not exceeding 50% to the 
ones that go beyond the threshold are 5:7 in internal structures, 5:6 in European 
involvement and 3:8 in attitudinal transformation. This positive trend is reversed in 
connection to domestic responsiveness where the ratio of minority to majority scores is 
6:3. On a closer look at the ratios, one can conclude that the difference between Irish 
scores is not as wide as that revealed in the Maltese case, suggesting a more balanced 
score difference for trade unions and employers’ representatives in Ireland. Such a 
discrepancy in the proportions obtained in the two member states will definitely have a 
direct repercussion in the final stage of the hypothesis testing process. 
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8.3.3 Questionnaire results summary: SHEGs 
 
As hinted earlier, Table 8.5 shows a summary of questionnaire results relating to 
SHEGs in Malta and Ireland. Once again the ratios between the number of scores not 
exceeding 50% and those that exceed the threshold are highlighted not only on an 
overall basis but also across each of the four dimensions. 
 
Like social partners, SHEGs in Malta and Ireland are also undergoing a transformation 
process because of Europeanisation as indicated by the global score ratios in Table 8.5. 
In fact the global ratio of minority scores to majority ones is 20:24 in Malta and 20:23 
in Ireland. However, if one compares and contrasts the overall ratios obtained by 
SHEGS with the ones registered by social partners in Table 8.3, it can be concluded that 
in the case of SHEGs, ratios are much closer to each other in both member states, 
signifying that the extent of Europeanisation seems to be lower than the degree of 
change experienced by trade unions and employers’ representativeness.  
 
Having commented on overall comparisons, it is now appropriate to bring in the four 
dimensions across which Europeanisation is being calculated. Table 8.6 shows the 
resulting ratios between the two types of scores for each dimension, thus allowing for a 
more detailed classification among SHEGs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 278 
Table 8.5: Questionnaire results summary – SHEGs 
    Malta Ireland 
    
Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores 
exceeding 
50% 
1 European dimension incorporated in the 
vision/mission statement of organisations 
   
2 
Intention to include a European dimension in 
the vision/mission statement if this is not 
already the case 
   
3 Inclusion of responsibility of EU affairs in the 
organisations' committees 
   
4 Participation in training programmes to 
acquire skills in EU affairs 
   
5 Points of contact already established in 
Brussels 
   
6 Intention to establish points of contact in 
Brussels if this is not already the case 
   
7 Attempts to access EU funds    
8 Success achieved in obtaining EU funds    
9 Intention to try again to access EU funds if 
unsuccessful in the past 
   
10 Participation in EU related activities both 
domestically and abroad 
   
11 
Rate of participation in EU related activities 
has stabilised or is experiencing further 
increases over the past 8 years 
   
12 
The European dimension has been 
integrated within the events organised by 
domestic organisations 
   
RATIO:  INTERNAL STRUCTURES 3 9 5 7 
13 Participation in domestic fora that discuss EU 
legislation 
 
  

14 
Participation in any coordination entities that 
bring together governmental and non-
governmental entities on EU affairs 
   
15 
Intention to start forming part of a 
coordinating entity if this is not already the 
case 
   
16 Teaming up with other domestic 
organisations to solidify voice 
   
17 Involvement in private-public partnerships    
18 
The EU enhanced the role of individual 
organisations in the process of domestic 
policy-making  .... 
  borderline result 
19 
The EU has been instrumental in 
accentuating the culture of civil dialogue in 
domestic affairs 
   
20 The EU induces domestic organisations to 
act more cohesively at the national level 
   
21 
The EU exerts pressure on national 
government to seek more participation from 
domestic organisations in policy-making 
   
RATIO:  DOMESTIC RESPONSIVENESS 
6 3 5 3 
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    Malta Ireland 
    
Scores 
not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores  
exceeding 
50% 
Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores  
exceeding 
50% 
22 Participation in any of the EC's working 
groups 
   
23 Submission of feedback concerning draft 
legislation issued by the EC 
   
24 
Engagement in consultation processes led by 
the EESC 
   
25 Affiliation to any European Federation    
26 Intention of affiliation to any European 
federation if this is not already the case 
   
27 
Members of domestic organisations holding 
executive responsibilities within European 
federations 
   
28 
Engagement in lobbying with any institution 
of the EU 
   
29 Identification of European partner 
organisations to cooperate over joint projects 
   
30 Intention to work with European partner 
organisations if this is not already the case 
   
31 Engagement with other European partners 
through members' exchanges 
   
32 
Engagement with European partners through 
online activity 
   
RATIO:  EUROPEAN  INVOLVEMENT 8 3 8 3 
33 EU membership affects the mind-set of 
organisations' members 
   
34 
The organisations' character has been 
influenced by norms and practices of 
European federations 
   
35 
There have been changes within 
organisations that are attributed to new ideas 
brought about by European partners 
   
36 
Organisations are encouraged by the pattern 
of EU governance to change their tactics and 
strategy in domestic negotiations 
   
37 EU funds as change stimulus    
38 Consensus value as change stimulus    
39 Socialisation as change stimulus    
40 Positive attitude as change stimulus    
41 Training as change stimulus    
42 
National culture promotes the acquisition of 
new norms and values from a wider 
European experience 
   
43 
Participation in exercises involving sharing of 
best practices  
   
44 
Benchmarking exercises have transformation 
effects on the norms that shape 
organisational culture 
   
RATIO: ATTITUDINAL TRANSFORMATION 3 9 2 10 
  GLOBAL SCORE RATIO 20 24 20 23 
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Table 8.6: Ratios at dimension levels – SHEGs 
 Malta Ireland 
 Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores not 
exceeding 
50% 
Scores 
exceeding 
50% 
Internal structures 3 9 5 7 
Domestic responsiveness 6 3 5 3 
European involvement 8 3 8 3 
Attitudinal transformation 3 9 2 10 
Global Score Ratio 20 24 20 23 
 
Ratios across dimensions show differing trends within and across the two member states. 
The case of Malta is to be treated first, followed by the Irish one. In relation to domestic 
responsiveness and European involvement, Maltese SHEGs exhibit a negative trend 
where the ratios of the number of scores not exceeding 50% to the ones that go beyond 
the threshold are 6:3 and 8:3, respectively. Meanwhile, in the remaining dimensions, the 
trend is reversed. The ratio of minority scores to majority ones is 3:9 both in internal 
structures and attitudinal transformation. Once again coercive constraints and 
embedded inward-looking structures are the major sources of inertia that hinder 
organised groups’ ability to diversify their methods of interest representation and grasp 
European opportunities and routes of influence. However this inertia might start to lose 
ground in the future because the attitudes and mindset within the changing structures of 
interest groups are being reengineered to absorb European values. 
 
Change is also manifested among Irish SHEGs. In two out of four dimensions, namely 
internal structures and attitudinal transformation, the ratios of minority scores to 
majority ones are 5:7 and 2:10 respectively. In terms of domestic responsiveness and 
European involvement, the ensuing ratio reveals a contrary drift (5:3 and 8:3 
respectively). The reasons for the lack of Irish engagement with EU institutions and 
other fellow organisations from other member states are very similar to the ones brought 
up by their Maltese counterparts, most prominently, because of very limited resources, 
and for other reasons rooted in their political landscaping that has been treated 
extensively in chapter 3. Since the situation applies to both states, the reason might also 
be rooted in the lack of opportunities (or incentives) arising from the EU’s structures. 
This last notion will be dealt in greater detail in the next chapter where asymmetries of 
EU power in different policy domains will share the centre stage. 
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The next step is to convert current ratios that have been discussed so far into outcomes 
of statistical significance, thus completing the testing process of the null hypotheses. 
 
 
8.3.4 Statistical analysis 
 
Having displayed the full range of ratios establishing relationships between the number 
of scores exceeding 50% and those that do not, the next final step is to conduct a 
scientific exercise of hypothesis testing to determine the statistical degree of 
discrepancy between minority and majority proportions in Malta and Ireland. If the 
discrepancy between proportions turns out to be statistically comparable or marginal, 
then the null hypothesis is confirmed, meaning that EU membership has made no 
significant change to the character of Maltese and/or Irish interest groups. If, on the 
other hand, the discrepancy between proportions comes out to be statistically significant, 
then the empirical situation can be interpreted in terms of the alternative hypotheses, 
meaning that EU membership has made significant change to the character of interest 
groups’ participation in the public policy of Malta and/or Ireland.  
 
Methodologically, the extent of Europeanisation is to be computed for each of the four 
dimensions across which domestic change is quantified. Hence the reader would be in a 
better position to measure the impact of EU membership upon each of the different, yet 
inter-related clusters of organised groups’ composition, namely their skeleton (internal 
structures), flesh and blood (home and European fieldwork activity), and attitude 
(norms and values). 
 
Hypothesis testing is to be carried out using the Z-score technique for each cluster of 
statements and for all statements combined.
118
 Since we are testing whether two 
proportions differ significantly, the Z-score is the test to be used to confirm or reject the 
null hypothesis. The explanation of the statistical computations, together with relevant 
examples, is provided in the next two sections. 
 
 
                                                 
118
 For a complete mathematical explanation and citings of examples, access  
http://stattrek.com/sampling/difference-in-proportion.aspx 
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8.3.4.1  Computation of Z-score 
 
Suppose that Maltese trade unions and employers’ associations were assessed on 
1n  
aspects of scores exceeding 50% and 
2n  aspects of scores not exceeding 50%. Let 1X  be 
the number of aspects in which Maltese social partners exhibited a score exceeding 50% 
and let 
2X  be the number of aspects in which they scored less than the selected threshold. 
The sample proportions 
1p  and 2p  are: 
 
1
1
1
X
p
n
  and 22
2
X
p
n
  
 
The central limit theorem states that the random variable z (Z-score) has an approximate 
standard Normal distribution where: 
 
   
 
and 1 2
1 2
ˆ
X X
p
n n
+
=
+
 
 
If we assume that trade unions and employers’ associations in Malta can be assessed on 
a very larger number of aspects, then the actual proportions (
1p  and 2p ) of aspects in 
which they score more or less than the 50% threshold are unknown. In order to test 
whether the actual proportion 
1p  (actual proportion of aspects in which Maltese actors 
scored more than 50%) differs significantly from the actual proportion 
2p  (actual 
proportion of aspects in which Maltese actors scored less than 50%), we specify the 
following hypotheses: 
 
0 1 2
1 1 2
: 0
: 0
H p p
H p p
 
 
 
If we test for 
0H , the variable z becomes  since 1 2 0p p- = .  
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Figure 8.2: Normal distribution 
 
 
 
 
The shaded area in figure 8.2 under the standard Normal curve beyond 1.96  is 0.05.  
Hence the null hypothesis (actual proportions do not differ significantly) is accepted if 
the estimated value of z lies between 1.96 . On the other hand, the alternative 
hypothesis (proportions differ significantly) is accepted if the estimated value of z lies 
beyond 1.96 .   
 
8.3.4.2  Example of a statistical computation 
 
In 28 out of a total of 43 aspects social partners in Malta displayed a score greater than 
50%, whereas in 15 out of a total of 43 aspects they score less than 50%. For Maltese 
social partners, the sample proportion of aspects in which a score beyond 50% was 
exhibited is 65.11% and the sample proportion of aspects in which a score less than the 
threshold was exhibited is 34.89%.  
 
So 
1 43n  , 1 28X  , 2 43n   and 2 15X     
 
 
1
1
1
28
0.6511
43
X
p
n
    and 22
2
15
0.3489
43
X
p
n
     
 
1 2
1 2
28 15
ˆ 0.5
43 43
X X
p
n n
+ +
= = =
+ +
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Since 2.8033z =  exceeds 1.96 we accept the alternative hypothesis indicating that the 
proportion of aspects in which Maltese trade unions and employers’ representatives 
generated a score greater than the threshold (65.11%) is significantly larger than the 
proportion of aspects in which they generated a score less than 50% (34.89%). 
 
8.3.4.3  Testing the null hypotheses 
 
The next set of five sub-sections show the Z-scores for social partners and SHEGs in 
Malta and Ireland in order to identify the level of significance of discrepancies between 
minority and majority proportions. Based on the computation shown in the example 
above, the outcomes will lead to the confirmation or rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Maltese trade unions and employers’ associations are to be tackled first, followed by 
their Irish counterparts. Subsequently the hypothesis test will be applied to SHEGs, first 
in Malta and then in Ireland.  
 
 
8.3.4.4  Null hypothesis rejected for Maltese social partners 
 
This first case was originally worked out in the example above but this time is being 
reworked to show the statistical outcomes at dimension levels as well. The overall 
outcome in Table 8.7 presents scientific evidence that Maltese trade unions and 
employers’ associations have experienced a significant degree of Europeanisation. The 
outcomes in two dimensions, namely internal structures (z = 2.4497) and attitudinal 
transformation (z = 3.2660) are statistically significant. Maltese social partners are 
indeed undergoing a strong transformation phase wherein their corporate set-up 
(skeleton) and their culture and identity (attitude) are being reshaped due to EU 
membership. The other two dimensions produce a non-significant outcome, where the 
Z-score of domestic responsiveness is 1.4145 and that of European involvement is 
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1.7889. These latter results imply a minor European influence on the domestic and 
supranational interactivity (flesh and blood) performed by social partners in Malta. 
Nonetheless, these marginal results are outmatched by the significant outcomes derived 
from the rest of the dimensions, thus confirming that the overall impact of change due 
to European triggers on trade unions and employers’ associations in Malta has been 
significant in the 8 years period between 2004 and 2011 (z = 2.8052). This result leads 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 8.7:  Z-scores of Maltese social partners   
       
Dimension  
Proportion    
of scores 
more than 
50% 
Proportion 
of scores 
less than 
50% 
Average of 
the two 
proportions 
Standard 
Error Z-score Outcome 
Internal 
Structure 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.2041 2.4497 Significant 
Domestic 
Responsiveness 0.6667 0.3333 0.5 0.2357 1.4145 Marginal 
European 
Involvement 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.2236 -1.7889 Marginal  
Attitudinal 
Transformation 0.8333 0.1667 0.5 0.2041 3.2660 Significant  
Overall 
outcome 0.6512 0.3488 0.5 0.1078 2.8052 Significant  
 
     
 
8.3.4.5  Null hypothesis confirmed for Irish social partners 
 
The Irish case involving social partners provides a different overall outcome as 
exhibited in Table 8.8. Since the overall Z-score does not go beyond the limit of 1.96 , 
we accept the null hypothesis which confirms that the EU membership has made no 
significant change to the character of trade unions and employers’ associations in Irish 
politics. This trend is reflected across three dimensions, namely internal structure (z = 
0.8163), domestic responsiveness (z = 1.4141) and European involvement (z = -0.4264). 
The only significant outcome is in terms of attitudinal transformation where z = 2.1318 
but its impact is overshadowed by the previous three outcomes. Consequently, since the 
overall Z-value of 1.078 does not exceed the threshold, we accept the null hypothesis 
indicating that the number of proportions of aspects in which the representatives of Irish 
social partners exhibited a majority score (55.81%) is not significantly larger than the 
proportion of aspects in which they exhibited a minority score (44.19%). 
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Table 8.8:  Z-scores of Irish social partners   
       
Dimension  
Proportion 
of scores 
more than 
50% 
Proportion 
of scores 
less than 
50% 
Average 
of the two 
proportions 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
score Outcome 
Internal 
Structure 0.5833 0.4167 0.5 0.2041 0.8163 Marginal 
Domestic 
Responsiveness 0.33333. 0.6666 0.5 0.2357. 1.4145 Marginal 
European 
Involvement 0.4545 0.5454 0.5 0.2132 -0.4264 Marginal 
Attitudinal 
Transformation 0.7272 0.2727 0.5 0.2132 2.1318 Significant 
Overall 
Outcome 0.5581 0.4419 0.5 0.1078 1.0779 Marginal 
 
8.3.4.6  Null hypothesis confirmed for Maltese SHEGs 
 
So far hypothesis testing has been carried out with respect to social partners. The next 
round of computations revolves around SHEGs in Malta and Ireland. Table 8.9 
represents the scenario of Maltese SHEGs. Since the overall Z-score of 0.8536 lies 
between the 1.96  limit, we can once again confirm the sustainability of the null 
hypothesis. The overall outcome indicates that the proportion of aspects in which 
Maltese SHEGs representatives registered a score greater than 50% (54.55%) is not 
significantly larger than the proportion of aspects in which they obtained a score less 
than 50% (45.45%). This does not mean there is no substantial EU impact on any of the 
dimensions forming the character of SHEGs in Malta. In fact, two dimensions 
registered a significant outcome, namely internal structures and attitudinal 
transformation that both displayed a Z-value of 2.4498. This means that 
Europeanisation has been significant in terms of changes experienced within their 
organisational set-ups embracing committee formations, training, funding and 
disposition to participate in EU related activities, as well as the acquisition of new 
norms and values from a wider European experience. But this significant impact is 
completely reversed in the remaining dimensions, in particular direct European 
involvement where the outcome is highly marginal (z = -2.1318) meaning that the 
proportion of aspects in which Maltese groups displayed a minority score (72.73%) is 
significantly larger than the proportion of aspects where they registered a majority score 
(27.27%). In addition, the dimension of domestic responsiveness generated a non-
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significant result (z = 1.4145). The overall outcome, therefore, leads to the confirmation 
of the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 8.9: Z-scores of Maltese SHEGs   
       
Dimension  
Proportion 
of scores 
more than 
50% 
Proportion 
of scores 
less than 
50% 
Average 
of the two 
proportions 
Standard 
Error Z-score Outcome 
Internal 
Structure 0.75. 0.25. 0.5 0.2041 2.4498 Significant 
Domestic 
Responsiveness 0.3333 0.6667 0.5 0.2357 -1.4145 Marginal 
European 
Involvement 0.2727 0.7273 0.5 0.2132 -2.1318 
Highly 
marginal 
Attitudinal 
Transformation 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.2041 2.4498 Significant 
Overall 
Outcome 0.5455 0.4545 0.5 0.1066 0.8536 Marginal 
 
 
8.3.4.7  Null hypothesis confirmed for Irish SHEGs 
 
The null hypothesis is reaffirmed in the case of Irish SHEGs as indicated by the overall 
Z-score (0.6473) in Table 8.10 which lies within 1.96  limit. This means that the 
proportion of aspects in which Irish interest groups generated a score greater than 50% 
(53.49%) is not statistically larger than the proportion of aspects in which Irish actors 
generated a score less than 50% (46.51%). When analysing this case from a dimensional 
perspective, a number of interesting outcomes emerges. In contrast to the overall result, 
attitudinal transformation stands out very prominently since it is the only dimension in 
this case that defies the null hypothesis with a Z-value of 3.2665. However this trend is 
completely reversed by the rest of the dimensions, particularly internal structure (z = 
0.8163) and domestic involvement (z = -1.0) that both testify for an insignificant 
evidence of EU impact. Furthermore, in the case of direct European involvement, the 
outcome is highly marginal (z = -2.1318) meaning that the proportion of aspects in 
which Irish groups registered a minority score (72.73%) is significantly larger than the 
proportion of aspects where they registered a majority score (27.27%). Considering all 
evidence, the null hypothesis is confirmed, implying that EU membership has made no 
significant contribution to the overall character of Irish interest groups. 
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Table 8.10: Z-score of Irish SHEGs 
       
Dimension  
Proportion 
of scores 
more than 
50%  
Proportion 
of scores 
less than 
50% 
Average 
of the two 
proportions 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
score Outcome 
Internal 
Structure 0.5833 0.4167 0.5 0.2041 0.8163 Marginal 
Domestic 
Responsiveness 0.375 0.625 0.5 0.25 -1.0 Marginal 
European 
Involvement 0.2727 0.7272 0.5 0.2132 -2.1318 
Highly 
marginal 
Attitudinal 
Transformation  0.8333. 0.1667 0.5 0.2041 3.2665 Significant 
Overall 
Outcome 0.5349 0.4651 0.5 0.1078 0.6473 Marginal 
 
8.3.5 Concluding the verification process of the null hypothesis 
 
We have reached the end of the verification process of the null hypothesis. Table 8.11 
displays the complete scenario derived from such an extensive deductive analysis. The 
only instance where the null hypothesis has been rejected is in the case of Maltese trade 
unions and employers’ associations, indicating that the alternative hypothesis built on 
the premise that the extent of Europeanisation is statistically significant has been 
confirmed. To this effect, EU membership did have a significant impact on the internal 
structure and attitudinal transformation of Maltese social partners, but failed to change 
significantly their ‘laid-back’ approach in terms of home fieldwork and direct 
engagement with European institutions. 
 
In the remaining three instances, the null hypothesis has been confirmed with respect to 
Irish trade unions and employers, together with Maltese and Irish SHEGs. In these cases, 
the results verify that EU membership has made no significant change to the overall 
character of the organised groups involved, in other words the extent of Europeanisation 
has not been statistically significant. Despite this assertion, there are certain specific 
dimensions within such organisations which have been significantly impacted by 
stimuli sprouting from the EU and the rest of its member states. For example in the case 
of Maltese SHEGs, organisational structure and culture challenge the overall result as it 
is statistically proven that they have been significantly changed because of EU influence. 
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Likewise, attitudinal transformation is the only dimension within Irish social partners 
and SHEGs that is experiencing a significant degree of Europeanisation. 
 
Table 8.11: Confirmation or rejection of null hypotheses 
 
 
 
Cohort of interest 
groups  
 
 
 
Member 
State 
Overall 
statistical 
difference 
between 
proportions 
 
 
 
Null 
hypothesis 
 
Specific dimensions of 
interest groups that are 
significantly impacted by 
Europeanisation 
Trade unions and 
employers’ 
associations 
 
Malta 
 
Significant 
 
Rejected 
Internal structures and 
attitudinal transformation 
Trade unions and 
employers’ 
associations 
 
Ireland 
 
Marginal 
 
Confirmed 
 
Attitudinal transformation 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
 
Malta 
 
Marginal 
 
Confirmed 
 
Internal structures and 
attitudinal transformation 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
 
Ireland 
 
Marginal 
 
Confirmed 
 
Attitudinal transformation 
 
In conclusion, the results in Table 8.11 show that although the null hypothesis 
dominates in three out of the four cohorts of interest groups, there are elements of 
gradual change currents that are silently reconfiguring the anatomical chart of domestic 
interests groups. In Van Schendelen’s terms, their skeleton, flesh, blood, as well a 
attitude are being remoulded against a political backdrop which is becoming less and 
less capable of delineating between domestic and European politics. Notwithstanding 
this way forward, the results point out that there is a major setback that is slowing down 
the degree of Europeanisation in all four instances: very weak direct European 
involvement. From previous tables, we know that in this specific dimension, social 
partners in Malta and Ireland Maltese registered insignificant Z-values, meaning that the 
majority of unions and employers remain disengaged with the institutional architecture 
of the EU. The situation is even more severe in the case of SHEGs in both member 
states where Z-scores produced outcomes of high marginality meaning that they are 
almost totally inactive vis-à-vis direct contribution (in the form of consultation and 
participation) and indirect access (in the form of lobbying) to the EU.  
 
The analysis of the results concerned with the extent of Europeanisation comes to an 
end here. In the next section, a new analysis relating to the nature of Europeanisation 
opens up.  
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8.4 Decoding the nature of Europeanisation 
 
So far we have established by definite quantitative evidence which cohorts of interest 
groups in Malta and Ireland have experienced a significant or a marginal degree of 
Europeanisation. However, the typology of Europeanisation is still not yet established. 
This information is crucial to test the other two original alternative hypotheses, the first 
based on RCI’s and the second based on SI’s explanations. The process of decoding the 
nature of Europeanisation will not be applied to the only instance where EU impact has 
been found to be significant. As explained in the Hypotheses Testing Model (Figure 
8.1), even in those instances where the extent of EU impact is found to be marginal will 
also be put to test in order to determine whether the roots of their marginal change are 
diffused in RCI or SI logics. Thus, whether marginal or significant in its extent, the 
process of Europeanisation still needs to be decoded in terms of its typology to achieve 
the overall scope of this study. 
 
The first endeavour is to establish which change triggers are at play for each cohort of 
interest groups in the two polities. In particular we have to decipher the cause and effect 
relationship between, on the one hand, Europeanisation as a result of opportunities and 
constraints (RCI understanding) and, on the other hand, Europeanisation as a result of 
socialisation and norm entrepreneurship (SI understanding).  
 
8.4.1 Bringing in the intermediate variables 
 
Distinguishing between the two parallel explanations of Europeanisation can only be 
determined by analysing the intermediate variables that act as mediating factors 
between the independent and dependent variables as explained in the hypotheses models 
in chapter 1. For ease of reference the two alternative hypotheses, together with their 
respective sets of variables, are reproduced in Figure 8.2. The answer is provided 
through a qualitative process of analysis by collating all the relevant coded findings that 
portray the intermediate (mediating) variables, thus assessing how different extracts 
combine to form an overarching theme. In this line of thought, the use of thematic maps 
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is crucial to sort the different codes into themes and to visualise the relationships 
between them (Braun and Clarke 2006). 
 
Figure 8.3: The two alternative hypotheses 
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socialisation 
and 
mutual learning
Number of veto 
points
+
Supporting formal 
institutions
Norm entrepreneurs
+
Cooperative informal
institutions
Elastic
organisational 
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lobby operations 
of interest groups
Elastic  
normative identity 
and
working culture
of interest groups 
EU institutional 
framework, 
rules, 
incentives and 
constraints
Research Context determined by Small States’ Governance
RCI
hypothesis
SI
hypothesis
Independent 
variable
Intervening 
variable
Dependent 
variable
In particular, direct reference is to be made to the set of intermediate variables that 
characterise RCI and SI hypotheses. In the case of RCI, the process of Europeanisation 
is facilitated or hindered through the dynamics of veto playing and formal institutions. 
Veto playing refers to the number of players in the sector and looks specifically to their 
ability to capitalise on strategies of synergy or rivalry.  Supporting formal institutions, 
on their part, are indeed pivotal in providing interest groups with resources and ideas 
that will ultimately lead to new configurations of empowerment. The intermediate 
variables shaping the SI hypothesis are also two, namely norm entrepreneurship and 
informal institutions. Whereas the first variable connotes to the existence of change 
agents that defy the status quo, the second one implies a political culture distinguished 
by informality and pragmatism. Qualitative data rolled out in the previous two chapters 
are now to be filtered through these four intermediate variables so as to determine which 
explanation of Europeanisation is best suited to decode the true typology of 
transformation that is happening among social partners and SHEGs in Malta and Ireland. 
 292 
8.4.1.1  A sociological Europeanisation of Maltese social partners 
 
Thematic mapping will first be applied to social partners, starting first with Maltese 
actors and then analysing the Irish ones. Figure 8.4 gives comprehensive evidence that 
Maltese trade unions and employers’ associations are being Europeanised through a 
process predominantly understood by a logic of appropriateness, hence the SI 
hypothesis provides the most appropriate explanation.  
 
The intermediate variables of RCI hypothesis work against change because domestic 
politics is highly polarised and, consequently, contagiously divisive. The sector is 
fragmented among various umbrella group formations whose voices are not normally 
consensual. Although centralised, tripartite and consultative institutions are in place and 
participation in formal social dialogue is the general norm, claims of partisan politics 
are numerous, regular and many often bitterly debated. Additionally, dialogue initiatives 
are often labelled as mere smokescreens by non-state stakeholders. SI’s mediating 
factors, on the other hand, are more appropriate to facilitate change due to 
Europeanisation. Culture is being gradually changed by a number of individual change 
agents from among civil society itself, and sometimes also from the political sphere, 
who do not play a victim’s role within inherited systems and polarised paradigms. 
Instead they strive to transform the mindset of their fellows. Informal contacts are ample 
though they are not necessarily deemed as most fair and effective in the long run. 
Additionally workers’ and employers’ representatives in Malta aim to render their 
institutions and processes of decision-making closer to the European model as this is 
considered desirable and legitimate.  
 
These forces have opened the way for greater socialisation with European partners and 
the internalisation of European values based on pluralism and common grounds that are 
challenging inherited practices, characterised by delicate matters dictated by personal as 
much as corporate conflicts. The logic of appropriateness, thus, explains the process of 
Europeanisation of Maltese social partners. Such logic promotes the need for civil 
dialogue, consensus-seeking culture, alliance formation, cross sectoral interactivity and 
sharing of best practices. 
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Figure 8.4: The sociological nature of Europeanisation of Maltese social partners 
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8.4.1.2  A rationalist Europeanisation of Irish social partners 
 
The Irish case presents a totally different narrative because there are a number of 
fundamental differences between Maltese and Irish political structures and cultures. The 
mediating variables pertaining to RCI hypothesis facilitate domestic change as a result 
of low incidence of veto playing and a strong history of institutions based on the 
principle of consensus-seeking (see Figure 8.5). These dynamics instigate a top-down 
logic of consequences wherein transformations are caused as a result of European 
regulations, directives, funding and impingement procedures, rather than by horizontal 
enablers of change like interactivity with other European partners and participation in 
sharing of best practices exercises. The existence of a legitimate and powerful Congress 
of Irish Trade Unions, and likewise an Irish Business and Economic Confederation, 
secures synergies among players and, hence, limiting the element of veto playing. 
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Furthermore, the concept of Social Partnership, even if it is now defunct among social 
partners, has cemented a national culture based on consensus-seeking.  
 
In contrast, the sociological aspect of Europeanisation is downplayed by a lack of norm 
entrepreneurs and a political culture that does not hold Europe as a reference point. 
Reflecting on the dramatic downfall of the Irish economy, stakeholders declined the 
claim of being change agents because they proved ineffective in not letting this collapse 
happen. In addition, due to their emotional and economic attachment to the Anglo-
Saxon world, primarily the UK, USA and Australia, the Irish feel sociologically 
detached from ‘the rest of the European continent’. The combination of these factors 
leads to a process of Europeanisation among Irish social partners based on the logic of 
calculation, even when adapting organisational norms, thus, rendering the RCI 
hypothesis more appropriate to determine the nature of change for the period under 
review. 
 
 
Figure 8.5: The rationalist nature of Europeanisation of Irish social partners 
Irish Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations
1. EU impact on social partners is more significant in terms of European regulations, directives and funding than in 
terms of socialisation through a wider European experience
2. Changes in mentality are the result of rational calculation to better access the incentives of EU membership
3. a general outlook of the EU which seems ambivalent more than ever, particularly, during the bailout period
Veto Points
• One Congress of trade 
unions with a long 
outstanding history
• One strong 
Confederation of 
business & industry 
and two defunct voices, 
farmers & small firms
• Low no. of veto 
players
Supporting formal 
institutions
• Recent Irish history 
dominated by a  
centralised bargaining 
system
• A strong corporatist 
economic model of  
interest mediation which 
has now been dismantled
Norm 
entrepreneurs
• Social partners are 
very sceptic of their 
change potential 
• Trade unions lack 
vision and relevance
• Local employers lack 
clout when compared to 
the multinationals
Cooperative  
informal institutions
•Personal contacts and 
discreet lobbying  have 
mushroomed in post Social 
Partnership Ireland
• Political culture geared 
towards the English-
speaking world and not 
towards Europe
Assessment of Intermediate variables 
RCI variables SI variables
Process of Europeanisation
predominantly understood by a                  
logic of consequences leading to:
Mario Vassallo 2014 
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8.4.1.3  A sociological and rationalist Europeanisation of Maltese SHEGs 
 
Having decoded the type of Europeanisation being experienced by social partners, 
attention will now shift to decipher the situation of other sectors within civil society, 
namely interest groups involved in social, human rights and environmental work. 
Maltese SHEGs are more resolute to live up to their ‘European vocation’ to the full, 
despite inbuilt coercive constraints that impose limits to European exposure. Many of 
their leaders, particularly those of peak interest groups and mediating bodies, talk about 
‘the need for Europe’ to reaffirm themselves, their organisation and all they believe in 
(see Figure 8.6). Consensus among the two political parties on EU membership, after an 
extremely bitter, divisive and polarised referendum campaign in 2004, brought a shared 
commitment towards the Europeanisation of Malta. Experience on the ground is 
indicating that the insular culture and behavioural attitudes of interest groups are 
likewise being gradually transformed through a process of normativeness and 
interaction among a wider network of European political communities.  
 
Figure 8.6: The rationalist and sociological natures of Europeanisation of Maltese SHEGs 
Veto Points
• Fragmented sector
• Mistrust not only 
between state entities 
and civil society 
groups but also among 
groups themselves
• Gradually, umbrella 
formations are making 
their way in.
Supporting formal 
institutions
• Civil dialogue started to be 
institutionalised on the road to EU 
accession
• Frustration often expressed 
because of alleged fake 
consultation
• Very positive feedback re: state 
aid on accessing Euro funding & 
identification of Euro partners
Norm 
entrepreneurs
• Many express 
confidence that interest 
groups are authentic
change catalysts
•The visibility & impact of 
the voluntary sector are 
far greater than its size.
Cooperative  
informal institutions
• Informal channels are
widespread and deemed 
to be more effective in the
short term
• Domestic political culture 
characterised by a positive 
outlook towards the EU.
Maltese Social, Humanitarian and Environmental groups
1. the take-up of new values and opportunities provided by the EU to change the way they do fieldwork in the domestic 
arena and, at the same time, a drive towards peer learning through interaction with European partners
2. simultaneous chain reactions of institutional and mentality changes that could not have been realised in a such a 
short period if it were not for EU impetus.
Assessment of Intermediate variables 
RCI variables SI variables
Process of Europeanisation
predominantly understood by a logic of consequences and a 
logic of appropriateness leading to:
Mario Vassallo 2014 
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This is clear evidence that the SI hypothesis is the preferred explanation of the nature of 
Europeanisation in this case; however the story does not end here. The intermediate 
variables within RCI hypothesis also work in tandem, thus suggesting that 
Europeanisation of Maltese interest groups is made possible by both logics of 
appropriateness and consequences. Although certain sectors of civil society are 
considerably fragmented where lack of trust characterises inter-groups’ relations, there 
are many indications that groups have started to look for better ways of interest 
representation, not least by joining forces and forming networks and partnerships. From 
their end, centralised institutions of civil dialogue benefit from a positive legacy dating 
back to pre-EU membership, even though they are still not free from political 
controversy like everything else in Malta. These institutions are extremely important in 
providing interest groups with free expertise on European funding and the identification 
of European partners. This ultimately leads to an enriched resource base which 
traditionally has been very poor both for national and local NGOs. All in all, Maltese 
interest groups are learning fast the rules of the game at the European level and, 
simultaneously, socialising with a more diversified platform of European organisations 
to which they did not have access in the past. 
 
As a result of the synchronous interplay between the two set of intermediate variables 
pertaining to the two alternative hypotheses, which theory holds to be mutually 
exclusive, the marginal Europeanisation of SHEGs in Malta is to be understood by both 
logics of the two major stripes of new institutionalism. 
 
8.4.1.4  A rationalist Europeanisation of Irish SHEGs 
 
Like Irish trade unions and employers’ associations, SHEGs in Ireland are ambivalent to 
the European reality. Although they publicly admit that their attitude, knowledge and 
experience of European affairs are somehow limited, they are still vociferous in getting 
from Brussels all that is being denied by their government in the social and 
environmental policy domains (see Figure 8.7). Accession to the EU provided them 
with an increased number of opportunities and incentives, in particular legislative 
measures, lobbying avenues and funding resources, to exercise their influence in more 
pragmatic ways, always in search of optimum results to maximise the attainment of 
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their respective interests. Again, there are low numbers of veto points within the Irish 
system of interest representation, hence, fostering a culture of consensus-seeking and 
compromise. Social Partnership structures are still functional or quasi-functional for 
SHEGs. Informal channels of communication and lobbying exist in abundance in 
Ireland but they are not necessarily to the advantage of ‘small’ interest groups. In their 
words, ‘they work best for business interests’.  
 
At the same time, over a span of forty years of membership, very little improvement has 
been registered in terms of socialisation with other European partners. Indifference was 
the norm rather than the exception because priority was always given to British, 
American and other counterparts that use English as their first language of 
communication.  Furthermore Irish SHEGs do not consider themselves as change agents. 
Reflecting once again on the Irish economic downfall, they lament about their failure to 
present an alternative and more sustainable narrative to greed and selfishness 
promulgated throughout the years of economic boom. When taking stock of all the 
factors at play, it transpires that the type of Europeanisation characterising Irish interest 
groups finds its roots in RCI understanding. The low number of veto points and the long 
established culture of supporting formal institutions facilitate a series of gradual 
changes based on consequential rationale. 
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Figure 8.7: The rationalist nature of Europeanisation of Irish SHEGs 
Irish Social, Humanitarian and Environmental Groups
Process of Europeanisation
predominantly understood by a                  
logic of consequences leading to:
1. a reliance of strategic lobbying within the EU institutional architecture, in particular environmental groups, to introduce 
and/or enforce social and environmental legislation in Ireland
2. acquisition of EU funding to address poor resource base of domestic organisations
3. imported legislation and methods of governance from the EU led to more recognition of Irish interest groups in domestic 
politics but so far it did not materialised into a reconfiguration of the resource base that alters power dynamics
Veto Points
• Low number of veto 
players
• A very strong culture 
of consensus 
settlement
• Groups are flexible 
when taking 
decisions
Supporting formal 
institutions
• Social Partnership 
structures are still 
functional or quasi-
functional for these groups
• Structures provide 
groups with material & 
ideational resources
Norm 
entrepreneurs
• Groups do not 
consider themselves as 
change catalysts
• They failed to drive an 
alternative narrative of 
what society can be like
Cooperative  
informal 
institutions
• Informal influence has 
always been more 
crucial than formal one 
but this works best for 
business interests 
• Low interest to interact 
with European partners
Assessment of Intermediate variables 
RCI variables SI variables
Mario Vassallo 2014 
 
8.5 Putting it all together 
 
The four thematic maps have decoded which of the two fundamental natures of 
Europeanisation applies to each category of interest groups. The extent of these 
processes, whether marginal or significant, has already been established using statistical 
computations. Therefore this is the point where a comprehensive answer can be 
provided with respect to the original set composed of three hypotheses. Table 8.14 
summarises the concluding results by integrating the statistical and qualitative analyses 
that have been used and, in the end, proposes amended hypotheses on the basis of the 
findings. 
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Table 8.12: Amendments of the original set of hypotheses 
       
Category of 
interest 
groups 
Member 
State 
Extent of Europeanisation                                        
- dimension level -                         
                           
Extent of 
Europeanisation 
- overall level - 
Nature of 
Europeanisation Amended hypothesis 
    dimension Extent       
Trade unions 
and 
employers' 
associations Malta 
Internal structure  
Domestic responsiveness 
European involvement  
Attitudinal transformation 
Significant                 
Marginal                         
Marginal                    
Significant Significant 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
Through the provision of socialisation 
and collective learning processes, EU 
membership has made a significant 
change to the overall character of 
social partners in Malta, in particular 
their internal structure and attitude 
formation. 
Trade unions 
and 
employers' 
associations Ireland 
Internal structure            
Domestic responsiveness 
European involvement  
Attitudinal transformation 
Marginal          
Marginal                       
Marginal                    
Significant Marginal 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
Although calculative rationale brought 
about a substantial attitudinal 
transformation among leaders of  Irish 
social partners, EU membership has 
made no significant change to the 
partners’ overall character. 
Social, 
Human rights 
and 
Environmental 
Groups Malta 
Internal structure  
Domestic responsiveness 
European involvement  
Attitudinal transformation 
Significant                       
Marginal                       
Highly marginal    
Significant Marginal 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism and 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
Although rational and sociological 
motivations brought about substantial 
change in the organisational and 
attitude formation of interest groups in 
Malta, EU membership has made no 
significant change to their overall 
character. 
Social, 
Human rights 
and 
Environmental 
Groups Ireland 
Internal structure  
Domestic responsiveness 
European involvement  
Attitudinal transformation 
Marginal          
Marginal         
Highly marginal    
Significant Marginal 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
Although calculative rationale brought 
about a substantial attitudinal 
transformation among leaders of Irish 
interest groups, EU membership has 
made no significant change to the 
groups’ overall character. 
       
      Mario Vassallo 2014 
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Europeanisation led to a significant impact on Maltese trade unions and employers’ 
associations, primarily, because of a number of stimuli associated with SI. Hence the SI 
hypothesis is confirmed in this case. Contrastingly their Irish counterparts have been 
marginally influenced by the process of Europeanisation. Such marginal changes have 
been prompted by factors attributed to RCI. In the circumstances, since Europeanisation 
did not cause a significant change in the overall character of Irish unions and employers, 
the null hypothesis is approved. There is one important proviso, however: the EU 
managed to transform substantially their leaders’ attitude formation. The null hypothesis 
has also been confirmed with respect to SHEGs in both Malta and Ireland with the 
proviso that substantial change was registered in the attitude of groups’ leaders in both 
Malta and Ireland. However the typography of Europeanisation varies from one member 
state to the other. Whereas changes among Maltese SHEGs are triggered by stimuli 
pertaining to both RCI and SI, SHEGs in Ireland are predominantly affected by RCI’s 
mediating factors. 
 
8.5.1 An unusual finding 
 
The amendments of the original set of hypotheses produce an unusual finding, namely 
that substantial attitudinal change seems to have arisen from rationalist interpretation in 
both cases involving Irish actors. This distinctive conclusion resulting from a systematic 
investigation challenges academic literature which postulates that a change in the set of 
organisational norms and values is motivated by sociological rather than rationalist 
impelling forces. This surprising contribution originating from the testing of two 
parallel interpretations and, in particular, the application of statistical measurements 
merits an explanation.  
 
In this case, qualitative narrative is the key to understand quantitative results. Irish 
interviewees confirm that over the years they have mirrored their government approach 
of treating the EU as a source of money. Consequentially, they were stimulated to 
gradually change their attitude because of rational calculation rather than out of 
conviction. Their level of socialisation on a European platform was low because of two 
major reasons: (a) lack of resources and (b) insular mentality. However this scenario 
started being challenged only recently when Irish unions, employers and interest groups 
began to realise that the EU’s paradigm is not necessarily that of a cash cow. They 
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became attracted to the idea that, above all, the EU can also be about active citizenship. 
Ironically this fresh attitude within the Irish psyche towards the European project 
coincided with the bail out experience which in itself provoked Euroscepticism on a 
grand scale. Such a trade off between EU citizenship and scepticism in the collective 
mind-set of the Irish nation requires further research in the future. 
 
8.5.2 Relation between extent and nature of Europeanisation 
 
The stimulus of attitudinal transformation in the two Irish cases may not be the only 
unusual finding, as there may be other atypical findings. At this point, it is logical to 
address one of the two remaining questions, that is, whether the statistical and narrative 
results exhibit a direct relation between the nature and extent of Europeanisation or not. 
However there is a point of theoretical connotation that is worth explaining before 
providing the answer.  
 
Some scholars assume that the extent of the EU effect is determined by the nature of EU 
triggers. For instance, Börzel and Risse (2003) claim that the EU’s transformative 
power is rather limited when only formal EU rules, regulations and institutional 
conditionalities are at play. Consequently the RCI approach tends to see and imply 
adaptation as skin deep because the logic is one of calculation, and calculation could 
change over time. Contrastingly, the SI approach embraces ideational, learning and 
normative factors to the definition of EU institutions and sees the EU as a model or 
promoter of socialisation and norm diffusion (Jupille at al. 2003, Risse 2001, Hall and 
Taylor 1996). This distinction led Vink (2003) to propose two types of Europeanisation, 
namely thin (or shallow) and thick (or deep) Europeanisation. Thin Europeanisation 
follows the RCI and demonstrates a limited and behavioural change under the EU 
pressures while thick Europeanisation reinforces SI that allows for substantial and long-
term EU effect, together with deeply embedded changes related to identity and 
collective culture at domestic level (Buhari 2009: 111/2).  
 
The statistical and narrative results obtained through this research comply with the 
distinction elucidated by Vink. In this line of thought, statistical significance relates to 
profound and thick EU effect, whereas statistical insignificance refers to marginal and 
thin Europeanisation. In the case of social partners in Malta, on the one hand, the impact 
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of Europeanisation is deemed to be significant because of SI stimuli. On the other hand, 
the Europeanisation of social partners and SHEGs in Ireland has been driven by factors 
largely attributed to RCI and, as a matter of fact, the impact of change is of statistical 
insignificance. In the end, the case of SHEGs in Malta where marginal Europeanisation 
is caused by both RCI and SI triggers seems to be atypical because it neither conforms 
to the thin/thick typography of Europeanisation nor to the traditional theoretical 
dichotomy between RCI and SI frameworks. The first anomaly may be explained in 
terms of context specific reasons, where coercive constraints because of smallness and 
islandness preclude Maltese SHEGs from a more direct and interactive engagement at 
the EU level. Statistical results showing high marginality in the dimension of European 
involvement (refer to Tables 8.4 and 8.6) support this explanation. The second anomaly 
is explained by more recent literature works on Europeanisation that favour a ‘synthetic 
approach’ of the two logics of political action, despite their conflicting and 
epistemological attributes. The issue of the complimentary nature between RCI and SI 
will be revisited in the concluding chapter. 
 
8.5.3 Europeanisation or not? 
 
 
The only remaining unanswered question concerns the dilemma if we are giving too 
much importance to Europeanisation as the instigator of change.  Is Europeanisation the 
true cause of domestic changes within the system of interest representation or are there 
other causes that trigger change due to globalisation and/or homegrown initiatives? In 
other words, are we attributing excessive importance to Europeanisation, particularly if 
there are other factors at play that are not necessarily confined to the European 
integration model? These questions merit a definitive answer that wipes out any 
misconceptions and unrealistic assumptions. 
 
Europeanisation shares the same approach of globalisation
119
 in the sense that it obliges 
states to embrace international competition, open their markets and, at the same time, 
                                                 
119
 The processes and structures of globalisation rest on a theoretically contested sphere. Simply put, 
globalisation denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of 
transcontinental flows and patterns of economic activity and social interaction. It refers to a shift or 
transformation in the scale of human organisation that links distant communities and expands the reach of 
power relations across the world’s regions and continents (Held and McGrew 2005: 1). Capitalism, 
information technology and travel industries are deemed to be the major driving forces of globalisation. 
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depoliticise decisions and issues. However there are key differences between the two. 
Firstly, Castells (2000), Delanty and Rumford (2005) and Ladrech (2010) maintain that 
Europeanisation is acting both as a guarantor of global forces and as a protector against 
the negative impacts of globalisation. Secondly, Europeanisation is not only 
encouraging market liberalisation and states’ interdependence but is transferring central 
funds to states, regions and non-state actors in order to become more economically 
competitive and socially cohesive. This is surely not the case of globalisation which is 
often singled out as the major cause of increasing the gap between the rich and the poor, 
not only across countries but within developed states as well (Stiglitz 2002, Held and 
McGrew 2005). 
 
For the purpose of this work, qualitative findings are to be employed to answer this 
question. Stakeholders’ feedback during interviews favours the premise that the true 
cause of domestic change is the EU rather than globalisation. However interest group 
leaders in Malta and Ireland, including trade unionists, do not negate the influence of 
globalisation but, at the same time, affirm that Europe is the biggest motivator for 
change. 
 
Europe is the true stimulus of change, but 
because of Malta’s strategic position in 
relation to North Africa, we shall be 
looking towards a global perspective as 
well (MSHG13). 
 
Globalisation plays a very important part 
but the reality is that Malta forms part of 
the European region. We have to learn how 
to live within this reality (MTU3). 
 
Changes in trade-unionism are the effect of 
globalisation but Europe brought a stronger 
fellowship among our unions (MTU1). 
Europe is the major cause of our change in 
mentality in environmental matters, 
although the global platform exists as well 
(MEG19). 
 
Globalisation does have an effect, but in 
social policy matters Europeanisation 
stimulus is more tangible (ISHG10). 
 
Notwithstanding Social Partnership, many 
of the significant developments on behalf of 
the workers in the last 25 years emerged 
from Europe. The EU was the real impetus 
(ITU3). 
 
The only exception is in the case of LGBT rights and other civil rights movements 
where ‘change goes beyond Europe’ (MSHG10), meaning that globalisation is a more 
prevalent force than Europeanisation. Another Irish trade unionist seems to imply that 
homegrown and global forces are the cause of their economic downfall when he states 
that ‘we are in this economic doom, firstly, because of our internal deficiencies and, 
secondly, because of the global neoliberal ideology’ (ITU2).  
 304 
  
The majority of environmental groups and some of the social and human rights groups 
in Ireland are more categorical in their affirmation of the European impact in their 
sphere of operations. 
 
The European institutions, in particular the 
EC and the ECJ are the source of change in 
environmental terms. It is more of an EU 
thing rather than globalisation (IEG17). 
I cannot think of one incidence of 
environmental legislation [in Ireland] that 
came from any other continent, except from 
Europe (IEG16). 
 
[Social] change in Ireland occurred because 
of Europe. We have learned about wealth 
generation from the Americans but we have 
imported our social democratic values from 
Europe (ISHG9). 
The source of change in the environment is 
Europe because the world is not following 
Europe (IEG18). 
 
Other Maltese and Irish leaders do not agree that the EU is the cause of change because 
the true source of transition is not an external factor but comes from within the 
individual who is motivated to do something good for the benefit of society. However 
the EU still plays a crucial role because it is regarded as a toolkit to assist people to 
bring about change, as well as a platform of democratic and pluralist values to maintain 
such change.  
 
The interest in environmental issues comes 
from within the individual. However 
Europe gives us empowerment in terms of 
legislation, institutions and partnerships to 
pursue our interests (MEG18). 
 
 
 
 
 
The motor of change are Maltese citizens 
themselves. But we are all hungry to bring 
the tools for change from Europe 
(MSHG11). 
 
Europe is not the stimulus of change... 
Stimulus is all about being awake in society. 
We [green NGOs] use Europe as our ally, 
our toolset (IEG19). 
 
From a total of 42 interviewees, there were only two who ruled out completely the idea 
of considering the EU as a major source, or an effective tool, of change. Both of them, 
one Gozitan and the other Irish, agree that because of Europeanisation the impact of 
change is low since the national mindset is largely influenced by emigrated 
communities abroad. 
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Most of our groups have close contacts in 
places where our nationals have emigrated, 
particularly Melbourne in Australia.  For us 
Melbourne is our second Gozo (MSHG12). 
 
Our [Irish] mentality is not one that thinks 
of Europe. Philosophically there was debate 
about whether we are closer to Boston or to 
Berlin. Of course the great majority of Irish 
people said Boston (ISHG12).  
 
Qualitative data suggest that the great majority of leaders of interest groups in Malta 
and Ireland consider the EU either as the source or the tool through which changes in 
the domestic scenario are activated or managed. Among others, EU change triggers 
include its multi-access point institutional architecture, directives and regulations, court 
decisions, public awareness campaigns, comradeships among partner organisations 
from different member states, and the learning and sharing of best practices. 
Nonetheless, the evidence confirms that Europeanisation as a strong source of change 
by no means eliminates the existence of other forces of innovation and transformation 
that are not necessarily European by nature. They may find their roots either from 
within the nation states through active citizenship and the modernisation of the state, or 
from specific geopolitical regions like the Mediterranean in the case of Malta and the 
Anglo-Saxon world in the Irish case, or in global trends and pressures.  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
The backbone of this chapter has been rooted in the logic of hypothesis testing that 
ultimately affirmed or discredited the original hypotheses. Rigorous statistical and 
qualitative analyses led to a set of concrete results determining the quantification and 
nature of Europeanisation. The first set of conclusions embrace the sustainability of the 
null hypothesis that rests on the premise that the extent of EU overall impact on 
domestic interest groups has not been significant, however a number of provisos apply. 
It has been confirmed with respect to Irish social partners, Maltese SHEGs and Irish 
SHEGs but was rejected in the case of Maltese social partners. The second set of 
conclusions was determined by a qualitative process, whereby the true nature of 
Europeanisation was revealed, in other words, whether Europeanisation is a 
phenomenon predominantly explained by RCI or SI. The significant Europeanisation of 
Maltese social partners is predominantly driven by sociological triggers while the 
marginal Europeanisation of their Irish counterparts is better explained by RCI logic. 
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On their part, Maltese SHEGs proved to be of a different breed because their marginal 
Europeanisation could be explained by a dual logic, thus rendering both RCI and SI as 
appropriate hypotheses. Lastly, Irish SHEGs have also experienced marginal 
Europeanisation that can be largely defined by the logic of consequences promoted by 
RCI. In this way, each of the three original hypotheses has now been confirmed or 
rejected.  
 
At the end of the hypothesis testing exercise, qualitative findings established the 
prevalence of Europeanisation to initiate change in the domestic polities of Malta and 
Ireland, yet other forces of innovation and transformation from within states themselves 
or through globalisation have not been excluded. 
 
The next chapter provides the overall conclusion to the study. In particular it embraces a 
synopsis of the research process that has been undertaken and attempts to interpret the 
outcomes in the light of scholarly debates revolving around small states’ governance, 
Europeanisation and new institutionalism. Moreover chapter 9 delivers a critical 
reflection of the research design while noting its limitations. At the end, it outlines 
potential ventures for further research that can be embarked upon to deepen and widen 
existing knowledge of Europeanisation and the performance of interest groups in small 
island states. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Critical Assessment and Conclusion 
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Chapter 9 
Critical assessment and conclusion 
 
 
What we find changes who we become.
120
 
 
Peter Morville 
British computer and internet expert 
President of Semantics Studio and founding father of Information Architecture 
 
 
 
9.1 Outlining the critical assessment 
 
The research cycle has turned full circle. Now that the rigorous research design has been 
marshalled right to the end and the empirical results have been revealed, it is 
appropriate to frame the findings into a wider literature perspective, thus elucidating the 
empirical, conceptual, methodological and theoretical contributions of this work. The 
critical assessment of the empirical observations starts by revisiting the original scope 
and initial questions, including a synthesis of the results obtained. It then makes 
reference to the literature on small states governance in its attempt to generalise the 
findings beyond case selection. The second level of assessment concerns the conceptual 
level. It looks into the mechanisms and choices that have been employed by this work to 
turn the notion of Europeanisation from an ‘attention-directing device’ (Olsen 2002) 
into an ‘operationalisable concept’ (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008) capable of guiding 
empirical investigations. The evaluation process eventually proceeds to the 
methodological level wherein the use of mixed data streams, particularly statistical 
results, are assessed on their capability of verifying or negating familiar grounds of 
Europeanisation that have been traditionally tried and tested by qualitative orthodoxy. 
The scrutiny of the explanatory-theoretical level follows soon after, wherein the 
competing/complementary logics of Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and 
Sociological Institutionalism (SI) are critically assessed in the light of bridging 
ontological and epistemological considerations. Furthermore, the conclusion ponders on 
the major caveats of this research, namely asymmetries of time and power that may 
have had the potential to explain or twist some of the results.  Finally, these same 
caveats pave the way for future research by identifying related and emerging themes, 
                                                 
120
 Retrieved on 21 September 2013 from http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/research 
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including Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Euroscepticism that require further 
scholarly attention.  
 
9.2 The empirical level of small island states  
 
Gauging the empirical results is the most tangible of all the other levels that have been 
selected for critical assessment. The main focus in this first section revolves around 
social partners and interest groups in Malta and Ireland and the different adaptation 
techniques they had to resort to in order to come to terms with EU membership. Major 
results are presented in brief, followed by a concise commentary that contextualises 
them within the larger picture of small states governance. This section ends with the 
identification of a set of knowledge claims that have significance to other similar states. 
 
9.2.1 Revisiting the original scope and questions 
  
This thesis has set out to explore the concept of Europeanisation in terms of elasticity 
measures employed by Maltese and Irish non-state actors and has determined the 
magnitude and nature of the twin forces of continuity and change in the field of interest 
representation. Relying on lessons drawn by a large cohort of Europeanisation scholars, 
this study has utilised the theoretical framework of new institutionalism, in particular 
RCI and SI, to identify incentives and norms for the preservation or transformation of 
Maltese and Irish politics. Without ever losing its primary research focus on social 
partners and interest groups, it has investigated the dichotomy between the embedded 
traditions of national polity and politics and the continuous series of calls for change 
and diversification promulgated by the EU’s style of governance and the lateral 
pressures exerted by the rest of member states. The implications of these endogenous 
and imported forces, which many a time are contradictory, are mapped out across four 
distinct, yet complementary, features that make up the character of organised groups, 
namely their internal organisational structures, actions and strategies within the 
domestic arena, engagement in European affairs and the pro- or anti-EU attitude of their 
leaders. Such a schematic model was instrumental in unravelling which dimensions act 
as pockets of resistance or inertia and which are rather predisposed to change and 
adaptability.   
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Methodologically, the thesis rests on four broad case scenarios replicated in Malta and 
Ireland, namely trade unions, employers’ associations, social and human rights groups 
and environmental groups. The adoption of a hypothetical-deductive research design, 
making use of quantitative and qualitative data, has produced unequivocal scientific 
evidence that demonstrates empirically the dependency of Europeanisation on specific 
factors that are relevant to distinct political territories and typologies of interest groups. 
In this vein, findings support Eising’s and Lehmkuhl’s argument that responses to 
European integration may very well be differential as the effects on interest 
representation are very much embedded in specific domestic contexts (Eising 2008: 180, 
Lehmkuhl 2008: 340, Quaglia et al. 2007: 414). Besides the validation process of the 
original set of hypotheses, the overall scope of this research work has been successfully 
achieved by answering the following three fundamental questions: 
 
 Has the impact of Europeanisation of Maltese and Irish interest groups been 
significant or marginal in the period between 2004 and 2011? 
 Independently of its extent, has Europeanisation among Maltese and Irish groups 
within the period in question been predominantly triggered by rationalist or 
sociological explanations? 
 Is Europeanisation the major stimulus of domestic change or are there other 
prevalent forces that shake the status quo? 
 
9.2.2 Empirical results 
 
The main empirical results are chapter specific and are summarised within the 
respective empirical chapters: Chapter 6 relating to trade unions and employers’ 
representatives and Chapter 7 featuring social, human rights and environmental groups, 
whereas the exercise of hypothesis testing was immediately carried out in the 
subsequent chapter. This section synthesises the empirical results that answer the 
study’s three fundamental questions. 
 
Trade unions and employers’ associations in Malta are the only ones to have registered 
a statistically significant degree of Europeanisation between 2004 and 2011. The 
Europeanisation impact left its mark on their organisational set-up and normative 
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archetype. Although they remain rational actors that are always keen to advance their 
interests given the additional opportunities and influence avenues of EU membership, 
Maltese workers’ and employers’ representatives expose a prevailing disposition to 
change rooted within an SI understanding. Research suggests that they are trying to 
reinvent themselves and reconstitute their domestic reality as a direct consequence of 
their socialisation in European fora and participation in collective learning exercises. 
Their desire for change may be considered as a reaction to the claustrophobic and 
polarised ambience in their domestic polity where political patronage and clientelism 
are very high. 
 
Contrastingly, all Irish actors that have been analysed, that is, trade unions, employers’ 
associations, together with social and human rights groups, as well as environmental 
groups, have generated an extent of Europeanisation of non-statistical significance. 
Social partners’ inelasticity or indifference to European influence came out to be very 
stout wherein their organisational structures together with their national and European 
interactivity showed no significant degree of receptivity. On their part Irish social 
groups, and to a lesser extent environmental groups, also proved to be insular and 
ambivalent towards the EU, although their attitude and sense of identity exhibited signs 
of transformation of statistical significance, thus opening a window for more potential 
changes in the future. Irish actors’ preferences and styles, in line with mainstream 
political discourse in their national arena, are deeply entrenched within an RCI loaded 
environment. Like their politicians, they regard European resources, mainly funding, 
lobbying outlets and legislative measures, as a means to support and promote their 
predefined interests. Conversely, they have invested very little to reconfigure their 
character and reengineer the Irish political terrain as a result of EU membership. 
 
Finally, in the first eight years since accession in 2004, Maltese social, human rights and 
environmental groups have undergone marginal Europeanisation, in other words the 
extent of change is of no statistical significance. Elements of coercive constraints, like 
inadequate human, financial and expertise resources, and the easy access to national 
politicians, induce a sense of alienation and estrangement from the EU’s integration 
project. However significant Europeanisation marks are manifested in their internal 
organisational structure and culture wherein they have strived to induce a European 
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dimension within their corporate vision, coordination of EU affairs, participation in 
training and funding opportunities, as well as the internalisation of European norms and 
values. Interestingly from a theoretical point of view, the nature of their marginal 
Europeanisation impact comprises a dual explanation: both RCI and SI stimuli share the 
limelight here. Maltese interest groups are interested in adapting their organisations and 
strategies to profit from the multilevel power structure of the EU but, at the same time, 
gradual change is also transforming the mental framework of their leaders through the 
construction and diffusion of innovative ideas stemming out of the EU and its member 
states. 
 
Although globalisation and home-grown initiatives do play a role in instigating change 
and transformation, the majority of research subjects in both selected countries 
emphasised that Europeanisation is the prevalent stimulus to challenge state traditions in 
polity formation, politics of interest representation and sectoral policymaking. 
Environmental groups in both countries are the most vociferous advocates of 
Europeanisation as they consider it the force majeure that can bring change to domestic 
policy and legislation rather than to polity and politics. Although clear cut causal 
mechanisms are very difficult to establish beyond any reasonable doubt, there is 
widespread consensus among the majority of Maltese subjects that the EU is the 
dominant external provider of both scope and tools to motivate institutional and social 
innovation back home. The Irish agree, but to a lesser extent, because of their 
attachments to the English-speaking world which embraces the USA, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand as well as the UK. Their frame of mind is conditioned by the Irish 
diaspora in all walks of life from commerce to culture and from job opportunities to 
innovation and benchmarking. Moreover, their knowledge of foreign languages is also 
weak, a factor that significantly hinders Irish interaction with other Europeans who do 
not speak English. 
 
9.2.3 Territorial creatures  
 
In spite of the plethora of additional opportunities and new norms made possible by EU 
membership, this empirical research illustrates that non-state actors are essentially 
creatures of their own territory. National politicians and senior bureaucrats remain the 
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preferred targets for lobbying, not only because they are easy to access and the cost of 
embarking on the Brussels route is exorbitant, but primarily because of the 
embeddedness of social partners and interest groups in domestic politics. Moreover in 
policy fields where neocorporatist structures prevail for long, such as in the ‘unique’ 
case of SP in Ireland and, to a lesser extent, the MCESD and the MEUSAC in Malta, 
non-state actors find it almost useless to engage directly with the EU’s institutional 
framework, since they are already well connected at the domestic level. These assertions 
confirm conclusions made by numerous scholars of civil society who maintain that 
European institutions and avenues are a ‘bonus’ rather than an ‘alternative’ as interest 
group continue to promote and defend their interests within their national political arena 
(Saurugger 2013, Klüver 2010, Eising 2008, Bache and George 2006). 
 
9.2.4 Potential for better organisational structures 
 
European influence is most visible not in terms of direct engagement with the 
supranational institutions and processes of decision making, but in the way non-state 
actors react to the challenges in domestic environment. Indeed, research results have 
confirmed that in all four case scenarios, the dimension of direct European involvement 
never obtained a score of statistical significance. On the other hand, domestic 
adjustments were numerous and took many shapes. As the findings reveal, they entailed 
continuous improvement in internal organisational structures to solidify voice, 
diversification of operations and adaptation to European pressures. In more concrete 
terms, adaptability processes include growing interest in the formation of partnerships 
with other state and private actors, the set-up of umbrella organisations, the 
development of European profiling through affiliation in Euro federations as well as the 
identification of partner organisations from other member states, the provision of 
training and funding opportunities, together with gradual changes in their collective 
mentality and identity.   
 
These sets of findings contextualise Van Schendelen’s model (2005) of ‘window-in and 
window-out’, as outlined in Chapter 4. Interest groups need to look out at the EU arena 
and, concurrently, look in to manage their homefront. This research presents ample 
evidence that contemporary organised groups in Malta and Ireland are not simply 
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engaged in ‘pressure politics’ but are rather involved in Public Affairs Management 
(PAM) which requires complex processes of ‘internal preparatory work’ and ‘fieldwork 
interactivity’. Saurugger (2013: 350) refers to the ‘professionalisation’ of voluntary 
organisations by means of training seminars largely sponsored by the EC, either set up 
by international, regional or national organisations, or by partnership with existing 
university training schemes.
121
 These learning opportunities open new avenues for 
domestic groups, as is the case of social partners and interest groups in Malta. The Irish 
seem to realise that, although they have invested very little in this regard over forty 
years of membership, this is the time to start engaging more with their counterparts in 
other member states. The people who work within organisational structures become, not 
only better equipped to maximise their groups’ interests in a multilevel political arena 
but, above all, more eager to learn through constant processes of evaluation and 
socialisation. Besides being more conducive to norms and values that embrace power-
sharing, negotiation, solidarity, coalition building and networking as promoted by the 
EU system of governance, PAM postulates a complementary, rather than conflicting, 
relationship between the rationalist and sociological understandings of Europeanisation. 
The nature of the duality of RCI and SI shall be dealt with in greater detail in the 
subsection dedicated to the theoretical level. 
 
9.2.5 Transferability of results 
 
The case selection of Malta and Ireland contextualises this study within a specialised 
field of scholarly literature: the politics of small island states. This is prominently 
indicated in the introductory chapter where the justification of the two countries was 
intrinsically tied to their absolute or relative smallness, as well as their islandness, 
exhibiting similar political, social and economic profiling. At the end of this research 
exercise, one would legitimately expect the empirical findings to go beyond case 
selection, thus attempting generalisability among other small states within the EU and, 
possibly, beyond. 
                                                 
121
 The EC has financed a number of these programmes such as the one attended by the present writer, 
entitled Closer to Europe Training Programme which was held in Malta between 2011and 2012 with the 
aim of improving domestic social and civil dialogue and at the same time to improve the quality of 
proposals submitted by interest groups to the Commission. The CONCORD network (Confederation 
d’ONG pour l’aide d’urgence et le development) develops very similar courses on capacity building, 
resource management, influence strategies and funding. 
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Although there is a growing literature on the issue of how small states experience EU 
membership in terms of Europeanisation and more specifically its effects on polity, 
research has barely started. Harwood (2012) argues that what limited investigation has 
been made has either lacked a framework to differentiate the Europeanisation 
experience of large and small states (Hanf and Soetendorp 2002) or has focused on a 
specific set of small states, primarily Scandinavian, and Central and Eastern countries 
where specific regional factors, like political traditions, may account for some of the 
conclusions drawn (Thorhallson 2000, Laegreid et al. 2002).  
 
This study does not have the primary intention of generating results that could be 
generalised across other member states that can be considered small by any kind of 
measurement or concept. Its understandings of Europeanisation defined by research 
subjects are specifically bound to the political terrain in which they are active and to the 
time band covered by the study. Moreover, attitudes towards the EU are highly 
dependent on the cyclical nature of domestic political and economic performance, thus 
accentuating a high dependency on the time element. Consequently, the extension of 
this research’s findings and conclusions to wider populations could be unsustainable 
because each member state, whether of small, medium or large proportions, has its 
unique narrative that, invariably, leads to different experiences of Europeanisation.  
 
Nevertheless, the peculiar factors that have been treated in this study do not adhere to 
what Silverman (2001: 223) has referred to as anecdotalism.
122
 Warrington (2012: 25) 
disclaims the idea of ‘unique governance experience’ as each country’s profile is 
compounded of ‘some elements that are distinctive’ and ‘many others that are shared 
with numerous states’, small and large, developed and developing. Since academic 
literature is interested in revealing implicit models that have the potential to explain 
phenomena in similar environments, there is still scope for ‘knowledge claims’ 
prompted by this work that can be applied beyond the two selected countries (Marsh 
and Furlong 2010). In scientific terms this is normally called transferability. Unlike 
generalisability, transferability does not involve broad claims, but invites readers of 
                                                 
122
 This occurs when research presents a good and interesting story that may blind the researcher to the 
fact that the anecdote is actually far from typical and possibly unique. There is a real danger that such 
memorable and distinct phenomena may come to influence and even bias the interpretation. 
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research to make connections between elements of a study and other analogous 
situations. In the context of small states’ governance and their Europeanisation 
experience, this thesis postulates or confirms a set of knowledge claims that are 
transferable to similar polities that share the following traits in full or partly: 
 
 smallness, whether absolute or relative, in the context of a dominant colonial 
legacy, 
 islandness, whether geographical or psychological, that generates a 
contradictory sense of isolation and openness, 
 gateway position between two opposing geopolitical realities - north and south, 
east and west, centre and periphery, island and mainland, insider and outsider, 
traditionalism and modernism – constraining the people in the centre to live 
within a paradoxical duality creating both tensions and synergies, 
 embedded religious tradition that induces a transcendental dimension to the 
interpretation of everyday affairs (Friggieri, O. 2013). 
 
Thus the analyses and findings of this research have an appeal to a wider group of EU 
member states, including candidate and applicant countries, provided that they share at 
least some of the mentioned traits. In such countries, non-state actors tend to suffer from 
chronic administrative capacity deficit which is manifested in manpower shortage, 
heavy reliance on volunteers, fragmentation and lack of adequate funding from 
independent sources. In turn, these internal limitations render organised groups more 
dependent on the state for funding, information and policy processes. This trend injects 
elements of rivalry among different organisations because each of them tries to 
negotiate the best deal which often comes at the expense of others due to limited 
resources. Very often, in situations where the elites are few and know each other very 
well, real negotiations do not occur during formal fora, but are rather the consequence 
of one-to-one informal bargaining processes. This is a direct symptom of small size 
where people and groups are obsessed by power that, many a time, has to be seized by 
intense, but brief, infighting. Besides providing little incentive to solidify the voice of 
non-state actors through inter-groups partnerships and umbrella organisations, this 
scenario also uncovers the imperfections of small states’ institutions. In contrast to the 
developed and impersonal apparatus of a large state, there is more scope for individuals 
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to serve as norm entrepreneurs within the existing institutional structures of small states. 
Although the EU constrains national governments to launch and develop structures and 
processes of consultation for more inclusivity in political activity, empirical research 
showed that these are often perceived as being tokenistic to please Brussels. Domestic 
dynamics continue to cement the centralisation of the public administration of small 
states where real power is exclusively reserved for the political elite.  
 
Structural embeddedness within domestic power dynamics requires interest groups and 
social partners to prioritise in favour of a ‘window-in’ model, that is, to concentrate 
mainly on the national level, generally achieving low levels of Europeanisation. 
However such a low extent of Europeanisation is also a consequence of coercive 
constraints, including geographical remoteness and lack of sufficient resources to cope 
with the bureaucratic requirements of EU programmes. On the other hand, there may be 
a minority of organised groups that treat themselves as outsiders to the system of 
interest representation as devised by the state. Due to their lack of dependence on state 
funds and non-participation in centralised systems of interest intermediation, they are 
more likely to adopt a ‘window-out’ approach to get from Brussels that which was 
consciously rejected locally for reasons of autonomy from state patronage. They are the 
ones that challenge embedded systems and norms, and continuously work to change 
domestic culture through their direct involvement in European affairs. The nature of 
Europeanisation, that is whether generated by RCI or SI motivators, largely depends on 
the dimensions of space and time. Research is suggesting that the greater the level of 
dissatisfaction by non-state actors of the domestic system and culture of interest 
representation, the greater their drive to transform the ingrained status-quo.  
 
One might argue that these knowledge claims concerning polity formation and political 
innuendos have been more a consequence of political tradition characterised by 
centralisation and statist approach to policy-making than a consequence of size. 
However smallness, islandness and remoteness tend to accentuate the claims’ effects 
and implications (Baldacchino 2013, Pirotta 2012, Warrington 2012, 1997, 1994; 
Thorhallsson 2000, Boissevain 1993, Katzenstein 1984). Yet knowledge claims 
revolving around the low levels of Europeanisation experienced by non-state actors, 
primarily interest groups, are determined by the resources as well as the domestic 
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national institutional context in which they operationalise their homefront and European 
strategies (Saurugger 2013, Klüver 2010). 
 
9.3 The conceptual level of Europeanisation 
 
By designating the EU as the independent variable in its conceptual framework, this 
work endorses the widely-used definition where Europeanisation is understood as ‘the 
reorientation or reshaping of politics (and governance) in the domestic arena in ways 
that reflect policies, practices or preferences advanced through the EU system of 
governance’ (Bache and Jordan 2006: 30). However the EU system of governance is not 
exclusively interpreted in its traditional top-down dimension as if the only mode of 
European influence is the downloading of legislation and court decisions from Brussels 
and Luxembourg, but it also embraces the horizontal dimension stemming from cross-
country experiences (Bache 2010: 114, Lehmkuhl 2008: 340). In addition, this research 
investigates the bottom-up dimension as well, particularly when direct reference is made 
to statistics and instances when domestic groups use surrogates to voice their concerns 
in the EU arena. These surrogates can take many forms but, most prominently, they are 
the European federations in which domestic groups are affiliated, MEPs and national 
politicians.  
 
However causal explanations go beyond the directionality of EU interference since they 
encompass methodological choices that affect correlations between variables 
(Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009). The first part of this section assesses the thesis’ 
contribution in the applied directionality and dimensionality of Europeanisation while 
the second part focuses on the new impetus resulting from geographical and timing 
choices. 
 
9.3.1 New impetus I: directionality and dimensionality 
 
In this vein, the thesis answers a series of calls for new research agendas as it manages 
to propose and work out a conceptual scope of Europeanisation that incorporates three 
of the innovative factors recommended by Vink and Graziano (2008: 8), namely: 
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1. There is nothing necessarily ‘top-down’ in Europeanisation as multi-directional 
forms of pressures are included. 
2. The research scope and the definition of Europeanisation coined for this study 
includes both vertical (direct) effects, like EU funding, lobbying, regulation and 
legislation, as well as lateral (indirect) effects, like socialisation and sharing of 
good practices among member states. 
3. With the research primacy focused on interest groups, the scope is not restricted 
to the ‘usual changing policy domains as a result of EU influence,’ but allows 
for a ‘wider potential domain of impact encompassing polity and politics’ 
dimensions’. 
 
In view of the first and second points, the thesis looks at the different directions that 
Europeanisation can take and, therefore, its vertical direction embraces both top-down 
and bottom-up dimensions, or as Vink and Graziano (2008: 10) coined it a ‘bottom-up-
down design’. The vertical dimension in itself is not exclusive either, as the thesis looks 
at the ‘horizontal’ directions as well where Europeanisation effects are understood as a 
corollary of both increased interdependency between member states and also of 
heightened exchange of information and mutual learning. In empirical terms, the 
vertical forces (in particular downloading) produce tangible and ‘direct effects’ as a 
result of ‘legalistic’ mechanisms (Lavenex 2008: 319), whereas the lateral forces, or 
crossloading, are more subtle, ‘indirect’ and ‘soft’ in their sociological nature (Vink and 
Graziano 2008). In this sense, this thesis endorses a ‘dominant constructive discourse’ 
(Lehmkuhl 2008: 337), or a sociological oriented design, that seems to characterise 
more recent works on Europeanisation (Blavoukos and Oikonomou 2012). In this sense, 
this work relates to Warleigh’s vision (2001) which considers ‘NGOs as agents of 
political socialisation’. Although these latest trends open new avenues in applying the 
concept of Europeanisation, they raise problems relating to concept stretching, 
methodology and research design. Consequently, in order to sustain the conceptual 
framework where the EU is deemed to be the independent variable, this work subscribes 
to the ‘pragmatic solution’ proposed by Bulmer and Lequesne (2013: 21) which upholds 
the ‘top–down understanding of Europeanisation as the core focus of the research 
design, while keeping other directionalities in mind as the research context’.  
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In view of the third point, the thesis addresses Bulmer’s reflection that in the realm of 
political forces, Europeanisation literature is arguably at an early stage of development 
(Bulmer 2008: 55). In their methodological study that maps out the usage of concepts 
and methods in Europeanisation, Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009: 514) agree with 
Bulmer when they observe that ‘there is definitively less intellectual appetite for 
appraising the politics dimension’. Originally, it was all about policy effects, but recent 
projects started to incorporate polity and political actors, including domestic political 
parties, interest groups, parliaments, executives, courts and public opinion (see Bulmer 
and Lequesne 2013). By centre-staging interest groups in the investigative process, this 
thesis responds to the lack of ‘comprehensive’ and ‘systematic’ information in scholarly 
literature about the effects of the domestic adaptation of interest groups to ‘European 
regional integration’ (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009, Harwood 2009, Eising 2008,  
Vink and Graziano 2008). Furthermore, the contribution in this regard is even bolder 
when one takes into consideration the contextualisation of the study: Malta and Ireland. 
Apart from a series of works edited by Xuereb (2004-2009),
123
 the Europeanisation of 
non-state actors in Malta is still at its inception, while in Ireland it has barely started to 
feature in scholarly literature as pointed out by the Study on Volunteering in the EU: 
Country Report Ireland, 2010. Ó Broin and Murphy (2013) did not feel the need to 
include the concept of Europeanisation in a collection of papers featuring the latest 
trends in civil society and public policy in Ireland. The Irish Political Studies (2009) 
journal did, however, publish a special edition on the Europeanisation of Irish party 
politics but interest groups hardly featured at all. In the circumstances, one can then 
better understand why many research subjects in both countries expressed their view 
that this research was ‘the first of its kind’ that they had ever participated in. 
 
9.3.2 New impetus II: geographical and timing dispersion  
 
Furthermore the choice of Malta and Ireland responds to Schimmelfennig’s and 
Sedelmeier’s (2008: 97) appeal to diversify the composition of country selection by 
including ‘old and new members’ because, as Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009) observe, 
                                                 
123
 The series, called Civil Society Project Report, provided the opportunity for experts to take stock of 
Malta’s experience of ‘Malta after Membership’ with the citizen at the centre and taking the political, the 
economic, the social and anthropological and the religious together, all feeding into the central question: 
What has changed for Malta and the Maltese?  
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‘some countries are more systematically studied, and others neglected’. Vink and 
Graziano (2008) name Germany, France and the UK as the ‘usual suspects’, whereas 
the perpetuation of this ‘within-region’ design has moved to Central and Eastern 
countries where comparisons are ‘confined among accession countries’ of the big bang 
enlargement (Blavoukos and Oikonomou 2012, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2008). 
This work follows Goetz’s (2008) advice to pay attention to variations in ‘broader 
territorial patterns’ and moves beyond geographical clustering. Besides venturing within 
different geographical zones, this thesis also experiments with contrasting temporal 
elements since it rests on two selected states with a very different EU timeline. In fact 
Ireland joined the EU more than 30 years before Malta. Such an unusual comparative 
study addresses the needs for new research pastures recommended by many scholars. 
Bache et al. (2011) establish new standards of comparative analysis on these lines when 
they compared Greece to Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Slovenia to assess the domestic 
impact of EU cohesion policy and pre-accession aid. Disparities in time and geography 
have the potential to widen and deepen our knowledge of the great variety of 
Europeanisation processes and mechanisms and about the conditions under which they 
are observable and effective. However it does come at a cost. A time disparity of three 
decades in the accession timeline of Malta and Ireland renders comparative analysis 
more problematic because of ‘time, timing and sequencing’ asymmetries (Bache 2010, 
Bulmer and Burch 2009). This brings us face to face with Bulmer’s call for more 
explicit HI theorising which is conspicuous by its absence in this study (Bulmer 2008: 
56). The issue of HI will be tackled in greater detail in the caveats section. 
 
9.4 The methodological level of mixed data streams 
 
Measuring Europeanisation remains a contested matter where the magnitude of change 
is of an interpretive nature, often based on ‘thick descriptive work’ (Vink and Graziano 
2008: 17). Although subscribing to a familiar conceptual framework that has been 
extensively used by many scholars, this thesis breaks a long and strong tradition of 
framing Europeanisation within a sui generis qualitative methodology (Exadaktylos and 
Radaelli 2009, Haverland 2008). Thus it comes as no big surprise that ‘most studies 
focus on the question of how the EU matters, rather than to what extent it matters’ 
(Haverland 2008: 67).  
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9.4.1 Simultaneous large-N and small-N analyses 
 
Since its initiation stages, this thesis was already constructing a mixed methodological 
model to address this gap in mainstream Europeanisation literature. To this end it 
utilised three data collections tools (surveys, interviews and observations) that criss-
cross the qualitative-quantitative divide. Alongside the merit of triangulating results, the 
research design looked further ahead and assigned specific tasks to the qualitative and 
quantitative streams of data. The latter, for example, was not used to test the two 
competing theoretical alternatives, RCI and SI, as is usually the case (Haverland 2008: 
61) but was strategically brought in to measure the extent of Europeanisation. Thus 
when outcomes point to significant or marginal degrees of Europeanisation, the 
attributed magnitudes of change are not the result of judgement and interpretation based 
on small-N qualitative analysis but are based on statistical tests that make use of large-N 
quantitative analysis. The term significance in this work is fundamentally rooted in its 
statistical sense. Besides gaining confidence that the identified patterns can be 
generalised to the population at large in the selected countries, this methodological 
option has ample potential for both longitudinal studies as well as cross-comparisons 
with other countries, given that the same variables are used in new research cycles. This 
is the reason why the conceptual and methodological frameworks have been thoroughly 
explained in Chapters 2 and 5 so as to create a detailed audit trail for replication studies 
in the future. 
 
On the other hand, qualitative data are not only used as an integral part of the 
comparative analysis between Malta and Ireland but, more importantly, they lead to the 
identification of the nature of Europeanisation. In Haverland’s terms, this study 
responds to ‘the question of how EU matters’. The intermediate variables belonging to 
the two schools of institutionalist thought, RCI and SI, are used as filters to determine 
which of them are acting as enablers of change or as pockets of resistance to pressures 
stemming from the EU and its member states. The nature of change, that is whether 
predominantly rationalist, sociological or both, is decoded through a stringent narrative 
analysis that ends the process of investigation with a series of thematic maps.  
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9.4.2 Methodological contributions 
 
In the end both the quantitative and qualitative parts of this work offer their fair share of 
original contribution to the scholarly debate on Europeanisation. The quantitative 
component expands on the emerging practice of injecting quantitative methods in 
Europeanisation literature which, according to Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009), have 
only been used by less than a handful of studies. Statistical data presents a novelty to the 
academic community in the way it understands familiar paradigms of Europeanisation 
that have been traditionally explored from a quasi-monopolistic qualitative orthodoxy. 
Nevertheless, the qualitative component still played a crucial role in the study. The 
variety of outcomes concerning the codification of the nature of Europeanisation 
suggests that the rationalist and sociological logics need not be considered as the 
occurrence of one precludes the occurrence of the other, but may be seen as part of a 
synthetic theoretical framework for Europeanisation research (Börzel and Risse 2003, 
Checkel 2001, Schimmelfennig 2001, Risse et al. 1999). 
 
9.5 The theoretical level of new institutionalism 
 
The last notion of the previous section introduces the next level for critical assessment: 
explanatory-theory. As the outcomes suggest, there is one case scenario involving 
Maltese SHEGs wherein the nature of Europeanisation has been predominantly decoded 
in terms of both RCI and SI understandings. To this effect, the empirical findings of this 
thesis contribute to a growing literature which argues that the two logics of political 
action are not mutually exclusive, despite their conflicting ontological and 
epistemological attributes. This section is essentially divided into two parts. Firstly, it 
assesses the nature of the relationship between RCI and SI and, secondly it reflects on 
the contribution of this work in terms of pairing ontological and epistemological 
considerations. 
 
9.5.1 Challenging the traditional dichotomy 
 
In a way, the outcomes challenge the foundations of the initial set of hypotheses as 
devised in Chapter 1. This was based on the traditional dichotomy between the two 
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brands of new institutionalism. In fact, the hypotheses’ formation of this work can be 
differentiated against the classical model of Europeanisation developed by Börzel and 
Risse in 2003 which treats RCI and SI as compatible and takes a synthetic approach in 
their investigation. Conversely, using the same set of independent, mediating and 
dependent variables, this study probed RCI and SI as contending or standing hypotheses 
in rivalry. After all, ‘the prerequisite for a well equipped research strategy is to mobilise 
competitive, sometimes counterfactual, explanations of possible change’ (Haverland as 
quoted by Graziano and Vink 2013). Accordingly the qualitative data analysis was 
intended to be marshalled from this perspective but participants’ feedback began to 
show from the early stages of data collection that, at times, the two logics often occur 
simultaneously, or characterise different phases in processes of adaptational change 
(Bache 2010). This is the reason why the nature of Europeanisation in Chapter 8 has 
been decoded in all instances in terms of predominance, meaning that, for example, the 
SI explanation of domestic transformation is more likely to be the case without, 
however, excluding the presence of the RCI variant. 
 
In reality, political action cannot generally be explained either as based exclusively on a 
logic of consequences or as entirely based on a logic of appropriateness but probably 
involves essential features of both. The findings presented in this work view the 
relationship between structures and personalities as closely interrelated. Strategically 
acting agents shape their environment even as they are being formed by it. This 
interdependence between institutions and actors is even more acute in small island 
polities as it has been argued both in the theoretical and empirical chapters. Political 
actors are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their anticipations 
of consequences, and by the norms embedded in their identities and political institutions 
(Thielemann 2001). They calculate consequences and follow norms, and the relation 
between the two is often subtle (March and Olsen 1989: 10). 
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9.5.2 Ontological and epistemological contributions 
 
Like any other social science research project, this thesis has been subjected to its 
ontological
124
 and epistemological
125
 positions. Although these remain implicit 
throughout the different phases of the research cycle, they still shaped the approach to 
theory and choice of methods. These positions are more like a ‘skin’ than a ‘sweater’ in 
this research: they were not put on and taken off whenever it was fit for the researcher 
(Marsh and Furlong 2010: 17).  
 
The formulation of a conceptual framework based on hypotheses that seek a cause and 
effect relationship and the application of a mixed methodology based on the 
hypothetical deductive model point out to a critical realist stance
126
. In fact critical 
realism, according to Zachariadis et al. (2010), offers a sound theoretical foundation for 
mixed-method information systems research. This strand of philosophical resonance 
shares an ontological position with positivism, meaning that in our case processes of 
Europeanisation exist independently of our knowledge and, consequently, it is possible 
to draw and test causal statements. However in epistemological terms, critical realism 
has more in common with the interpretist tradition, in the sense that outcomes are 
shaped by the way Europeanisation is socially constructed by people, groups and 
institutions. In this vein, critical realists need to identify and understand both the 
external ‘reality’ and the social construction of that reality if their research is to explain 
the relationships between social phenomena. Methodologically, this rationale has clear 
implications as it acknowledges the utility of both quantitative and qualitative data. 
 
Grounded within these parameters of realism, this thesis uses quantitative methods to 
identify the extent to which social partners and interest groups have become 
                                                 
124
 Ontology is essentially the nature of knowledge. The central question is whether social entities have a 
reality external to social actors (objectivism) and thus it is fixed; or whether they can and should be 
considered as social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors 
(constructionism) and thus it is always in the making (Bryman 2008). 
125
 Epistemology lays out the ways how we can arrive to acceptable knowledge. The central question is 
whether it is appropriate to apply the methods of the natural sciences (i.e. quantitative) to social science 
research. If so, then it is either a case of positivist epistomology executed by a value free researcher or a 
realist epistemology that believes in a reality independent of our perceptions. If not, then we have to use 
qualitative data  that attempts to see world from the actor’s perspective, in other words relying on 
interpretivism (Bryman 2008). 
126
 Sometimes referred to ‘contemporary realism’. 
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‘Europeanised’. Simultaneously, it was equally committed to analyse qualitatively how 
Europeanisation is perceived, or discursively constructed, around the logics of 
appropriateness and consequences by interest groups and social partners. According to 
Bache, Bulmer and Gunay (2012), these two logics that ‘are usually used as proxies of 
SI and RCI respectively within Europeanization literature are bridged by such a critical 
realist ontology’. The two parallel lines of investigation are crucial because the realist 
argument would be that both the ‘reality’ and the discursive construction affect what 
domestic actors do in response to the triggers of Europeanisation. Whereas the 
quantitative investigation produces ‘objective’ and ‘transferable’ findings as in 
positivist approaches; the qualitative part, as in interpretivism,  generates an 
understanding or narrative which is particular to that time and space, and partial, being 
based on a subjective interpretation of the views of the research subjects involved 
(Marsh and Furlong 2010). To this end, critical realism advocates methodological 
pluralism within a framed ontological and epistemological setting. 
 
This is the metatheoretical design that has been utilised throughout the whole thesis: 
from the setting of its initial objectives down to the presentation of its empirical 
findings. One of the major criticisms of the realist school has been that ‘it is not easy, 
indeed many would see as it as impossible, to combine scientific [positivism] and 
interpretivist positions’ because of their conflicting philosophical underpinnings 
(Bryman 2008).  However, Bache (2010) and Burnham et. al (2008: 30) notice the trend 
towards more dialogue between competing ontological and methodological approaches, 
typically between rationalist and sociological analyses. They claim that insights could 
be utilised in this endeavour from a critical realist ontology and epistemology. Their 
suggestion has been put to test in this thesis wherein critical realism proved to be 
practical, suitable and flexible for the purposes of this research. This could only be 
achieved by a rather complex research design and an intricate hypotheses testing 
exercise. 
 
9.6 Caveats and areas for further research 
 
The study has offered an empirical perspective of the impact of Europeanisation on 
domestic non-state actors. As a direct consequence of the methodology employed, the 
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study encountered a number of methodological and thematic limitations which were 
exposed in Chapter 5. Nonetheless at this stage it is important to focus on the major 
caveats of the study which may in turn serve as the basis for further research. 
 
9.6.1 Asymmetries of time 
 
The most serious caveat of this research is the absence of HI as the third major variant 
of new institutionalism which has the potential of decoding processes of 
Europeanisation as a corollary of time. Although this research identified a clear time-
period (2004-2011) for appraising the effects of Europeanisation processes on the 
dependent variables, it did not incorporate ‘path-dependency’ as a lever of change.  
Preference was, instead, given to institutional opportunities and sociological impetus as 
stimuli of Europeanisation. However the exclusion of HI from the explanatory 
theoretical framework, for reasons of practicality, was compensated by innumerable 
occasions where its logical underpinnings were implicit throughout the thesis, 
particularly in Chapter 3 where the political landscaping of the two selected countries 
depicted various insights of locked-in pathways and critical junctions. Furthermore, a 
great number of differences between Malta and Ireland that emerged out of the 
quantitative results and qualitative narratives could be understood in terms of the 
different timing of their accession to membership. Finally the confirmation of the null 
hypothesis in three out of four case scenarios highlights the ‘stickiness’ of endogenous 
institutional and political arrangements in small states’ governance. The results confirm 
that besides the complexity of policy processes and the need to be contingent in order to 
respond to the ever changing scenario, continuity is the third essential component of 
institutional stability. This resembles the principle of ‘incremental change’, as 
advocated by HI, with no hint of any ‘punctuating’ events that could have distorted the 
pre-existing equilibrium (Bulmer 2008: 50).  
 
According to Graziano and Vink (2013: 40), ‘the main focus of this strand of research 
was – and still is – the analysis of the sequences of domestic adaptations in connection 
to the evolution of European political discourses, strategies, institutions, and policies’. 
HI is considered by pioneering scholars in the field as a key component of 
Europeanisation research. As an approach, it incorporates both rationalist and 
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sociological elements, but emphasises the importance of practices embedded over time 
in explaining how actors and institutions react to external pressures for change (Bache 
2010). The case of this thesis matches the experience of most contemporary social 
scientists who unconsciously take a momentary view of the social world. Indeed, the 
methodological decisions constrained this ‘momentary view’ as survey research is run 
at intervals and, thus, producing an instant snapshot at a fixed time. Yet the meaning of 
social events or processes is frequently distorted when they are ripped from their 
temporal context. Pierson (2004), the pioneer of ‘politics in time’, maintains that 
constructing ‘moving pictures’ rather than ‘snapshots’ can vastly enrich the 
understanding of complex social dynamics, and greatly improve the theories and 
methods that are used to explain them. 
 
The importance of HI becomes even more crucial when one takes into account the case 
selection for this research where a disparity of more than 30 years marks the different 
accession periods of Malta and Ireland. The research falls short of assessing how the 
different length of the two states’ membership could have potentially affected the results 
obtained. The enthusiasm and high hopes shared by a number of research subjects in 
Malta who were experiencing the first years of EU membership was totally out of synch 
in the context of the great majority of Irish subjects who have become accustomed, if 
not disillusioned, by the European experience. Moreover such a disparity of accession 
time has a direct effect on the tempo of change suggesting that the acceleration of 
change in Malta had to be more rapid than in Ireland. In other words, the uneven 
Europeanisation experiences in Malta and Ireland can be attributed to asymmetries of 
time that go beyond the mediatory roles of RCI’s and SI’s explanations. A more 
comprehensive understanding of the extent and nature of Europeanisation would have 
included issues of time, timing and tempo, given the focus on two states whose 
engagement with the EU varies substantially across these dimensions. This presents an 
opportunity for further research in the future which would entail a longitudinal element 
in its design to account for change over longer periods of time. It may seek to explore, 
as suggested by Bulmer (2008: 56), the way in which non-state actors were obliged at 
different times to adjust to the impact of the EU upon their country and, thereby, 
identifying how the tempo and sequence of developments triggered adjustment 
processes. Such a study will be ideal for Malta in a couple of years’ time, in particular, 
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as it would have further matured its performance and attitude over the EU’s learning 
curve. 
 
9.6.2 Asymmetries of power 
 
Another important caveat that needs to be flagged is the asymmetries of powers of the 
EU in different categories of policy sectors. In other words, the impact of European 
integration on the behaviour of non-state actors is not uniform, partly, because it varies 
in accordance with the specific policy domains that they are active in (Bulmer and 
Radaelli 2013: 357, Magone 2011, Bache and George 2006: 354, Pollack 2005a: 46). 
For example the EU’s competency in the social policy areas, like health care and 
education, is rather weak when compared to policies comprising trade and labour 
regulation that have been systematically developed over time (Quaglia et al. 2007: 415). 
This explains why trade unions and employers’ associations are more prone to EU 
pressures, not necessarily because they are better resourced or informed than the rest of 
interest groups, but mainly because their core policy domains are largely influenced by 
EU institutions, mechanisms and processes. Such an assertion might explain the 
significant extent of Europeanisation experienced by Maltese social partners but falls 
short of accounting for the minor extent registered by their Irish counterparts. It is here 
that the asymmetries of time become crucial once again because HI undoubtedly has 
great potential in explaining such a discrepancy in terms of differing temporal elements. 
 
In line with the rationale above, the commonality of results concerning the low extent of 
Europeanisation shared by Maltese and Irish SHEGs can also be explained in terms of 
asymmetrical EU competencies in different policy domains. Since EU responsibilities 
are rather weak and diffused in many of the areas concerning social and community  
policies, interest groups are less inclined to Europeanise because they are still able to 
fulfil many of their political goals at the domestic level. Consequently, instead of 
pursuing a ‘logic of influence’, in other words looking for influence at the EU level, or 
window out in Van Schendelen’s terms; interest groups follow a ‘logic of the immediate 
environment’ and remain concentrated on their activities at the domestic level (Beyers 
and Kerremans 2007 as quoted by Saurugger 2013: 342) or window in Van 
Schendelen’s terms.  
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However one might legitimately ask whether the inclusion of environmental groups 
with social and human rights ones was effectively a good idea, given that the two sets of 
groups appertain to different policy domains. Whereas, as we have seen earlier, EU 
competencies are rather insubstantial in the case of the latter, they are very strong and 
well established in the case of the former. Thus, one would have expected a different 
adjustment process by the two sets of groups. The fact that they were amalgamated, 
particularly in the quantitative analysis, can be regarded as a structural weakness 
because their individual performance in the survey was not highlighted. However this 
methodological flaw was consciously inevitable from the very start. Since the numbers 
of environmental groups in both Malta and Ireland are very limited as indicated in the 
methodology chapter, their numbers had to be incorporated with the ones that are active 
in social affairs, so as to achieve a critical mass for statistical purposes. Otherwise the 
whole scope of quantitative analysis would have lost its appeal because of small 
absolute figures that would invariably lead to unreliable statistical results. Likewise the 
trade unions and employers’ organisations were also amalgamated, even though they 
normally maintain opposing standpoints, not least on EU affairs. This is an inbuilt 
limitation imposed by the reality of small states where the number of actors is small, yet 
differences between merged actors are still made evident through qualitative data that 
treated each set of the four groupings on a separate basis. 
 
9.6.3 Euroscepticism 
 
Research findings, particularly resulting from elite interviewing, suggest another 
important and emerging trend in Europeanisation studies which is hardly discussed in 
this thesis: Euroscepticism among non-state actors. Trade union leaders in Malta, but 
more aggressively in Ireland, air their frustrations against ‘exhaustive’ austerity 
measures promulgated by a neoliberal EU which, according to them, is being led by an 
inner core (Germany in particular, and France to a lesser extent) that seems to enjoy 
hegemonic power over the rest. As argued by Bulmer and Lequesne (2013: 21), a 
‘prolonged period of economic austerity’, such as the one experienced by the Irish 
during the time of this research, is definitely directly related to a growth of criticism of 
the EU. Resistance and inertia against the European integration process is not only 
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manifested by militant trade unionists alone. Some of the leaders of environmental 
groups, as well as social and human rights groups, also share their reservations. For 
example, the Maltese hunters’ lobby speaks of a sort of ‘conspiracy theory’ mastered by 
both national and European authorities which is putting them at a disadvantage to more 
mainstream green groups. In addition, a number of Irish and Maltese social groups 
lament the ceasing of Social Europe and of the alleged loss of the democratic credentials 
of the EU that had to make way for the dictum of the austerity programme as devised by 
the EC, the ECB and the IMF.  
 
These sceptic reactions need further investigation in the future as they may offer a 
potential challenge to some of the tenets of Europeanisation literature. For many years, 
Europeanisation has been regarded as a benign force of domestic change but the 
economic and financial crises since 2007 have taken their toll not only on failed 
member states like Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain but also on strong ones that are 
bound to lend money to the former as part of the rescue of the single currency. For 
example, when the Maltese Finance Minister spoke in Parliament that Malta's share in 
the Greek bailout amounted to 3% of its GDP, making Malta the largest contributor out 
of the EU member states (Balzan 2013), there was an outcry of public discontent among 
the Maltese who were already aware that the EC had cast its eyes on their country 
because its deficit exceeded 3% of GDP in 2012 and again in 2013 (The Malta 
Independent 2013). Europeanisation, as many commentators opine, did not remain as a 
sort of an ‘ideal’ to aspire to but it has become a sort of ‘flaw’ to stay away from. 
Criticism of neoliberal European integration has been used by a large number of non-
state actors either to boost their appeal with a disgruntled population or to establish 
themselves in the national arena (Saurugger 2013: 346). Taking Ireland as their focus of 
study, Hayward and Murphy (2010) and Laffan and Mahoney (2008: 82) refer to 
various instances in Irish politics when ‘audible voices critical to the EU’ seemed to 
override ‘the strong consensus that exists amongst mainstream parties’ on EU affairs. 
 
The answer to Blavoukos and Oikonomou’s hypothesised question on whether 
‘Europeanisation is still in academic fashion’ must include deeper and wider studies of 
the impact of an increasing eurosceptic psyche if Europeanisation literature is to go 
beyond its ‘current regional and country-based focus’, particularly featuring the Central 
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and Eastern member states and others that, at present, have an accession perspective 
(Blavoukos and Oikonomou 2012: 12). Goetz (2008: 77) suggest that Eurosceptism 
outstrips territorial proximity as it is ‘widespread’ across the different regions of the EU 
and beyond. Referring to political parties and party systems, Mair (2008: 155) contends 
that there is growing work in the politics of Euroscepticism, however it needs to adopt a 
comparative stance rather than remain inevitably nationally oriented if it really wants to 
set the terms of reference for later work.  
 
This thesis exposes Euroscepticism as an area that deserves greater attention in 
Europeanisation studies not only when the focus is on political parties but, equally 
important, when social partners and interest groups are involved. Research in this 
direction can illustrate how this negative form of Europeanisation can be used as a tool 
by certain domestic groups to legitimise their stratagems at the domestic level within an 
integrative region which is transforming itself on an ongoing basis. 
 
9.7 Final reflections 
 
Oscar Wilde once said, 'The truth is rarely pure and never simple'
127
. This statement 
sums up the challenges that had to be faced throughout all the stages of this work right 
from the construction of a conceptual framework through the adaptation of explanatory 
theories to the formulation of a comparative methodology that produces meaningful 
empirical results. This research has evidently shown that there are various areas where 
social partners and interest groups in Malta and Ireland, as two small island polities at 
the frontiers of an integrated regional block, share a similar narrative but, in others, they 
contradict each other. In spite of the great emphasis on size which has been made in this 
work, there are other factors that can have a direct effect on the extent and nature of 
Europeanisation of domestic non-state actors. Supranational developments at the EU 
level, time bands, policy domains, political culture and the typography of organised 
groups can all be mediators of the domestication of European politics. As the reflections 
on the findings reveal, these can possibly be more influential than size in itself.  
 
                                                 
127
 Quoted from The Importance of Being Earnest, A Trivial Comedy for Serious People, a play by Oscar 
Wilde which was first performed on 14 February 1895 in London. 
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On a more general note, the critical realist stance of this work attempted to generate a 
rich and extensive corpus of data that provides contrasting and complementary 
understandings of the case scenarios in Malta and Ireland. On methodological grounds, 
it stands out in forging a workable statistical method to measure the extent of 
Europeanisation with the potential of replication in future studies. The formulation of a 
set of knowledge claims that can be transferable to other states which share similar 
socio-political profiling is a significant addition to the merits of the ambitious 
methodology of the study. At the end of it all by focusing exclusively on domestic 
organised interests and the political dynamics that shape small states’ governance, this 
work constitutes an original contribution to the body of knowledge concerning the 
Europeanisation of polities and politics. 
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Preliminary fieldwork 2009-2011 
  
Date Interviewee Interviewee Position 
 
Interview Scope Venue 
13/01/09 Prof Roderick Pace 
 
Director of European 
Documentation & 
Research Centre 
 
To explore issues of 
Europeanisation 
University 
of Malta 
18/02/09 Dr Joanna Drake 
 
Head, Permanent 
European Commission 
Representation in 
Malta 
To identify potential policy 
domains to serve as case 
studies and establish 
contacts for fieldwork in 
Brussels 
 
Malta 
23/02/09 Dr Vanni Xuereb 
 
Head, Malta EU 
Steering & Action 
Committee (MEUSAC) 
To obtain an observatory 
status on MEUSAC 
sectoral committees 
 
MEUSAC, 
Malta 
Multiple 
meetings 
Dr Edward 
Warrington 
 
Head, Department of 
Public Policy 
To explore issues of 
institutionalism in small 
states 
 
University 
of Malta 
Multiple 
meetings 
Prof Godfrey A 
Pirotta 
 
Head, Institute of 
Public Admin. & 
Management 
To discuss nature and 
character of Maltese civil 
society 
 
University 
of Malta 
21/04/09 Mr Saviour Rizzo 
 
Assistant Head, 
Labour Studies 
Institute 
To research social 
partners’ role in Maltese 
and European contexts 
 
University 
of Malta 
19/05/09 Prof Kenneth Wain 
 
Commissioner for 
Voluntary 
Organisations 
To explore developments 
of Maltese legislation for 
voluntary organisations 
 
Malta 
21/05/09 Mr Julian Farrugia 
 
Consultation 
Executive, MEUSAC 
To map consultation 
processes among state and 
non-state actors 
 
MEUSAC, 
Malta 
28/05/09 H.E. Gerald 
O’Connor 
 
Irish High 
Commissioner for 
Malta 
To establish networking 
contacts with Irish 
counterparts 
 
Irish 
Embassy, 
Malta 
07/07/9 Anonymous on the 
request of the 
interviewee 
 
Attachè – Malta Desk To get first hand info about 
the operations of the 
Maltese permanent 
representation in Brussels 
 
Dar Malta 
Brussels 
08/07/09 Mr Charles 
McCreevy 
 
EU Commissioner for 
the Internal Market 
and Services 
 
To interview him about the 
performance of small 
states in the EU 
 
Berlaymont 
Building 
Brussels 
09/07/09 Mr Omar Cutajar 
 
Malta Business 
Bureau, Permanent 
Representative in 
Brussels 
 
To learn about Maltese 
business lobby in the EU 
context 
Brussels 
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12/10/09 Dr Manwel Debono 
 
Head, Department of 
Labour Studies 
 
To discuss issues 
pertaining to statistical 
analysis 
University 
of Malta 
20/6/11 Ms Marzia 
Baldassari 
Executive, 
Volunteering Ireland 
To seek assistance in 
managing fieldwork in 
Ireland 
 
Dublin 
21/6/11 Dr Rory O’Connell Director, National 
Economic & Social 
Council 
To seek assistance in 
managing fieldwork in 
Ireland 
 
NESC, 
Dublin 
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 Malta 
 
Trade unions  
 
Association of Airline Engineers Malta (AAEM) 
Confederated Maltese Trade Unions (CMTU) 
Emergency Nurses Union (ENU) 
Enemalta Professional Officers Union (EPOU) 
Enemalta Senior Staff Union 
Forum Unions Maltin (ForUM) 
General Workers Union (GWU) 
Għaqda Professjonisti tal-Korporazzjoni għas-Servizzi tal-Ilma 
Malta Air Traffic Controllers Association 
Malta Union of Bank Employees (MUBE) 
Malta Union of Midwives and Nurses (MUMN) 
Malta Union of Teachers (MUT) 
Malta Union of Tourist Guides (MUTG) 
Musicians and Entertainers Union 
Rampa Union 
The Lotto Receivers Union 
The Medical Association of Malta (MAM) 
Union Ħaddiema Bank Ċentrali  
Union Ħaddiema Magħqudin (UĦM) 
Union Ħaddiema Università ta' Malta (UĦUM) 
Union of Cabin Crew 
Union Professjonisti - l-Awtorità tal-Ippjanar u Ambjent (UPAP) 
Union Technical and Clerical MEPA (UTAC) 
University of Malta Academic Staff Association (UMASA) 
 
 
Employers’ associations 
 
Assoċjazzjoni tal-Bdiewa 
Assoċjazzjoni tal-Bejjiegħa tal-Laħam 
Association of Car Importers Malta (ACIM) 
Association of General Retailers and Traders (GRTU) 
Association of Ship Agents 
Federated Association of Travel and Tourism Agents (FATTA) 
Federation of Malta Hotels, Pensions and Catering Establishments 
Għaqda Bdiewa Progressivi 
Għaqda tal-Pitkala 
Gozo Tourism Association 
Malta Chamber of Commerce 
Malta Chamber of Small and Medium enterprises 
Malta Employers Association (MEA) 
Malta Hotels and Restaurants Association (MHRA) 
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Social and Human rights Groups 
 
AEGEE - Valletta 
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat Malta  
Amplify 
Arab European Forum for Development and Dialogue 
Arabic Culture Information Society 
Armenian Community of Malta 
Assoċjazzjoni Kunsilli Lokali 
Assoċjazzjoni tas-Sidien Caravans u Bangalows Għadira Site Mellieħa 
Balluta Residents Association 
Ċentru Tbexbix (Sunrise Centre) 
CycleSafe Malta 
Domus Pius IX 
Don Bosco House 
Down Syndrome Association 
Equal Partners 
European Movement (Malta) 
Fondazzjoni AŻAD - Ċentru ta' Studji Politiċi 
Fondazzjoni Kenn u Tama 
Fondazzjoni Temi Zammit 
Fondazzjoni Soċjo-Kulturali Ambjentali Augustina 
Fondazzjoni U (Xandir Soċju Reliġjuż)  
Fondazzjoni Ulied Ħal Qormi 
Forum for Justice and Cooperation 
Fostering Social Technological Economic Renewal Foundation (FOSTER) 
Foundation for Respite Care Centre (Dar il-Kaptan) 
Foundation for Shelter and Support for Migrants 
Foundation for Women Entrepreneurs (Malta) 
GetUpStandUp! 
Gift of Life Foundation 
Good Shepherd Sisters (Dar Merħba Bik) 
Gozo Association for the Deaf 
Gozo NGOs Association 
Grupp Flimkien Naslu 
Għaqda Mużikali San Ġużepp, Għajnsielem 
Għaqda Persuni Neqsin mis-Smigħ – Malta 
Għaxaq Folk Group (a.k.a. Għaxaq Folk Ensemble) 
Happy Moments Kenya 
Home Economics in Action 
Ignatian Youth Network – Malta Foundation 
Inħobbu l-Munxar u x-Xlendi 
Inspire Foundation 
Islamic Community Malta 
Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice Foundation 
Koperattiva Kummerċ Ġust 
Koperazzjoni Internazzjonali - Malta (Kopin) 
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Kunsill Nazzjonali taż-Żgħażagħ 
Lions Club Mdina 
Lions Club Sliema 
Living Ability Not Disability (LAND Group) 
Living with Dignity Group 
Malta Association of Women in Business 
Malta Federation of Organisations of Persons with Disability 
Malta Gay Right Movement 
Malta Girl Guides 
Malta Humanist Association 
Malta Parkinsons Disease Foundation 
Malta Red Cross Society 
Malta Regional Development and Dialogue Foundation 
Malta Society of the Blind 
Malta UNESCO Youth Association 
Mental Health Association Malta 
Mid-Dlam Għad-Dawl  
Mission Fund 
Mission of Mercy 
Mothers' Union  
Moviment Graffitti 
Muscular Dystrophy Group 
National Association of Pensioners 
National Council of Women 
National Foster Care Association 
National Parents Society of Persons with Disability 
Noise Abatement Society 
Pamper the World 
Paulo Freire Institute Foundation 
Pope John XXIII, Peace Laboratory 
Richmond Foundation 
SKOP (Solidarjetà u Koperazzjoni) 
Sliema Residents Association 
Soċjetà Storika, Kulturali, Amjentali Vittoriosa 
Solidarity and Overseas Service Malta (SOS Malta) 
S.T.A.R.S. (Shock Trauma Acceptance Reality Situations) 
St. John Rescue Corp 
Ta’ Klula Foundation 
The Anglican Church in Malta and Gozo 
The Military & Hospitaller Order of St, Lazarus of Jerusalem Grand Prior of the 
Maltese Islands 
The Millenium Chapel Foundation 
The Multiple Sclerosis Society of Malta 
The Today Public Policy Charitable Trust 
Touring Club Malta 
TROUPE 18:45 
Valletta Alive Foiundation 
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Victim Support Malta 
Vodafone Malta Foundation 
YMCA Valletta 
Young European Federalists (JEF Malta) 
Żminijietna – Leħen ix-Xellug (Voice of the Left) 
 
 
Environmental Groups 
 
Alternattiva Demokratika Żgħażagħ - Green Youth Malta 
Animal Rights Group 
BirdLife Malta 
Din L-Art Helwa 
Federazzjoni Kaċċaturi, Nassaba u Konservazzjonisti (FKNK) 
Flimkien Ghal Ambjent Ahjar 
Friends of the Earth Malta (FOE MALTA) 
Genista Research Foundation 
Greenhouse - Malta 
Għaqda Produtturi tal-Għasel 
Malta Horticultural Society (The) 
Malta Organic Agricultural Movement 
Nature Trust (Malta) 
Permaculture Research Foundation Malta 
Share Malta Association 
Sharklab 
Soċjetà Agrarja 
The Entomological Society of Malta 
The Heritage Parks Foundation 
Wirt Għawdex 
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Republic of Ireland 
 
Trade unions 
 
Association of Higher Civil & Public Servants 
Association of Secondary Teachers Ireland 
Building and Allied Trades Unions 
Communications Workers' Union 
Electricity Supply Board's Officer's Association 
Irish Bank Officials' Association 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
Irish Federation of University Teachers 
Irish Medical Organisation 
Irish Municipal, Public and Civil Trade Union 
Irish National Bus and Rail Union  
Irish National Teacher's Organisation 
Irish Nurses and Midwives Organisation 
Mandate Trade Union 
 
 
Employers’ Associations 
 
Alcohol Beverage Federation of Ireland 
Building Materials Federation 
Cement Manufacturers Ireland 
Concrete Manufacturers Association of Ireland 
Federation of Aerospace Enterprises in Ireland (FAEI) 
Industrial Products and Services Group (IPSG) 
Industry Construction Federation 
Irish Brewers Association 
Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) 
Irish Cider Association 
Irish Decorative Surface Coatings Association 
Irish Engineering Enterprises Federation 
Irish Marine Federation 
Irish Plastic Pipe Manufacturers Association 
Irish Proshare Association 
Irish Small and Medium Enterprises Association (ISME) 
Irish Spirits Association 
Plastics Ireland 
Retail, Grocery, Diary and Allied Trades Association (RGDATA) 
The Irish Farmers Association (IFA) 
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Social and Human rights Groups 
 
Active Retirement Ireland 
Age Action Ireland Ltd 
ALFA (Active Learning For Adolescents) 
Angelman Syndrome Ireland 
Aspire 
Barnardos 
Bedford Row Family Project 
Business in the Community Ireland 
Campaign for Children 
Carers Association 
Centre for Independent Living 
Changing Ireland 
Children’s Rights Alliance 
Comber Foundation 
Congress Centres Network 
Crime Victims Helpline 
Doras Luimni 
Drimnagh Community Network 
Dublin Aids Alliance 
Dublin Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgendered Queer Pride Ltd 
Dublin Rape Crisis Centre 
Endometriosis Association of Ireland 
European Anti-Poverty Network Ireland 
Extern Ireland 
FLAC 
Front Line Defenders 
Galway Hospice Foundation Ltd 
GLEN 
Irish Council for Civil Liberties 
Irish Council for Social Housing 
Irish Heart Foundation 
Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed 
Irish Rural Link 
Irish Senior Citizens Parliament 
Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice 
Kildare Youth Services 
Kilkenny LEADER Partnership 
Knockanrawley Resource Centre 
L'Arche Ireland 
Le Cheile Schools Trust 
LIR Anti-Racism Training 
 386 
MACRO Senior Citizens Project Ltd 
Migraine Association of Ireland 
Migrants Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) 
My Mind Centre 
NASC Irish Immigrant Support Centre 
National Association of Building Cooperatives 
National Traveller MABS 
National Youth Council of Ireland 
One in Four 
Protestant Aid 
Respond! Voluntary Housing Association 
Retrieve Foundation 
Society of St Vincent de Paul 
Sunbeam House Services 
TASC (Thinktank for Action on Social Change) 
The Hanly Centre 
The SNUG Counselling Services (Dublin) 
The Wheel 
Third Age Foundation 
Tipperary Regional Youth Service 
TRUST for homeless people 
USPI  (Unmarried and Separated Parents of Ireland) 
Volunteering Ireland 
 
 
 
 Environmental Associations 
 
An Taisce - The National Trust for Ireland 
Birdwatch Ireland 
Carra/Mask/Corrib Water Protection Group  
Coastwatch 
Crann 
Friends of the Earth 
Friends of the Irish Environment 
Golden Eagle Trust 
Green Sod Land Trust  
IEN (Irish Environment Network) 
Irish Doctors Environment Association  
Irish Peatland Conservation Council 
Irish Seal Sanctuary 
Irish Whale and Dolphin Group 
Irish Wildlife Trust 
Longford Environmental Alliance  
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Save Our Lough Ree 
Sustainable Ireland Cooperative 
SWAN (Sustainable Water Network Ireland) 
VOICE (Voice of Irish Concern for the Environment) 
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Appendix C 
 
Accompanying Letter to the 
Questionnaire 
(English and Maltese versions) 
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To the person responsible for the organisation,   
I am a Maltese academic who am presently reading for a PhD degree at the Department 
of Politics of the University of Sheffield (UK). My research theme revolves around the 
process of Europeanisation and how is it affecting the character and contribution of 
domestic interest groups. In particular, I will be analysing this theme from the 
perspective of small island member states at the periphery of an integrated continent, 
thus, embracing Malta and the Republic of Ireland as the two major case studies. 
Your organisation has been selected to take part in the data collection phase and, to this 
effect, I am kindly asking you to fill-in the questionnaire attached. 
Although the participation of your organisation in this research project is voluntary, I 
would be grateful if you choose to fill it in wherein you may opt to remain anonymous 
by not writing your name and role within the organisation you are representing. 
Responses will remain confidential at all times. All the data that will be generated will 
be presented in aggregate format and will only be used for academic purposes. 
Kindly return the filled questionnaire either by email 
(mario.t.vassallo@um.edu.mt) or by post (Mario Thomas Vassallo, The University 
of Malta, Department of Public Policy, Faculty of Economics, Management and 
Accountancy, l-Imsida, Malta) by not later than Monday 13
th
 February 2012. The 
questionnaire will only take a few minutes of your time to be completed as most 
questions involve just a Yes or No answer. 
Thank you for your kind attention and hope to have a positive response from your end. 
Your participation is very much appreciated. 
Mario Thomas Vassallo 
Assistant Lecturer – University of Malta 
PhD Student – University of Sheffield (UK) 
Home Telephone: (00356) 21 468 400 
Office Telephone:  (00356) 2340 2728 
Mobile Number:   (00356) 7973 4543 
email: mario.t.vassallo@um.edu.mt  
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Lill-persuna responsabbli mill-organizzazzjoni, 
Jiena akkademiku fl-Università ta' Malta u fil-prezent qiegħed insegwi kors ta' PhD fid-
Dipartiment tal-Politika fl-Università ta' Sheffield (UK). It-tema tar-riċerka tiegħi 
tinkwadra l-proċess ta' Ewropeanizzazzjoni u kif din qiegħda taffettwa l-karattru u l-
kontribuzzjoni tas-socjetà ċivili b'risq it-tfassil tal-politika. B'mod partikolari se nkun 
qiegħed nistħarreġ din it-tema mill-perspettiva ta' pajjiżi zgħar fl-UE, b'mod partikolari 
Malta u r-Repubblika tal-Irlanda. 
L-organizzazzjoni li inti tirrapreżenta ġiet magħżula biex tieħu sehem f'dan l-eżerċizzju 
ta' ġbir ta' informazzjoni u, għaldaqstant, qiegħed nibgħatlek il-kwestjonarju li jinsab 
anness. Għandek issib verżjoni bil-Malti u oħra bl-Ingliż biex tirrispondi l-aktar waħda 
komda għalik. 
Għalkemm il-parteċipazzjoni tiegħek f'din ir-riċerka hija fuq bażi volontarja imma, fl-
istess waqt, inkun obbligat jekk taċċetta li tieħu sehem għax tkun qiegħed tgħini hafna 
għad-Dottorat. 
Jekk jogħġbok ibgħat il-kwestjonarju mimli fuq mario.t.vassallo@um.edu.mt jew 
inkella bil-posta fl-indirizz (Mario Thomas Vassallo, L-Università ta’ Malta, 
Dipartiment tal-Public Policy, Fakultà tal-Ekonomija, l-Management u l-
Accountancy, l-Imsida, Malta) sa mhux aktar tard minn nhar it-Tnejn 10 
t'Ottubru 2011. Il-kollega tiegħi, is-Sur Andrè Debattista, se jkun qiegħed jagħmel 
kuntatt miegħek sabiex, jekk ikun hemm ħtieġa, il-kwestjonarju jimtela minn fuq it-
telefown. 
Grazzi tal-attenzjoni ġentili tieghek u nittama li jkolli rispons pożittiv min-naħa tiegħek. 
Hija l-intenzjoni tiegħi li nkompli nkattar l-involviment tas-soċjetà ċivili fit-tfassil tal-
politika permezz tar-riċerka li qiegħed nagħmel. 
Il-parteċipazzjoni tiegħek hija wisq apprezzata 
 
Mario Thomas Vassallo 
Membru tal-istaff akkademiku, l-Università ta' Malta 
Student tad-Dottorat, Università ta' Sheffield 
Telefown tad-dar:   21 46 84 00 
Telefown tal-uffiċċju: 2340 2728 
Mowbajl:      7973 4543 
email:    mario.t.vassallo@um.edu.mt 
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Appendix D 
 
Questionnaire Guide 
(English and Maltese versions) 
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The implications of membership in the European Union (EU) 
on domestic interest groups 
Structured Questionnaire Guide 
 
Officer’s name: (optional)_______________________       Date : ______________________ 
  
Role of officer in the organisation:  (optional)  ______________________________________ 
  
Organisation’s name: ___________________________________________________ 
 
Policy domain of the organisation: [  ] Employers’ Association [  ]  Trade Union 
[  ] Social/Human rights [  ]   Environment 
Country of origin:   [  ] Malta  [  ] Rep. of Ireland 
The organisation engages [  ]  volunteers only  [  ] paid personnel only 
    [  ] a mix of volunteers and paid personnel 
Changes in internal structure 
Q1 Does the organisation’s vision/mission statement include a European dimension? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q2 If yes to Q1, did this occur because of EU membership? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No  
Q3 If no to Q1, does your organisation intend to include a European dimension in its 
vision/mission statement? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q4 Is there a member/s within your organisation that is responsible for EU affairs? 
[  ] Yes, one person who is solely responsible for EU affairs 
[  ] Yes, one person who performs other tasks as well as EU affairs 
[  ] Yes, there is more than one person responsible for EU affairs as part of their jobs 
[  ] No 
Q5 Have any of your personnel undergone training to acquire the necessary skills in EU 
affairs (e.g. application for funds, identifying partners, lobbying strategies, 
consultation procedures, EU institutional set-up, etc) 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q6 Did your organisation establish any contacts in Brussels? (you can tick more than one 
option) 
[  ] Yes, by establishing a permanent office in Brussels 
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[  ] Yes, by relying on an umbrella Euro-group based in Brussels 
[  ] Yes, by sending any of our members to Brussels from time-to-time 
[  ] Yes, by online networking 
[  ] Yes, by other means [please specify] _______________________________ 
[  ] No 
Q7 If no to Q6, does your organisation intend to establish any contacts in Brussels? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q8 If yes to Q7, which of the following means of contact is your organisation likely to 
opt for? (you can tick more than one option) 
[  ] Establish a permanent office in Brussels 
[  ] Rely on an umbrella Euro-group based in Brussels 
[  ] Sending any of our members to Brussels from time-to-time 
[  ] Online networking 
[  ] Other means [please specify] ______________________________________ 
Q9 Does your organisation try to access EU funds? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q10 If yes to Q9, was the organisation successful in obtaining EU funds? 
[  ] Yes, in 1 project            [  ] Yes, in more than 1 but less than 5 projects 
[  ] Yes, in 5 projects or more          [  ] No 
Q11 If not successful so far, does your organisation intend to try to access EU funds in the 
future? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q12 Does your organisation seek external advice to access EU funds? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No [  ] not applicable 
Q13 If yes to Q12, which sources does your organisation seek external advice from? (you 
can tick more than one option) 
[  ] government agencies  [  ] independent experts 
[  ] other domestic NGOs  [  ] other European NGOs 
[  ] Others [please specify] _________________________________ 
Q14 Did your organisation participate in EU related activities in these last 8 years? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
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Q15 Did your organisation’s participation in EU related activities increase or decrease 
over the years?  
 [  ]  increased [  ]  remained stable [  ]  decreased  [  ] not applicable 
Q16 Has the European dimension been integrated in any of your domestic events? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No  
Domestic responsiveness 
Q17 Does your organisation participate in domestic fora that discuss prospective EU 
legislation? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No  
Q18 Is your organisation part of any state body that brings together governmental and 
non-governmental bodies to debate policy domains? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q19 If no to Q18, does your organisation consider to start forming part of any state body 
responsible for social and civil dialogue? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q20 In fora involving social and civil dialogue, which of the following strategies is 
adopted by your organisation?  
[  ] competitive  [  ]  consensus  
[  ] compromise  [  ] laissez faire [  ] depends on the situation 
Q21 Did your organisation team-up with other Irish NGOs to solidify its voice in these last 
8 years?  
[  ] Yes  [  ]  No  
Q22 Did your organisation involve itself in private/public partnerships to administer joint 
projects in these last 8 years? 
[  ] Yes, on 1 occasion   [  ] Yes, in more than 1 but less than 5 occasions 
[  ] Yes, in 5 occasions or more  [  ] No 
Q23 Do you think that the EU enhanced the role of your organisation in the process of 
domestic policy-making? 
[  ] Yes, to a great extent [  ]  Yes, to some extent  
[  ] Yes, to a minor extent [  ] No, not at all 
Q24 Do you think that the EU has been instrumental to accentuate the culture of civil 
dialogue in domestic affairs? 
[  ] Yes, to a great extent [  ]  Yes, to some extent  
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[  ] Yes, to a minor extent [  ] No, not at all  
Q25 Do you think that the EU has induced domestic NGOs to act more cohesively at the 
national level? 
[  ] Yes, to a great extent [  ]  Yes, to some extent  
[  ] Yes, to a minor extent [  ] No, not at all 
Q26 Do you think that the EU has exerted pressure on national government to seek more 
participation from domestic NGOs in policy-making? 
[  ] Yes, to a great extent [  ]  Yes, to some extent  
[  ] Yes, to a minor extent [  ] No, not at all 
European involvement  
Q27 Does your organisation participate in any of the European Commission’s working 
groups?  
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q28 Does your organisation submit any feedback to draft legislation, including Green and 
White papers, issued by the European Commission? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q29 Does your organisation engage in any consultation processes led by the European 
Economic and Social Committee? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q30 Is your organisation an affiliated member of any European federation? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q31 If no to Q30, would your organisation consider to be part of any European federation 
in the future? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q32 If no to Q31, why? (you can tick more than one option) 
[  ] no need to be part of a European federation      [ ]high monetary cost of affiliation 
[  ] focusing on domestic issues is a priority        [  ] affiliation is against statute 
[  ] other reasons (please specify)__________________________________________ 
Q33 Do any members of your organisation hold any executive responsibilities within the 
European federation which your organisation is part of? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
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Q34 Does your organisation engage itself in any lobbying with any institution of the EU? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q35 If yes to Q34, which of the following institutions/personnel did your organisation 
lobby? (you can tick more than one option) 
[  ] The European Commission   [  ] National members of EESC 
[  ] National members of European Parliament  [ ] The Commissioner of your       
country 
[  ] The member state holding the Presidency of the Council 
[  ] Others (please specify) ______________________________________________ 
Q36 If not, why? (you can tick more than one option) 
[  ] Preference for the domestic route of influence among national politicians   
[ ] Preference for targeting national ministers who will in turn voice their opinion at 
the Council of Ministers 
[  ] High cost involved in lobbying at EU level 
[  ] No knowledge of how the EU institutional arrangement works 
[  ] The EU does not have any relevance to the domestic scenario  
[  ] Lack of administrative capacity  
[  ] Other reasons (please specify) ________________________________________ 
Q37 Does your organisation identify European partner organisations with whom you can 
cooperate over joint projects? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q38 If yes to Q37, from which member states do your organisation’s partners originate? 
(tick the names of respective member states) 
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark 
Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary 
Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands 
Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain 
Sweden U.K.     
 
Q39 If no to Q37, does your organisation consider to work with European partners in the 
future? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
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Q40 Is your organisation engaged in physical networking with other European partners? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
Q41 Is your organisation engaged in virtual networking with other European partners? 
[  ] Yes  [  ] No  
Attitudinal transformation 
Q42 Does membership in the EU affect the mind-set of members within your 
organisation? 
[  ] Yes, to a great extent  [  ]  Yes, to some extent  
[  ] Yes, to a minor extent  [  ] No, not at all 
Q43 Is the character of your organisation influenced by the norms and practices of 
European federations? 
[  ] Yes, to a great extent  [  ]  Yes, to some extent  
[  ] Yes, to a minor extent  [  ] No, not at all 
Q44 Have there been any changes within your organisation that are attributed to new 
ideas brought about by European partner organisations?  
[  ] Yes  [  ]  No [  ] Don’t know 
Q45 Is your organisation encouraged by the pattern of EU governance to change its 
tactics and strategy in domestic negotiations? 
[  ] Yes  [  ]  No  [  ] Don’t know 
Q46 If yes to Q46, what is the source of stimulus for the change in your organisation’s 
tactics and strategies? (If you opt for more than one reason, rank them on a priority 
order; 1 being the least important) 
 [  ] The opportunity to gain EU funds  [  ] The value of consensus-seeking 
[  ] The socialisation effect with other partners [ ] Positive attitude towards each other 
[  ] The acquisition of new skills through training  
Q47 Does the national culture inhibit the acquisition of new norms and values originating 
from the wider European experience? 
[  ] Yes, to a great extent  [  ]  Yes, to some extent  
[  ] Yes, to a minor extent  [  ] No, not at all 
 
Q48 Does your organisation participate in exercises involving the sharing of best practices 
with other organisations? 
[  ] Yes, only with domestic organisations       
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[  ] Yes, only with European organisations 
[  ] Yes, only with foreign organisation beyond the EU 
[  ] Yes, both with domestic and European organisations  
[  ] Yes, with domestic, European and other foreign organisations 
[  ] No, not at all 
Q49 If yes, do these exercises have transformation effects on the norms that shape the 
culture within your organisation? 
[  ] Yes, to a great extent  [  ] Yes, to some extent  
[  ] Yes, to a minor extent  [  ] No, not at all [  ] not applicable 
 
Q50 Any additional comments __________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
Your assistance has been appreciated. 
Mario Thomas Vassallo, PhD student 
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield (UK) 
Telephone: (356) 79 73 45 43   E-mail: mario.t.vassallo@um.edu.mt 
You can email the filled in questionnaire on the email address provided  
or print it and send by traditional post to: 
Mario Thomas Vassallo, Department of Public Policy, FEMA, University of Malta,    
L-Imsida, Malta. 
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L-implikazzjonijiet tas-sħubija fl-Unjoni Ewropea (UE)  
fuq is-soċjetà ċivili fl-istati membri 
Gwida għall-Kwestjonarju 
 
Isem min qed iwieġeb: __________________________ Data tal-intervista:______________ 
 
Rwol tal-persuna fl-organizzazzjoni: ______________________________________________ 
 
Isem tal-organizzazzjoni: _______________________________________________________ 
 
Qasam li fih l-organizzazzjoni hi attiva  [  ] Assoċjazzjoni ta’ min iħaddem   
[  ] Trade Union                   [  ]  Ambjent 
[  ] Soċjali/Drittijiet tal-Bniedem   
Stat li fih taħdem l-organizzazzjoni [  ] Malta  [  ] Rep. tal-Irlanda 
L-organizzazzjoni tħaddem [  ]  voluntiera biss  [  ] uffiċjali mħallsa 
    [  ] taħlita ta’ voluntiera u uffiċjali mħallsa 
Tibdil fl-istrutturi Interni 
M1 Il-viżjoni/missjoni tal-organizzazzjoni tinkludi d-dimensjoni Ewropea? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M2 Jekk iva, dan ġara minħabba s-sħubija fl-UE? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le  
M3 Jekk le, l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tinsab interessat li tibda tinkludi d-dimensjoni 
Ewropea fl-istqarrija tal-viżjoni/missjoni tagħha? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M4 Jeżisti membru/i fl-organizzazzjoni tiegħek li huwa responsabbli minn affarijiet tal-
UE? 
[  ] Iva, persuna waħda li esklussivament tieħu ħsieb l-affarijiet tal-UE 
[  ] Iva, persuna waħda li fost responsabbiltajiet oħrajn, tieħu ħsieb l-affarijiet tal-
UE 
[  ] Iva, hemm iżjed minn persuna waħda responsabbi mill-affarijiet tal-UE bħala parti 
mix-xogħol tagħhom fi ħdan l-għaqda 
[  ] Le 
M5 Kien hemm membri mill-organizzazzjoni tiegħek li rċivew taħriġ biex jakkwistaw 
ħiliet fl-affarijiet tal-UE (eż. applikazzjoni għall-fondi, identifikazzjoni ta’ partners, 
proċeduri ta’ konsultazzjoni, l-qafas istituzzjonali tal-UE, eċċ)? 
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[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M6 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek stabbiliet xi forom ta’ kuntatt ma’ Brussell? 
[  ] Iva, permezz ta’ ftuħ ta’ uffiċċju permanenti fi Brussell 
[  ] Iva, billi nikkomunikaw ma’ Euro-group bbażat fi Brussell 
[  ] Iva, billi nibagħtu lil xi wieħed mill-membri fi Brussell minn żmien għal ieħor 
[  ] Iva, permezz ta’ netweking online 
[  ] Iva, b’mezzi oħrajn [jekk jogħġbok speċifika] __________________________ 
[  ] Le 
M7 Jekk le, l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek hija mħajra biex tistabilixxi kuntatt ma’ Brussell? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M8 Jekk iva, liema wieħed minn dawn il-forom ta’ kuntatt huwa l-aktar probabbli li 
jingħażel mill-organizzazzjoni tiegħek ? 
[  ] Iva, permezz ta’ ftuħ ta’ uffiċċju permanenti fi Brussell 
[  ] Iva, billi nikkomunikaw ma’ Euro-group bbażat fi Brussell 
[  ] Iva, billi nibagħtu lil xi wieħed mill-membri fi Brussell minn żmien għal ieħor 
[  ] Iva, permezz ta’ netweking online 
[  ] Iva, b’mezzi oħrajn [jekk jogħġbok speċifika] __________________________ 
M9 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek ippruvat taċċessa fondi mill-UE? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M10 Jekk iva, l-organizzazzjoni kellha suċċess fil-kisba ta’ fondi mill-UE? 
[  ] Iva, fi proġett wieħed   [  ] Iva, f’aktar minn proġett 1 imma f’anqas minn 5 
[  ] Iva, f’5 proġetti jew iżjed  [  ] Le 
M11 Jekk le għal M9, l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek hija interessata li tipprova taċċessa fondi 
mill-UE fil-futur? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M12 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tipprova ssib għajnuna esterna biex tikseb fondi mill-UE? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le [  ] Mhux applikabbli 
M13 Jekk iva, minn liema sorsi tikseb l-għajnuna esterna l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek? 
[  ] aġenziji tal-gvern  [  ] esperti indipendenti 
[  ] għaqdiet oħrajn Maltin  [  ] għaqdiet oħrajn Ewropej 
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[  ] Oħrjan [jekk jogħġbok speċifika] _________________________________ 
M14 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek ipparteċipat f’attivitajiet relatati mal-UE f’dawn l-aħħar 8 
snin? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M15 Ir-rata ta’ parteċipazzjoni tal-organizzazzjoni tiegħek’s f’attivitajiet relatati mal-UE 
żdiedet jew naqset matul is-snin? 
 [  ]  żdiedet [  ]  baqgħet stabbli [  ]  naqqset [  ] mhux applikabbli 
M16 Id-dimensjoni Ewropea ġiet integrata fl-attivitajiet li torganizzaw f’Malta? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le  
Involviment fl-Arena Domestika 
M17 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tipparteċipa f’diskussjonijiet f’Malta fejn ikunu ttrattati 
liġijiet prospettivi tal-UE? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le  
M18 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tagħmel parti minn istituzzjoni ċentrali li ġġib flimkien lis-
settur pubbliku u lis-soċjetà ċivili biex jiddibattu t-tfassil tal-politika? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M19 Jekk le, l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tikkunsidra li tibda tifforma parti minn istituzzjoni 
ċentrali li tkun responsabbli mid-djalogu soċjali u ċivili? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M20 F’diskussjonijiet li jkunu jinvolvu d-djalogu soċjali u ċivili, liema minn dawn l-
istrateġiji normalment tkun addottata mill-organizzazzjoni tiegħek?  
[  ] kompetittiva   [  ]  konsensus  
[  ] ta’ kompromess [  ] laissez faire [  ] jiddependi skont il-każ 
M21 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek issieħbet ma’ għaqdiet Maltin oħra biex issaħħaħ il-vuċi 
tagħha f’dawn l-aħħar 8 snin? 
[  ] Iva  [  ]  Le  
M22 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tinvolvi ruħha f’public-private partnerships biex 
tamministra proġetti konġunti f’dawn l-aħħar 8 snin? 
[  ] Iva, f’okkażjoni 1   [  ] Iva, f’aktar minn okkażjoni 1 imma anqas minn 5 
[  ] Iva, f’ħames okkażjonijiet jew aktar   [  ] Le 
M23 Taħseb li l-UE saħħet ir-rwol tal-organizzazzjoni tiegħek fil-proċess tat-tfassil tal-
politika  f’Malta? 
[  ] Iva, ħafna  [  ]  Iva, mhux ħażin  
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[  ] Iva, xi ftit   [  ] Le, xejn affattu 
M24 Taħseb li l-UE kienet strumentali biex ssaħħaħ il-kultura tad-djalogu ċivili fl-affarijiet 
fil-pajjiż? 
[  ] Iva, ħafna  [  ]  Iva, mhux ħażin  
[  ] Iva, xi ftit   [  ] Le, xejn affattu  
M25 Taħseb li l-UE ħajret lill-għaqdiet Maltin biex jaġixxu iżjed bħala forza flimkien fil-
livell nazzjonali? 
[  ] Iva, ħafna  [  ]  Iva, mhux ħażin  
[  ] Iva, xi ftit   [  ] Le, xejn affattu  
M26 Taħseb li l-UE ppressat lill-Gvern Malti biex jinvolvi aktar lill-għaqdiet Maltin fit-
tfassil tal-politika? 
[  ] Iva, ħafna  [  ]  Iva, mhux ħażin  
[  ] Iva, xi ftit jew wisq [  ] Le, xejn affattu  
Involvilment fl-Arena Ewropea 
M27 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek pparteċipat f’xi wieħed mill-working groups tal-
Kummissjoni Ewropea (KE)? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M28 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tissottometti l-fehmiet tagħha fil-konfront ta’ leġiżlazzjoni 
ġdida, inkluż Green u White Papers maħruġa mill-KE? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M29 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tipparteċipa fi proċessi ta’ konsultazzjoni mmexxija mill-
Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew?  
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M30 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek hija affiljata ma’ xi federazzjoni Ewropea? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M31 Jekk le, l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tikkunsidra li taffilja ruħha ma’ xi federazzjoni 
Ewropea fil-futur? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
Q32 Jekk le , għaliex?  
[  ] m’hemmx bżonn ta’ affiljazzjoni ma’ federazzjoni Ewropea  
[  ] il-ħlas ta’ sħubija huwa għoli wisq għalina 
[  ] nippreferu niffukaw fuq materji lokali        
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[  ] affiljazzjoni ma’ Federazzjoni Ewropea hija kontra l-istatut tal-għaqda tagħna 
[ ] raġuni oħra (jekk jogħġbok speċifika)  ____________________________________ 
M 33 Hemm membri fl-organizzazzjoni tiegħek li jokkupaw xi responsabbiltà eżekuttiva f’xi 
federazzjoni Ewropea li l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tifforma parti minnha? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M34 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tagħmel lobbying mal-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M35 Jekk iva, ma’ liema minn dawn l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tagħmel il-lobbying? 
[  ] Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea [  ] Il-membri Maltin tal-Kumitat Soċjali u   Ekonomiku 
Ewropew 
[  ] Il-politiċi Maltin fil-Parlament Ewropew  [  ] Il-Kummissarju Malti 
[  ] L-istat membru li jkun qiegħed jokkupa l-Presidenza tal-Kunsill  
[ ] Oħrajn (jekk jogħġbok speċifika) ________________________________________ 
M36 Jekk le, għaliex? 
[  ] Nippreferu nagħmlu l-lobbying tagħna fix-xena politika Maltija  
[ ] Nippreferu li navviċinaw lill-Ministri Maltin biex min-naħa tagħhom iwasslu l-
interessi tagħna fil-Kunsill tal-Ministri 
[  ] L-ispejjeż biex tagħmel lobbying fil-livell tal-UE huma kbar wisq 
[  ] M’għandniex għarfien ta’ kif jaħdmu l-istitituzzjonijiet tal-UE 
[  ] L-UE m’għandhiex rilevanza  fil-kamp fejn taħdem l-organizzazzjoni tagħna 
[  ] Limitazzjoni ta’ kapaċità amministrattiva 
[  ] Raġuni oħra (jekk jogħġbok) ___________________________________ 
M37 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tidentifika għaqdiet Ewropej oħra bħala partners biex 
magħhom tikkopera fuq proġetti bi sħab? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M38 Jekk iva, minn liema stati membri ssibu dawn il-partners? (immarka l-ismijiet tal-istati 
partners skont l-għażla tiegħek) 
L-Awstrija Il-Belġju Il-Bulgarija Ċipru Ir-Rep. 
Ċeka 
Id-
Danimarka 
L-Estonja Il-Fillandja Franza Il-Ġermanja Il-Greċja L-Ungerija 
L-Italja Il-Latvija Il-Litwanja Il-
Lussemburgu 
L-Irlanda L-Olanda 
 404 
Il-Polanja Il-Portugall Ir-Rumanija Is-Slovakja Is-Slovenja Spanja 
L-Iżvezja Renju Unit     
 
M39 Jekk le, l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tikkunsidra li taħdem ma’ partners Ewropej fil-
furur? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M40 l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek hija involuta f’netwerking fiżiku (skambji ta’ membri) ma’ 
partners oħrajn Ewropej? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le 
M41 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek hija involuta f’netweking virtwali (bl-internet) ma’ partners 
oħrajn Ewropej? 
[  ] Iva  [  ] Le  
Trasformazzjoni fl-Attitudni 
M42 Is-sħubija fl-UE affettwat il-mod ta’ ħsieb tal-membri fl-organizzazzjoni tiegħek? 
[  ] Iva, ħafna  [  ]  Iva, mhux ħażin  
[  ] Iva, xi ftit   [  ] Le, xejn affattu 
M43 Il-karattru tal-organizzazzjoni tiegħek ġie influwenzat min-normi u l-prattiċi tal-
federazzjonijiet Ewropej? 
[  ] Iva, ħafna  [  ]  Iva, mhux ħażin  
[  ] Iva, xi ftit   [  ] Le, xejn affattu 
M44 Kien hemm tibdil fl-organizzazzjoni tiegħek li huwa attribwit għal ideat ġodda 
miġjuba minn organizzazzjonijiet oħrajn Ewropej li kienu partners tagħkom?  
[  ] Iva  [  ]  Le  [  ] Ma nafx 
M45 L-istil ta’ governanza Ewropea jinkoraġġixxi lill-organizzazzjoni tiegħek biex tbiddel it-
tattiċi u l-istrateġiji tagħha fin-negozjar li tkunu involuti fih f’Malta? 
[  ] Iva  [  ]  Le  [  ] Ma nafx 
M46 Jekk iva, liema huwa s-sors tal-istimulu li jġiegħel lill-organizzazzjoni tiegħek’s 
tbdiddel it-tattiċi u l-istrateġiji tagħha? (Jekk tagħżel iżjed minn sors wieħed, 
ppreżentahom f’lista ta’ priorità; 1 huwa l-INQAS sors importanti għall-bidla)) 
 [  ] L-opportunità li tikseb l-fondi Ewropej [  ] Il-valur li nsibu ftehim b’kunsens 
[  ] Is-soċjalizzazzjoni ma’ partners Ewropej [  ] Aktar attitudni pożittiva lejn xulxin 
[  ] L-akkwist ta’ ħiliet ġodda bit-taħriġ  [  ] Oħrajn  ___________________ 
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M47 Taħseb li l-istil tal-kultura Maltija jtellef mill-akkwist ta’ normi u valuri ġodda li 
joriġinaw mill-esperjenza Ewropea? 
[  ] Iva, ħafna  [  ]  Iva, mhux ħażin  
[  ] Iva, xi ftit   [  ] Le, xejn affattu 
M48 L-organizzazzjoni tiegħek tipparteċipa f’eżerċizzji li jinvolvu l-qsim tal-aħjar prattiċi 
ma’ organizzazzjonijiet oħrajn? 
[  ] Iva, ma’ organizzazzjonijiet Maltin biss       
[  ] Iva, ma’ organizzazzjonijiet Ewropej biss 
[  ] Iva ma’ organizzazzjonijiet li mhumiex parti mill-UE 
[  ] Iva, kemm ma’ organizzazzjonijiet Maltin u Ewropej 
[  ] Iva, kemm ma’ organizzazzjonijiet Maltin, Ewropej u lil hinn 
[  ] Le, ma nipparteċipawx 
M49 Jekk iva, dawn l-eżerċizzji jħallu effetti ta’ bidla fil-karattru tal-organizzazzjoni 
tiegħek? 
[  ] Iva, ħafna  [  ]  Iva, mhux ħażin  
[  ] Iva, xi ftit   [  ] Le, xejn affattu   [  ] mhux applikabbli 
M50 Għandek xi kummenti addizzjonali oħrajn __________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Grazzi tal-ħin tiegħek biex imlejt il-kwestjonarju 
L-assistenza tiegħek ġiet apprezzata 
Mario Thomas Vassallo, student tal-PhD 
Dipartiment tal-Politika, L-Universita ta’ Sheffield, Ir-Renju Unit 
Telefown: (356) 79 73 45 43   E-mail: mario.t.vassallo@um.edu.mt 
Tista’ tibgħat il-kwestjonarju bil-posta elettronika fuq l-e-mail provdut , 
Inkella pprintjah u ibagħtu bil-posta f’dan l-indirizz: 
Mario Thomas Vassallo, Dipartiment tal-Public Policy, FEMA, L-Università ta’ Malta, 
L-Imsida, Malta. 
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Appendix E 
 
Interview Guide together  
with Inviting Letter 
(English and Maltese versions) 
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Hope you are well. 
 
You have already helped me a lot in my research regarding interest groups by filling in 
the questionnaire on behalf of your organisation. 
 
In order to investigate further, I am going to conduct a number of elite interviewing 
sessions both in Malta and Ireland to enquiry further the extent of EU impact on interest 
groups originating from small island member states. 
 
Your organisation, __________________________________, has been selected to take 
part in this part of data collection as well. 
 
I am going to take the lead and suggest a date and time when I can come to your office 
and have a conversational interview with you or with another officer who represents 
your organisation. I am suggesting the following date _____________ (date) at 
________ (time).  You are free to change the time or date, or both, to fit your timetable. 
When the time draws more near, I will forward you the set of questions that will guide 
our interview. Essentially we will be talking about the impact of the EU on your 
organisation and other interest groups that are engaged in the same policy domain. 
Anonymity is guaranteed as no names are to be divulged in my thesis. However, if 
consent is given, the name of your organisation will appear in one of the appendices 
highlighting the organisations that participated in this research exercise. If you do not 
have any reservations, it is my intention to audio-record the interview for transcription 
purposes. 
 
Looking forward to have your confirmation or otherwise. 
Wish you the very best. 
Kindest wishes, 
 
  
 
Mario Thomas Vassallo 
Assistant Lecturer – University of Malta 
PhD Student – University of Sheffield (UK) 
Home Telephone:  (00356) 21 46 84 00 
Mobile Number:   (00356) 7973 4543 
email: mario.t.vassallo@um.edu.mt  
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Mario Thomas Vassallo 
PhD in Politics 
February & March 2012 
 
Meetings with peak Irish interest groups 
Fieldwork research visit in Dublin, Ireland 
 
Interview Guide 
 
 
1. How do you describe the process of interest representation in Ireland today? 
 
2. How much really open are government officials to take onboard 
recommendations put forward by Irish civil and social partners? Does your 
organisation receive any feedback from government for its 
dossiers/research/suggestions? 
 
3. There are those who complain that although today there is more space for 
consultation between state and non-state actors, the real fact is that it is part of a 
cosmetic exercise? What is opinion of your organisation about the state of  true 
consultation in Ireland today? 
 
4. Do Irish and civil partners opt for a consensus based approach when dealing 
with central government entities or do they resort to veto playing so as to 
suppress potential agreement among the different stakeholders? Does your 
organisation use veto playing in its lobbying strategies? 
 
5. Besides the formation of formal consultation structures, like the Social 
Partnership, do informal channels of cooperation exist in Ireland?  
 
6. Does your organisation engage itself in any public-private partnership to lead or 
participate in a number of joint-projects? How was the experience so far? 
 
7. From among the representatives of the Irish civil society, are there any who can 
be called social entrepreneurs in the sense that they advocate change in mentality 
and governance? What qualities do they usually have to bring about change in 
the systems and institutions? 
 
8. Have there been any instances wherein your organisation bypassed national 
authorities and lobbied directly with EU institutions through European 
federations or on its own? 
 
9. What do you understand by the term ‘process of Europeanisation’? 
 
10. From your experience, do you think that your organisation has undergone a 
process of Europeanisation or are there any barriers (including fragmentation, 
lack of administrative capacity and sectoral rivalry) that preclude it? 
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11. What are the major barriers that impact negatively on the Europeanisation 
potential of Irish interest groups? Or better still, why do Irish interest groups opt 
to remain indifferent to the influences flowing from the EU mode of 
governance? 
 
12. Does the national culture inhibit the acquisition of new norms and values 
originating from the wider European experience? 
 
13. Is a process of Europeanisation motivated by the opportunity to acquire 
additional funding through the EU or by the socialisation effects with other 
European partner organisation? 
 
14. If you are of the opinion that your organisation has been Europeanised in some 
way or in another, does it manifest itself in tangible effects? Eg: mentality, 
culture, management processes, lobbying strategies, etc  
 
15. From your experience, were the changes that occurred within your organisation 
the result of the Irish membership in the EU or because of a wider globalisation 
experience? 
 
16. Which are those specific Irish characteristics that should be preserved 
notwithstanding the influences for change emanating from the EU and other 
member states? 
 
17. All in all, do you think that the process of Europeanisation has been significant 
within your organisation and the Irish civil society in general? 
 
 
 
________________________ 
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Għażiż Sinjur/a, 
 
Nittama li tinsab tajjeb 
 
Nibda biex ngħid li int diġà tajtni ħafna għajnuna fir-riċerka li qiegħed nagħmel dwar l-
organizzazzjonijiet mhux governattivi meta ġentilment imlejt il-kwestjonarju f’isem l-
għaqda li inti tirrappreżenta. 
 
Bl-iskop li nissokta nistħarreġ iżjed fil-fond it-tema tar-riċerka tiegħek, se nkun qiegħed 
nikkordina numru ta’ intervisti kemm f’Malta kemm fl-Irlanda biex hekk niskopri iżjed 
fil-fond l-impatt tal-Unjoni Ewropea fuq l-organizzazzjonijiet li joriġinaw fl-Istati 
Membri li huma żgħar u gżejjer. 
 
L-organizzazzjoni li inti tirrappreżenta, ___________________________, ġiet 
magħżula biex tipparteċipa wkoll f’dan l-istadju tal-ġabra tad-data. 
 
Ippermettili nieħu l-inizjattiva u nissuġġerixxi data u ħin meta nkun nista’ niġi l-uffiċċju 
tiegħek u nagħmlu din l-intervista flimkien, jew ma’ xi uffiċjal ieħor li jirrappreżenta 
lill-għaqda tiegħek. Qiegħed nissuġġerixxi id-data ________________ (data) fil-
_______ (ħin). Ħossok liberu li tbiddel il-ħin jew id-data, jew it-tnejn, jekk dan ikun ta’ 
ħtieġa. Meta joqrob iżjed iż-żmien, nibgħatlek ukoll is-sett ta’ mistoqsijiet li għandhom 
jiggwidawna waqt l-intervista. Essenzjalment se nkunu qegħdin nitħaddtudwar l-impatt 
tal-UE fuq l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek u organizzazzjonijiet simili li jaħdmu fl-istess 
għalqa. 
L-anonimità hija garantita għax ebda isem ta’ persuni mhu se jkun imsemmi fit-teżi. 
Jekk inti taqbel, l-isem tal-organizzazzjoni tiegħek ikun jidher f’wieħed mill-appendiċi 
li jelenka dawk l-organizzazzjonijiet li jkunu pparteċipaw fir-riċerka. Jekk inti ma 
jkollox riżervi, huwa l-ħsieb tiegħi li nirrekordja l-intervista bl-iskop li nkunu nista’ 
nagħmel traskizzjoni ta’ dak li jkun intqal. 
Nittama li jkolli risposta mingħandek fil-pożittiv jew mod ieħor. 
Nixtieqlek l-aħjar u l-aqwa fil-ħidma tal-organizzazzjoni tiegħek. 
 
Inselli ħafna għalik, 
 
 
Mario Thomas Vassallo 
Membru tal-istaff akkademiku, l-Università ta' Malta 
Student tad-Dottorat, l-Università ta' Sheffield 
 
Telefown tad-dar:   21 46 84 00 
Telefown tal-uffiċċju: 2340 2728 
Mowbajl:      7973 4543 
email:    mario.t.vassallo@um.edu.mt 
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Mario Thomas Vassallo 
Riċerka li twassal għal Dottorat fil-Politika 
  
Sensiela ta’ intervisti ma’ uffiċjali li jirrappreżentaw is-soċjetà ċivili f’Malta 
April u Mejju 2012 
 
Gwida għall-mistoqsijiet matul l-intervisti 
 
 
1. Kif tiddeskrivi l-proċess ta’ djalogu mas-soċjetà ċivili f’Malta kif inhu llum? 
 
2. Kemm tabilħaqq huma disponibbli l-uffiċjali tal-gvern biex jilqgħu 
rakkomandazzjonijiet suġġeriti mill-imsieħba soċjali u s-soċjetà ċivili? L-
organizzazzjoni tiegħek tirċievi rispons mill-gvern għas-suġġerimenti u r-riċerka 
li tissottometti lill-awtoritajiet? 
 
3. Hemm min jilmenta li għalkemm illum hawn aktar spazju għall-konsultazzjoni 
pubblika bejn il-gvern u s-soċjetà ċivili, imma fil-fatt dan jagħmel parti minn 
eżerċizzju kożmetiku. X’inhi l-opinjoni tiegħek dwar l-istat ta’ konsultazzjoni 
ta’ veru f’Malta llum? 
 
4. Meta tkunu madwar il-mejda tad-diskussjoni, x’inhi l-klima tad-djalogu li jkun 
għaddej – klima mnissla minn spirtu ta’ kunsens jew inkella klima mdakkra 
mid-dissens (veto-playing) minħabba pożizzjonijiet riġidi u polarizzati? 
 
5. Minbarra l-istrutturi formali tad-djalogu bħal MCESD u MEUSAC, jeżistu 
kuntatti informali f’Malta fejn l-istat jikkomunika mas-soċjetà ċivili? 
 
6. Jekk l-organizzazzjoni pparteċipat fi proġetti bi sħab mal-istat jew mas-settur 
privat, kif kienet l-esperjenza? Pożittiva jew negattiva? 
 
7. Is-soċjetà ċivili f’Malta tista’ tiġi msejħa bħala aġent tal-bidla, kemm fil-
mentalità u kif ukoll fil-politika settorjali (policies)? X’inhuma l-kwalitajiet li 
organizzazzjoni għandu jkollha biex iġġib bidla fis-sistemi u l-kultura? 
 
8. Kien hemm sitwazzjonijiet fejn l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek injorat lill-awtoritajiet 
Maltin u marret twassal il-vuċi tagħha direttament fi Brussell permezz ta’ 
federazzjonijiet Ewropej jew inkella fuq il-merti tagħha biss? 
 
9. X’tifhem bit-terminu ‘proċess ta’ Ewropeanizzazzjoni’? 
 
10. Mill-esperjenza tiegħek, taħseb li l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek għaddejja minn 
proċess ta’ Ewropeanizzazzjoni jew minħabba ċertu xkiel (eż. frammentazzjoni 
fis-settur, nuqqas ta’ kapaċità amministrattiva, nuqqas ta’ fondi) dan mhux qed 
issir? 
 
11. Il-proċess ta’ Ewropeanizzazzjoni huwa mmotivat mill-opportunità li jkunu 
akkwistati l-fondi jew inkella minħabba l-effetti ta’ soċjalizzazzjoni ma’ 
msieħba Ewropej oħra? 
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12. Taħseb li hemm xi raġunijiet partikolari għalfejn numru ta’ organizzazzjonijiet 
non-governattivi f’Malta baqgħu indifferenti għar-realtà tal-Unjoni Ewropea? 
 
13. Taħseb li l-kultura Maltija hija ta’ xkiel biex ikunu addottati normi u valuri 
ġodda li joriġinaw mill-esperjenza Ewropea? 
 
14. Jekk l-organizzazzjoni tiegħek qiegħda b’xi mod tkun affettwata mill-proċess ta’ 
Ewropeanizzazzjoni, hemm xi effetti tanġibbli ta’ dan? (fil-mentalità, il-kultura, 
proċessi ta’ tmexxija, strateġiji ta’ lobbying, eċċ). 
 
15. Inti taħseb li l-bidliet li qegħdin iseħħu fl-organizzazzjoni tiegħek u fis-settur 
fejn topera huma riżultat tas-sħubija ta’ Malta fl-UE jew minħabba l-
globalizzazzjoni? 
 
16. Taħseb li hemm karatteristiċi Maltin li jeħtieġ li jkunu ppreservati minkejja l-
influwenzi qawwija u kostanti ta’ bidla li jiġu minn barra minn xtutna? 
 
17. Kollox ma’ kollox, taħseb li l-proċess ta’ Ewropeanizzazzjoni kien wieħed 
sinifikattiv għall-organizzazzjoni tiegħek u għas-soċjetà ċivili f’Malta? 
 
 
 
_____________ 
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Appendix F 
 
Maltese and Irish Participants  
in Elite Interviewing 
 414 
Maltese organisation/personalities that participated in elite interverviewing 
 
1. Assoċjazzjoni tal-Bdiewa 
2. Bird Life Malta 
3. Ċentru Fidi u Ġustizzja 
4. Confederation of Maltese Trade Unions (CMTU) 
5. Federazzjoni Kaċċaturi, Nassaba u Konservazzjonisti (FKNK) 
6. General Retailers’ and Traders’ Union (GRTU) 
7. General Workers’ Union 
8. Gozo NGOs Association 
9. Kunsill Nazzjonali tan-Nisa 
10. Malta Business Bureau (MBB) 
11. Malta Council for Economic and Social Development (MCESD) 
12. Malta Council for Voluntary Organisations 
13. Malta-EU Steering and Action Commitee (MEUSAC) 
14. Malta Gay Rights Movement 
15. Nature Trust Malta 
16. Parliamentary Secretariat for Consumers, Fair Competition, Local Councils and 
Public Dialogue 
17. Permanent Representation of Malta in Brussels 
18. Resident academic of the University of Malta 
19. Resident academic of University of Malta and former politician 
20. SOS Malta 
21. Union Ħaddiema Magħqudin 
 
 
Irish organisations/personalities that participated in elite interverviewing 
 
1. An Taische (National Trust of Ireland) 
2. Birdwatch Ireland 
3. Children’s Rights Alliance 
4. Coastwatch Europe 
5. Friends of the Earth Ireland 
6. Friends of the Irish Environment  
7. Gay and Lesbian Equality Network (GLEN) 
8. Ireland Environmental Network (IEN) 
9. Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) 
10. Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) 
11. Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed (INOU) 
12. Irish National Youth Council 
13. Irish Nurses and Midwives Trade Union (INMTU) 
14. Irish Small and Medium Enterprises Association (ISME) 
15. Maltese political observer on Irish politics 
16. Mandate Trade Union 
17. National Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
18. Sustainable Water Network (SWAN) 
19. The Wheel 
20. Thinktank for Action on Social Change (TASC) 
21. Volunteering Ireland 
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Appendix G 
 
Observations Sessions  
in Malta and Ireland
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No Date Event Event Type                                        Organised/Delivered  Venue Hours 
2008 
  
1 27 June 2008 Green Jobs: What Prospects? National Seminar ETC St Julians, Malta 
7 
2 
9/10/11/12 Dec 
2008 
Europe Listens: Dialogue with the 
Maltese Civil Society 
Sectoral Workshops 
MEUSAC and Commission 
Representation in Malta 
Sliema, Malta 
28 
2009 
  
3 28 Feb 2009 
The Consultation Process with Civil 
Society 
Seminar MEUSAC Sannat, Gozo 
4 
4 24 April 009 
The Impact of EU legislation on Maltese 
Family Law 
Discussion Seminar National Family Commission Valletta, Malta 
3 
5 6-9 May 2009 SME Fair Convention Maltese Government Valletta, Malta 
8 
6 6 May 2009 
Inġibu xogħol lin-negozji Maltin mill-
Ewropa  
Seminar GRTU Valletta, Malta 
2 
7 8 May 2009 Linking Enterprise Networking Fora Malta Chamber of Commerce Valletta, Malta 
2 
8 14 May 2009 Micro Business... Big Ideas National Conference 
Ministry of Finance, Economy 
and Investment 
Floriana, Malta 
6 
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9 15 May 2009 
Malta in the EU: 2004-2009. Reflection 
on the first 5 years of membership 
Conference EDRC, University of Malta St Julians, Malta 
7 
10 29 May 2009 
Safeguarding Today's Jobs for 
Tomorrow's Growth 
Conference 
Malta Chamber of Commerce + 
Trade Commissioner Catherine 
Ashton 
Valletta, Malta 
3 
11 26 June 2009 
Gender and the Renewed Social 
Agenda of the EU 
Seminar EDRC, University of Malta San Giljan, Malta 
2 
12 28 July 2009 MEUSAC Sectoral Committee Committee  MEUSAC and Social Partners Valletta, Malta 
2 
13 4 August 2009 Civil Society and the European Union Conference MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 
6 
14 
30 September 
2009 
Work/Life Balance - Publication of 
Research Results 
Conference 
Employment & Training 
Corporation (ETC) 
St Julians, Malta 
2 
15 3 November 2009 MEUSAC Sectoral Committee Committee  MEUSAC and Social Partners Valletta, Malta 
2 
16 20 November 2009 
Pjan tal-Iżvilupp Rurali għal Malta      
2007-2013 
Consultation Seminar 
BOV, MEUSAC, & Ministry for 
Resources & Rural Affairs 
Santa Venera, 
Malta 
2 
17 24 November 2009 
Mainstreaming Small States Studies in 
Higher Education 
Workshop 
Islands and Small States 
Institute 
University, Malta 
3 
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2010 
  
18 26 January 2010 
Priorities and Programmes of the 
Spanish Presidency 
Public Dialogue 
Spanish Embassy in Malta and 
MEUSAC 
Floriana, Malta 
3 
19 1 February 2010 
The Future Competition Law 
Framework applicable to the Motor 
Vehicle sector 
 consultation session 
for stakeholders 
MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 
2 
20 18 March  
Public Sector Effectiveness for Private 
Sector Efficiency Business Breakfast Malta Institute of Management Saint Julians, Malta 4 
21 27 March 
Caritas in Veritate - The Pope Encylical 
on Global Realities Public Seminar 
Department of Public Policy 
and Faculty of Theology 
Mosta, University of 
Malta 3 
22 19-Apr 
Joint Sectoral Committee Meeting on 
Europe 2020 
MEUSAC Committee 
Meeting 
Employ, Social & Health Com + 
Educ, Youth, Culture Com 
Dar l-Ewropa, 
Valletta 2 
23 3 May 
Workers on the Move - Working in the 
EU Business Breakfast 
MEUSAC and the Malta 
Employers Association Floriana, Malta 4 
24 7 May 
MEP Meeting with Maltese Business 
Community Meeting Prof Edward Scicluna MEP                  Floriana, Malta 2 
25 19 May 
Making the Most of EU Membership for 
SMEs in Gozo Business Breakfast MEUSAC and MCESD Mgarr, Gozo 4 
26 21 May 
The Management of Biodegradable 
Waste and the Directive on Ambient Air 
Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe Consultation Session MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 2 
27 25 May 2010 European SME Week 
Enterprise meeting 
College students SME Incubator Centre MCAST, Mosta 2 
28 
3 July 2010 Europe 2020 - Maltese Perspectives 
MEUSAC National 
Conference 
MEUSAC Floriana Malta 
3 
29 22 Sept 2010 Green Paper on Pensions Reform 
MEUSAC Sectoral 
Committee - Empl, 
Social Policy & Health  MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 2 
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30 10 Sept 2010 
Draft Commission Regulation on Scrap 
Metal Consultation session MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 2 
31 17 -18 Sept 2010 Assemblea Djoċesana Diocesan Assembly 
Archbishop + religious 
organisations B'Kara Malta 7 
32 3 November  
Caritas Exhibition at the Auberge of 
Castille Art Exhibition Caritas Malta Valletta, Malta 1 
33 10-Nov-10 
Construction of new Road in Kalkara in 
connection with Smart City Project Public Consultation MEPA Kalkara, Malta 2 
34 14 Dec 2010 Poverty and Social Exclusion Art Exhibition Żminijietna 
GWU, Valletta, 
Malta 1 
2011   
35 10-Jan 
Commission Communication: Towards 
a Single Market Act - for a highly 
Competitive Market Economy 
MEUSAC public 
consultation MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 2 
36 12-Jan 
The EU's Cohesion Policy: Consultation 
on the Conclusions of the 5th report on 
Econ, Social & Territorial Cohesion Public Consultation MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 2 
37 14-Jan 
Dimostrazzjoni kontra l-Governanza bla 
Ruħ Soċjali National Protest March Partit Laburista Valletta, Malta 2 
38 18-Jan 
A Strong Europe: Priorities and 
Programme of the Hungarian 
Presidency Public Dialogue 
Embassy of Hungary and 
MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 2 
39 26-Jan 
Closer to Europe: Social and Civil 
Dialogue National Conference MCESD Floriana, Malta 5 
40 9-Feb 
European Strategy for Disability 2010-
2020 
MEUSAC Sectoral 
Committee - Empl, 
Social Policy & Health  MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 3 
41 25 Feb Inter-Faith Peace Conference  Faith conference 
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat 
Malta Floriana, Malta 2 
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42 25 March 
Fished Out...? The State of Our 
Fisheries National Conference Din l-Art Ħelwa San Giljan, Malta 7 
43 26 March Volunteer! You Make a Difference! National Conference 
Malta Council for the Voluntary 
Sector H'Attard, Malta 4 
44 31 March Il-Festi: Kultura u Identità National Seminar 
Soċjetà Mużikali Madonna tal-
Ġilju Ħal Luqa, Malta 4 
45 09-Apr 
Id-Divoluzzjoni tal-Poter: Bejn Ħolma u 
Realtà National Seminar 
Department of Public Policy 
and Association of Local 
Councils (Malta) Birkirkara, Malta 4 
46 27-Apr Ħal Ilwien: Street Theatre Community Theatre  
Ħal Miftuħ - a community 
theatre project travelling to 
different localities to spread a 
strong message in favour of 
social inclusion at the 
workplace. Ħaż-Żebbuġ, Malta 1 
47 18 May 
Protest Against Harmful Gay 
Conversion attempts and fairy-tale 
beliefs Public Protest Malta Gay Rights Movement Ħaż-Żebbuġ, Malta 1 
48 3 June 
7 Years of EU Membership: Our 
achievements Public Lecture 
Organised by MEUSAC and 
delivered by Dr Lawrence 
Gonzi, Prime Minister Valletta, Malta 2.5 
49 4 June 
Human Rights Walk to promote 
awareness on the rights of disabled 
persons and other minorities 
Walk, public 
entertainment and 
exhibition stands by 
NGOs 
Kummissjoni Nazzjonali 
Persuni b'Dizabilità with the 
support of of the EU 
Programme for Employment 
and Social Responsability - 
Progress (2007-2013) Valletta, Malta 1 
50 5 June Silent March Against Animal Cruelty Silent March 
Animal rights coalition and 
Police Assistant Commissioner 
Josie Brincat 
Sliema and Ta' 
Xbiex, Malta 1 
51 6 June 
Waste Regulations 2011, Legal Notice 
184/2011 Information Seminar MEUSAC and MEPA Valletta, Malta 2 
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52 13 June 
Malta's Action Plan to Prevent and 
Reduce Ambient Noise Consultation Session MEUSAC and MEPA Valletta, Malta 2 
53 14 June 
The Asylum Procedure…And Then 
What? National Conference 
Office of the Refugee 
Commissioner Sliema, Malta 6 
54 17 June 
Re-launch of the Single Market and 
what it means for Business Business meets MEPs 
Malta Business Bureau and 
Louis Grech Floriana, Malta 2 
55 19 June 
Protest against elected politicians and 
global/regional institutions (such as 
IMF, WTO and EU) for their economic 
failure leading to global recession Sit-in street protest Direct Democracy 
O'Connel Str, 
Dublin 1 
56 8 July 
Oħloq Tbissima - Maratona ta' Xandir 
b'risq il-missjoni fil-Perù, il-Filippini u l-
Pakistan 
Fund raising marathon 
on TV 
Missionary Society of Saint 
Paul 
Santa Venera, 
Malta 1 
57 15 July 
Public Protest as a sign of solidarity 
with Air Malta workers who are ro suffer 
big job   Public Protest 
ALPA (Pilots' union), General 
Workers Union and Forum of 
Trade Unions Valletta, Malta 1 
58 20 July 
Consultation session on the European 
Platform Against Poverty and Social 
Exclusion Consultation session MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 2 
59 27 July 
Evenings on Campus: Mirca Tour for 
Human Rights - 70 artists from 28 
countries Art Exhibition University of Malta University, Malta 1 
60 28 July 
Roadmap towards a Resource Efficient 
Europe under the Europe 2020 Strategy Consultative session MEUSAC Valletta, Malta 2 
61 13 September 
Malta's actions in the fields of waste 
and noise management (directive 
2002/96/EC and Directive 2002/49EC) Public seminar MEUSAC L-Imġarr, Gozo 5 
62 15 September Use of Pesticides 
Information and Public 
Consultation Session 
MEUSAC and Consumer 
Affairs Authority In-Naxxar, Malta 2 
63 23, 24 September 
The Church in Malta: social and political 
transformations since the end of the 
synod 2003 Diocesan Assembly The Maltese diocese Birkirkara, Malta 7 
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64 3 October Freshers’ Week - University of Malta 
Info stands by 
Students' Associations 
and fun activities 
Kunsill Studenti Universitarji 
(KSU) 
University of Malta, 
Malta 2 
65 12 October 
Public Consultation Meeting on the 
Environment Impact Assessment 
regarding the extension of the 
Portomaso complex 
Public Consultation 
Meeting 
Malta Environment and 
Planning Authoity (MEPA) Saint Julians, Malta 2 
66 14 October Pre-Budget Consultation Session Working Breakfast 
Ministry of Finance, Economy 
and Investment San Lawrenz, Gozo 3 
67 16 October 
Intrapiża Malta - your appointment with 
the Maltese business community 
Fun activities, info 
stands and public 
discussions 
Ministry of Finance, Economy 
and Investment Ta' Qali, Malta 3 
68 22 October 
Facebook people blocking the entrance 
of the National Bank of Ireland Sit-in street protest Facebook society Dublin, Ireland 2 
69 23 October 
Mission Village wherein NGOs that are 
active in foreign mission in developing 
countries had the possibility to meet 
with people Activity for the family 
Moviment Missjunarju Malti 
flimkkien mal-għaqdiet tal-
Missjoni Ta' Qali, Malta 2 
70 27 October The Annual Assembly of Mosta Parish 
Annual Parish 
Assembly Mosta Parish Mosta, Malta 4 
71 30 October Walk for Life (from Valletta to Sliema) Activity for the masses Gift of Life 
Valletta to Sliema, 
Malta 3 
72 4 November 
Symbolic street protest against the 
failure of the Public Transport Reform Street Protest Reboot - single issue group Valletta 1 
73 21 November 
The Annual Assembly of Floriana 
Parish 
Annual Parish 
Assembly Floriana Parish Floriana, Malta 2 
74 30 November 
The Value of Volunteering and the 
Economy - Discussion session 
European Year of 
Volunteering - National 
Exhibition 
Malta Council for the Voluntary 
Sector Floriana, Malta 2 
75 7 December Save Wied il-Għasel Petition Campaign 
Collection of 
signatures of the 
general public Grupp Patrimonju Mosti Valletta, Malta 0.5 
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2012 
76 13 January 
Social Enterprise - unleashing its 
potential Breakfast meeting 
Ministry of Finance, Economy 
and Investment Floriana, Malta 2 
77 11 February Anti-ACTA Street Protest Street Protest The Malta Anti Acta Group Valletta, Malta 1 
78 29 February 
Protest Picket at EU Commission 
Officesto mark European Trade Union 
Day of Action Against Austerity 
Measures Protest Picket 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
(ICTU) Dublin, Ireland 1 
79 29 February 
Protest by the Irish Rural Communities 
against Household Tax and Septic Tank 
Charges 
Protest walk against 
austerity cuts from the 
Spire in O'Connell 
Street to Leinster 
House 
Rural Ireland Against Charges, 
mostly community groups - 
attended by 700 people Dublin, Ireland 3 
80 4 May 
Public Consultation Meeting regarding 
an evironmental impact assessment on 
the establishment of 12 dairy farms in 
Siġġiewi 
Public Consultation 
Meeting 
Malta Environment and 
Planning Authoity (MEPA) Siġġiewi, Malta 2 
81 5 May 
Malta Cannabis March as part of the 
14th Annual Global Marijuana March Cannabis March Moviment Graffiti Valletta, Malta 2 
82 24, 25 May 
Ethics and Values in Social and Civil 
Dialogue and the Role of the Media Seminar and training MCESD Mgarr, Gozo 10 
 
 
 
Total number of hours of observations: 260 hours 
 
Number of observations sessions in Malta: 78 
 
Number of observations sessions in Ireland: 4
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Appendix H 
 
Statistical findings pertaining to  
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations  
in Malta and Ireland 
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STATISTICAL CROSSTABS REGARDING 
TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS’ ASSSOCIATIONS  
(a.k.a. SOCIAL PARTNERS) 
IN MALTA AND IRELAND 
 
 
 
Demographic question 
 
 
 Type of personnel engaged by organisations 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 volunteers only Count 20 0 20 
Percentage 54.1% .0% 28.2% 
paid personnel only Count 5 16 21 
Percentage 13.5% 47.1% 29.6% 
mix of volunteers &         paid 
personnel 
Count 12 18 30 
Percentage 32.4% 52.9% 42.3% 
Total Count 37 34 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 26.88, v = 2, p < 0.0005  
 
 
Question 1 
 
The vision/mission statement incorporate a 
European dimension 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 23 24 47 
Percentage 60.5% 70.6% 65.3% 
No Count 15 10 25 
Percentage 39.5% 29.4% 34.7% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.802, v = 1, p = 0.371  
 
 
 
Question 2 
 
The inclusion of the EU dimension in the 
vision/mission statement occurred as a 
consequence of EU accession 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 12 20 32 
Percentage 52.2% 83.3% 68.1% 
No Count 11 4 15 
Percentage 47.8% 16.7% 31.9% 
Total Count 23 24 47 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.248, v = 1, p = 0.022,u 
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Question 3 
 
 Intention to include a European dimension in 
the vision/mission statement if this is not 
already the case 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 6 0 6 
 Percentage 40.0% .0% 24.0% 
No Count 9 10 19 
Percentage 60.0% 100.0% 76.0% 
Total Count 15 10 25 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.263, v = 1, p = 0.022  
 
 
Question 4 
 
Responsibility of EU affairs within organisations 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes, one person who is 
solely responsible 
Count 7 1 8 
Percentage 18.4% 2.9% 11.1% 
Yes, one who performs 
other tasks as well 
Count 11 13 24 
Percentage 28.9% 38.2% 33.3% 
Yes, more than one person 
responsible 
Count 5 18 23 
Percentage 13.2% 52.9% 31.9% 
No Count 15 2 17 
Percentage 39.5% 5.9% 23.6% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 21.801, v = 3, p < 0.0005, u 
 
 
Question 5 
 
Participation in  training programmes to acquire 
necessary skills in EU affairs 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 17 16 33 
Percentage 44.7% 47.1% 45.8% 
No Count 21 18 39 
Percentage 55.3% 52.9% 54.2% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.039, v = 1, p = 0.844  
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Question 6 
 
 The type of contact that has already been established in 
Brussels, if any 
Trade Unions & Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Permanent Office in Brussels Count 3 6 9 
Percentage 4.8% 10.7% 7.6% 
Relying on umbrella Euro-
group based in Brussels 
Count 16 27 43 
Percentage 25.8% 48.2% 36.4% 
Sending members to Brussels 
periodically 
Count 14 12 26 
Percentage 22.6% 21.4% 22.0% 
Online networking Count 10 6 16 
Percentage 16.1% 10.7% 13.6% 
Other means Count 1 3 4 
Percentage 1.6% 5.4% 3.4% 
no contact Count 18 2 20 
Percentage 29.0% 3.6% 16.9% 
Total Count 62 56 118 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 18.511, v = 5, p = 0.002, u 
 
 
Question 7 
 
 Intention to establish contact with Brussels if 
this is not already the case 
Trade Unions & Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta  Ireland 
 Yes Count 6 0 6 
Percentage 33.3% .0% 30.0% 
No Count 12 2 14 
Percentage 66.7% 100.0% 70.0% 
Total Count 18 2 20 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.952, v = 1, p = 0.329, u 
 
 
Question 8 
 
Type of intended contact with Brussels 
Trade Unions & Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Rely on umbrella group 
based in Brussels 
Count 2 2 4 
  Percentage 28.6% 28.6% 28.6% 
Send members to 
Brussels periodically 
Count 1 1 2 
Percentage 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 
Online networking Count 3 3 6 
 Percentage 42.9% 42.9% 42.9% 
Other means Count 1 1 2 
Percentage 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 
Total Count 7 7 14 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 < 0.00005, v = 3, p = 1.000, u 
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Question 9 
 
 Attempts to access EU funds 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 23 7 30 
Percentage 60.5% 20.6% 41.7% 
No Count 15 27 42 
Percentage 39.5% 79.4% 58.3% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 11.776, v = 1, p = 0.001  
 
 
Question 10 
 
Success achieved in obtaining EU funds 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes in 1 project Count 6 2 8 
Percentage 25.0% 28.6% 25.8% 
Yes in more than 1 less than 5 
projects 
Count 6 4 10 
Percentage 25.0% 57.1% 32.3% 
Yes in 5 projects or more Count 4 1 5 
Percentage 16.7% 14.3% 16.1% 
No Count 8 0 8 
Percentage 33.3% .0% 25.8% 
Total Count 24 7 31 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 4.115, v = 3, p = 0.249, u 
 
 
Question 11 
 
 Intention  to try again to access EU funds if unsuccessful 
in the past 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 17 3 20 
Percentage 70.8% 42.9% 64.5% 
No Count 7 4 11 
Percentage 29.2% 57.1% 35.5% 
Total Count 24 7 31 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.853, v = 1, p = 0.173, u 
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Question 12 
 
 Use of external advice to access EU funds 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 16 7 23 
Percentage 64.0% 38.9% 53.5% 
No Count 9 11 20 
Percentage 36.0% 61.1% 46.5% 
Total Count 25 18 43 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 2.652, v = 1, p = 0.103 
 
 
Question 13 
 
 Sources of external advice sought by organisations 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Government agencies Count 12 4 16 
Percentage 30.8% 21.1% 27.6% 
Independent experts Count 5 3 8 
Percentage 12.8% 15.8% 13.8% 
Other domestic NGOs Count 1 3 4 
Percentage 2.6% 15.8% 6.9% 
Other European NGOs Count 5 2 7 
Percentage 12.8% 10.5% 12.1% 
Other means Count 16 7 23 
Percentage 41.0% 36.8% 39.7% 
Total Count 39 19 58 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.871, v = 4, p = 0.424, u 
 
 
Question 14 
 
 Participation in EU related activities both 
domestically and abroad 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 27 31 58 
Percentage 73.0% 91.2% 81.7% 
No Count 10 3 13 
Percentage 27.0% 8.8% 18.3% 
Total Count 37 34 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.925, v = 1, p = 0.048, u 
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Question 15 
 
The rate of participation in EU related activities 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Increased Count 11 14 25 
 Percentage 28.9% 41.2% 34.7% 
Remained Stable Count 11 15 26 
Percentage 28.9% 44.1% 36.1% 
Decreased Count 5 2 7 
Percentage 13.2% 5.9% 9.7% 
Not Applicable Count 11 3 14 
Percentage 28.9% 8.8% 19.4% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 6.631, v = 3, p = 0.085, u 
 
 
Question 16 
 
 The European dimension has been integrated within 
the events of the organisation 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes 
 
Count 24 30 54 
Percentage 63.2% 88.2% 75.0% 
No Count 14 4 18 
Percentage 36.8% 11.8% 25.0% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 6.019, v = 1, p = 0.045, u 
 
 
Question 17 
 
Participation in domestic for a that discuss EU 
legislation 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 
 
Yes Count 31 23 54 
Percentage 81.6% 67.6% 75.0% 
No Count 7 11 18 
Percentage 18.4% 32.4% 25.0% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.858, v = 1, p = 0.173  
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Question 18 
 
 Participation in any coordination entities that bring 
together governmental and non-governmental bodies 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 26 13 39 
Percentage 68.4% 38.2% 54.2% 
No Count 12 21 33 
Percentage 31.6% 61.8% 45.8% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.659, v = 1, p = 0.010  
 
 
Question 19 
 
Intention to start forming part of a coordinating entity, if 
this is not already the case 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 4 1 5 
Percentage 30.8% 5.0% 15.2% 
No Count 9 19 28 
Percentage 69.2% 95.0% 84.8% 
Total Count 13 20 33 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 4.070, v = 1, p = 0.044, u 
 
 
Question 20 
 
 Preferred style of negotiations 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Competitive Count 2 0 2 
Percentage 5.3% .0% 2.8% 
Consensus Count 3 9 12 
Percentage 7.9% 27.3% 16.9% 
Compromise Count 16 2 18 
Percentage 42.1% 6.1% 25.4% 
Depends on the 
situation 
Count 17 22 39 
Percentage 44.7% 66.7% 54.9% 
Total Count 38 33 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 16.258, v = 3, p = 0.001, u 
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Question 21 
 
 Teaming up with other domestic organisations to 
solidify voice 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 21 19 40 
Percentage 55.3% 55.9% 55.6% 
No Count 17 15 32 
Percentage 44.7% 44.1% 44.4% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.003, v = 1, p = 0.958 
 
 
Question 22 
  
 Involvement in Private-Public Partnerships   
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes, on 1 occasion Count 1 0 1 
Percentage 2.6% .0% 1.4% 
Yes, in more than 1 but less than 
5 occasions 
Count 7 8 15 
Percentage 18.4% 25.0% 21.4% 
Yes, in 5 occasions or more Count 3 1 4 
Percentage 7.9% 3.1% 5.7% 
No Count 27 23 50 
Percentage 71.1% 71.9% 71.4% 
Total Count 38 32 70 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.886, v = 3, p = 0.596, u 
 
 
Question 23 
 
The EU enhanced the role of the individual organisation in the process of domestic policy-making 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U Test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
  Malta 2.34 1.097 1.98 2.70 644.000 0.981 
  Ireland 2.32 0.843 2.03 2.62   
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Question 24 
 
The EU has been instrumental in accentuating the culture  of social dialogue in domestic affairs 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean Mann-
Whitney U 
test 
P 
value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 Malta 3.05 0.868 2.77 3.34 448.000 0.031 
 Ireland 2.55 1.063 2.17 2.92   
 
Question 25 
 
The EU induces domestic organisations to act more cohesively at the national level 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 Malta 2.76 0.971 2.44 3.08 397.500 0.003 
 Ireland 2.00 1.073 1.63 2.37   
 
 
Question 26 
 
 
The EU exerts more pressure on national government to seek more participation 
from domestic groups in policy-making 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.76 0.971 2.44 3.08 451.500 0.032 
 Ireland 2.33 0.736 2.07 2.59   
 
Question 27 
 
Participation in any of the European Commission’s 
working groups 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 15 13 28 
Percentage 39.5% 38.2% 38.9% 
No Count 23 21 44 
Percentage 60.5% 61.8% 61.1% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.012, v = 1, p = 0.914 
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Question 28 
 
 Submission of feedback to draft legislation issued by 
the European Commission 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 19 28 47 
Percentage 50.0% 82.4% 65.3% 
No Count 19 6 25 
Percentage 50.0% 17.6% 34.7% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 8.287, v = 1, p = 0.004  
 
Question 29 
 
 Engagement in consultation processes led by the 
European Economic and Social Committee 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 12 15 27 
Percentage 32.4% 45.5% 38.6% 
No Count 25 18 43 
Percentage 67.6% 54.5% 61.4% 
Total Count 37 33 70 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.248, v = 1, p = 0.264 
Question 30 
 
 Affiliation to any European federation 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 27 32 59 
Percentage 71.1% 94.1% 81.9% 
No Count 11 2 13 
Percentage 28.9% 5.9% 18.1% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 6.452, v = 1, p = 0.011  
 
Question 31 
 
 Intention of affiliation to any European federation, if this 
is not already the case 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 6 0 6 
Percentage 54.5% .0% 46.2% 
No Count 5 2 7 
Percentage 45.5% 100.0% 53.8% 
Total Count 11 2 13 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 2.026, v = 1, p = 0.155 
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Question 32 
 
 Reasons why not to affiliate to a European 
federation 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 No need to be part of      
Euro federation 
Count 2 1 3 
Percentage 40.0% 33.3% 37.5% 
focusing on domestic   
issues is a priority 
Count 2 2 4 
Percentage 40.0% 66.7% 50.0% 
Other reasons Count 1 0 1 
Percentage 20.0% .0% 12.5% 
Total Count 5 3 8 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.889, v = 2, p = 0.641 
 
 
Question 33 
 
 Members of domestic organisations holding executive 
responsibilities within European federations 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 13 11 24 
Percentage 34.2% 33.3% 33.8% 
No Count 25 22 47 
 Percentage 65.8% 66.7% 66.2% 
Total Count 38 33 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.006, v = 1, p = 0.938 
 
 
Question 34 
 
 Engagement in lobbying with any institution of the EU   
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 17 30 47 
Percentage 44.7% 88.2% 65.3% 
No Count 21 4 25 
Percentage 55.3% 11.8% 34.7% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 14.98, v = 1, p < 0.0005  
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Question 35 
 
 European institutions targeted for lobbying purposes 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 European Commission Count 5 27 32 
Percentage 15.2% 32.1% 27.4% 
National members of EESC Count 10 12 22 
Percentage 30.3% 14.3% 18.8% 
National MEPs Count 10 27 37 
Percentage 30.3% 32.1% 31.6% 
Commissioner of home  
country 
Count 3 11 14 
Percentage 9.1% 13.1% 12.0% 
Member State holding 
Presidency of Council 
Count 1 2 3 
Percentage 3.0% 2.4% 2.6% 
Other means Count 4 5 9 
Percentage 12.1% 6.0% 7.7% 
Total Count 33 84 117 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 7.287, v = 5, p = 0.200   
 
 
 
Question 36 
 
 Reasons why certain organisations do not engage with   
EU institutions for lobbying purposes 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Domestic route of influence 
is preferred 
Count 4 1 5 
Percentage 14.8% 14.3% 14.7% 
Targeting national ministers 
who in turn voice their 
opinion at Council of 
Ministers 
Count 1 3 4 
Percentage 3.7% 42.9% 11.8% 
High cost of lobbying at     
EU level 
Count 4 0 4 
Percentage 14.8% .0% 11.8% 
No knowledge of EU 
institutional design 
Count 4 0 4 
Percentage 14.8% .0% 11.8% 
EU does not have relevance Count 2 1 3 
Percentage 7.4% 14.3% 8.8% 
Lack of administrative 
capacity 
Count 12 1 13 
Percentage 44.4% 14.3% 38.2% 
Other reasons Count 0 1 1 
Percentage .0% 14.3% 2.9% 
Total Count 27 7 34 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 14.796, v = 6, p = 0.022   
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Question 37 
 
 Identification of European partner organisations to 
cooperate over joint projects 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 13 29 42 
Percentage 34.2% 87.9% 59.2% 
No Count 25 4 29 
Percentage 65.8% 12.1% 40.8% 
Total Count 38 33 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 21.054, v = 1, p < 0.0005  
 
 
Question 38 
 
 The European regions from which partner organisations 
originate 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Southern & Mediterranean cluster Count 13 94 107 
Percentage 40.6% 22.0% 23.3% 
Central cluster Count 7 87 94 
Percentage 21.9% 20.3% 20.4% 
Northern cluster Count 12 96 108 
Percentage 37.5% 22.4% 23.5% 
Eastern cluster Count 0 151 151 
Percentage .0% 35.3% 32.8% 
Total Count 32 428 460 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 18.663, v = 3, p < 0.0005  
 
Question 39 
 
 Intention to work with European partner organisations       
if this is not already the case 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 15 1 16 
Percentage 60.0% 33.3% 57.1% 
No Count 10 2 12 
 Percentage 40.0% 66.7% 42.9% 
Total Count 25 3 28 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.778, v = 1, p = 0.378  
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Question 40 
 
 Engagement with other European partners through  
physical networking (members’ exchanges) 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 10 29 39 
Percentage 26.3% 85.3% 54.2% 
No Count 28 5 33 
 Percentage 73.7% 14.7% 45.8% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 25.142, v = 1, p < 0.0005 
 
 
Question 41 
 
 Engagement with European partners through 
virtual networking (online activity) 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 
 
Yes Count 13 29 42 
Percentage 34.2% 85.3% 58.3% 
No Count 25 5 30 
Percentage 65.8% 14.7% 41.7% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 19.266, v = 1, p < 0.0005  
 
 
Question 42 
 
EU membership affects the mind-set of the members within the organisation 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.97 0.944 2.66 3.28 586.500 0.432 
 Ireland 2.94 0.489 2.77 3.11   
 
 
Question 43 
 
The character of the organisation has been influenced by norms and practices of European federations 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.58 1.030 2.24 2.92 521.500 0.196 
 Ireland 2.36 0.603 2.15 2.58   
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Question 44 
 
 There have been changes within the organisation that 
are attributed to new ideas brought about by 
European partners 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 15 15 30 
Percentage 40.5% 44.1% 42.3% 
No Count 18 6 24 
Percentage 48.6% 17.6% 33.8% 
Don't Know Count 4 13 17 
Percentage 10.8% 38.2% 23.9% 
Total Count 37 34 71 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 10.657, v = 2, p = 0.005 
 
 
Question 45 
 
 The organisation is encouraged by the pattern of EU 
governance to change its tactics and strategy in 
domestic negotiations 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 21 5 26 
Percentage 55.3% 14.7% 36.1% 
No Count 14 17 31 
Percentage 36.8% 50.0% 43.1% 
Don't Know Count 3 12 15 
Percentage 7.9% 35.3% 20.8% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 15.362, v = 2, p < 0.0005 
 
Question 46 
Source of stimulus that instigate change in the organisation’s tactics & strategies 
Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Mann-
Whitney 
U test  p value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
European  
Funds 
Malta 3.0000 1.44914 2.3404 3.6596 32.500 0.189 
 Ireland 2.1000 1.47479 .2688 3.9312   
Consensus  
Value 
 Malta 3.2143 1.44544 2.5563 3.8722 37.500 0.324 
Ireland 2.5000 .79057 1.5184 3.4816   
Socialisation  
with partners 
Malta 3.2619 1.18974 2.7203 3.8035 36.000 0.276 
 Ireland 3.9000 .96177 2.7058 5.0942   
Positive  
Attitude 
 Malta 2.4762 .87287 2.0789 2.8735 36.000 0.276 
Ireland 3.1000 1.24499 1.5541 4.6459   
Training  
Opportunities 
 Malta 3.0476 1.04767 2.5707 3.5245 44.000 0.574 
Ireland 3.4000 1.19373 1.9178 4.8822   
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Question 47 
National culture inhibits the acquisition of new norms and values originating from a wider European 
experience 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney U 
test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.42 1.004 2.09 2.75 448.500 0.169 
 Ireland 2.07 0.923 1.72 2.42   
 
Question 48 
 
 Participation in exercises involving sharing of best practices 
with other organisations 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Domestic Organisations only Count 12 1 13 
Percentage 31.6% 2.9% 18.1% 
European Organisations only Count 2 2 4 
Percentage 5.3% 5.9% 5.6% 
Both Domestic & European 
Organisations 
Count 10 14 24 
Percentage 26.3% 41.2% 33.3% 
Domestic, European & beyond EU 
Organisations 
Count 7 6 13 
 Percentage 18.4% 17.6% 18.1% 
Not at all Count 7 11 18 
Percentage 18.4% 32.4% 25.0% 
Total Count 38 34 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 10.751, v = 4, p = 0.030  
 
Question 49 
 
Benchmarking exercises have transformation effects on the norms that shape the culture of the 
organisation 
Trade Unions and 
Employers’ 
Associations 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.67 0.784 2.36 2.98 259.500 0.584 
 Ireland 2.71 0.561 2.46 2.97   
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Appendix I 
 
Statistical findings pertaining to  
Social, Human Rights and 
Environmental Groups 
in Malta and Ireland 
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STATISTICAL CROSSTABS REGARDING 
SOCIAL/HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS 
(a.k.a. SHEGs) 
IN MALTA AND IRELAND 
 
 
Demographic question 
 
 
X
2
 = 38.91, v = 2, p < 0.0005 
 
 
 
Question 1 
 
 
The vision/mission statement incorporate a 
European dimension 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 62 32 94 
Percentage 53.9% 38.1% 47.2% 
No Count 53 52 105 
Percentage 46.1% 61.9% 52.8% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 4.87, v = 1, p = 0.027  
 
 
Question 2 
 
The inclusion of the EU dimension in the 
vision/mission statement occurred as a 
consequence of EU accession 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 19 13 32 
Percentage 27.5% 38.2% 31.1% 
No Count 50 21 71 
Percentage 72.5% 61.8% 68.9% 
Total Count 69 34 103 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.217, v = 1, p = 0.270  
 
Type of personnel engaged by interest groups 
 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups Total 
Malta  Ireland  
 volunteers only Count 63 10 73 
 Percentage 54.8% 11.9% 36.7% 
paid personnel only Count 2 5 7 
Percentage 1.7% 6.0% 3.5% 
mix of volunteers &         
paid personnel 
Count 50 69 119 
Percentage 43.5% 82.1% 59.8% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Question 3 
 
Intention to include a European dimension in 
the vision/mission statement, if this is not 
already the case 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 18 8 26 
Percentage 33.3% 15.7% 24.8% 
No Count 36 43 79 
Percentage 66.7% 84.3% 75.2% 
Total Count 54 51 105 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 4.384, v = 1, p = 0.036  
 
 
 
Question 4 
 
Responsibility of EU affairs within organisations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes, one person who is 
solely responsible 
Count 7 5 12 
Percentage 6.1% 6.0% 6.1% 
Yes, one who performs 
other tasks as well 
Count 31 11 42 
Percentage 27.0% 13.3% 21.2% 
Yes, more than one person 
responsible 
Count 24 22 46 
Percentage 20.9% 26.5% 23.2% 
No Count 53 45 98 
Percentage 46.1% 54.2% 49.5% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.571, v = 3, p = 0.134  
 
 
 
Question 5 
 
Participation in  training programmes to acquire 
necessary skills in EU affairs 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 53 19 72 
Percentage 46.1% 22.9% 36.4% 
No Count 62 64 126 
Percentage 53.9% 77.1% 63.6% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 11.208, v = 1, p = 0.001  
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Question 6 
 
The type of contact that has already been established in 
Brussels, if any 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Permanent Office in Brussels Count 3 2 5 
Percentage 1.9% 1.6% 1.8% 
Relying on umbrella Euro-
groups based in Brussels 
Count 33 39 72 
Percentage 21.2% 31.2% 25.6% 
Sending members  to Brussels 
periodically 
Count 21 22 43 
Percentage 13.5% 17.6% 15.3% 
Online networking Count 30 17 47 
Percentage 19.2% 13.6% 16.7% 
Other means Count 18 16 34 
Percentage 11.5% 12.8% 12.1% 
No contact Count 51 29 80 
Percentage 32.7% 23.2% 28.5% 
Total Count 156 125 281 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 7.154, v = 5, p = 0.209 
 
 
Question 7 
 
Intention to establish contact with Brussels if  
this is not already the case 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 25 6 31 
Percentage 47.2% 20.7% 37.8% 
No Count 28 23 51 
Percentage 52.8% 79.3% 62.2% 
Total Count 53 29 82 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.590, v = 1, p = 0.018 
 
 
Question 8 
 
Type of intended contact with Brussels 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Rely on umbrella group 
based in Brussels 
Count 5 1 6 
Percentage 17.2% 12.5% 16.2% 
Send members to 
Brussels periodically 
Count 4 1 5 
Percentage 13.8% 12.5% 13.5% 
Online networking Count 14 4 18 
Percentage 48.3% 50.0% 48.6% 
Other means Count 6 2 8 
 Percentage 20.7% 25.0% 21.6% 
Total Count 29 8 37 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.152, v = 3, p = 0.985, u 
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Question 9 
 
Attempts to access EU funds 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 69 43 112 
Percentage 60.0% 51.8% 56.6% 
No Count 46 40 86 
Percentage 40.0% 48.2% 43.4% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.317, v = 1, p = 0.251 
 
 
 
Question 10 
 
Success achieved in obtaining EU funds 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes in 1 project Count 16 9 25 
Percentage 22.9% 20.5% 21.9% 
Yes in more than 1 less than 5 
projects 
Count 26 20 46 
Percentage 37.1% 45.5% 40.4% 
Yes in 5 projects or more Count 12 6 18 
Percentage 17.1% 13.6% 15.8% 
No Count 16 9 25 
 Percentage 22.9% 20.5% 21.9% 
Total Count 70 44 114 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.815, v = 3, p = 0.846 
 
 
 
Question 11 
 
Intention to try again to access EU funds if unsuccessful 
in the past 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 44 26 70 
Percentage 74.6% 65.0% 70.7% 
No Count 15 14 29 
Percentage 25.4% 35.0% 29.3% 
Total Count 59 40 99 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.055, v = 1, p = 0.304 
 
 446 
Question 12 
 
 Use of external advice to access EU funds 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta  Ireland 
 Yes Count 70 33 103 
Percentage 73.7% 53.2% 65.6% 
No Count 25 29 54 
Percentage 26.3% 46.8% 34.4% 
Total Count 95 62 157 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 6.959, v = 1, p = 0.008  
 
 
 
Question 13 
 
 Sources of external advice sought by organisations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Government agencies Count 45 14 59 
Percentage 43.3% 28.0% 38.3% 
Independent experts Count 17 12 29 
Percentage 16.3% 24.0% 18.8% 
Other domestic NGOs Count 16 11 27 
Percentage 15.4% 22.0% 17.5% 
Other European NGOs Count 21 11 32 
Percentage 20.2% 22.0% 20.8% 
Other means Count 5 2 7 
Percentage 4.8% 4.0% 4.5% 
Total Count 104 50 154 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 4.050, v = 4, p = 0.399, u 
 
 
 
Question 14 
 
Participation in EU related activities both 
domestically and abroad 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 76 57 133 
Percentage 67.3% 70.4% 68.6% 
No Count 37 24 61 
Percentage 32.7% 29.6% 31.4% 
Total Count 113 81 194 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.212, v = 1, p = 0.645 
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Question 15 
 
 The rate of participation in EU related activities 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Increased Count 42 30 72 
Percentage 36.8% 37.5% 37.1% 
Remained Stable Count 31 24 55 
Percentage 27.2% 30.0% 28.4% 
Decreased Count 4 7 11 
Percentage 3.5% 8.8% 5.7% 
Not Applicable Count 37 19 56 
Percentage 32.5% 23.8% 28.9% 
Total Count 114 80 194 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.648, v = 3, p = 0.302, u 
 
 
 
Question 16 
 
The European dimension has been integrated within 
the events of the organisation 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 74 42 116 
Percentage 64.9% 53.2% 60.1% 
No Count 40 37 77 
Percentage 35.1% 46.8% 39.9% 
Total Count 114 79 193 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 2.686, v = 1, p = 0.101 
 
 
 
Question 17 
 
Participation in domestic fora that discuss                
EU legislation 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 55 51 106 
Percentage 48.2% 60.7% 53.5% 
No Count 59 33 92 
Percentage 51.8% 39.3% 46.5% 
Total Count 114 84 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.023, v = 1, p = 0.082  
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Question 18 
 
Participation in any coordination entities that bring 
together governmental and non-governmental bodies 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 44 31 75 
Percentage 38.3% 37.3% 37.9% 
No Count 71 52 123 
Percentage 61.7% 62.7% 62.1% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.017, v = 1, p = 0.896 
 
 
 
Question 19 
 
Intention to start forming part of a coordinating entity, if 
this is not already the case 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 33 7 40 
Percentage 46.5% 13.7% 32.8% 
No Count 38 44 82 
Percentage 53.5% 86.3% 67.2% 
Total Count 71 51 122 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 14.45, v = 1, p < 0.0005 
 
 
 
Question 20 
 
Preferred style of negotiations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Competitive Count 4 1 5 
Percentage 3.7% 1.4% 2.7% 
Consensus Count 23 25 48 
Percentage 21.1% 33.8% 26.2% 
Compromise Count 20 3 23 
Percentage 18.3% 4.1% 12.6% 
Laissez-Faire Count 1 0 1 
Percentage .9% .0% .5% 
Depends on the situation Count 61 45 106 
Percentage 56.0% 60.8% 57.9% 
Total Count 109 74 183 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 11.594, v = 4, p = 0.021, u 
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Question 21 
 
Teaming up with other domestic organisations to solidify 
voice 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 56 47 103 
Percentage 48.7% 57.3% 52.3% 
No Count 59 35 94 
Percentage 51.3% 42.7% 47.7% 
Total Count 115 82 197 
  Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.426, v = 1, p = 0.232 
 
 
 
Question 22 
 
Involvement in Private-Public Partnerships   
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes, on 1 occasion Count 9 5 14 
Percentage 7.8% 6.0% 7.1% 
Yes, in more than 1 but less than 5 
occasions 
Count 19 10 29 
Percentage 16.5% 12.0% 14.6% 
Yes, in 5 occasions or more Count 8 9 17 
Percentage 7.0% 10.8% 8.6% 
No Count 79 59 138 
Percentage 68.7% 71.1% 69.7% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.768, v = 3, p = 0.622 
 
 
 
Question 23 
 
The EU enhanced the role of the individual organisation in the process of domestic policy-making 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean  
Mann-
Whitney U 
test p value Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
Malta 2.43 1.081 2.23 2.63 4396.000 0.658 
Ireland 2.50 1.055 2.27 2.73   
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Question 24 
 
The EU has been instrumental in accentuating the culture  of civil dialogue in domestic affairs 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney U 
test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 3.01 0.907 2.84 3.18 2588.000 0.005 
 Ireland 2.64 0.885 2.45 2.84   
 
 
 
Question 25 
 
The EU induces domestic organisations to act more cohesively at the national level 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney U 
test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.62 0.933 2.45 2.79 4187.000 0.331 
 Ireland 2.47 0.985 2.25 2.69   
 
 
Question 26 
 
The EU exerts more pressure on national government to seek more participation from domestic 
groups in policy-making 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney U 
test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.77 0.810 2.62 2.92 3597.500 0.017 
 Ireland 2.42 1.026 2.19 2.65   
 
 
 
Question 27 
 
 Participation in any of the European Commission’s 
working groups 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 16 15 31 
Percentage 13.9% 17.9% 15.6% 
No Count 99 69 168 
Percentage 86.1% 82.1% 84.4% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.574, v = 1, p = 0.449 
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Question 28 
 
Submission of feedback to draft legislation issued by the 
European Commission 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 29 28 57 
Percentage 25.2% 33.3% 28.6% 
No Count 86 56 142 
Percentage 74.8% 66.7% 71.4% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.564, v = 1, p = 0.211 
 
Question 29 
 
Engagement in consultation processes led by the 
European Economic and Social Committee 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta .Ireland 
 Yes Count 10 24 34 
 Percentage 8.7% 28.6% 17.1% 
No Count 105 60 165 
Percentage 91.3% 71.4% 82.9% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 13.537, v = 1, p < 0.0005  
 
 
Question 30 
 
Affiliation to any European federation 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 49 39 88 
Percentage 43.0% 47.0% 44.7% 
No Count 65 44 109 
  Percentage 57.0% 53.0% 55.3% 
Total Count 114 83 197 
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.312, v = 1, p = 0.577 
 
Question 31 
 
Intention of affiliation to any European federation, if this 
is not already the case 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 37 19 56 
Percentage 56.9% 45.2% 52.3% 
No Count 28 23 51 
Percentage 43.1% 54.8% 47.7% 
Total Count 65 42 107 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.397, v = 1, p = 0.237 
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Question 32 
 
Reasons why not to affiliate to a European federation 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 No need to be part of a   
Euro federation 
Count 15 4 19 
Percentage 34.1% 14.3% 26.4% 
high monetary cost of 
affiliation 
Count 13 8 21 
Percentage 29.5% 28.6% 29.2% 
focusing on domestic  
issues is a priority 
Count 12 14 26 
Percentage 27.3% 50.0% 36.1% 
affiliation is against     
statute 
Count 1 0 1 
Percentage 2.3% .0% 1.4% 
Other reasons Count 3 2 5 
Percentage 6.8% 7.1% 6.9% 
Total Count 44 28 72 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 5.635, v = 4, p = 0.228 
 
 
Question 33 
 
Members of domestic organisations holding executive 
responsibilities within European federations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 24 13 37 
Percentage 21.4% 17.1% 19.7% 
No Count 88 63 151 
Percentage 78.6% 82.9% 80.3% 
Total Count 112 76 188 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.535, v = 1, p = 0.464 
 
 
Question 34 
 
Engagement in lobbying with any institution of the EU   
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 41 35 76 
Percentage 35.7% 42.2% 38.4% 
No Count 74 48 122 
Percentage 64.3% 57.8% 61.6% 
Total Count 115 83 198 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.866, v = 1, p = 0.352 
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Question 35 
 
 European institutions targeted for lobbying purposes 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 European Commission Count 19 24 43 
Percentage 32.2% 29.3% 30.5% 
National members of EESC Count 3 13 16 
Percentage 5.1% 15.9% 11.3% 
National MEPs Count 21 25 46 
Percentage 35.6% 30.5% 32.6% 
Commissioner of home  
country 
Count 4 7 11 
 Percentage 6.8% 8.5% 7.8% 
Member State holding  
Presidency of Council 
Count 0 9 9 
Percentage .0% 11.0% 6.4% 
Other means Count 12 4 16 
Percentage 20.3% 4.9% 11.3% 
Total Count 59 82 141 
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 17.717, v = 5, p = 0.003  
 
Question 36 
 
 Reasons why certain organisations do not engage with 
EU institutions for lobbying purposes 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Domestic route of influence    
is preferred 
Count 22 24 46 
Percentage 19.5% 24.0% 21.6% 
Targeting national ministers 
who in turn voice their 
opinion at the Council of 
Ministers 
Count 13 10 23 
Percentage 11.5% 10.0% 10.8% 
High cost of lobbying at        
EU level 
Count 12 17 29 
Percentage 10.6% 17.0% 13.6% 
No knowledge of EU 
institutional design 
Count 9 8 17 
Percentage 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
EU does not have      
relevance 
Count 11 9 20 
Percentage 9.7% 9.0% 9.4% 
Lack of administrative   
capacity 
Count 41 27 68 
Percentage 36.3% 27.0% 31.9% 
Other reasons Count 5 5 10 
Percentage 4.4% 5.0% 4.7% 
Total Count 113 100 213 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.702, v = 6, p = 0.717   
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Question 37 
 
 Identification of European partner organisations to 
cooperate over joint projects 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 58 46 103 
Percentage 49.6% 54.8% 51.8% 
No Count 57 38 96 
Percentage 50.4% 45.2% 48.2% 
Total Count 115 84 199 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.525, v = 1, p = 0.469  
 
 
Question 38 
 
 The European regions from which partner organisations 
originate 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Southern & Mediterranean cluster Count 95 67 162 
Percentage 26.5% 24.2% 25.5% 
Central cluster Count 68 63 131 
 Percentage 18.9% 22.7% 20.6% 
Northern cluster Count 84 75 159 
Percentage 23.4% 27.1% 25.0% 
Eastern cluster Count 112 72 184 
Percentage 31.2% 26.0% 28.9% 
Total Count 359 277 636 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 3.725, v = 3, p = 0.293 
 
 
Question 39 
 
Intention to work with European partner organisations    
if this is not already the case 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 47 24 71 
Percentage 79.7% 68.6% 75.5% 
No Count 12 11 23 
Percentage 20.3% 31.4% 24.5% 
Total Count 59 35 94 
 Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.462, v = 1, p = 0.227 
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 Question 40 
 
Engagement with other European partners through 
physical networking (members’ exchanges) 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 43 33 76 
Percentage 38.1% 40.7% 39.2% 
No Count 70 48 118 
Percentage 61.9% 59.3% 60.8% 
Total Count 113 81 194 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.143, v = 1, p = 0.705  
 
 
Question 41 
 
 Engagement with European partners through 
virtual networking (online activity) 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 57 46 101 
Percentage 50.9% 56.8% 52.3% 
No Count 55 35 92 
Percentage 49.6% 43.2% 47.7% 
Total Count 112 81 193 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 1.112, v = 1, p = 0.292 
 
 
Question 42 
 
EU membership affects the mind-set of the members within the organisation 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney U 
test P value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.65 1.047 2.45 2.84 4485.500 0.840 
 Ireland 2.69 1.001 2.46 2.91   
 
 
Question 43 
 
 
The character of the organisation has been influenced by norms and practices of European federations 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney 
U test 
p 
value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.16 1.172 1.94 2.38 4469.000 0.804 
 Ireland 2.17 0.991 1.95 2.40   
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Question 44 
 
 There have been changes within the organisation that 
are attributed to new ideas brought about by 
European partners 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 48 33 81 
Percentage 42.5% 39.8% 41.3% 
No Count 54 26 80 
Percentage 47.8% 31.3% 40.8% 
Don't Know Count 11 24 35 
Percentage 9.7% 28.9% 17.9% 
Total Count 113 83 196 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 13.122, v = 2, p = 0.001  
 
Question 45 
 
 The organisation is encouraged by the pattern of EU 
governance to change its tactics and strategy in 
domestic negotiations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Yes Count 50 31 81 
Percentage 43.9% 37.3% 41.1% 
No Count 43 36 79 
Percentage 37.7% 43.4% 40.1% 
Don't Know Count 21 16 37 
Percentage 18.4% 19.3% 18.8% 
Total Count 114 83 197 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 0.639, v = 2, p = 0.639 
 
Question 46 
Sources of stimulus that instigate change in the organisation’s tactics & strategies 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean  Mann-
Whitney U 
Test 
p 
value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
European  
Funds 
Malta 3.8396 1.26253 3.4916 4.1876 617.0000 0.050 
Ireland 3.3065 1.20884 2.8630 3.7499   
Consensus  
Value 
Malta 2.6132 1.17523 2.2893 2.9371 661.0000 0.131 
Ireland 3.1129 1.37058 2.6102 3.6156   
Socialisation  
with Partners 
Malta 3.1038 1.14924 2.7870 3.4205 739.0000 0.437 
Ireland 3.3226 1.30095 2.8454 3.7998   
Positive  
Attitude 
Malta 2.4528 1.02029 2.1716 2.7341 689.0000 0.210 
Ireland 2.7097 .99812 2.3436 3.0758   
Training 
opportunities 
Malta 2.9906 1.15813 2.6713 3.3098 632.5000 0.075 
 Ireland 2.5484 .89773 2.2191 2.8777   
 457 
Question 47 
  
National culture inhibits the acquisition of new norms and values originating from a wider European  
Experience 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean Mann-
Whitney U 
test p value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 Malta 2.25 0.944 2.07 2.43 4228.000 0.812 
 Ireland 2.27 1.008 2.04 2.50   
 
 
Question 48 
 
 Participation in exercises involving sharing of best practices 
with other organisations 
Social, Human rights and 
Environmental Groups 
Total Malta Ireland 
 Domestic Organisations only Count 22 28 50 
Percentage 19.3% 33.7% 25.4% 
European Organisations only Count 13 1 14 
Percentage 11.4% 1.2% 7.1% 
Organisations beyond the EU only Count 3 1 4 
Percentage 2.6% 1.2% 2.0% 
Both Domestic & European 
Organisations 
Count 26 17 43 
Percentage 22.8% 20.5% 21.8% 
Domestic, European & beyond EU 
Organisations 
Count 19 28 47 
Percentage 16.7% 33.7% 23.9% 
Not at all Count 31 8 39 
Percentage 27.2% 9.6% 19.8% 
Total Count 114 83 197 
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
X
2
 = 24.916, v = 5, p < 0.0005  
 
 
Question 49  
 
 
Benchmarking exercises have transformation effects on the norms that shape the culture of the  
Organisation 
Social, Human rights 
and Environmental 
Groups 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mann-
Whitney U 
test p value Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Malta 2.90 0.744 2.73 3.07 2840.500 0.989 
 Ireland 2.89 0.815 2.70 3.08   
 
